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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an investigation into two British policy preferences in the 
sovereignty discussions between Britain and Argentina in the late 1960s. 
Chapter I examines the current political impasse between Britain and 
Argentina over sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. It then reviews the 
British effort to co-operate with Argentina to solve this territorial dispute 
in 1966-68. The sharply contrasting British attitudes to the same issue 
bring out the central question of this thesis: why did British conduct of the 
Falklands policy change from non-cooperation before the end of 1966, to 
cooperation with Argentina throughout 1967-68, and return to non- 
cooperation at the end of 1968? 
Chapter 2 explores the issue from different perspectives in the 
published literature. As it concludes that these perspectives are not 
contingent enough, a call for an alternative explanation is therefore 
legitimised. Chapter 3 introduces and examines prospect theory. Chapter 4 
tests four hypotheses to test the validity of prospect theory. Chapter 5 
concludes with the implications and an assessment of future possibilities. 
This thesis argues that the two turning-point policy preferences in 
1966-68 were caused by the exercise of framing, the explanatory variable 
of prospect theory. The British conduct of the Falklands dispute in the late 
1960s can be seen as largely pragmatic. In the longer term, framing may 
continue to have influence on the British attitude to this issue. 
Theoretically, this thesis illustrates a case of framing parsed into the 
domain of frame and motivated framing. With this methodological design, 
prospect theory proves a valuable tool to explain foreign policy decision- 
making. It can be seen as a dual-causal framework consisting of the 
models of bounded rationality and cognitive psychology. Nevertheless, 
there is a need to differentiate the influence of a reference point from that 
of motivated framing. Taking loss avoidance in application of prospect 
theory is also shown to be problematic. 
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In the years since the 1982 military conflict with Argentina, the attitude of the 
British Government on the issue of the Falkland Islands has been perceived as having 
progressively hardened! This contrasts sharply with the attitude of the British 
Government at the time of the sovereignty negotiations with Argentina from 1966 to 
1968. This thesis explores the British attitude characterising this period. 
Chapter I is divided into two main sections. The first section explains the current 
uncertainties surrounding the Falklands waters because of this sovereignty dispute. 
The second provides an account of British behaviour between 1966 and 1968, a 
period during which Britain became more accommodating towards the Argentines on 
the issue of the Falkland Islands. This contrast in the pattern of state behaviour raises 
two fundamental questions: why did Britain change its position from primarily 
supporting the wishes of the Falklands Islanders to one in which the interests of 
Britain became the guiding principle in 1966-68? And why did Britain reverse this 
policy shift at the end of 1968? These two questions further formulate the basis of this 
thesis: Why were there two British turning-point policy preferences on the issue of the 
Falkland Islands between 1966 and 1968? 
Two key words have to be defined from the outset. The term "turning-point" 
refers to two respective policy preferences that deviate significantly from each other. 2 
In this case, the term represents a sharp contrast of attitude in the whole British 
conduct of the Falklands policy. It shows that Britain changed from non-cooperation 
before 1966 to cooperation in 1966-68, and back to non-cooperation again in late 
1968. The effects of the two policy changes were dramatic. They made the Argentines 
see the door to sovereignty negotiations open "suddenly after being tightly closed for 
over a century, and then shut again". 3 The word "policy" in this thesis is a "planned 
policy". It involves "the course of action which the [British] government really intends 
to implement". 4 "Policy preference", on the other hand, is defined as the sub-unit of 
' Interviews with Rex Hunt, former Falkland Island Governor, on 14 June 1998 and David Taylor, 
former Chief executive of the Falkland Island Government on II December 1998. 
2 Yehudit Auerbach (1989) "Legitimation for turning-point decisions in foreign policy: Israel vis-i-vis 
Germany 1952 and Egypt 1977", Review ofInternational Studies, 15,4, p. 329 
' Peter Beck (1988) The Falkland Islands as an international problem (London & NY. Routledge), p. 
106. 
" John Baylis (1977) "Introduction", in John Baylis (ed. ), British defence policy in a changing world 
(London: Croom Helm), p. 12. 
decision-making reached immediately after policy evaluation and/or revision. It can 
be seen as one step prior to the "planned policy". 5 Admittedly, a government may 
change attitude. But the change is worth exploring if it happens dramatically within a 
fairly short period. For this thesis, the British conduct of the Falklands policy in 1966- 
68 is a good case in point. 
1. A litany of uncertainties after the war 
Argentina's national appeal 
The dispute over the Falkland Islands between Argentina and Britain can be 
traced back to 1833, when Britain landed a military force, declaring its repossession 
of the territory. 6 Adding to the complexity is the dubious status of the sovereignty that 
can be traced further back to 1770, when Spain evacuated the British settlement on 
the Falkland Islands. 7 Although the basis of Britain's argument in the past one and a 
half centuries has changed from the principle of prior discovery to self- 
determination, 8 the change symbolises little substance from the Argentine point of 
view. 9 For most Argentines, the validity of their claim is part of their national myth. 10 
The Falkland Islands indisputably belong to them, because Argentina inherited the 
claims that Spain had abandoned. " In September 1999, Gallup ofArgentina in a 
national opinion poll showed that up to 73% of those consulted thought that the issue 
of the Falkland Islands remained "importanf'. 12 Their contrasting perspective on 
sovereignty poses a mounting challenge to the British claim, to the extent that the war 
in 1982 did not solve this historical Problem. 13 A request for "restitution" of the 
Falklands was entered into the 1994 Argentine constitution, 14 which includes the 
5 A. Callincos (1986) Ideology andforeign policy: Problems ofcomparative conceptualisation (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell), p. 108. 
6 Colin Gross (1968) Thefall ofthe British empire: 1918-1968 (London: Hodder & Stoughton), p. 132. 
7 Friedrich V. Kratochwil (1985) Peace and disputed sovereignty Reflections on conflict over territory 
(London: University Press of America), p. 5 1. 
,B ritish Government (19 8 5) Fa Wand Islands: Fifth reportfrom th e Foreign Affairs Comm ittee, Cmnd. 
9447 (London: HMSO), p. 4; Paul Eddy, Magnus Linklater and Peter Gillman (1982) The Falklands 
war (London: Andre Deutsch), p. 40. 
9 Ruben M. Perina (199 1) "The view from Buenos Aires", in Wayne S. Smith (ed. ), Toward resolution? 
The FalklandslMalvinas dispute (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publisher), p. 50. 
10 Lucio Garcia del Solar (1990) Argentina and the United Kingdom: From war to peace 
(Southampton: University of Southampton), p. 11. 
11 Peter Calvert (1983) "Sovereignty and the Falklands crisis", International Affairs, 52,3, pp. 408- 10. 
12 La Nacion, 14 September 1999. 
13 Jeffrey D. Myhre (1983) "ritle to the Falklands-Malvinas under international law", Millennium, 12, 
1, p. 34. 
"' Patricio Gavan Connolly (1994) (trans. ) The constitution ofthe Argentine nation 1994 (Buenos Aires: 
2 
Falkland Islands in the boundaries of the Argentine 23d state, Tierra del Fuego. 15 
If the war has taught any lesson to the Argentine elite, it is that the leaders have 
to become more realistic about their route to the ultimate goal. According to Carlos 
Menem, the former Argentine President, Argentina's strategy was to "initiate a 
constructive dialogue with the British government in order to create a bilateral 
framework", so that there would be room for cooperation between both countries "to 
resolve the territorial dispute in peace through negotiations". 16 Indeed, the diplomatic 
strategy taken by the previous Menem's Administration was impressive. Menem 
tactfully pledged that Argentina was not going to ask Britain "to give the Malvinas 
bacle', but simply invited Britain to "fulfil" the United Nations' request to "open a 
dialogue" about the issue of sovereignty, and that was that. 17 He also advocated the 
idea of shared sovereignty, appearing intent on boasting of being a true democracy 
capable of accommodating the islanders' way of life. 18 And indeed, his five-day visit 
to London in autumn 1998 was described in the media on both sides as a success. The 
Daily Telegraph saw the president's laying of a wreath at St Paul's Cathedral 
Falklands Memorial as the "true act of reconciliation". 19 Some newspapers in South 
America took the act as pushing the British-Argentine links to the highest level 
throughout the recent diplomatic history. 20 
However, what Britain regards as "improved relations" is seen by Argentina as an 
opportunity to advance its territorial claim. Undeniably, Menem's visit together with 
all the other signs of improved relations constituted Menem's measured actions to box 
Britain in at talks about the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. As Menem clarified 
in 1998, "Let there be no doubt. We are closer than ever now to opening a dialogue 
that will lead to an accord on the Malvinas [Falkland Islands] it . 
21 
Latin American Linguistic Service); The Financial 71mes, 8 April 1997. 
15 Charles Maechling Jr. (199 1) "Confidence building and the future", in Wayne S. Smith (ed. ), Toward 
resolution? The FalklandslMalvinas dispute (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), p. 109. 
16 Carlos Floria (199 1) "The Argentine perspective", in Wayne S. Smith (ed. ), Toward resolution? Yhe 
FalklandslUalvinas dispute (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), p. 8 1, p. 10 1. 
" The Financial 27mes, 8 October 1998. 
18 Peter Beck (199 1) "Fisheries conservation: A basis for a special Anglo-Argentine relationship? " The 
World Today, 47,7, p. 102; The Daily Telegraph, 3 January 1998; The Economist, 29 May 1999; The 
Ylmes, 2 January 1997; 21 January 1997; 29 October 1998. 
19 The Daily Telegraph, 28 October 1998; Falkland Islands Association (FIA) (I 999a) Falkland Islands 
Newsletter, April, no. 74, p. 4 
20 La Nacion, 22 September 1999; Mercopress, II September 1998. 
21 FIA (I 999a) Falkland Islands Newsletter, p. 6. 
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The above remark was no surprise. The Argentine claim has not gone away 
despite the military defeat in 1982. The image that Menem has conjured up in the eyes 
of the world is that Argentina is different now-it has been both patient and practical 
about the issue of the Falkland Islands for the last two decades. Therefore, as the 
Argentine logic goes, Argentina is entitled to negotiate on the issue of sovereignty, 
and now it is Britain's move. 
Britain's intransigence on sovereignty 
To the disappointment of Argentina, Britain has been taking a tough approach 
towards the issue of the Falkland Islands since the war in 1982. It has been emphatic 
that the idea that a "solution" has to be found is a myth of Argentine making. 22 
Argentina must accept that the nature of this issue has been altered since the war in 
23 1982. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is willing to discuss 
with Argentina the general problems relating to the Falkland Islands as broadly as 
possible-fishing, 24 oil, or tourism. Britain even supports Argentina's leadership in 
the forthcoming Southwest Multilateral Fisheries Agreement, in which the Falkland 
Islands is a fellow participant. 25 These discussions, however, can only be conducted 
under a so-called "umbrella7, in which sovereignty is set aside. 26 
This marked reluctance to include sovereignty in the talks has not been relaxed 
since the Labour Party came into office in 1997.27 Whether the Blair Government will 
change the conduct of Falklands policy in the future remains to be seen, but, like its 
predecessors, the incumbent Government has been exceedingly sensitive to any 
suggestion that sovereignty be included on the agenda . 
28 With Argentina's change of 
government in December 1999, for instance, the British Minister of State at the FCO, 
22 Sukey Cameron (1998a) "Speech to the South Atlantic Council Conference-Falkland Islands 
update", London, 3 February, <http: //www. falklands. gov. fk/9h. htm> 
23 FIA (1999a) Falklandislands Newsletter, p. 4; Hansard (Commons) col. 555,14 July 1993; Hansard 
records after November 1988 are on the website and they are not arranged in the order of volumes. The 
referencing of them in this thesis after November 1988 as a result does not specify the number of each 
volume. 
24 Both Governments issued ajoint statement declaring the conservation of fish stocks around the 
Falkland Islands in Madrid on 15 February 1990. See British Government (1992) "The Falkland 
Islands", Cmnd. 1824 (London: HMSO), p. 5. 
2' Hansard (Commons) col. 179,28 April 1999. 
26 Walter Little (1988) "Anglo-Argentine relations and the management of the Falklands question", in 
Peter Byrd (ed. ) British foreign policy under Thatcher (Oxford: Philip Allan/St. Martin), p. 142. 
27 The Times, 23 April 1997. 
28 FIA (I 998b) Falkland Islands Newsletter, June, no. 72, p. 4; Hansard (Lords) col. 1613,3 0 July 
1998. 
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John Battle, was quick to reiterate that the change in no way weakened Britain's 
commitment to protecting its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. 29 
Conceivably then, although 1999 witnessed the bilateral talks held officially 
between the islanders and Argentina, and a Falklands/Argentine relations'pact was 
signed, 30 these events did not signify a fundamental change in British official 
sentiment towards the dispute. The immediate reason for Britain's engagement in the 
talks lay in the sudden halt of the air service from Chile to the Falkland Islands. In 
March 1999, Chile protested against Britain's detention of General Pinochet and 
discontinued the weekly flight to the Falkland Islands. 31 When the only air link of the 
Falkland Islands with the outside world was suspended, Argentina seized the 
opportunity to offer an alternative air route, linking Stanley, capital of the Falklands, 
to Buenos Aires. It even promised that there would be no suspension for any political 
reason. 32 The talks bore fruit. On 14 June 1999, a joint statement was signed between 
Britain and Argentina. 33 On 16 October, the first flight from Argentina landed at 
Mount Pleasant, the international airport of the Falkland Islands. 34 
The second reason for the talks was the increase of illegal fishing within the 
Falkland Islands' Fisheries Protection Zone. The revenue from fishing licences has 
been the mainstay of the Falklands economy. 35 To keep economic sustainability, 
conservation of the two main species, illex and loligo, subsequently becomes a major 
concern of the islanders. However, there has been a consistent threat from Argentines' 
over-fishing. 36 Reports show that the Argentine Government often underestimates "the 
need for additional conservation measures". 37 Argentina is also said to impose 
economic sanctions on foreign companies involved in fishing around the Falklands' 
waters. 38 On the one hand, although Argentina and Britain both signed the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement in December 1995, there has been little progress so far. Neither 
Britain nor Argentina has ratified the Agreement, and even ratification cannot assure a 
29 Mercopress, 12 December 1999. 
30 Penguin News, 26 July 1999; The Times, 24 May 1999. 
31 Hansard (Commons) col. 180,28 April 1999; The Economist, 29 May 1999. 
32 Penguin News, 4 June 1999. 
33 Ibid., 16 July 1999. 
34 Ibid., 15 October 1999. 
3' Hansard (Commons) cols. 177-9,28 April 1999; col. 250,29 April 1999. 
36 The Financial Tmes, 6 February 1998. 
3' Hansard (Commons) col. 867,18 May 1999. 
39 Statement by Falkland Island Legislative Council (1998) http: //www. falklands. gov. fk/9q. htm> 
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potential commitment. 39 In January 2000, for instance, two Argentine liners were 
spotted illegally poaching in South Georgia. 40 On the other hand, increasing poaching 
activities risk the depletion of the stocks in the Falklands' waters. In 1999, poaching 
by Taiwanese vessels probably accounted for over 30,000 tonnes-a quarter of overall 
harvest. 41 Since the multilateral framework proves to be of limited value and the 
Falklands Government alone cannot deal with poaching effectively, a bilateral 
discussion with the nearest neighbour, Argentina, became a necessity to the Falkland 
Islands. 42 
Oil drilling was another reason for the bilateral talks. Britain insists that oil found 
in the Falklands' waters in the future belong to Britain. Argentina rebuts that any oil is 
theirs, and threatens to impose taxes and sanctions on those international oil 
companies working with the Falklands Government. 43 To end the impasse, Britain has 
proposed a tax and drilling licensing regime to collect shared revenues. The technical 
details as a result have to be negotiated with Argentina. 44 
Therefore, for the Falkland Islands and the British Government in London, the 
current discussions are basically out of concern for fishing, oil and communications. 45 
The islanders firmly assume that the talks are exclusively geared to the technical 
problems. The Falkland Islands Councillors taking part in the discussions are also 
careful to exclude sovereignty from the agenda in order not to raise any tantalising 
possibility of wishful thinking on the Argentine side. Councillor Sharon Halford, to 
name but one, did not miss the opportunity to play down the talks. She reminded her 
counterpart Guido Di Tella, Argentine Foreign Minister, that "we come from very 
different cultures and traditions". 46 The import of her remark was not too hard to 
fathom: the issue of sovereignty "is unquestionably dead in the watees. 47 Therefore, 
although the flights represent an emotional moment for some Argentines, 48 the island 
39 Joy Hyvarinen, Elizabeth Wall and Indrani Lutchman (1998) "The United Nations and Fisheries in 
1998", Ocean Development & International Law, 29, p. 329. 
40 Falkland Islands News Network, 24 January 2000. 
41 Penguin News, 17 and 21 May 1999. 
42 Ibid., 14 July 1999. 
43 FIA (I 998b) Falkland Islands Newsletter, pp. 1-2. 
44 Hansard (Lords) col. 998,10 June 1998. 
45 Penguin News, 2 July 1999. 
46 Ibid., 28 May 1999. 
47 Mercopress, 4 April 1999. 
48 Falkland Islands News Network, 17 October 1999. 
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community on the whole is still sceptical. 49 Some islanders believe that Argentina 
pressed Uruguay and Chile to stop flights. Some take the discussions with Argentina 
as nothing but a surrender to blackmail. 50 Because of this new development, there was 
another new lobby group set up in late 1999, venting their frustration about the 
agreement signed in July 1999.5 1 All these indicate that, as long as the traumatic effect 
of the invasion still haunts the collective memory, the islanders may continue to take 
sovereignty as the most sensitive issue. Surely, they cannot be unaware that, 
ultimately, their interests will "inevitably become bound up with the [Argentine] 
52 
mainland". They may know only too well that a clash on sovereignty will affect 
extraction of resources from the adjacent areas. 53 However, given the islanders' 
determination to exclude sovereignty from negotiations, London seems quite satisfied 
to keep the talks at the functional level, where flight access, potential oil revenues and 
fisheries are the appropriate subjects. 54 
The agony is that what Argentina wants most is precisely the one thing that 
Britain is least likely to offer. This thesis is therefore bound to ask how long 
Argentina's patience will hold out. At the time of writing, Menem has already stepped 
down. 55 Whether the new Argentine government, under the presidency of Fernando 
de la Rua, 56 will follow his predecessor's policy is too early to say. 57 But the point is 
that, when the Radical/Prepaso Alliance was the Argentine chief opposition party, it 
had been dissatisfied with Menem's moderate approach to the issue of the Falkland 
Islands. They made it abundantly clear that they would not honour the 1995 oil 
agreement with Britain. 58 They were on record as wanting neither to accept a freeze of 
49 Penguin News, 23 July 1999. 
So Merceopress, 14 April 1999; Penguin News, 21 May 1999. 
31 FIA (1999) October, no. 75, p. 7. 
52 J. E. S. Fawcett (1982) "The Falklands and the law", The World Today, 38, p. 206; Colin Phipps 
(1977) Whatfuturefor the Falklands (London: Fabian Tract), p. 8; Lord Shackleton (1976) Economic 
survey ofthe Falkland Islands, vol. I (London: Economist Intelligence Unit), p. iii. 
53 Peter J. Beck (1982) "Cooperative confrontation in the Falkland Islands dispute: The Anglo- 
Argentine search for a way forward", Journal ofInternational Studies and World Affairs, 24,1, p. 50; 
David A. Colson (1985) "The Falkland Islands crisis and the management of boundary disputes", in 
Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds. ), The Falklands war. - Lessonsfor strategy, diplomacy and 
international law (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), p. 213. 
54 penguin News, 9 July 1999. 
55 The Economist, 29 May 1999, p. 65. 
56 The 71mes, 26 October 1999. 
57 Solar (1990) Argentina and United Kingdom, p. 11. 
58 FIA (I 998c) Falkland Islands Newsletter, September, no. 73, p. 20; Mercopress News, II September 
1999. 
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sovereignty, nor the self-determination applied to the islanders . 
59 Even the Peronists, 
members within Menem's political camp, seem no longer patient with the current 
ambiguity of the diplomatic route. For example, Prince Charles in his visit to 
Argentina in March 1999 called on the Argentinians "to live amicably" with the 
islanders, who were also "passionately attached to their traditions". To this, Carlos 
Ruckauf, then Vice President of Argentina, retorted that "the Prince took an 
intolerable attitude. The islanders have no right to self-determination as the Prince 
suggested. His kingdom is a powerful country, which has stolen the islands. His words 
show his policy of domination" . 
60 Ruckaufs rebuttal implied that the future of British- 
Argentine relations could hardly be put on a normal footing without tacit recognition 
of Argentinian claims to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands .61 The plain fact 
therefore is that, as Rex Hunt expected, the new Argentine Government will "continue 
to press the sovereignty claim at every opportunity". 62 
Britain could not possibly have misunderstood that Ruckauf s rebuttal 
represented Argentina's nationalist passions simmering not far below the surface. This 
also explains part of the reason why a regime of utilities to share benefits of fisheries 
and oil has been proposed as the agenda for the talks. The talks launched in 1999 
could well be interpreted as the British effort to seek to address "broader collective 
concerns" with Argentina in order to manage a way towards peace. 63 With the passage 
of time, hopefully, both sides may produce a mechanism to ameliorate the current 
impasse through cooperation. Nevertheless, the following section will show that 
Britain's resolve to act in accordance with the principle of self-determination has 
rendered the British effort to develop mutual interests almost untenable. 
Self-determination-a controversial principle 
Britain holds a very clear position that the islanders are entitled to expect the 
Government's support, because self-determination is a generally accepted customary 
rule of international law. As one of the Falkland Islands Legislative Councillors, Mike 
59 FIA (I 999a) Falkland Islands Newsletter, p. 4. 
60 Ibid., p. 10. 
61 Lowell S. Gustafson (198 8) The sovereignty dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), p. 180; Christian Herter Jr. and Wayne S. Smith (199 1) "Possible solutions", 
in Wayne S. Smith (ed. ), Toward resolution? The FalklandslMalvinas dispute (Boulder & London: 
Lynne Rienner), p. 123. 
61 MercopreSS, 12 December 1999. 
63 Barry Buzan (1991 a) "Interdependence and Britain? External relations", in Lawrence Freedman and 
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Summers, insisted, the issue is about people, not about land. 64 Nevertheless, playing 
the self-determination card does not necessarily mean that Britain occupies a solid and 
legal base in this case. To begin with, the British claim based on self-determination 
will not suffice from the perspective of UN Resolution 2065, approved on 16 
December 1965. According to Resolution 2065, Argentina and Britain were ordered to 
"pursue negotiations with a view to finding a peaceful solution". But they were not 
required to consult the inhabitants of the islands, nor their wishes. Instead, as the text 
stipulates, what should be taken into account are the islanders' interests in the process 
of the talks. 65 The UN's interpretation is indeed a pragmatic view. When Woodrow 
Wilson enunciated the principle of self-determination in 1918, he spoke both of 
interests and wishes . 
66 But he later decided to take interests into consideration onj Y) 67 
because there was difficulty in putting the idea of wishes into practice. That said, 
Britain's adoption of the wishes of the islanders is not fully convincing either in terms 
of historical practice or the text of Resolution 2065. 
Another problem with the British legal position lies in the notion of "self' or 
Is peoples" in international law. 68 Firstly, as to whether the inhabitants are entitled to the 
right of self-determination must be determined within a colonial framework. This is 
because self-determination only applies to "those people who seek an end to colonial 
domination", not "for people who form a minority within an existing state territory ". 69 
In this respect, Britain's position is weak too. The Falkland Islanders cannot be 
U accurately specified" as a "self', because the ancestors of the islanders are not an 
indigenous people native to the Falkland Islands. 70 
Secondly, the UN clearly has taken a realist position that a state's integrity comes 
before the principle of self-determination. 71 When UN Resolution 1514 was ratified in 
Michael Clarke (eds. ), Britain in the world (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 41. 
64 Financial 71mes, 4 January 2000. 
65 Alfredo Bruno Bologna (1983) "Argentinian claims to the Malvinas under international law", 
Millennium, 12,1, p. 40. 
66 Derek Heater (1996) "Woodrow Wilson and national self-determinati&', Modern Historical Review, 
7,3, p. 6. 
67 Denzil Dunnett (1983) "Self-determination and the Falklands", International Affairs, 59,2, p. 416. 
68 W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe (1977) The principle ofsetr-determination in international law (NY- Nellen), p. 
40. 
69 David B. Knight (1985) "Territory and people or people and territory? Thoughts on post-colonial 
self-determination", International Political Science Review, 6,2, p. 248. 
70 Gustafson (1988) The sovereignty dispute, p. 55. 
71 Michael Freeman (1999) "The right to self-determination in international politics: Six theories in 
search of a policy", Review ofInternational Studies, 25,3, p. 357, p. 365. 
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December 1960, the major purpose was to liberalise the colonial yokes of the Third 
World states. But having been aware that the text "All people have the right to self- 
determination" might impair political unity, the Special Committee of 24, a UN 
subcommittee on colonisation, was quick to add that any attempt at disrupting the 
territorial integrity would be dismissed. The Falklands case was also acknowledged as 
falling within this consideration. 72 Resolution 3160 of 14 December 1973 and 
Resolution 31/49 of the 17 December 1976 also confirmed this bottom line. 73 In this 
respect, Britain does not have a good argument. Neither the British Government nor 
the Falkland Islanders have any intention of promoting independence. 74 The islanders, 
indeed, are fighting for their political right to be associated with Britain. 75 
Taken together, Britain apparently does not present a convincing legal argument 
for accepting as of fundamental importance the issue of self-determination, to the 
extent that even the UN supervising team is said to have "implicitly recognised the 
76 strength of the Argentine case". It has on the contrary reinforced the suspicion that 
its claim is rooted in the political interests at stake at a given moment with the 
intended effect to perfect its title to the Falkland Islands. 77 This suspicion is 
justifiable. Looking into traditional British diplomacy, one will find that solving a 
political problem solely by one principle has been rare in British politics. 78 with 
accommodation and compromise, 79 Britain's diplomacy has long been noted for its 
72 Alejandro Dabat and Luis Lorenzano (1982) Argentina: The Malvinas and the end ofmilitary rule, 
Ralph Johnstone (trans. ), (London: Verso), p. 43; Adridn F. J. Hope (1983) "Sovereignty and 
decolonisation of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands", Boston College International and Comparative 
Law Review, 6,2, p. 3 97. 
73 Anthony Arend (1985) "The Falklands war and the failure of the international legal order", in Alberto 
R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds. ), Yhe Falklands war. Lessonsfor strategy, diplomacy and 
international law (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), p. 56; Thomas M. Franck (1985) "The strategic 
role of legal principles", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds. ), The Falklands war. Lessons 
for strategy, diplomacy and international law (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), p. 25, p. 30. 
74 Gustafson (1988) The sovereignty dispute, pp. 39-41. 
75 Ibid., p. 39. 
76 Arthur Gavshon and Desmond Rice (1984) The sinking ofthe Belgrano (London: Secker and 
Warburg), p. 9. 
77 Franck (1985) "The strategic role", p. 3 1. 
78 Gustafson (1988) Yhe sovereignty dispute, p. 48; T. Wright (1994) Citizen and subjects (London: 
Routledge), p. 4. 
79 John Baylis (1989) British defence policy, striking the right balance (London: Macmillan), pp. 10- 1; 
lain Chambers (1993) "Narratives of Nationalism: Being 'British'? ", in Erica Carter, James Donald and 
Judith Squires (eds. ), Space & place: Yheories of identity and location (London: Lawrence & Wishart), 
p. 15 1; Grant Jordan and Jeremy Richardson (1982) "The British policy style or the logic of 
negotiation? ", in Jeremy Richardson (ed. ), Policy styles in Western Europe (London: George Allen & 
Unwin), p. 8 1. 
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"politics of experience", reflecting what has been learned . 
80 Labour has often found its 
ideologies divorced from foreign affairs . 
81 The Conservatives are characterised by 
pragmatism with no manifest goals in its party constitutions. 82 Little wonder Francis 
Pym, Foreign Secretary in 1982, admitted that self-determination in this dispute was 
"of more recent origin". 83 It is therefore reasonable to expect Britain to fail in its 
attempt to win a favourable position in the annual debates in the UN. In November 
1987, more than 100 countries in the UN voted against Britain's firm stance on the 
issue of the Falkland Islands. The result prompted a harsh attack on the government in 
84 the House of Commons at Britain's "humiliating defeat". As late as July 1999, the 
UN debate in the Decolonisation Committee again passed its pro-Argentine resolution 
calling for talks over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. 85 These results prove 
that what many states oppose is not Argentina's claim, but their way of proceeding 
towards it in 1982. On the other hand, their being refused talks about sovereignty has 
aroused sympathy from the international community. Many commentators even 
suspect that the principle of self-determination, held by Britain in this case, can 
possibly be a self-imposed barrier to Argentina's access to sovereignty negotiations. 86 
The above suspicion certainly has its negative impact on British prestige in the 
UN. It indicates that the world today is inclined to urge Britain to bring the doctrine 
down from abstraction to working reality, rather than solely holding self- 
determination as a way to structure a possible outcome of the dispute. On the other 
hand, Britain's commitment also cannot prevent it from being harshly criticised at 
home. It has come under fire as being "peculiarly intransigent", "uncompromising", 
U expensive [and] irritant". The opposition contend that the commitment reduces the 
80 Allen Potter (1966) "The political consensus", New Society, 7,182, p. 10. 
81 Bruce George (199 1) The British Labour party and defence (NY & London: Praeger), p. 7; David 
Reynolds (199 1) Britannia overruled: British policy and world power in the twentieth century (London 
& NY. Longman), p. 40. 
82 Patrick Dunleavy (1993) "The political parties", in Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday 
and Gillian Peele (eds. ), Developments in British Politics (London: Macmillan), p. 125; Richard Rose 
(1989) Politics in England: Change andpersistence, 5h edition (London: Macmillan), p. 263; Robert 
Leach (1995) "Political ideas", in Maurice Mullard (ed. ), Policy-making in Britain (London & NY- 
Routledge), p. 13; A. J. Davis (1995) We, the nation: The Conservative party and the pursuit ofpower 
(London: Little, Brown and Company), p. 448. 
83 Tam Dalyell (1982) One Man's Falklands (London: Woolo, p. 138. 
84 Hansard (Commons) cols. 1046,1060,18 November 1987. 
85 FIA (I 999b) Falkland Islands Newsletter, October, no. 75, p. 5. 
86 Philip Windsor (1983) "Diplomatic dimensions of the Falklands crisis", Millennium, 12,1, p. 94; 
Lawrence Freedman (1983) "Bridgehead revisited: The literature of the Falklands", International 
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pool of available resources to deal with other pragmatic problems, weakens the ability 
to react to new situations in an open manner, and constantly exposes the islanders to 
renewed tension. 87 Britain can not possibly be unaware of its disadvantageous 
position at home and abroad. As things stand, its stand on self-determination has been 
suspected as a slogan, 88 limited in effeCt'89 and found wanting as a political solution to 
fill in the security gap. In an attempt to compensate the political disadvantages, 
Britain has had to resort to highly costly measures of deterrence. 
The enduring security concern 
Successive recent British governments have tended to assume irresolution to be 
the source of trouble in this issue. They are determined not to repeat the failure of the 
defence programme in 198 1, when the defence budget was severely cut. 90 The policy 
of "Fortress Falklands" subsequently came as a ready-made solution with annual 
maintenance costs of E70 million. 91 
Given the military build-up, nagging questions remain as to whether this policy 
of "Fortress Falklands" will be enough to provide for security. The concern is not 
baseless. With the end of the Cold War, non-military conflicts have come to the fore 
and attracted attention of the world politics. 92 If security on the Falkland Islands today 
is defined as "perceived and actual freedom from [the Argentine] threat", 93 this is a 
subject eminently worth further study in its own right. This is because, first of all, 
behind such non-military threats after the end of the Cold War, there lies the central 
concern, that a non-military threat is no less disturbing than a military one. By 
87 Dunnett (1983) "Self-determination", p. 427; The Guardian, 22 September 1983; Bruce George and 
Walter Little (1985) Options in the Falklands-Malvinas dispute (London: South Atlantic Council 
Occasional Papers), p. 3; Hansard (Commons) vol. 52, col. 904,25 January 1984. 
88 J. H. W. Verzijil (1968) International law in historicalperspective, vol. I (Netherlands: A. W. 
Sijthoff-Leiden), p. 325. 
89 G. Michael Dillon (I 988a) 7he Falklands, politics and war (London: Macmillan), p. 74. 
90 British Government (1981) The UnitedKingdom defence programme: The wayforward, Crand. 8288 
(London: HMSO); Peter Byrd (1988) "Defence policy", in Peter Byrd (ed. ), Britishforeign policy 
under Thatcher (Oxford: Philip Allan/St Martin), p. 157; Michael Clarke (1992) British external 
policy-making in the 1990s (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs), p. 212; Anthony 
Sampson (1982) The changing anatomy ofBritain (London: Hodder & Stoughton), p. 259; Anthony 
Verrier (1983) Yhrough the looking glass: Britishforeign policy in an age of illusions (London: 
Jonathan Cape), p. 338. 
91 Gustafson (1998) The sovereignty dispute, p. 178; The Financial Times, 9 June 1997. The defence 
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92 Clarke (1992) British externalpolicy-making, p. 79; Samuel P. Huntington (1993) "Why 
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93 Eric Herring (1994) "International security and dcmocratisation in East Europe", in Geoffrey 
Pridham, Eric Herring and George Sanford (eds. ), Building democracy (London: Leicester University 
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characterising conflicts as non-military, one should not obscure the fact that the 
degree of concern caused by them has not reduced. This concern could be more 
enduringly felt under the guise of no-potential-for-military clashes. However, when 
the definition of security expands, and "the role of force in the security system" turns 
ambiguous, the military means to meet a security issue may be difficult to muster. 94 
The Falklands dispute nicely encapsulates what this thesis is concerned about. To 
begin with, as Summers admitted, the currently looming non-military threats refer to 
conflicts of interests, such as oil resources and fishing revenues around the Falklands' 
95 waters. The established means in the name of "Fortress Falklands" is apparently 
inappropriate to cope with such threats. 
In the second place, the objective of deterrence is to persuade an adversary that 
the losses "of seeking a military solution" will outweigh the "possible gains" . 
96 To be 
effective with this kind of persuasion, the defender has to demonstrate the resolve by 
97 specifying where security lies. However, security after the end of Cold War can no 
longer be defined exclusively in military terms. The security concern derived from 
non-military issues can sometimes "expand the range of concern" about security. 98 
When the range of security concerns expands, the non-military concerns will compete 
with the originally focused military concerns. Therefore the focus of specified 
security can be deflected. The deflection will result in two dangerous consequences. 
On the one hand, with other non-military variables brought into prominence in 
the attention of crisis events, we may see the vigilance of military deterrence 
relatively reduced, although the salience of security issues are not altered. On the 
other hand, the degree of defence dilemma will increase on the ground that those 
competing variables-quarrels over resources, or policing activities--enhance the 
possibility of triggering crises and highlighting the contradiction between military 
Press), p. 88. 
" Laurel Richardson (1994) "Writing: A method of inquiry", in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. 
Lincoln (eds. ), Handbook ofqualitative research (London: Sage), p. 47. 
95 The Times, 27 October 1998. 
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of wars (London: Unwin Paperbacks), p. 228; Ned Richard Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (1987) 
"Beyond deterrence", Journal ofSocial Issues, 43,4, p. 6. 
97 David A. Baldwin (1997) "The concept of security", Review ofInternational Studies, 23,1, p. 26; 
John Orme (1987) "Deterrence failure: A second look", International Security, 11,4, p. 122. 
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defence and security. 99 To sum up, when the possibility of different kinds of non- 
military concern has risen to the extent of outweighing "the costs of seeking a military 
means", the established military means used "to persuade" the adversaries not to resort 
to force will be rendered relatively weak. 
If we need a reminder of how this will happen, poaching in the Falklands' waters 
is it. Poaching is the most serious problem threatening the natural resources of the 
fisheries in the Falklands' waters. As over half of the world catch of illex squid is in 
this area, 100 hundreds of fishing boats, including illegal poaching ones, will be 
attracted here during the harvest seasons. To address the poaching problem, a policing 
operation including dispersion or warning shots seems to be an effective measure 
mounted by the Falklands Government. Indeed, no sooner had armed patrolling boats 
been recruited (April 1999), than guns were fired (15 May) for the first time, and 
these damaged a Taiwanese fishing boat that was caught catching illex squid 
illegally. 101 From the geopolitical perspective, it is hardly likely to escalate tension 
from policing activities to military confrontation between the British and Taiwanese 
Governments. But Britain has given a warning to the Taiwanese Government that 
poachers will have a difficult time in the harvest season in 2000.102 But in respect of 
British-Argentine relations, this will be a different picture. The issue of fishing rights 
and policing fire might poison the current political climate in the delicate British- 
Argentine relations and spark off new tensions. This is the defence dilemma arising 
from non-military concerns in today's British conduct of the Falklands policy. This 
kind of dilemma has no longer been limited to "societal security", as the islanders try 
to keep distance from Argentina by pledging to keep the British way of life. It has 
instead transformed the whole issue into a concern for economic security, where 
U access to the resources, finance and markets" becomes a problem. 103 
Finally, extension of security concerns into other areas such as the economic and 
environmental, does not imply that BritaiWs basic assumption of the military threat 
and the need for defending the Islands has been altered. Given the notion that military 
99 Barry Buzan (1983) People, states andjear. Yhe national security problem in international relations 
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf), p. 18 1. 
100 Peter J. Beck (1991) "Fisheries conservation: A basis for a special Anglo-Argentine relationship? ", 
The World Today, 47,7, p. 103. 
"' Penguin News, 21 May 1999. 
112 Falkland Islands News Network, 7 February 2000. 
103 Barry Buzan (199 1 b) "New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century", International 
14 
use for territorial conquest has become less popular because of rising costs in modem 
times, 104 Argentina's declared intention to advocate peaceful means towards a 
settlement of the issue could not but be reassuring. 105 In the short term, Argentina! s 
neoliberal adjustment remains plagued with problems. Its overvalued peso after 1989 
has proved harmful to exports. Its soaring trade deficit makes it dependent on constant 
foreign capital. 106 In the longer term, following Buzan's definition of a revisionist 
state, Argentina, on the issue of the Falkland Islands, could be described as a typical 
orthodox revisionist in its relentless pursuit of a right to the Falkland Islands "aimed 
at producing a redistribution" of what has been loSt. 107 In other words, the current 
Argentine approach can at best be seen as having displayed itself patient enough and 
wait "within the system until the time is ripe". 108 
The real concern of the Falkland Islanders is therefore twofold. First, will 
Argentina resurrect the decades-old technique of military intimidation? This 
possibility cannot be dismissed, because the newly elected president, Fernando de la 
Rua, has only a fragile hold on power. The Argentine Congress is still controlled by 
the Peronist Party. 109 Second, will Britain be capable of another combat mission in the 
Falklands at a "reasonable" level of military expenditure? ' 10 Sanders maintained that 
the garrison was "probably enough", but this cannot assure this thesis. "' The British 
Ministry of Defence has already admitted that the military means is "symbolic, not 
substantive". The deterrence capability is at best a trip wire. 112 Some observers are 
therefore doubtful about Britain's capability of sustaining another Falklands operation 
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in the late 1990s. 113 Long-distance logistical support and force projection, indeed, can 
be a mounting challenge, reinforcing the enduring security concern that currently 
harasses the islanders. ' 14 
A classic impasse 
The foregoing illustrates the persistent tension in the Falklands between Britain 
and Argentina. The tension, in summary, lies in the Argentines' national appeal, 
Britain's intransigence on self-determination, and the enduring security concern. As 
the current talks develop, Britain hopes that a more democratic Argentina will pursue 
the sovereignty issue "less passionately". ' 15 But the non-aggressive attitude on the 
Argentine side by no means implies that Argentina will sideline the issue of 
sovereignty. Sovereignty for Argentina is "but an unrealised goal". 116 Britain, in 
contrast, seems perfectly aware that talks about sovereignty will open the floodgates 
to a final transfýr of it, and therefore, its resolve to- act in accordance with the 
principle of self-determination has so far not flickered. 
Nevertheless, contrary to the above attitude, Britain did not always hold a non- 
negotiable position over the Falkland Islands. In the history of the Falkland Islands, 
there were talks about sovereignty between the two Governments. The period that this 
thesis refers to starts in late 1966 and ends in December 1968. For two years, Britain 
had a more flexible attitude towards the Argentine appeal for sovereignty and, indeed, 
sovereignty was seriously discussed with Argentina. A review of British attitudes to 
the issue of the Falkland Islands during that period follows. 
2. Review of Britain's cooperative mood in 1966-68 
Searching for a meeting ground 
In retrospect, the dynamic atmosphere for talks set in at the end of 1965, when 
the UN adopted Resolution 2065, calling on the British and Argentine governments to 
113 Michael Clarke (199 1) "Defence and security in Britain's external relations" in Lawrence Freedman 
and Michael Clarke (eds. ), Britain in the world (Cambridge: Cambridge University), p. 92. 
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settle this dispute "without delay". 117 In June 1966, talks between the two sides were 
launched. In March 1967, a tacit agreement emerged whereas the British Government 
secretly informed Argentina that the Falkland Islands were ready to be transferred 
"under certain conditions". ' 18 As regards the precise definition of "certain conditions", 
the British Foreign Office (FO) reiterated in Parliament its commitment to the 
interests of the islanders as a criterion. As Michael Stewart, British Foreign Secretary, 
and Goronwy Roberts, Foreign Minister, both explained the Falklands policy in 
Parliament, "we are speaking of the interests [emphasis added] of the people" and 
"conducting talks with the Argentine about the long-term future of these islands in 
accordance with and in the spirit of the United Nations resolution, to which I should 
think both sides of the House would pay respect". ' 19 
Argentina, on the other hand, saw Britain's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands 
as a "residuum of a colonial empire" and assumed that transfer of sovereignty over the 
Falklands would not do harm to Britain's state interests. 120 Discussions of this issue 
for both Governments thus became a timely agenda. It would help Britain to shed the 
burden of the old empire, either because Britain had lost the strategic motive to hold 
on to it as a means of safeguarding the lines of communication, 121 or because the 
Falklands Islands made no contribution to Britain's maritime strategy. 122 Viewed in 
this light, the policy difference between Argentina and Britain during this period was 
one of degree, not of kind. As Lord Chalfont, Foreign Minister responsible for 
relations with South American states, recalled the atmosphere in the talks, "we are 
engaged in sincere consultations with a friendly sovereign State". 123 This remark was 
suggestive. When the expectations of the two sides converged, the talks about 
sovereignty found no problem in gaining ground. 
Meanwhile, if cooperation requires a means of "voluntarily and consciously 
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mutual adjustment"with the aim of reducing uncertainty or misperception, 124 
reviewing of the Franks Report also demonstrated Britain's strong inclination to meet 
the Argentine need. In November 1966, Britain proposed to maintain a 30-year 
"sovereignty freeze" as an interim period for the allowance of normalising relations 
between the islands and Argentina, during which period both positions on sovereignty 
would not be affected by any action in trade or other forms of contact. When the 
interim period expired, the islanders would decide to be under Argentine 
administration or to agree to a British presence. Argentina was clearly unwillingly to 
give free rein to the islanders. It rejected the proposal. 125 Despite this rejection, Britain 
did not cease its effort. The talks went on. The first breakthrough in the talks came in 
March 1967, when Britain expressed its willingness to cede sovereignty, if the wishes 
of the islanders were respected. 126 The point to note is that, the wishes of the 
islanders, nevertheless, were not considered a stumbling block. 127 Instead, with the 
indication that the FO abided by the phrase "the principles of consultation and 
consent", 128 policy priority was clearly given to the interests of the islanders. In other 
words, the interests of the islanders became the essence of the talks. The wishes of the 
islanders were sidelined. As Stewart argued, "our object in the talks has been both to 
preserve the interests of the islanders and to see that for the future they can live on 
good terms with their large neighbourl. 129 As regards the content of interests, the 
British Government assumed the position as the best judge of the interests of the 
islanders in the process of sovereignty transfer. 130 The FO stated that the meaning of 
the interests were subject to its interpretation. 13 1 As Chalfont affirmed categorically, 
"We [the British officials] were the people who could decide upon the interests of the 
islanders, no so much the islanders themselves"! 32 To clarify Britain's stance, Stewart 
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and Chalfont reiterated in Parliament that "the power to decide over a transfer of 
sovereignty lies with Her Majesty's Government". 133 As Chalfont later explained, "you 
really cannot, in the long run, conduct the foreign policy of an important international 
power according entirely to the interests, and certainly not to the wishes, of a couple 
of thousand inhabitants of some islands in the South Atlantic". 134 
In short, if international cooperation is understood as a process intended to make 
both parties better off with the realisation of the adversaries' preferences, 135 there are 
powerful reasons for supposing that confidential talks between Argentina and Britain 
during the period of 1966-68 were a good case in point. The British intention to make 
its adversary "better off' was manifest. 
The flexible notion of sovereignty 
It has been widely held that the most important reason for the perceived 
continuity of the Falklands quarrel and Britain's unwillingness to negotidte with 
Argentina about sovereignty lies in the absence of substantial alternatives to the 
principle of sovereignty. 136 Because of this, many commentators believe that 
sovereignty over the Falkland Islands was essential to any form of settlement, 137 no 
matter whether the talks were held in 1966-68, one year before 1982, or even now. 
Barnett pushed the view to extremes and argued that, without sovereignty, the British 
elite in this case would perceive the "peril of extinction". 138 
Nevertheless, insofar as sovereignty implies a confining factor, the above 
argument fails to account for the exceptional case of the history of the Falkland 
Islands, i. e. 1966-68. 
The talks during this period were characterised by the British notion of 
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sovereignty over the Falklands being compatible to a considerable degree with 
Argentine hunger for it. When UN Resolution 2065 called for talks, the British 
attitude was "far more flexible". 139 As Stewart recalled, "We were quite prepared to go 
on discussing sovereignty". 140 With regard to the demand raised in Parliament that the 
question of sovereignty be kept from entering into the talks with the Argentines, the 
FO insisted that what they endeavoured to do was to build a "permanent satisfactory 
relationship between the islands and Argentina". 14 1 To defend the designated policy 
geared to the interests of the islander, the FO tried to convince Parliament that there 
was a necessity for the talks over sovereignty. As Stewart argued, I fully accept the 
proposition that one cannot buy good relations by giving away things that one should 
not give away. However, it is also true that if one is genuine in saying that one wants 
good relations, one cannot refuse to discuss a subject even if one's views and the 
views of [the] other party are completely at variance". 142 To achieve this objective, 
Stewart was emphatic that sovereignty be one of the topics under discussion, because, 
if sovereignty had been withdrawn from the agenda, Britain would be "unable to talk 
to the Argentine about anything". 143 
Even during the heated debate in Parliament in December 1968, when MPs were 
strongly suspicious of the 170's intention, Stewart did not retreat from the pressure. He 
went on with the belief that sovereignty was actually secondary in this territorial 
dispute, and firmly pledged that "negotiations involving the sovereignty of the Islands 
are still continuing". 144 Indeed, Henry Hankey, Under-Secretary at the FO, later 
admitted, "we did not mind letting the Islands go". 145 
The above remarks showed that Britain's value of sovereignty in its relations 
with Argentina was vague from 1966 to 1968 to the extent that the British claim to 
sovereignty over the Falkland Islands could be either adjusted into a concrete policy 
objective in order to meet British interests elsewhere, and even that a change of hand 
to meet Argentina's burning appeal had been seriously discussed. It had been the 
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stated intention of the Wilson Government to negotiate on all aspects of the dispute, 
including sovereignty, as long as there was a solution to it. 146 This flexible notion of 
sovereignty was clearly consoling to Argentina. It, in turn, encouraged the Argentines 
to pursue a negotiated settlement patiently, believing that the talks were proceeding 
well. As Micanor Costa Mendez, Argentine Foreign Minister in 1966-68, later noted, 
the signal sent from the British side to him seemed to indicate that Britain recognised 
the legitimate force of the Argentine claim. 147 
Entertaining a double standard 
The British approach to settlement of the dispute through talks about sovereignty 
can also be highlighted by the different attitudes towards the issue of Gibraltar and 
that of the Falkland Islands during the same period. To start with, the historical 
premises of the two cases were similar. Britain had held the two pieces of land against 
foreign protests as its possessions for centuries. The insignificant status of the two 
pieces of non-self-governing territories in the eyes of the British decision-makers was 
the same-both were downplayed in the 1960s. As recalled Joe Haines, a political 
correspondent for the Sun in 1964-68 who later became the Press Secretary to Wilson, 
"If I lived in Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands, I would not sleep at night for 
worrying about it, because so far as policy is concerned, those territories are 
peripheral... The officials will never die in the ditch for either of them". 148 
Nevertheless, despite the same lack of concern, the two pieces of territory received 
different policy treatments. On 20 December 1966, the case of Gibraltar was 
considered in UN Resolution 223 1, calling upon Spain and Britain to settle the issue. 
The stipulation in the text of the resolution was roughly the same as that applied in the 
case of the Falkland Islands. It urged both Spanish and British Governments to take 
into account the interests of the local population in the process of the sovereignty 
talks. 149 
Nevertheless, Britain's response to this UN resolution was in sharp contrast to 
that on the issue of the Falkland Islands. The FO described UN Resolution 2231 as 
146 Philip Ziegler (1993) Wilson: The authorised life ofLord Wilson ofRievauIx (London: Weidenfeld & 
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148 Joe Haines (1977) The politics ofpower (London: Jonathan Cape), pp. 72-3. 
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"disgraceful". 150 It protested that dccolonisation did not necessarily mean the 
incorporation of Gibraltar into Spain. In June 1967, Britain unilaterally announced a 
decision to hold a referendum in Gibraltar, where the local people would have the 
opportunity to express their intention either to stay under British rule, or the Spanish 
government. 151 Judith Hart, British Minister of State at the FO, pledged in Parliament 
on 14 June 1967 that "decolonisation cannot consist in the transfer of one population, 
however small, to the rule of another country, without regard to their own opinions 
and interests... We accordingly decided that a referendum should be held in Gibralta? 
in accordance with the British "powers and responsibilities". 152 But HarVs position 
was characterised by a double standard. The Falkland Islanders were not offered 
alternatives to choose their way of government or to decide where their interests lay. 
Quite the opposite, when Argentina expressed opposition to the idea of a referendum, 
Britain claimed that a plebiscite was "an unusual process within the British 
Commonwealth" and the Falklands community was "too small to hold a plebiscite". 153 
These statements were contradictory to what Hart had openly declared. Indeed, during 
the same period when a referendum was carried out in Gibraltar, according to 
Cawkell, the islanders' "own communication system was being dismantled and their 
dependence on Argentina organised". They "were deprived not only of information 
when they needed to be informed, but also of a voice". 154 Indeed, in the midst of 
suspicion, it was reported from Argentina that a timetable had been agreed, whereby 
Argentinian sovereignty would be recognised "in four to ten years". 155 The rumour 
even went round that Chalfont complained in Buenos Aires that, in their joint effort to 
persuade the islanders to accept the cession of sovereignty, Argentina did not do as 
much as Britain expected! 156 
Gibraltar provided eloquent testimony to Britain's double standards in the 
Falklands case. It showed that Britain was more ready to accommodate Argentina, an 
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opposite position held toward Spain in the case of Gibraltar in 1966-67. 
The pincer-shaped educational campaign 
The British attitude to cooperation over the issue of the Falkland Islands was not 
only in principle but also in deeds. Between 23-27 November 1968, Chalfont visited 
the Falkland Islands. Accompanying Chalfont was Ezequiel F. Pereyra, an Argentinian 
diplomat. 157 Here, history witnessed a campaign jointly waged by the British and 
Argentine Governments in the form of a pincer movement targeting the islanders. 
From the British side, Chalfont clearly intended to sow "seeds of gloom and 
uncertainty". 158 He attempted to persuade the local population "what cession to 
Argentina would mean in benefits for the islanders". He spoke before 500 islanders, 
pointing out their narrowness that "things are changing in the world outside. Great 
Britain is not the great imperialist power of the nineteenth century". Chalfont warned 
the islanders that, when they expressed the view to remain British, they had to "make 
absolutely certain" that they knew what they meant, because "their children could feel 
otherwise". 159 As Chalfont said in a menacing tone, I am not offering any 
assurance". 
160 
On the Argentine side, Pereyra spoke soft words and conveyed an Argentinian 
friendly attitude with the assurance that the islanders need not concern themselves 
about their future if a transfer would take place. The future was promising, pointed 
out Pereyra. The transition of sovereignty would not affect property ownership. 
Instead, Argentina would provide oil and gas. Besides, it was a natural development 
for the islanders to develop links with mainland Argentina. The islanders could even 
feel free to live in Argentina. A Welsh community, for instance, had been living in 
Patagonia peacefully for more than a century. 161 Pereyra's assurance together with 
Chalfont's pompous utterance exemplified a set of state behaviour consequent on 
international cooperation. The FO was actively engaged in managing the transfer of 
the islands to Argentina with a view to settling the different claims in the past 130 
years. 
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The above account can be formulated in a few words. From November 1966 to 
December 1968, the Wilson Government, bearing on these interests as a guiding 
162 163 
principle, moved "discreetly towards transferring sovereignty to Argentina". The 
change of policy preference during this period was conspicuous, judging from 
Britain's refusal to discuss the issue of the Falkland Islands with Argentina in the past 
130 years. As late as September 1964, the British representative on the committee of 
24 remained emphatic that the Falklands was a territorial, not a colonial dispute, and 
its title was not negotiable. 164 
3. Statement of the puzzles 
From December 1968 onward, the British Government changed its diplomatic 
tack. It declared that sovereignty was to be "neither negotiated nor ceded". 165 Lord 
Caradon, the Permanent UK Representative to the UN, 1964-70, argued that 
sovereignty over the Falkland Islands would not be ceded, because it was against the 
wishes of the islanders. 166 Stewart echoed this view, explaining in Parliament that the 
wishes of the islanders were "paramount" in the negotiations. 167 This position was in 
sharp contrast to that of the previous two years. After Resolution 2065 was passed in 
1965, Caradon affirmed categorically in the UN that "the interests of people must be 
paramount" and Britain would not betray that UN principle. 168 This was the first 
turning-point policy preference on the British side. It would not be hard for Argentina 
to anticipate what the future could bring. In December 1968, however, the FO argued 
that a settlement of the issue was premature. The Franks Report issued by Britain in 
1983 stated that the prepared Memorandum of Understanding, supposed to be issued 
jointly with Argentina, had to be abandoned. This was because, according to the 
Franks Report, the Argentines were not willing to accept the Memorandum to include 
the terms that "any transfer of sovereignty would be subject to the wishes of the 
Islanders". 169 
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But this reason is not cogent. In the text of the so-called Memorandum of 
Understanding, released in part by the Franks Report, there is no reference to the 
wishes of the islanders. The Memorandum only stated that "the United Kingdom 
Government shall consider whether the inteFests of the Islanders would be secured by 
the safeguards and guarantees to be offered by the Argentine Government". In other 
words, whether to publicise the Memorandum or not was up to London. It had nothing 
to do with Argentina's attitude. Argentina's attitude, instead, is found consistent 
throughout the two-year talks. Their negotiating basis had not changed at all ever 
since the ratification of Resolution 2065, which articulated that the interests of the 
islanders should be a primary concern in the agenda of the talks. 170 The explanation of 
the Franks Report is therefore one-sided. Argentina was not to blame for Britain's 
resuming the wishes of the islanders as the negotiating principle. Rather, it was 
apparent that to change the negotiating premise from the interests to the wishes was a 
unilateral decision made by the British FO at the end of 1968. The FO had sidelined 
the wishes of the islanders as the negotiating principle in the two years before the end 
of 1968. The change of policy preference in late 1968 constituted the second turning- 
point decision, which effect cannot be lightly dismissed. To be sure, the change 
revived the long-standing controversy. The issue from then on has been characterised 
by two mutually conflicting principles-wishes vs. interests-blocking each other. As 
some officials recalled, the end of 1968 could be ascertained as the watershed of the 
whole issue of the Falklands Islands. 17 1 Lord Wallace confirmed that Britain since 
December 1968 had "abandoned an attempt to reach a settlement with Argentina on 
sovereignty. 172 Mendez on the Argentine side also admitted that at the end of 1968, a 
sense of disillusionment began to set in among the Argentine officials. 173 These 
remarks indicate that the spate of contradictions in the British conduct of the 
Falklands policy is well worth reflecting upon. Why did Britain change its traditional 
attitude and begin talks with Argentina over the Falkland Islands in 1966? Why did 
the Wilson Government change the negotiating principle from the interests of the 
islanders to their wishes in December 1968? What kind of theoretical mechanism 
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reflects such a causal relationship for the two turning-point policy preferences? What 
are the implications of these policy shifts? 
4. Justification of the case study 
An under-researched area 
The two turning-point policy preferences in 1966-68 are by no means a unique 
case when seen in the context of the next decade of negotiation from 1966 to 1982, 
before the war broke out. Throughout the 16 years after 1966, Britain had unceasingly 
repeated its effort in making proposals in the talks. However, a series of proposals 
including communications agreements in 1971, the idea of condominium in 1974, the 
scientific cooperation in 1978, and the leaseback proposal in 1980 as well as a series 
of educational campaigns, all proved abortive. 174 The negotiations eventually ended 
up switching back to the previous position-respecting the wishes of the islanders. 
The ultimate return to the status quo as it was in 1966-68 demonstrates that December 
1968 was the watershed for "a realistic understanding" of this issue. 175 Seen from the 
series of failed attempts in the next decade when the wishes of the islanders 
eventually came to the fore as the major barricade to further efforts in cooperation, 
this case study represents a non-typical event. This non-typicality will strengthen the 
potential of this thesis to make limited generalisations. In other words, the two policy 
preferences seem entitled to be the topical questions that constitute a central concern 
of the academic field. 176 It is in this sense that Britain's policy preferences on the issue 
of the Falkland Islands become an important question in international politics. 177 
The second point to justify the case choice is that the British conduct of the 
policy in respect of the Falkland Islands during the 1960s is under-researched, to the 
extent that many scholars tend to see the 1960s as part of the continuity in the full 
Falklands history. 178 Decision-makers, equally, paid scant attention to the dramatic 
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development during this period. This de-emphasis, however, was not because the 
period was less significant relative to the moment prior to the war in 1982, so that the 
policy shifts were allowed to slumber. 179 Rather it is because the sovereignty talks 
were confidential. 180 Decision-makers as a consequence tended to be careful not to 
dwell on it. Stewart, serving as the head of the FO twice in 1966-68, glossed over the 
Falklands policy during the period without revealing the details, so did the Franks 
Report published by the British Government in 1983.181 George Brown, who took 
over Stewart's position in October 1966 and later handed it back to Stewart in March 
1968, does not even mention it in his autobiography. 182 On the other hand, 
confidentiality also brought about some hearsay reports. The Economist, for instance, 
wrote that it was not until "1977 the question of a transfer of sovereignty was formally 
discussed ... for the first time". 
183 Thomas argued that "for more than 130 years, 
successive British governments maintained that British sovereignty over the Falkland 
Islands and Dependencies was not negotiable". 184 Perina reported that "the first 
official conversations between Argentina and Britain were carried out in London in 
1970". 185 These accounts are mistaken. They show that the issue of the Falkland 
Islands in the 1960s is a grey area in the Falklands history that needs exploring more. 
If the goal of social sciences is to identify behavioural patterns of decision-making 
and, i. e. the British attitude on the issue of the Falkland Islands, the silence is not 
appropriate. Without the effort to explore this grey area as part of the Falklands 
history, readers, who are interested in the issue proper, will run the risk of overlooking 
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the British decision-makers' consciousness involved in this dispute. 
Labour now in power 
Part of the reason to justify the study is that the Labour Party is now in power. 
This thesis is not to argue that, because the Wilson Government in the late 1960s and 
the Blair Government at present are the same party, history will be repeated. The 
ultimate force of motivation can never be homogeneous between the two governments 
bearing the same name. But it is important to note as a caveat that, different from their 
Tory counterparts, Labour, as some argue, tends to accept the idea of talks on 
sovereignty as a means of reducing the overall costs of defence and diplomacy. ' 86 
In the late 1960s, some Labourites put it ideally at the annual Labour conference 
that "We are not interested in British sovereignty. We leave that to the Tory Party". 187 
Denis Healey, Labour's Defence Minister in the 1960s, also emphatically maintained 
that Britain should not refuse to discuss sovereignty with Argentina. This was 
because, according to Healey, in 1984, Britain had launched negotiations over the 
sovereignty of Hong Kong without consulting the four million inhabitants of Hong 
Kong. There was by the same token no reason why a perpetual settlement of the 
Falklands could not follow suit, especially since Argentina had become a democratic 
regime. 188 As regards the incumbent Prime Minister Tony Blair, he is on record as 
having said, "given the starkness of the military option, we need to compromise on 
certain things". As Blair explained, Britain's position "should not be determined by the 
wishes of the Falkland Islanders", and that "promise of self-determination for the 
Falklanders could lead to a full-scale war". 181 Perhaps more striking is Blair's 
Christmas message to the Falkland Islanders in 2000, in which he promotes the policy 
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of dialogue with Argentina. 190 All these evidences incline this thesis to identify New 
Labour as a party being less intransigent towards the current deadlock. 191 
However, British governments also tend to be engulfed in policy confusion, 
whenever there are critical choices to be made between integration into an 
interdependent international community through regional development and keeping 
sovereignty. 192 The essential point therefore has to be narrowed down as the following 
question: under what circumstances will the flexible mood of the Labour Government 
on the issue of the Falkland Islands come alive again? 
Lastly but not exhaustively, this case study is, in part at least, a response to the 
call for academic concern. As Bulpitt observed, British political scientists display 
more of "an interest in the general subject of government", but are "markedly reluctant 
to develop any enthusiasm for the study of particular governments". An effort at 
specific focus on one government instead is often left to "historians or memoir- 
mongers". 193 Heeding Bulpitt's complaint, this thesis is better placed to designate a 
specific unit for solving our puzzle in Chapter 1, and the unit to be observed is the 
Labour Government under Harold Wilson, 1966-70. 
Exploring the feasibility of three proposals 
This research can also be justified by the need to explore the feasibility of the 
following three proposals-the idea of leaseback, shared sovereignty and integration 
into the Antarctic Treaty System. This thesis makes it clear that these three proposals 
are not chosen randomly solely because they are relevant. Each of the proposals, 
indeed, has been seriously discussed by the two sides before, publicly promoted by 
Argentina, or suggested by the scholars. For the purpose of solving this historical 
sore, this thesis seeks to shed light on the feasibility of them through understanding 
the causes of the puzzles, since it has been well said that "politics is the art of the 
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The idea of leaseback 
The leaseback proposal is an expedient to transfer sovereignty to Argentina with 
guarantees of a continuation of a British lifestyle. This approach can be summarised 
as flone country, two systems". It implies a certain degree of autonomy in the Falkland 
Islands for a fixed number of years after the transfer of sovereignty. As Beck, George 
and Little, argue, the idea of leaseback is advisable and promising because it 
195 
constitutes a combination of British administration and Argentine sovereignty. 
Beck, following the Hong Kong model, suggested a 99-year period for leaseback to 
come true. 196 He criticised Britain's tendency to ignore Argentina's ultimate goal, 197 
arguing that "it is clearly easier for a European than for a Latin American power to 
concede territorial sovereignty in Latin America". 198 
It seems to this thesis that, because the Hong Kong solution as a design for an 
eventual settlement of a territorial dispute has already been put into practice, 
leaseback in the Falklands question can be one possible option. However, there is 
contention that the likelihood of resuming discussions about leaseback was low on the 
ground that Britain, after the war, has tried to separate the case of Hong Kong from 
the issue of the Falkland Islands. 199 But it has to be remembered that British policy- 
200 
makers have floated the idea of leaseback twice in the Falklands history. It was 
initiated at the end of 1940,201 gaining currency after 1977, and was even broadly 
considered as "realistic" by the Thatcher Government before the war in 1982.202 In 
1983, Raul Alfonsin, former President of Argentina, was clearly prompted by the case 
of Hong Kong and re-staged the leaseback proposal. 203 If "compromise is one of the 
` Terry McCarthy (1999) "The son of heaven? ", Time, 29 November 1999, p. 38. 
195 Beck (1982) "Cooperative confrontation", pp. 37-58; Beck (1986) The international politics of 
Antarctica (London & Sidney: Croom Helm); George and Little (1985) Options in the Falklands- 
Malvinas dispute, pp. 1- 12. 
196 Peter J. Beck (1985) "The future of the Falkland Islands: A solution made in Hong Kong? ", 
InternationalAffairs, 61,4, pp. 650- 1, pp. 654-5. 
197 Peter J. Beck (1983) "Research problems in studying Britain's Latin American past: The case of the 
Falkland dispute 1920-50", Bulletin ofLatin American Research, 2,3, p. 13. 
198 Ibid. (1982) "Cooperative confrontation", p. 256. 
199 Ibid. (1988) The Falkland Islands as an internationalproblem, p. 154. 
2'0 Herter and Smith (199 1) "Possible solutions", p. 127. 
201 Martin Honeywell and Jenny Pearce (1982) FalklandslValvinas: Rose crisis? (London: Latin 
American Bureau), p. 36. 
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203 Charlton (1989) 77ie littleplatoon, pp. 106-7; Hansard (Commons) vol. 75, col. 527,14 March 
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things politics is all about", 204 and if Charlton is correct that the issue of the Falkland 
Islands is characterised by the tendency to refute the "general truth that history does 
not repeat itself', 205 it is likely that the British Government will reconsider the idea of 
leaseback as the "most elegant approach to [re]move the current dilemma". 206 
Shared sovereignty 
Shared sovereignty is a concept under which both national anthems are played 
and national flags are hoisted, but neither government directly rules in the same piece 
of territory. Instead, the two governments involved only symbolically send 
representatives to the islands on a personal basis, where the inhabitants elect their own 
representatives into the council. Under this condition, troops are not needed on 
station, nor is there a change of lifestyles. 207 This idea is advocated following the 
existing model of Andorra, the mountainous state on the border between France and 
Spain. Andorra is exemplified as a case of dual sovereignty, where Spanish rights and 
French influence converge. 208 Former President Menem had once publicly promoted 
this proposal, 209 which was supported by scholars such as Dent, Herter and Smith. 
Having seen that the Andorrans have lived under this customary arrangement for 700 
years, these scholars openly questioned "why prejudge or preclude that possibility in 
the Falklands/Malvinas", given that Andorra has a larger population than the Falkland 
IslandS? 210 Indeed, some Argentine nationalists have recently been trying to draw this 
notion in by suggesting that Argentina's national flag fly in the Darwin Cemetery in 
the Falkland Islands, where 237 Argentine soldiers killed in the war lie buried .2 
11 
More specifically, the notion of shared sovereignty may be compatible with the 
thinking pattern of New Labour, whose political project also partakes of the idea of 
community. 212 Given the idea of shared sovereignty, will the Blair Government take 
this proposal on board? 
1985. 
204 Robert Jervis (1979) "Deterrence theory revisited", World Politics, 3 1,2, p. 323. 
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Integration into the Antarctic Treaty System 
Sir Vivian Fuchs, President of the British Royal Geographical Society, made a 
proposal that the Falklands dispute be put into the institutional framework of the 
Antarctic Treaty. His rationale is not hard to fathom. It is hoped that the Antarctic 
Treaty System will restrain unnecessary risk-taking behaviour of the two disputants, 
and through it the uncertainties around the Falklands' waters can be largely swept 
aside. 213 
Fuchs' scheme can hardly be said to be baseless. The major characteristic of the 
Antarctic Treaty is to leave the territorial claim frozen. It has been a successful 
mechanism to maintain peace around Antarctica. 214 Encouraging evidence showed 
that British and Argentine representatives did not walk away from the discussion on 
the establishment of mineral regimes attached to the Antarctic Treaty, even during the 
war in 1982.215 This might imply that both sides were cautious to observe the status 
quo in Antarctica and to keep it exclusively for peaceful purposes, despite the military 
clash. 216 It is also arguable that Britain may take this as an option, because, once the 
Falklands territory enters into the domain of the Antarctic Treaty, the Falklands 
Islands are internationalised, and Britain will never be a loser. 
The Falkland Islands Legislative Council apparently planned to integrate the 
islands into this institutional framework. Richard Ralph, former Governor of the 
Falkland Islands, was keen to build up the functional image of a connection between 
Antarctica and the Falklands. Boasting of the important contribution of the facilities 
on the islands to the research activities of the British Antarctic Survey, he was quoted 
as saying that no place engaged in Antarctic research could compete with the service 
offered by the Falkland Islands. 217 Will the Falkland Islands Government successfully 
(London: Abacus), p. 256. 
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get London to agree to enter the territorial dispute into the framework of the Antarctic 
Treaty framework in an attempt to "influence the debate involving the future of 
Antarctica" ?2 18 Research designed to address this issue may help shed some light on 
this question. 
To summarise, this thesis chooses the period from 1966 to 1968 as the subject, 
partly because it is under-researched, and partly because it is a watershed in Falklands 
history. The period is an important watershed because throughout the next 16 years, 
the essence of the talks from 1968 to 1981 is two negotiating principles competing 
with each other. The competition constitutes the topic of this thesis-between the 
wishes and the interests. 219 
5. The mode of enquiry 
Searching for an explanation 
The goal of the enquiry is to generate an explanation for the stated puzzle. To this 
goal, this thesis believes that historical documents alone are insufficient to generate a 
reliable explanation. 220 This is because, although the basic aim of research is to bring 
forward new data, 221 the data cannot speak for itself . 
222 To provide an explanation, 
this thesis makes the effort to observe phenomena systematically with the help of 
theory. 223 However, it is admitted that the interaction of the two Governments is far 
more complex than this thesis hopes to comprehend. 224 The report will always be 
"'Ibid., p. 10. 
2'9 British Government (1983) Falkland Islands review, p. 7. 
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open to modification. 225 Admitting the limitation on certainty, on the other hand, does 
not mean that any alternative explanation will be as reliable as what this thesis 
produces. 226 Its epistemological base is by no means relativism. Instead, this thesis 
seeks to produce a statement, with which it intends to conclude either true or false a 
proposition from a given perspective by given evidence. 227 Above all, although this 
thesis has no intention of predicting an exact tendency of the issue in the future, 228 it 
tries to preserve a scientific attitude. 
Methodological triangulation 
Methodological triangulation refers to the adoption of multiple methods to 
explore one specified set of phenomena. 229 The strategy is advisable because a 
researcher may commit errors of "significant oversight and misguided conclusions" in 
observation. This does not mean that a triangulated structure in methods will 
automatically increase the validity of the report, but it certainly helps to "gain a more 
holistic view of the setting" to maintain the credibility of the inference. 230 By this 
reasoning, this thesis employs a procedure consisting of a literature review, archive 
study and personal interviews. Of these, the former two are the major approaches. 
With negation as a technique in inference, the literature review in Chapter 2 will help 
focus this thesis on the area where potential answers lie. 231 With regards to the archive 
study in Chapter 4, inference will be attempted through a theoretical framework. 
Personal interviews will serve as a supportive approach inten-nittently. The rationale 
of this arrangement can be illustrated as follows. 
In the literature review, Chapter 2 puts forward "a series of theories", rather than 
an isolated one, to appraise the published literature. The series of theories not only 
... Robert Jervis (199 1) "Models and cases in the study of international conflicf', in Robert L. 
Rothstein (ed. ), The evolution oftheory in international relations: Essays in honour of William T R. fox 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press), p. 79. 
226 Martyn Hammersley (1995) The politics ofsocial research (London: Sage), pp. 17-8. 
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228 David Q Smith (1957) "Political science and political theory", American Political Science Review, 
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refer to those perspectives in the past, but the perspectives that have the potential to 
solve the puzzles. 232 This arrangement will broaden the scope of view to include those 
relevant methods discussed among scholars on the issue of the Falkland Islands. 233 
With this "series of theories" under review in Chapter 2, this thesis will go beyond the 
commonly assumed link between one theory and one experiment. It will instead 
present itself in a triangular form of competition among rival theories. 234 In this way, 
another form of triangulation takes shape in Chapter 2, where various perspectives 
including dependence, historical, domestic, cultural, social, world-system approaches 
will be assessed and competing theories such as neorealist and neoliberal 
institutionalist models will also be entered into the equation. When the above 
frameworks prove inadequate, the first part of methodological triangulation ends. 
Chapter 3 will then follow with an alternative strategy. 
Archive study is another important part of triangulation in this thesis. In Chapter 
4, this thesis tries to reconstruct the problem situation under the guidance of a theory 
that is to be specified in Chapter 3. Fortunately under the 30-year British archival rule, 
the official documents of the FO in 1968 were released and transferred to the Public 
Record Office, Kew Garden, London, in January 1999. By observing the first-hand 
data left by the British FO in this period under study, Chapter 4 will maximise the 
validity of observation to be made. 235 
Regarding personal interviews, this thesis pursued them in a structured way that 
the respondents answered a series of questions in the same order. 23' The questions' 
wording is shown in Appendix A. In addition, this thesis also adds some open-ended 
questions with a view to reducing the chances of guessing by the interviewees. 237 
232 ion Clark and Gordon Causer (199 1) "Introduction: Research strategies and decisions", in Graham 
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Nevertheless, although personal interviews are usefUI, 238 they have limitations. 
This is because, firstly, the targeted interviewee is defined as a person involved with 
the issue of the Falklands Islands in the 1960s. This definition is narrow. It will 
heighten the concern about the low-rate of qualified interviewees. As to this difficulty, 
it is said that the low-rate can be coped with by using the "snowballing" technique to 
trace out the appropriate targets. "Snowballing" is advised on the assumption that 
"people with similar characteristic or attributes are likely to know each other". 239 In 
this regard, the Falkland Islands Association is an ideal target because of its role as a 
lobby group. 
However, a small population and a chosen respondent as the result of 
"snowballing" is likely to produce a homogenous set of answers. This concern will 
presumably inhibit the intended broad scope in argumentation, and run the risk of 
depending on extreme cases that may disproportionately influence the findings. 240 
This is unacceptable from the perspectives of a detached observer and theory 
evaluation. Bowing to this concern, this thesis will avoid statistical sampling. 
Nevertheless, if sampling is given up, the precision in generalisation is sacrificed. 
Consequently, personal interviews as a source of data have to be judged in a reserve 
capacity by this thesis. 
Secondly, with thirty years passing, the memory of the potential interviewees 
may fail. 241 Valid interviewees could therefore be very few. Besides, what makes the 
interviewing account possibly one-sided is that the responding answers may be deeply 
influenced by the emotive aspects of the war. Because of these concerns, this thesis 
would like to treat the data from interviewing as supportive sources only. 
It has to be acknowledged that however devoted in the methodological 
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arrangement and however broad the scope, this thesis may still miss some variables, 
because observation is theory-laden and theory is focused on its key variables only. 242 
However, by expounding sophisticated conceptual structures in an attempt to both 
advance a theory and solve the empirical puzzles, 243 this thesis is at least on the right 
track closer to the common concerns in the academic circle. 244 
The assumption 
The unit of analysis includes the Falkland Islands Government, the whole sub- 
units of the FO/FCO as well as the Wilson Cabinet from 1966 to 1968. To identify the 
decision-making units hierarchically from the Cabinet down to the sub-units of the 
FCO implies where the data will come from. But the identification is not a passing 
whim. Basically, it is a functional assumption. 
To start with, this thesis realises the weakness in a functional perspective. 
Functionalist phraseology restates rather than explains. Having a role to play is a far 
cry from saying that one is willing to fulfil one's role responsibly. 245 Decision-makers 
sometimes make choices without "acknowledged responsibility" or significant 
attention to the policy consequences. 246 Ultimately, the "complexity of events is too 
great for them to grasp what is going on". 247 Nevertheless, these criticisms do not de- 
emphasise the need to explore the decision-makers in the FO/FCO as a unit of 
analysis. Because, firstly, as Griffith and Booth explain, "No government wishes to 
demonstrate in public its internal dissension and so decisions once come to are 
248 
presented by all Ministers as the policy of Government". A functional perspective 
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can be seen in this light as far as a decision or policy preference is concerned. 
Secondly, a functional perspective can be reinforced by observation when the latter is 
designated as decision-makers-oriented . 
249 A coherent interpretation from a functional 
perspective becomes pertinent in that the observation of decision-makers' attitude and 
motivation can serve as the stepping stone for exploring the perception and behaviour 
of the whole unit under analysis . 
250 This thesis therefore believes that the exploration 
from the functional perspective can link the policy preferences of the decision-makers 
to the whole structure of the issue. More specifically, through the functional 
perspective, the major concern of this thesis is looking for patterns of behaviour in 
collective forms. Collective patterns of behaviour, nevertheless, cannot be self- 
contained by applying an individual's knowledge only. They are a reflection of the 
immediate environment of the whole issue. 251 In other words, by accepting a 
functional assumption, this thesis treats the FCO as a structure absorbing and 
synthesising different views in the bureaucratic structure. 252 
Therefore, although a functional perspective may not present the exact necessary 
and sufficient causality in foreign policy analysis, 253 so far as the potential to produce 
of 254 a contingent" report is concerned , the FONCO's decision-making cannot be 
lightly dismissed. 
More generally, from the conventional perspective of "collective responsibility" 
in Britain, 255 the FO/FCO is arguably a dominant unit in executing foreign policy, 256 
because it can unify different opinions into a concrete one in order to respond to 
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external realities. 257 More specifically, while it was the Prime Minister who decided 
the Cabinet agenda, it was the Foreign Secretary who placed an issue onto the Cabinet 
agenda. 258 The years of the Wilson Government was also reported as the era when 
"lengthy meetings on big questions" were held in the Cabinet. 259 
As Vital explained the role of the FO/FCO in the overall British bureaucratic 
system: 
It is perhaps best seen, however, as the chief component of the 
central, vertical column of inter-connected authorities which are ... 
in charge of the formulation and implementation of major external 
policy and which extends downwards from the Cabinet, through the 
Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, the Foreign Secretary, the 
Foreign Office itself, and on to the Diplomatic Service in the 
f 260 ield. 
Vital's observation lends a lot of weight to the assumption of this thesis. 
Although the influence of the FO in the 1960s had given ground relatively to the 
departments dealing with economieS, 26 1 it is, admittedly, the antenna that sensitises an 
analyst. It is also ultimately the FO that sets strategic guidelines for foreign policy in 
explicit form as most "government decisions are made within the confines of single 
,, 262 government departments . 
Thirdly and perhaps more relevant to this assumption is that the Falklands 
dispute in the 1960s is peripheral in Britain's overall foreign Policy. 263 Because of its 
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low priority, it left the sub-units in the FO a lot of room to exert influence on the 
policy outcomes. Based on the functional assumption, this thesis expects to see more 
secretariats assume "a limited, but more substantial" decision-making role in the name 
of the FO, as more power is devolved to deputy secretary levels in the 1960s. 264 In 
other words, the two turning-point policy preferences indicate that the FO, as the 
representative or state actor in foreign-policy making, might seize more room to 
interpret and initiate actions, even though its effort sometimes proved unsuccessful. 
This, in turn, will endorse the functional assumption of this thesis to see the FO/FCO 
as a unitary actor in a collective form throughout the whole study. 
cabinet (London: Jonathan Cape), pp. 112-3. 
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CHAPTER TWO-LITERATURF, REVIEW 
Chapter 2 is concerned with the published literature in the issue of the Falkland 
Islands. As part of triangulation, this thesis will examine answers from various 
perspectives that have been explored by some scholars. These perspectives include the 
Soviet viewpoint, historical, domestic, cultural, social, UK-geopolitical and rational 
choice theories. The purpose of the discussion is threefold. It adds substance to the 
historical review presented in the previous chapter. It specifies the nature of the 
deficiencies in the explanations made from these perspectives. It also indicates the 
ways in which these deficiencies will be tackled. 
1. Some Soviet scholars' perspective 
As stated in Chapter 1, little work has been explicitly done on British conduct of 
its Falklands policy in 1966-68. This lack of research has reinforced an impression of 
policy continuity, to the extent that some writers ascribe this unending territorial 
dispute to British imperialist ambition. ' This misunderstanding comes in the main 
from the scholars on the Soviet side. 2 In 1984, the "Social Science Today" in the 
Soviet Union published its interpretation of this issue. The ma or theme of the 
interpretation is partially characterised by dependence theory that tends to interpret 
the controversies between the North and South as a reflection of efforts by the western 
powers to preserve their colonial enterprises. 3 Argentina in this vein is seen as having 
been financially dependent on London on the grounds that the former was almost a 
British commercial colony. 4 The dispute has thus been grounded in historical reasons 
with imperialist ambition behind it. 5 The continuity of the issue of the Falkland 
Islands as a result is interpreted as Britain's desire to preserve the vestiges of 
1 Pavel Boiko (1984) "Mounting anti-imperialist struggle", in "Social Science Today" (eds. ), The 
Malvinas (Falkland) crisis: The causes and consequences (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences), p. 
110. 
2 Robert A. Isaak (1995) Managing world economic change: Internationalpolitical economy (NJ: 
Prentice-hall International), pp. 193-5. 
3 Benjamin J. Cohen (1973) The question ofimperialism: Thepolitical economy ofdominance and 
dependence (London: Macmillan), p. 206; Chris Brown (1985) "Development and dependency", in 
Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom (cds. ), International relations: A handbook ofcurrent theory 
(London: Francis Pinter), pp. 62-3; Thcotonio Dos Santos (1970) "The structure of dependence", 
American Economic Review, 60,2, p. 23 1; J. Stanley and Barbara H. Stein (1970) The colonial 
heritage ofLatin America: Essays on economic dependence in perspective (NY: Oxford University 
Press), p. 198. 
4 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1996) Imperialism: Yhe highest stage ofcapitalism (London & Chicago: 
Pluto), p. 86. 
5 Linda Steinbaum (1984) "Background to the conflict*, in 'Social Science Today", p. 24. 
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colonialism. 6 This interpretation is not limited on the Soviet side only. Dillon saw the 
British decision-makers "often trapped by a defence culture imbued with nostalgia for 
the global age of British power' .7 The talks in 1966-68 leading nowhere were a result 
that could be seen as a throwback to Britain's imperial history. Accordingly, the 
bilateral talks in a co-operative form in 1966 were an outcome of the rise of national 
8 liberation movements that pressurised the colonial system to retreat. BritaiWs 
decision to give up the Memorandum of Understanding that was supposed to be 
jointly issued with Argentina in 1968, by the same token, "was but a pretext for taking 
a shortcut to further its global strategy, i. e. plans to set up a military base on the 
islands". 9 To concur, Lazarev contended that Britain could have settled the issue 
through international arbitration, but for its relentless imperial ambitions after 
WWII. 10 Some even claimed that unless British imperialism was uprooted, neither 
side would find a way out of the political impasse. ' 1A cursory examination of these 
arguments reveals outrage directed at Britain's imperialist exploitation. However, the 
historical record shows that such representations do not grasp the nature of British- 
Argentine relations as a general context of the issue of the Falkland Islands. 
The long-standing trade link 
As early as 1806, when Britain began to explore markets in South America, 
Britain had been aware of the importance of recognising Argentine sovereignty in 
trading for business. 12 Since then, Britain had viewed Argentina as a place of 
economic interest rather than a political sphere. 13 This attitude had been retained for 
the next 150 years, except 1845-7, when the dictator General Juan Manuel de Rosas 
tried to denounce foreign influences by launching protective measures against foreign 
6 Vlasdimir Miroshevsky (1984) "Britain's armed invasion of La Plata", in "Social Science Today", p. 
21. 
G Michael Dillon (I 988a) 7he Falklands, politics and war (London: Macmillan), p. 89. 
Andrei Goncharov (1984) "Introduction", in "Social Science Today" (eds. ), The Malvinas (Falkland) 
crisis: The causes and consequences (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences), pp. 5-6; Izabella Shokina 
(1984) "Argentine workers' movement at the new stage", in 'Social Science Today", p. 102. 
9 Yuri Khrunov (1984) "The South Atlantic in imperialism's plans", in "Social Science Today" (eds. ), p. 
31. 
10 Marklen Lazarev (1984) "The legal aspect of the conflict", in *Social Science Today", p. 65. 
11 Walter Little (1988) "Anglo-Argentine relations and the management of the Falklands question", in 
Peter Byrd (ed. ), Britishforeign policy under Thatcher (Oxford: Philip Allan/St Martin), p. 155; 
Anthony Sampson (1982) The changing anatomy ofBritain (London: Hodder & Stoughton), p. 259; 
David Sanders (1990) Losing an empire, finding a role: Britishforeign policy since 1945 (London: 
Macmillan), p. 126. 
12 Martin Honeywell and Jenny Pearce (1982) FalklandslMalvinas: nose crisis? (London: Latin 
American Bureau), p. 34. 
13 Harry S. Ferns (1960) Britain andArgentina: In the nineteenth century (Oxford: Clarendon), pp. 28- 
5l, p. 86, p. 97, p. ll0, p. 275, p. 279. 
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commodities. In September 1845, Britain responded to Rosas' blockade by allying 
with France and sending a naval fleet in an attempt to reopen the closed market. 
However, when the British Government realised that a blockade of Buenos Aires was 
detrimental to trade, it resumed the traditional economic policy and abandoned the 
blockade. 14 
After the 1860s, British investment in Buenos Aires began to take off. 15 Contact 
between Britain and Argentina was institutionalised into a long-standing trade link. As 
things stood, the link proved resilient enough to attack financial crises occurring in 
Buenos Aires and explicitly evinced the interdependence relationship between the two 
sides. The two grave crises in 1890 and in the early 1930s will support this argument. 
By the late 1880s, Baring Brothers of London, a leading financial firm in Buenos 
Aires, had acted as a representative of the Argentine Government to extract the loan of 
British capital invested in Argentina. 16 However, in 1889, owing to the rapid 
expansion of credit in Buenos Aires, Baring failed to attract the loan that it had 
underwritten to rebuild the water supply system in Buenos Aires. This failure to 
endorse the checks brought about a hurried flight of foreign capital, and caused huge 
unemployment as well as homelessness. The crisis seriously undermined the 
Argentine economies and led to the fall of the Juarez Cleman Government in August 
1890.17 
As half of Argentina's capital foreign investment came from London when the 
crisis occurred, 18 there were powerful financially interested groups in Britain urging 
the use of political tools to interfere in Argentina's financial independence. " 
Nevertheless, despite being well positioned to exploit the political gains, the British 
Government was resolved to meet the crisis purely in economic terms. In November 
1890, the Bank of England agreed to continue the investment and honour the 
14 John Lynch (1993) "From independence to national organisation", in Leslie Bethell (ed. ), Argentina 
since independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 11, p. 33. 
15 E. Bradford Bums (1982) Latin America: A concise interpretative history (NJ: Prentice-Hall), p. 133; 
Roberto Cortes Conde (1993) "The growth of the Argentine economy, 1870-1914", David Brookshaw 
(trans. ), in Leslie Bethell (ed. ), Argentina since independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), p. 76. 
16 Aldo Ferrer (1967) The Argentine economy (Berkeley & Los Angels: University of California Press), 
pi 103; David Rock (1985) Argentina 1516-1982 (California: University of California Press), pp. 71-2. 
Ron Smith (199 1) "The political economy of Britain's external relations", in Lawrence Freedman and 
Michael Clarke (eds. ), Britain in the world (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 136. 
" Mercopress, 30 November 1999. 
19 P. Whitetaker Arthur (1964) Argentina (NJ: Prentice-Hall), p. 50. 
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signature of the Baring Brothers by bearing half of any loss on bills incurred . 
20 British 
intervention as a consequence de-escalated the crisis. In the longer term, the 
intervention stabilised the Argentine financial situation for a decade to come. 21 
The Great Depression in the 1930s witnessed another severe test of British- 
Argentine economic links. As the buying capabilities in the Western markets shrank, 
Britain adopted the urgent demands from Australia and South Africa for preferential 
access to imperial markets following the agreements at the Ottawa Conference in 
1932. The British decision to import meat from other sources posed an immediate 
threat to Argentina. This was not only because Britain was then the largest importer of 
Argentine meat products, but also because Argentina did not belong to the 
Commonwealth. Argentina would face the possible loss of a market as the 
consequence of the Ottawa Agreement. Argentina at this critical moment dispatched a 
negotiating team, led by Vice President Julio Roca, to London in an attempt to strike a 
deal with Britain and save the market. The Roca-Runciman Treaty as a result was 
signed in 1933. Britain agreed to keep the import of Argentine meat at the level of 
1931-32, whereas Argentina conceded to importation duties on its British imports at 
rates lower than those in 1930.22 
The significance of the Roca-Runciman Treaty to Argentina must not be lightly 
dismissed. it sustained the British-Argentine economic link for another two decades. 
Even as late as the 1960s, with the passing of Britain's imperial era, Argentina 
continually saw Britain as the major market for its agricultural products. Argentina 
had once been deeply concerned about the prospect of Britain's entry into the EEC 
(European Economic Community). It was willing to see Britain's success in entry, 
because Britain's entry into the EEC could mean Argentina's preferred status of trade 
with Britain could have been transferred to the EEC member states. 23 It was, 
accordingly, not surprising that, when de Gaulle rejected Britain's application for 
entry into the EEC in 1963, there was "great rejoicing" on the Argentine side. 24 
20 Ferns (1960) Britain andArgentina, p. 436. 
21 P. J. Cain and A. G Hopkins (1993) British imperialism: Crisis and deconstruction, 1914-1990 
(London & NY. Longman), p. 154. 
22 Theodore H. Moran (1970) 'The 'development' of Argentina and Australia: The radical party of 
Argentina and the Labour party of Australia in the process of economic and political development", 
Comparative Politics, 3,3, pp. 83-6; Ysabel F. Rennie (1945) TheArgentine Republic (NY. 
Macmillan), p. 237; David Rock (1993) *Argentina: 1930-1946", in Leslie Bethell (ed. ), Argentina 
since independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 191-3. 
23 Rock (1985) Argentina 1516-1982, p. 100. 
24 Arthur A. Whitaker (1964) Argentina (NJ: Prentice-Hall), p. 17. 
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The interdependence relationship 
Looking back, the British-Argentine relationship in history was more complex 
than that which the dependency theorists portrayed. Firstly, after the British took over 
the role previously filled by the Spaniards since 1806, the British merchants had been 
subject to political uncertainty in Argentina. This was not only because the occasional 
political dictatorship constituted the source of hindrance to their way of doing 
business, but also because these businessmen received rare diplomatic promotion 
from the British Government. 25 Even though naval force was called in twice, in 1807 
and 1845, it proved futile. On the other hand, the influence of the Bank of England 
was anything but dominating. It did not occupy a dominant position as the 
dependency theorists interpreted. The commercial banks in Buenos Aires "were 
subject to competition" and to "a rapid succession of rival politicians". They were also 
suffering from insufficient information for financial decision-making. 26 During the 
crisis in 1889, for instance, it was observed that Argentine policy makers held to a 
firm line and "left little space for compromise" in the negotiations about the loans. 27 
Secondly, Britain's decision to intervene in the Baring crisis in 1889 with the 
commitment to the financial aid was "so radical a departure from the accepted rules of 
laissez-faire". 28 The British attempt to prevent a financial collapse in Argentina 
indicated that Argentina was perceived as a weighty partner in the economic field. 29 
Although Argentine economies had never returned to the levels before the 1920s, 30 the 
Treaty was undoubtedly in the interests of the Argentine agricultural sectors and "was 
crucial to the economic recovery" in the 1930s. 31 Because of the Treaty, when 
Argentine meat became tainted with foot-and-mouth disease in the 1940s, leading to 
an overall ban by most foreign markets, the Smithfield Market in London remained 
the only market open to the Argentine agricultural products. 32 Seen in this light, the 
25 D. C. M. Platt (1972) "Economic imperialism and the businessmen: Britain and Latin America before 
1914", in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliff (eds. ), Studies in the theory ofimperialism (London: 
Longman), p. 295; Judith Blow Williams (1935) "The establishment of British commerce with 
Argentina", The Hispanic Historic Review, 15,1, p. 54. 
26 Platt (1972) "Economic imperialism and the businessmen", p. 298. 
27 Ezequiel Gallo (1993) 'Society and politics, 18 80-1916', Richard Southern (trans. ), in Leslie Bethell 
(ed. ), Argentina since independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University), p. 95, p. I 11. 
28 Ferns (1960) Britain andArgentina, p. 448. 
29 Cain and Hopkins (1993) British imperialism, pp. 154-5. 
30 Simon Collier (198 1) 'Argentina: Domestic travail, international censure", International Affairs, 57, 
3, p. 477. 
31 Cain and Hopkins (1993) British imperialism, p. 158. 
32 Alberto Conil Paz and Gustavo Fen-ari (1966) Argentina ýjbreign poliq4 1930-1962, John J. 
Kennedy (trans. ), (Notre Dame & London: University of Notre Dame Press), p. 7; Rennie (1945) The 
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Treaty can be seen as a means of sustaining the British-Argentine traditional market 
that the traditional agrarian sectors in Argentina badly needed. 33 This thesis therefore 
is inclined to see mutual vulnerability as the link that compelled Britain to attempt to 
solve the trade crisis. To be rational, Britain was not obliged to buy Argentine meat. 
The Argentine main sources of imports were from the United States, not Britain. 
There had been huge trade between the two sides in favour of Argentina before the 
signing of the Treaty. Although the Argentine Government's pledge to "buy from those 
who buy from us" in the late 1920s, it proved no more than a slogan. 34 However, 
despite the trade imbalance, Britain did not deny Argentina! s access to the London 
market. It was more likely that the Treaty was agreed on the grounds that Britain was 
afraid of Argentines' retaliation against British investment in Argentina, should Britain 
cut meat imports from Argentina. 35 
Dependence theory apparently does not fit the case either in its assumptions or 
description. Quite the opposite; Argentina was hardly dictated to by British imperialist 
power. 36 What captured the important part of reality was that even in the Sixth 
Congress of the Third Communist International held in 1928, Argentina, among the 
Latin American countries, was thought to remain politically independent due to weak 
economic exploitation. 37 The above observations incline to the assertion that the 
British-Argentine economic link was a typical instance exemplifying more of 
interdependence than imperialist understanding. Ferns is correct in arguing that the 
British-Argentine historical relations were characterised by "growth and maturity". 
The links seemed to be more dependent "upon the strictest respect and independence 
on the plane of politics, while on the plane of economics it involved a complex and 
delicate interdependence". 38 There existed another argument that British investments 
were "bad" capital and the US investment was "good". 39 But this distinction does not 
Argentine Republic, p. 234, pp. 245-6; Rock (1993) "Argentina: 1930-1946", p. 174. 
33 Cristobal Kay (1999) "Rural development: From agrarian reform to neoliberalism and beyond", in 
Robert N. Gwynne and Cristobal Kay (eds. ), Latin American transformed. Globalisation and 
modernity (London, Sydney & Auckland: Arnold), p. 273. 
34 Ysabel E Rennie (1945) The Argentine Republic (NY. Macmillan), p. 236. 
35 Rock (1993) "Argentina: 1930-1946", p. 191. 
36 Charles A. Jones (1992) 'British capital in Argentine history: Structures, rhetoric and change", in 
Alistair Hennessy and John King (eds. ), Yhe land that England lost (London: British Academic Press), 
68, P. 74. 
Carlos Ramirez-Faria (199 1) The origins ofeconomic inequality between nations (London: Unwin 
Hyman), p. 73. 
38 Ferns (1960) Britain and Argentina, p. I 
39 Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro (1970) Essays in the economic history oftheArgentine republic (New 
Haven: Yale University Press), p. 32; Jeffrey A. Friden (1994) "International investment and colonial 
control: A new interpretation", International Organisation, 48,4, p. 5 84. 
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advance dependence theory very far. Coding British investment as bad capital 
represented more of the nationalists' emotional outlet. 40 A point of departure is that, 
when Juan Peron after 1946 eventually opted for the purchase of British-owned 
railways as a symbol of anti-colonialism, 41 it helped little to stimulate the Argentine 
economy. 42 Peron might try to break its old economic bond, but he ultimately "had to 
confront the so-called "good" capital of the United States. 43 The act of nationalisation 
in fact hastened the overall withdrawal of other foreign investment, leading to 
agricultural and industrial stagnation up to the mid-1960s. 44 
Calling for a hermeneutic understanding 
A hermeneutic perspective, adding inter-subjective psychological elements to the 
reference of the work , 
45 Will show that the economic ties in British-Argentine 
diplomatic history were more complex than what dependence theorists describe. As 
Argentine General Mosconi averred, "British imperialism, contrary to the U. S. that is 
pursuing political and economic hegemony over the continent, is not intruding in 
domestic politics and foreign PoliCy". 46 In 1960, an Argentine delegate in the UN 
matched Mosconi's statement by describing the European imperialists in the UN as 
having "the most extraordinary qualities of intelligence[j inventiveness and most 
47 
enterprising people that humanity has known". It is noteworthy that these remarks 
were gleaned from the conviction among Argentine leaders that their economic 
independence, progress and order lay in British productive techniques and investing 
capital . 
48 The opinions of these decision-makers on the Argentine side clearly indicate 
40 F. j. McLynn (1983) 'Peron's ideology and its relation to political thought and action", Review of International Studies, 9,1, pp. 1-2. 
41 Robert A. Potash (1980) The army andpolitics in Argentina, 1945-1962: Peron to Frondizi (London: 
Athlone), pp. 58-60. 
42 Fritz L. Hoffmann and Olga Mingo Hoffmann (1984) Sovereignty in dispute: The 
FalklandslMalvinas, 1493-1982 (Boulder & London: Westview), p. 99. 
43 Riordan Roett (1992) "The foreign policy of Latin America", in MacRidis Roy C. (ed. ), Foreign 
policy in worldpolitics (NJ: Prentice-Hall International), p. 268. 
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University of Texas Press), p. 273. 
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Oxford University Press), p. 58. 
49 Jonathan C. Brown (I 979)A socio-economic history ofArgentina, 1776-1860 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University), pp. 227-8; Rock (1985). 4rgentina 1516-1982, p. 75; Wright (1974) British- 
owned railways, p. 8; Jorge Larrain (1999) *Modernity and identity: Cultural change in Latin America", 





that dependence theory is correspondingly weak in explaining British-Argentine 
relations. If we define an imperialist oppression as a combined political and economic 
49 force exerted towards another country by unlimited forcible expansion, applying the 
phrase "imperialist/colonialist relations" to the British-Argentine link would be wide 
of the mark. Taking no account of the Argentine liberal aspirations, or British policy 
orientation towards Argentina, the interpretations made from the perspective of British 
imperialism are static and arbitrary. 50 It has to be borne in mind that largely through 
British capital after 1860, Argentina emerged from insignificance to a prominent 
position before WWII. 51 When there were few political or military controls being 
directly imposed by Britain, who had little colonising motives seeking for territories 
in the Argentine mainland '52 the British-Argentine link could not be coherently 
. 
interpreted as exploitative. 53 Argentina had never been forced out of its independent 
status in its dealings with Britain, and the lack of any political intrusion might be 
considered as one of the remarkable features of the relations that dependence theorists 
neglect. A hermeneutic understanding of the British-Argentine link will expose the 
fact that the dependence model does not adequately account for regional differences 
in the whole British imperial enterprise. 54 The model lacks reflective consciousness of 
the state actors in observing a case study. 55 It has instead precluded the reader from 
noticing that British imperialism was on the wane after NWII. 56 To sum up, the 
explanation provided by dependence theorists in this case is at best an interpretation 
modernity (London, Sidney & Auckland: Arnold), p. 187. 
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an ideological fashion. 57 It does not communicate enough insight into the behavioural 
pattern bearing on the puzzles in this thesis. 
2. The historical perspective 
Based on the historical approaches, both Beck and Charlton analysed the causes 
of the Falklands dispute in 1966-68. Beck explored the issue extensively from the 
philatelic affairs to the Antarctic area, while Charlton gave an intensive insight into 
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the domestic British politics by means of interviews. To take up the first question of 
why Britain decided to negotiate sovereignty with Argentina in 1966, Beck offered a 
heavy package of reasons, ranging from the UN's pressure, British economic interests, 
strategic calculation, concern for British identity and even the "British interests 
elsewhere". 59 As regards the second question why the talks dried up in 1968, Beck 
correctly placed the blame on Britain for its shifting the negotiating premise to the 
wishes of the islanders. 60 
Charlton, on the other hand, found that when the talks began in late 1966, 
Britain's policy was tom between the policy to stand by the islanders and an equal 
determination to alleviate the burden of empire. 61 Charlton explained that the 
negotiating principle, changing from the interests of the islanders to their wishes in 
December 1968, was intended to remedy this uncertainty. At this juncture, Charlton 
turned to moral language. He quoted Edmund Burke's notions of "social contract", 62 
63 
and developed it into the power of "sympathy". With these, Charlton explained that 
the unyielding drive to resist a possible transfer of sovereignty stemmed from the 
simple call of patriotism. In short, it was patriotic fervour inflaming parliamentary 
rhetoric that discouraged a possible compromise with Argentina at the end of 1968. 
Beek's and Charlton's historical accounts are helpful but only to a certain 
" Irving Louis Horowitz and Ellen Kay Trimberger (1975) "State power and military nationalism in 
Latin Americe, Comparative Politics, 8,2, p. 225. 
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dimension", International Affairs, 59,3, pp. 429-44; Charlton (1989) The littleplatoon, p. 101. 
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107. 
60 Ibid., p. 106. 
61 Charlton (1989) The littleplatoon, p. viii. 
62 Edmond Burke (1989) "Reflections on the revolution in France 1790", in Paul Langford and L. G 
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descriptive point. These two historical approaches help an analyst with a closer look 
into the whole background of this dispute. They also succeed in identifying the two 
interesting policy shifts at issue. 64Beck, for instance, is perfectly correct to argue that 
a "lack of consensus between the disputants and the primacy attached to the Islanders' 
wishes" imprisoned the disputants in the 14-year fruitless talks before the war. 65 
However, this argument is insufficient for our understanding. If one believes that the 
goal of reading historical accounts is to understand how a decision-maker in history 
U 66 smoothes some paths and closes others off' in order not to repeat errors, onecannot 
intellectually stop here. 
A critique of Beck's historical approach 
The basic weakness of Beck! s historical researches is the tendency to take 
description as analysis. For the purpose of analysis, one cannot take some happenings 
as "necessary preconditions for other phenomena" . 
67 Basically, a case study attempts 
to explain the dynamic of a certain period in a wholistic manner, as some historian 
pledged to, can be too ambitious a view. 68 This is because historical description can be 
frustrated by the fact that the essence of decision-making is a black box that can never 
be filled in with enough details. That said, the descriptions of historical events, 
however lengthy, have to select some features and ignore others. In the historical 
approach, one's interests and ideologies will subconsciously influence one's data 
selection and interpretation. 69 This thesis is, as a result, incapable of knowing (a) what 
Beck had omitted, despite his laborious work, and (b) whether his data were detailed 
enough in the process of selection. Most disturbing is his proposal to resolve this 
dispute. When Beck argued that to cede sovereignty would be "less painful" for 
64 Beck (1988) The Falkland Islands as an internationalproblem, p. 99. 
65 Ibid., p. 190. 
66 Lee Benson (1972) Toward the scientific study ofhistory. - Selected essays (Philadelphia: Lippincott), 
pp. 199-200. 
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p 97-8. 
6 Baruch Fischhoff (1982) "For those condemned to study the past: Heuristic and biases in hindsight", 
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and biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 349; Ottar Hellevik (1984) Introduction to 
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at the XVIth Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin, August 21-25, p. 13. 
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Britain, what was his hidden motivation? 70 
In other words, there is a gap to straddle between description and Beck's 
analysis. Beck could not eschew building a causal mechanism linked between 
explanatory and dependent variables in a form of simple leverage in an attempt to 
"explain as much as possible with as little as possible". 71 When he suggested that 
since December 1968 the "dispute had been transformed from an international 
problem into a domestic issue with foreign policy overtones", he refrained from 
admitting that the year 1968 was a watershed in the development of British policy 
over the Falkland Islands. 72 He recognised that the Falkland Islands Emergency 
Committee (FIEC) was one of "the most persistent and effective British pressure 
groups", 73 but left unanswered why this lobby group could not succeed in preventing 
the Memorandum of Understanding from coming into being. Beck is right to point out 
that "the continued paramountcy of the islanders' wishes has been British policy since 
" 74 1968 , but to stop here without giving the rationale behind the story makes Beck's 
account at best a journalistic report. It lacks a political focus and inclines this thesis to 
the view that Beck's report commits the fallacy of "inputism"-all the input factors 
shape one political action. 75 
A critique of Charlton's conception of patriotism 
Charlton's claim that patriotism was the root cause of British intransigence is 
also not convincing. This is because Charlton was equivocal in providing readers with 
a settled definition of "patriotism". In British national history, there were two forms of 
patriotism waxing and waning from the 17th century onwards. These referred to 
"patriotism dissatisfied", people who expressed opposition to government authority; 
and "patriotism satisfied", people who were willing to be loyal to British 
Governments. 76 So far as the issue of the Falkland Islands was concerned, the two 
definitions of "patriotism" had competed with each other, to the extent that they once 
caused quite a lot confusion in the policy debates in 1770, when Spain evicted the 
70 Beck (1982) "Co-operative confrontation", p. 56. 
71 Gary King, Robert 0 Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994) Designing social inquiry: Scientific 
inference in qualitative research (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 29. 
72 Beck (1988) The Falkland Islands as an internationalproblem, p. 99, p. 107. 
73 Ibid., p. 105. 
74 Ibid., 158. 
75 Roy C. Macridis (1996) "Comparative analysis: Methods and concepts", in Bernard E. Brown and 
Roy C. Macridis (eds. ), Comparative politics: Notes and readings, 8fledition (London: Wadsworth), p. 
7. 
76 Louis L. Snyder (1968) The meaning ofnationalism (NY. Greenwood), p. 148. 
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British from the islands (discussed later). 77 
In retrospect, the major source of patriotism could be traced to the time of the 
English Reformation. 78 It came from the belief that the English were the people 
chosen to accomplish a divine plan. This belief, as it turned out, proved too valuable 
to be resisted by successive British Governments. 79 Patriots at this stage were defined 
as dissenters on the left. For one century down to 1760, most of these people were 
labelled as "Little Englanders", whose attitude was seen as the "creed of opposition", 80 
backed by liberal aspirations .81 They were noted for their romantic concept of English 
nationality and drastic political standing. 82 
In the fourth quarter of the 18th century, after the War of American 
Independence, a second mode of patriotism emerged in Britain. Patriotism was taken 
by some as a state-sponsored ideological movement that emphasised the value of 
military achievement with the purpose of building an empire. 13 Faced by Napoleonic 
expansion, British patriotism was solidified into an "outward style of Edwardian 
patriotiSM", 84 understood as a duty to "bury all differences of opinion7 to identify 
individual interests with a government's power. 85 People in the name of patriots were 
supposed to think of the country first, and be ready to answer the call to arms with an 
attempt to keep the political status quo. 86 
The meaning of patriotism in British history has therefore been mixed. From 
1760 onward, patriotism in Britain represented two sets of conflicting ideas. It either 
denotes a leftist value against royal power, or a value nourished by the rightists. 87 But 
77 Julius Goebel (1982) Yhestrugglefor the Falklandislands (New Haven& London: Yale University 
Press), pp. 238-9, pp. 272-8. 
79 Christopher Hill (1989b) "The English revolution and patriotism", in Raphael Samuel (ed. ), 
Patriotism: The making and unmaking ofBritish national identity, vol. I (London: Routedge), p. 159. 79 John Wolffe (1989) *Evangelicalism in mid-nineteenth century England", ibid., p. 192. go Hugh Cunningham (198 1) "The language of patriotism, 1750-1914", History Workshop, 12, p. 27; 
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it is important to note that neither has excluded the other. Because of this non- 
exclusion, when referring to patriotism in the British case, Charlton needs to be 
cautious. 88 Charlton's failure to clarify what he means by patriotism in his argument 
will trap the reader into a problem of definition. 
But contemporary readers are not the only victims of this confusion. The 
confusion had happened once in the history of the Falkland Islands. In 1770, Spain 
evicted the British garrison from the Falkland Islands. 89 In the policy debates about 
the proper response to this surprising event, the policy discussants were confused 
about whether to fight the Spanish in order to redress "an offence to the British king 
[George III] whose forces had been attacked in times of peace". 90 Although Prime 
Minister Federick North made it abundantly clear that "England did not want the 
island, it was of no use to us", 91 emotion was aroused in the name of patriotism on the 
opposition, who opted for war against Spain for the Falkland Islands. In the midst of 
confusion, Dr. Johnson was called in by the North Government to back the 
government policy. Clearly, Johnson tried to resolve the policy confusion by settling 
the definition of patriotism first. He declared roundly: 
those men are no Patriots, who when the national honour was 
vindicated in the sight of Europe, and the Spaniards having invaded 
what they called their own, ... would still have instigated us to a war 
for a bleak and barren spot in the Magellanic ocean, of which no use 
could be made, unless it were a place of exile for the hypocrites of 
patriotism. 92 
Johnson's statement launched a counter-attack against the emotional appeal of 
the term "patriotism" on the oppositions. The interesting point was that Johnson's 
interpretation of patriotism and the policy proposed was contrary to what Charlton 
claimed and sought to explain. The contradiction indicates that patriotism in reference 
Unwin Hyman), p. xiii; Colley (1984) "The apotheosis of George Ill", pp. 95-6; John Plamenatz (1973) 
"Two types of nationalism", in Eugene Kamenka (ed. ), Nationalism: The evolution ofan idea 
(Canberra: Australia National University Press), p. 24; J. A. Sharpe (1987) Early modern England., A 
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to the Falklands policy is a controversial and ambiguous concept that one cannot take 
for granted. 
Indeed, the ambiguity caused by the term "patriotism" on this issue had not been 
resolved even 200 years later in the British Parliament. Brian Parkyn, MP for 
Bedford, to name but one, in the heated debate over the Falklands policy in the House 
of Lords in December 1968, continued to emphasise: "we should never forget that, in 
the world outside Europe, England is still seen by many as the only hope for a 
civilised world ... We must keep this in mind, accept the responsibility, and be 
prepared to give a moral lead of the world in getting away from the idea of national 
sovereignty" . 
93 His appeal reflected that the 170'-century proud and liberal voice still 
rang in the ears. However, Foreign Secretary Stewart, faced by the outcry in 
Parliament, was not convinced by the patriotic appeal. He did not lose his composure 
and seemed to know well where the national interest lay. As Stewart coldly 
commented: "There were a number of people in Parliament who either were, or 
claimed to be, very gravely alarmed at the possibility of our handing over the Islands. 
There was never any justification, I may say, for that alarm". Because, continued 
Stewart, "the Cabinet took the plain British man-in-the street's view about the 
Falkland Islanders". Chalfont concurred by stating that "There was certainly no sense 
of crisis. This was regarded then as a long-term problem". 94 Tony Benn in the Cabinet 
also expressed his concern for Britain's international reputation rather than sympathy 
with the islanders. He stated that Britain's unilateral walking away from talks with 
Argentina gave "the impression of deviousness" to the world. 95 All these statements in 
late 1968 could not be named as unpatriotic. Conversely, the policy preference to hold 
the Falkland Islands in 1968 might be seen as an unnecessary policy blunder leading 
to a loss of credit that Britain had taken pains to accumulate from its peaceful 
disengagement from the old empire. 96 
Therefore Charlton's explanation of the conception of patriotism would introduce 
confusion. The British decision-makers' opting for discussing about sovereignty with 
93 Hansard (Lords) vol. 775, col. 689,12 December 1968. 
94 Charlton (1989) The littleplatoon, pp. 21, p. 25-6. 
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Argentina in the late 1960s could be a quite rational view, so far as defending BritaiWs 
national prestige was concerned. To trade the Falkland Islands for other long-term 
interests could hardly be criticised as unpatriotic. Secondly, Charlton based his 
argument on Burke's notion of a living continuity between past and present. But he 
could not use the concept selectively. When Burke advocated the "cultivation of 
human reasons", 97 he warned at the same time the potential danger of establishing 
policies by making deductions from abstract principles without noticing the 
situational difference. 98 Charlton's adoption of Burke's notion in such a selective way 
makes this thesis suspect that his interviewing account was less a statement of a 
thought than a means of expressing an emotion he himself felt. 
An incomplete effort 
This thesis is not satisfied by the answers given by Beck and Charlton, because 
historical approaches are at best "a body of knowledge" regarding the past. 99 Their 
effort is incomplete. 100 To distil the inner logic of the case and thereby to educate our 
judgement, there is a need to analyse. The inability to explain the fluctuating 
relationships among the investigated phenomena and the intervening variables gives 
this thesis the impression that these historical approaches intended to explain all the 
subtleties by relying on common sense. This is unacceptable. On the other hand, 
Charlton should "stop confusing patriotism with simple conservatism, or smothering it 
with damning and dismissive reference to chauvinism and jingoism". 101 Taking 
patriotism as an explanation without clarifying its definition, this thesis can eventually 
find itself on the horns of a dilemma-whether patriotism was a driving force to 
retreat from the empire for the sake of British prestige, or whether to stick to the 
historical claim on the Islands. 
3. The domestic approach 
There is also a proposition that the internal struggle among domestic groups is 
the key factor in an international cooperative agreement. 102 It is held that to fulfil a 
97 Andrew Vincent (1992) Modern political ideologies (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 60. 
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purpose in democratic polities, 103 foreign-policy making has not only "an antagonist 
in front of it but a homeland behind it". 104 Therefore, it is argued that the domestic 
concern is pivotal because foreign policies are subject to debates over the distribution 
of interests among domestic groups. 105 To claim the high ground, this approach insists 
that "domestic preferences" are the "most powerful influence" in foreign policy 
making, 106 because, as Koslowski and Kratochwil concur, "reproduction of the 
practice of international actors depends on the reproduction of domestic actors". 107 
In this vein, Freedman contended that domestic politics in the British conduct of 
Falklands policy before the war in 1982 was "surprisingly neglected". 108 Roper 
pointed out that Britain and Argentina in the process of negotiations were strongly 
driven by domestic concerns to the extent that the cost of failure had not been 
seriously discussed. 109 Robin Edmonds, the Head of the American Department in the 
Foreign Office, thought that the cancellation of the Memorandum of Understanding at 
the end of 1968 represented Britain's recognition of the essence of the issue, i. e. the 
drive of domestic politics. ' 10 
Domestic politics is of course relevant to foreign policy. Whenever decision- 
makers talked about a state's reputation in the world, this kind of argument reflects the 
belief that securing autonomy and prestige in foreign policy is sometimes a response 
to domestic needs. "' Besides, the domestic politics are worth exploring in that a 
103 K. J. Holsti (1995) Internationalpolitics: A frameworkfor analysis (NJ: Prentice-Hall 
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division between international and domestic policies is sometimes difficult to draw. 112 
Nevertheless, to what degree is the causal link between domestic politics and foreign 
policy present in this case? By de-emphasising the assumption of the state being a 
unitary actor, 113 this thesis will examine domestic politics in Britain in this issue on 
two fronts. They are the parliamentary opposition, and the Falklands lobby, i. e. the 
Falkland Islands Emergency Committee (FICE) set up in March 1968.1 14 
Parliamentarianism 
Some researchers argued that the Falklands policy was "vitiated" by the power of 
Parliament. ' 15 It was recorded that there were "some 100 MPs" demanding the Wilson 
Government not to transfer the sovereignty against the islanders' will in late 1968.116 
Ziegler described the effect of the crossfire from the backbenchers on Wilson's 
perception at that critical moment. "There is mounting opposition in the Cabinet to 
what was agreed before", wrote Ziegler, "feeling in the House is very strong and cuts 
across the parties; and [Edward] Heath [leader of the Conservative] is already 
beginning to make a big public issue of it". 117 Indeed, since the mid-1960s, the' 
strength of Parliament had been featured by the "influx of thoughtful, able and 
politically tough Members" and had become difficult for the executive to manage. 118 
In contrast to its rising influence in Parliament was the declining influence of the 
Foreign Office (FO) in Whitehall as the result of Britain's dwindling world power. "' 
This contrast made the argument of parliamentarianism-a relational picture with a 
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power asymmetry towards Parliament, based on "the principles of control over 
unbridled executive power and consent to government"-seems convincing in this 
case. 120 
Nevertheless, the above argument seems to have mistaken the result for the 
cause, and it is one-sided. Before political reform was first launched in Britain in 
1974,121 Parliament had only modest or symbolic power over foreign Policy. 122 The 
Whig's constitutional thinking that British rules overseas ought to be "responsive, 
representative and participatory" did not have significant impact on British foreign- 
policy makings, despite it having been widely discussed in the 150 years before the 
1960s. 123 Rather the Whig's project had been effectively transformed into traditional 
constitutionalism. 124 Conventionally as a result, a Cabinet was the source of power 
machine as it was composed of party members drawn from Parliament. Most MPs 
subsequently are seen inclined to follow the party whip, 125 because showing party 
allegiance is the individual's first step to being selected for office. 126 In other words, 
the independence of the backbenchers could, more often than not, be "circumscribed" 
under the guise of party unity. 127 The MP's inclination to go up the ladder-aspiration 
for office--would make the Cabinet, not backbenchers' personal passions, a 
determining factor for MPs' response in Parliament. 128 The link between Parliament 
and the ruling party as a result would render the concept of parliamentarianism a less 
contingent cause of significant policy shifts. 
Secondly, given a certain degree of independence among backbenchers, the 
effect on policy shifts owing to MP's responses in Parliament remained debatable. 
Basically, backbenchers define an issue differently. Some backbenchers are more 
involved with ideologies and less interested in concrete issues. Others are more 
120 David Judge (1993) The parliamentary state (London: Sage), p. 30. 
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concerned with practical issues than political ideals. 129 The different attitudes among 
backbenchers indicate that parliamentarianism can be a broad and vague concept. The 
agony from the perspective of parliamentarianism is that, according to Barnett, 
69 nobody in the Commons actually cared very much if at all about the islanders" in the 
process of the sovereignty talks in 1966-68.130 Therefore this thesis is bound to ask 
why there were 100 MPs united in opposition at the end of 1968. There must be 
political reasons why the Falkland Islands were commonly interpreted as being at 
stake in Parliament, so that the Government was forced to take the opposing opinion 
on board. But what were these reasons? 
Given that there were political reasons to act, and there formed a united front 
among the backbenchers against the Government on the Falklands policy, the 
designated policy did not necessarily change solely because of Question Time in 
Parliament. The criticisms made in Question Time were less threatening to the 
executive than they might have appeared. This was partially because MPs need to 
table a question in advance of at least 10 sitting days, during which period, the 
Foreign Office had reasonable time to prepare its response in order to convince the 
opposition. 131 Therefore, Question Time in Parliament serves more to expose 
"administrative discrepancies" rather than contributing to a policy shift. 132 The British 
parliament, conceivably then, as a force to influence most policy outcomes in late 
1960s may be deemed to have had only a symbolic role. 
The normal situation as a result was that Parliament was a "legitimising body", 
functioning in a supportive rather than a checking role. 133 A government having a 
majority of seats in Parliamentary "can count on getting more if not all of its 
legislative proposals onto the statute books". 134 That said, it is perhaps going too far to 
comment that "the Commons has become the creature of the party machine and lost 
its centrality to the national debate". 135 There are influential arguments exchanged in 
Parliament. But the Cabinet in the 1960s was undoubtedly standing "at the pinnacle of 
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government". 136 Wilson was indeed the power holder behind the party machine. His 
immediate dismissal of seven parliamentary private secretaries who had abstained on 
the vote for the EEC initiative on 10 May 1967, for instance, might not be 
unprecedented, 137 but the prompt reaction could be seen as his careful and firm 
control of the party. 138 In his first two tenures from 1964 to 1970, even the left in the 
Labour Party was judged as relatively silent, 139 compared to those defenders of 
Clause Four against the previous Labour leader, Hugh Gaitskell. 140 Accordingly, 
George Brown might be under vocal fire for his addiction to liquor; Michael Stewart 
might be of a "dull" personality. 141 But these examples did not suggest that the 
Government had difficulty in building consensus or these personalities would give in. 
Ultimately, the British style of politics is taken as "much less personalised". 142 These 
personalities at the level of ministers were irrelevant to the powerful status of the 
government when designating a policy. Once a policy is designated, the pressure from 
parliamentary enquiries should not be taken for granted. As Michels concludes, 
echoed by Lipset, 143 "the influence exercised upon the governmental machine by an 
energetic opposition party is necessarily slow, [and] is subject to frequent 
interruptions". 144By this token, when it comes to the issue of the Falkland Islands in 
the late 1960s, this thesis has to pay attention to the executive side in search of the key 
factors of policy preferences. 
The Falklands lobbyists 
The campaigning skill of the Falklands lobby was taken by Little as the factor 
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that pressurised the Government into shifting the negotiating principle and giving up 
the Memorandum of Understanding. Little noted that the "Islanders are politically 
sophisticated". Their lobbying campaign was successful because they "presented 
themselves as a small people" exploited by decision-makers in London. 145 
However, Little's explanation was no more than impressionistic, and he was 
reasonably reserved in his claim. 146 Bureaucratically speaking, lobbying activities 
have a long history from the 18th century onwards. 147 Nevertheless, lobbying activities 
have hardly been taken for granted as decisive. There are two reasons for this 
observation. To start with, policy makers seem deeply aware that lobbying activities 
tend "to reinforce existing bias within the political system". 148 To keep a view as 
balanced as possible, policy makers may also be more inclined to widen the access to 
different sources of lobbyist activities. The other side of the coin is that legitimacy is a 
fundamental criterion for the government to decide which views of the lobby groups 
are considered and acted upon. 149 In order to gain influence in policy-making, a lobby 
group has to be seen as legitimate. Seen in this light, the FIEC did not occupy a 
privileged position as a lobby group. It was known as a London-based company 
running a business in the Falkland Islands. In 1968, among the 800 shareholders of 
that company, there were only 10 per cent of them living in the islands. Most 
shareholders lived in Dundee, Perth and London. 150 The FO, in the decision-making 
process, had good reasons to keep a distance from the FIEC, as the latter could not 
legitimately be conferred an "insider status" to affect policy outcomes. 151 The role of 
FIEC cannot be exaggerated in this case, as the FO would not be expected to consult 
the FIEC "on a regular basis". 152 The influence from FIEC could be easily sidelined. 
Therefore, contrary to the expectation that "the most important question 
concerning the interested groups is how much power" they possessed, 153 this thesis 
145 Little (1988) "Anglo-Argentine relations", p. 149. 
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saw the influence of FIEC as being marginalised. Besides, however powerful and 
skilful a lobby group can be, and however heavy investment the lobby groups may put 
into their activities aimed at arousing aspirations, "propaganda does not constitute a 
movement". 154 In other words, lobbyists in British politics normally have no 
difficulties in gaining access to the governments, 155 but this does not mean having 
decisive influence in the decision-making process. 156 Exactly which groups' 
suggestion will be taken into account remains dependent upon the policy makers in 
Whitehall. 157 
More destabilising to the argument made from the perspective of lobby groups 
was that, when the sovereignty negotiation was secretly performed and the talks were 
recorded in the form of a Memorandum, the Wilson Government was apparently in a 
ICUlty. 1 8 position to sideline the lobby groups without too much diff, 5 Hence, although 
Grant argued that "Government makes concessions to a pressure group because of the 
validity of its argument", 159 this statement is still debatable as bearing on this case. If 
the talks are shrouded in secrecy, chances of debate in public are minimised. The 
factor of lobby groups, however persuasive in their arguments, has to be downplayed. 
On the other hand, British foreign policy had been largely deemed as a 
continuous effort by successive governments. There was a manifest mood of 
indifference in British society towards foreign policy in the mid- I 960s, particularly 
when economic problems attracted fixed attention. "0 This general attitude of 
indifference to foreign affairs will incline this thesis to the conclusion that the role of 
the Falklands lobby can be exaggerated in 1968. It was highly likely that the British 
public was ready to leave the issue of the Falkland Islands to the "narrow elite". 161 
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Under this circumstance, it will be safe to argue that foreign policies could not be the 
area where lobby groups had much impact on the government. 162 
Perhaps Dillon is correct to conclude that "neither the power of the Falklands 
lobby, nor the constitutional prerogatives and political sentiments of the Commons 
were decisive". 163 This statement goes to the heart of the contention. It may be the 
nature of the Falklands Islands policy, rather than the relative power of Parliament or 
interest groups at stake in the late 1960s. 
To sum up, domestic politics as the explanation either from the perspective of 
parliamentarianism or that of lobby groups can be plagued with difficulties in this 
case. Firstly, domestic politics shed less light on the part each played in the decision- 
making process. 164 It is concerned even less with the exact influence of the values, 
held by the competing groups, on the executive. 165 Domestic politics is certainly 
yoked closely to international politics. But this thesis tends to see the interaction of 
domestic politics and international politics as the driving force in this issue, ' 66 
because foreign policy is much more than an external expression of domestic 
politics. 
167 
4. The cultural approach 
The cultural approach attempts to demonstrate how a state's political behaviour 
reflects its underlying cultural structure. Its major aim is to explain the tendency of 
certain groups of people in their adherence to "the perceptions, preferences, and 
values" that can "sustain their social relations". 168 On this premise, Smith argued that 
the British-Argentine dispute was a cultural clash. The British decision to side with 
the islanders was "a rite of democracy", organised and maintained around a cultural 
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code in a religious sense. 169 Explaining the romantic overtones of the dispute 
grounded in Emile Durkheim's viewpoint, 170 Smith dismissed domestic politics in 
understanding the dispute. He also denied that the British response was a consequence 
of patriotic fervour. Rather, following Durkhcim's dichotomous line between the 
"sacred" and "profane", 171 Smith argued that the cultural forces created pervasive 
meaning that was unacceptable to both sides. The dispute as a result became hard to 
avoid on the ground of a cultural division between the two sides. Furlong and 
Albiston reinforced this reasoning. They further elaborated the division by creating a 
contrast between Argentina and Britain as "authoritarianism vs. traditional open 
society", "personalism vs. merit", "corporatism vs. contracC, "transcendentalism vs. 
pragmatism". 172 It is to this perspective this thesis now turns. 
Elusive definition 
Taking culture as an explanatory variable, Smith has to explain the first question 
as to what culture means. The problem is that culture is too "permissive" for an 
observer to grasp its exact meaning. 173 Culture may refer to "language, geography, 
history, religion, social class, race, rural-urban residence, nationality"; or "a common 
political organisation, a social structure, an economic system, a religion, and a 
common way of life that embraces every aspect of human existence"; or "attitudes, 
values, norms and opinion" set "in a macro level". 174 It may also refer to "a system" or 
"norms of cognition, values, meanings, beliefs, understandings, ideologies, rules, 
... symbols, emotions, expressiveness, the unconscious, behaviour patterns, structures, 
practice". 175 The character of permissiveness in the definition 'of culture leads to a 
169 Ibid., pp. 114-5. 
"' Philip Smith (199 1) 'Codes and conflict: Toward a theory of war as ritual", Theory and Society, 20, 
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sarcastic comment that anything that cannot be explained by an identifiable factor is 
attributed to culture. 176 Culture, as Alvesson adds, becomes "a word for the lazy". 177 
Yet, those analysts following cultural approaches seem satisfied with the 
definition of culture being broad and permissive. 178 They claim that they take "delight 
in employing a variety of theories and methods from diverse disciplines", so that they 
refrain from applying any strict methodology, 179 because they have no intention of 
predicting, 180 but only have the need for "always writing". ' 81 
However, if one sets culture as one's starting point, one can be confused without 
a clearly defined boundary to control the explanatory variable and to estimate its 
causality. As Herring explained, cultural patterns across the two confrontational sides 
sometimes overlap. 182 The overlapping ground among the above elements such as 
norms, values, beliefs, ideologies, can be likened to movement between U shifts of a 
more subterranean nature". 183 More often than not, the so-called "subterranean" 
framework constitutes an unstable perspective in observation. Culture as a result 
becomes elusive as an explanatory variable. 184 Analysts run the risk of circular 
reasoning. 185 
Another point is that a cultural movement is "socially transmitted", 186 but this 
does not imply the reverse is true. Culture does not necessarily transmit a society. 
Quite the contrary, as Alexander observed, "powerful groups often succeed in 
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transforming cultural structures" with invisible but legitimate means. 187 The BBC 
acting as a powerful "filter" for the rise of British rock'n'roll was a case in point. 
According to Street, because of the effective manipulation of the BBC, British 
roclen'roll in the 1960s had a different meaning from that in the United States., 88 In 
other words, culture may be better treated as a dependent variable in analysis. 1 81 It 
may not be appropriate as an explanatory variable for a systematic observation and 
theory testing. 
Lastly, Smith's argument is problematic in that cultural difference does not 
perforce link to conflict. Nearly "all the social groups" are somewhat culturally 
different, but not all of the cultural differences will bring about cultural conflict. 190 
When two different cultures meets, the result is either to "perceive", to "conceive" or 
even to learn from others. 191 That said, conflicting groups may be distinguished by 
cultural difference, but culture in most conflicts "is not what is at stake". 192 
Where to draw the line? 
Formidable obstacles remain if the British-Argentine relations are observed from 
a cultural perspective. For more than a century, Argentina had been strongly affected 
by Britain's liberal norms, 193 to the extent that even the US found it difficult to 
remove this European influence from South America ever since the promulgation of 
the Monroe Doctrine. 194 Partly because Argentina used to be one of the leading 
countries of immigration, 195 partly because its populations were mainly of European 
descent, the cultural exclusiveness in Argentina was by no means distinct. Argentina 
was not only described as the "most European" among the South American countries 
187 Alexander (1990) "Analytic debates", p. 26. 
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but culturally "another British dominion". 196 The British influence on Argentines, on 
the other hand, was not limited to Buenos Aires, a cosmopolitan city. With Britain's 
cheap commercial goods dumped into the Argentine interior, the British influence was 
actually countrywide in Argentina. 197 By 1914, the largest British community outside 
Britain was in Argentina, 198 in the 1940s many Argentines identified themselves with 
their British counterparts! 99 Judging from the tendency of cultural transformation to 
be slower than other institutional change, 200 this thesis finds it not baseless to argue 
that the overlapping of two cultures constituted a subterranean force linking Britain to 
Argentina down to the 1960s. To put it precisely, notwithstanding the territorial 
dispute over the Falkland Islands in the past 130 years, there was still a "considerable 
fund of Argentine good will for Britain" as late as the 1960s, 201 when the two turning- 
point policy preferences took place. Culture was clearly not at stake. 
Therefore, when Furlong and Albiston described Argentina in terms of 
"corporatism" as one criterion to differentiate British and Argentine cultures, their 
distinction can be arbitrary. If corporatism is defined as a convention that a 
government policy emerges from negotiations among government, business and 
unions, in which process, state is the major co-ordinator, 
202 this thesis witnesses 
corporatism also ushered in by the Wilson Government of 1964 in Britain. 203 There 
was, for instance, a wage freeze as part of a deflation programme by both 
governments at the same period '204 although the Argentine version might be termed 
more radical. 205 The difference was therefore of degree, not of kind. It would be risky 
to treat the two as dichotomous. 206 
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Likewise, when Furlong and Albiston described Britain as a "traditional open 
society", it was worth stressing that, after Peron stepped down in 1955, Argentines had 
experienced more than a decade of liberal-democratic reforms. 207 With many 
scientific and literary clubs being organised, Buenos Aires was seen as culturally 
"receptive to all the scientific, literary and political currents of thought that were in 
voguen. 208 It was a place of cultural liberalism that could even compete with London 
in cultural creeds. 209 The people in Buenos Aires in the 1960s therefore could not have 
missed out on the British "New Wave", expressive of strong working class sentiment 
in the theatre and novels at that period, because the new wave of British fashion was 
widely enjoyed across international boundaries. 210 In other words, this pattern of 
British cultural influence would not be dwindling merely because of British industrial 
decline. 211 It instead proved even more influential through television in the 1960s. 212 
The overlapping values across the two boundaries in turn will support the view of this 
thesis that cultural difference is not persuasive as an argument for the ensuing conflict 
concerning the issue of the Falkland Islands in the late 1960s. 
Where was the political action? 
Adopting a cultural explanation for the issue of the Falkland Islands does not 
locate the exact source of power, nor clarify who or what exercises power in the 
interaction process. 213 To understand a particular political action, there is a need to 
strike a balance by reference to subjective meaning in the wider context, and the value 
of the power holders has to enter the equation. 214 Culture over the decision-makers is 
not a determining superstructure. It is neither mechanically self-functioning on the 
mindset of decision-makers, nor statically interpreted in meaning. 2 15 An individual 
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can be obedient to cultural norms. But his/her behavioural response is by no means 
mechanical. As Wikan pointed out with such directness, it is those who use the power, 
not cultures themselves, that are "accountable". 216 Kier made a reinforcing point by 
passing that the British way of strategic thinking was a "politically inspired" activity, 
rather than a "culturally determined myth". 217 It is no wonder that Douglas and Crick 
complain that the analysts addressing cultural conflict "say nothing about PolitiCS99.218 
The point to note here is that when Smith traces his argument of cultural 
difference between Argentina and Britain to Durkheim's assumption of "social facts" 
characterised by dichotomy, Durkheim's assumption does not help deepen the 
understanding of this issue. Durkheims assuming "social facts" as "every way of 
acting ... independent of its individual manifestations", will hardly escape criticism of 
an "epochal analysis", 2 19 because Durkheims "social facts" have gone beyond an 
external representation. 220 That is the reason why Durkheim's followers either in 
sociology or anthropology have no longer considered the sacred-profane dichotomy as 
empirically sustainable. 221 In explaining Britain's intransigence in 1968 as a result, 
Smith can not stay with the bald idea that the students of post-Durkheim have no 
longer endorsed. 
So far as the puzzles in this thesis are concerned, a cultural explanation in this 
case is clearly too vague. The unclear definition, Durkheim's holistic account of 
preference formation, and empirically, the subterranean form of cultural link between 
Argentina and Britain, illustrate that the current findings based on cultural difference 
are an interpretation put in a hyperbolic form. The argument that culture "is more like 
a style than a set of preferences", as Swindler rightly avers, will leave culture at best 
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an image that does not determine the causes to the two turning-point policy 
preferences stated in Chapter 1.222 
5. The perspective of identity 
Some scholars work with the idea of national identity and use it to explain 
foreign policy. They stipulate that the call for identity is decisive, because identity 
constitutes "peoples' frames of reference in general, and their political perspectives in 
particular". 223 When people of the same identity perceive their identity under threat, 
they will struggle for recognition. 224 From that perspective, Gustafson argued that the 
islanders were not a minority on which Britain took pity by accident. The sympathy 
with the islanders was activated by the call for a recovery of Britishness. 225 Femenia 
advanced the view that the intransigent British position was a reaction to the fact that, 
with the Suez crisis of 1956 as a watershed, the British witnessed their history- 
congruent self-image withering away during the 1960s. 226 Macleod believed that the 
question of national identity placed a limit on British foreign policy and therefore, the 
issue of the Falklands Islands in the late 1960s was by nature where British identity 
was at stake. 227 Here, identity was taken as a psychological dynamic, triggered by an 
unchanged need for self-assertion. 228 When it came to the British conduct of the 
Falklands policy in 1968, a hidden need for relating a glorious past to the present 
became a cause of the British policy preference to hastily invent the formula that the 
wishes of the islanders should be paramount. Hence, the fundamental issue in the 
process of the talks in 1966-68 had no longer been the credibility or compromise in 
the sovereignty talks. 229 It was, rather, Britishness-an objectified mode of the "social 
consciousness"-operating in the British foreign poliCy. 230 Therefore, although the 
issue of the Falkland Islands used to be a dormant territorial issue, and although it 
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could be worth a settlement by ceding sovereignty in 1966, the FO found that British 
identity was decisive, because the talks were transformed into emotive ones. Hence, 
the policy preference to stick to the wishes of the islanders was understood as a 
therapy and a symbol of compensatory force to reverse fading Britishness. 231 The 
suspension of the Memorandum of Understanding in December 1968 therefore 
became a necessary result. 232 
A static image 
Nevertheless, whereas these scholars made sense of the British policy 
preferences concerning the Falklands issue by referring to national identity, a simple 
specification by Britishness did not lend them well to rigorous empirical research. To 
start with, identity as a decisive force can be contributing to unity or disunity in the 
British politics. Langlands argued that "the English basis of Britishness is the source 
of its greatest strength, as well as its greatest weakness. It ensures strong English 
support for the state, while simultaneously attenuating and ensuring the persistence of 
Scottish and Welsh national identity". 233 What Langlands has suggested is a need to 
recognise that "the moment of identification is profoundly political". 234 The essential 
political dynamics in terms of power and in the sense of belonging cannot escape 
closer observation. 235 
That was the reason why, in the analysis of the Falklands dispute, the point that 
the reiterative script could construct an emotional aspect of identities and prescribed 
actions, as Femenia argued, was debatable. 236 The link between scripture and identity 
237 cannot be taken as a causal one without considering the specific context. More 
specifically, the public, to different degrees, is capable of choosing an identity to be 
associated with according to the situations. 238 Script-language bearing on identity 
does not offer an ontological force to grip on human minds. Identity is to be 
231 John Eldridge (1994) "Book review: 'Framing the Falklands war: Nationhood, culture and 
identity? '", Sociology, 28,2, p. 567. 
232 Ibid., pp. 18-9; E. J. Hobsbawn (1990) Nations and nationalism since 1780: Program, myth, reality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 163. 
233 Rebecca Langlands (1999) 'Britishness or Englishness? The historical problem of national identity 
in Britain", Nations and Nationalism, 5,1, p. 63. 234 Ibid.. 
235 David Knights and Hugh Willmott (1985) *Power and identity in theory and practice", The 
Sociological Review, 33,1, p. 23. 
236 Femenia (1996) National identity, p. 199. 
237 Smith (197 1) Theories ofnationalism, p. 20; Snyder (1968) The meaning ofnationalism, p. 22. 
238 Ernst B. Hass (1993) "Nationalism: An instrumental social construction", Millennium, 22,3, p. 505. 
71 
recognised, not solely endowed. 239 When perceiving the effect from the perspective of 
identity, an analyst will run the risk of outweighing the individual reasoning with a 
deterministic concept of the script structure. 240 Above all, making an argument based 
on the concept of identity, the political dynamic has to be explored. This is not only 
because of the ethics of Kantian liberals that identity is a free "process of remaking 
and becoming", 24 1 but also because identity as a symbolic structure is subject to 
"political contestation" and redefinition. 242 
Unfortunately, although Femenia, for instance, claimed that her picture of British 
identity in the 1960s was "always in process" of remaking the "collective meaning". 243 
her description of British identity under threat was fragmented and not supportive. It 
makes this thesis suspect that identity, as a determining force, cannot provide an 
explanation for the unending dispute between the two sides in the late 1960s. To 
illustrate this point, the thesis argues that Femenia did not realise that in the 1960s 
there existed mixed, or even contrasting, views about Britishness in the British public 
mind. There is clearly a need for Femenia to gain enough contextual support both in 
time and space to strengthen the argument. 
The perspective of time sequence 
Femenia started her observation from the Suez Crisis. For Femenia, the loss of 
identity in respect of Britishness had been in evidence since then. However, the 
psychological backlash of the Suez Crisis in 1956 was on British decision-makers, 
rather than on British society. In the second half of the 1950s, British society was in a 
complacent mood with the rise of consumption and expectations of affluence. 244 
Childs saw Britain "changing fundamentally" and moving for the better, because of 
prosperity and full employment in the early 1960s. 245 But Femenia did not pay enough 
attention to this fact. She took "the flare-up of racism against former colonists coming 
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240 Finlayson (1998) "Psychology, psychoanalysis and theories of nationalism", p. 153. 
241 Michael J. Sandel (1996) Democracy's discontent (Cambridge: Belknap), p. 12; Christopher J. 
Ullock (1996) "Imaging community: A metaphor of being or becoming? ", Millennium, 25,2, p. 440. 
242 Pierre Birnbaum (1996) 'From multiculturalism to nationalism', Political Theory, 24,1, p. 34; 
Roxanne Lynn Doty (1996) 'Immigration and national identity: Constructing the nation", Review of 
International Studies, 22,3, p. 239; Alan Finlayson (1998) 'Psychology, psychoanalysis and theories of 
nationalism", Nations and Nationalism, 4,2, p. 157; David Miller (1989) Market, state, and 
co= Theoreticalfoundations ofmarket socialism (Oxford: Clarendon), p. 235. 
243 (1996) National identity, p. 32. 
244 Dick Bradley (1992) Understanding Rock 'n'Roll. - Popular music in Britain 1955-64 (Buckingham 
& Philadelphia: Open University), p. 8L 
245 Childs (1997) Britain since 1945, p. 79. 
72 
to settle in Great Britain" as the supportive example, jumping to the conclusion that 
"from then on, a series of identity crises ensued" leading to the eventual clash between 
Argentina and Britain. 246 Nevertheless, when Femenia wrote that "everyone in the 
United Kingdom confronted both with the threatened loss of national symbols, and 
Britain's pending integration into the evolving European Community led to an 
247 intensification of national identity as a way to keep it aliveý* , 
her description could 
be over-statcd. 
Regarding Britain! s entry, opinion polls in 1961 showed that up to fifty per cent 
of the British public were in favour ofjoining the EEC. 248 In 1966, public opinion in 
favour of entry remained a majority of above 70 per cent . 
249 Britain's entry or not, 
indeed, seemed not an issue at that period. Rather, entry into the EEC represented 
British economic aspirations then. 250 There were some politicians in strong opposition 
to the entry, but they seemed to base their arguments more on parliamentary 
sovereignty than on identity being under threat. 25 1 Even Enoch Powell, one of the 
most controversial politicians in British politics on immigration, racial policy and 
entry of the EEC, 252 urged a "multi-racial society" in Britain by declaring in 1964 that 
"the immigrants are part of the community". 253 This remark was in sharp contrast to 
his Birmingham speech-Rivers of Blood-delivered in March 1968 that shocked 
British society. 254 His moderate viewpoint in 1964 indicated that the argument from 
the perspective of British identity as being under threat was fragmented and 
incoherent, so far as British identity translated into Britain's foreign policy in the 1960 
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was concerned. Even in 1965, when Powell began to call for repatriation of the 
255 immigrant population, there was no steady support for his position. The lack of 
support not only implied that identity of local people could not be incompatible with 
the immigrants, but reflected that the social pressure from the immigrants leading to 
the so-called loss of Britishness was exaggerated. As late as 1966, BICA (British 
Immigration Control Association), a group campaigning for the immigration ban, did 
not garner visible support. 256 When the immigration policy was debated in the 1966 
election campaign, it had proceeded in a quite rational manner and was not considered 
a serious political issue. 257 When the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968 was 
hurriedly passed, 258 the Act might be understood as a hasty response to a possible rise 
of hatred among the classes. It could hardly be interpreted as a break-uP of the "we- 
ness" of Commonwealth units. 259 The sense of "fraternity" in the Commonwealth 
remained rooted in many different areas, 260 and the general British attitude towards 
immigrants remains quite stable. Seen in this light, it was more likely that the 
explosion of the Birmingham speech might be more of Powell's exploitation of the 
issue of inflows of Kenya Asian immigrants in early 1968.261 It was, according to 
Roth, a "classic example of misjudged brinkmanship" challenging Heath, the Tory 
leader, 262 rather than a true reflection of a social force trying to reverse the decline of 
Britishness. 263 
This interpretation is plausible. Ultimately, the inflow of immigration had been 
exaggerated, because there was a net outward-flowing population in Britain in the 
mid-1960s. 264 There was no apparent increase in the size of Powell's supporters after 
March 1968, and indeed, Powell received immediate rebuttals by politicians from 
both parties. 265 His popularity was limited, 266 not only because the racialist speeches 
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were "single-issue based"-In the realm of immigration policy only, 267 but also 
because they could be seen coming more directly from the ideologies among classes 
rather than national identity. 268 It was understandable that this kind of concern came 
from fear of redundancy and lowering of wage rates. 269 The fear would appear "at its 
strongest among unskilled working people" in Britain and it had more to do with 
"economic threat" of specific labour groups, 270 or "union membership". 271 Conceivably 
then, the concern had less to do with national identity. Femenia's description can be 
farfetched. In addition, this kind of concern with unemployment had already existed 
well before the Suez Crisis. In the early 20th century, there had been "coloured alien 
seamen problem accompanied by riots" taking place among British seamen in Cardiff, 
Liverpool and Newport. 272 It is therefore problematic to interpret the act of defending 
economic means as the psychological frustration of Britishness. This is because 
defending economic interests has always been a constant concern in human history. 
Femenia clearly took a constant concern as a specific one in foreign policy-making. 
Different perceptions of spaces 
Taking identity as an explanatory variable for foreign policy; one has to realise 
that the underlying question is whether one group in observation sharing a collective 
identity is incompatible with another group with a different identity. 273 In other words, 
there is clearly a need for the analyst to explore the perception of identity, i. e. the 
perception of Britishness in this case, both in the British Isles and the Falkland Islands 
in the late 1960s. 
According to Dillon, the Falklands Islands in the 1960s were a community in the 
sense of a group mutually dependent upon one another and who inclined to "act 
together to satisfy their needs through common forms and sets of organisations". 274 
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Unfortunately, this geographically remote district as a group was psychologically 
isolated, because the British Government and the Falkland Islands Government were 
a consistently unresponsive to the Islanders' views". 275 It was socially feudalistic, 
because "ideas were communicated and issues debated through direct social and 
personal contact". 276 It was also politically paternalistic, because their poor 
educational standards and gradual depopulation made their economic life almost 
dependent on the Falkland Islands Company; the latter occupied a monopoly position 
in the islands by holding half of the land. Because of the dependent relationship 
between the islanders and the vested-interest minority, according to Dillon, when the 
islanders' viewpoints about their future were not responded to accordingly, there 
existed a rather tense relationship between the islanders and the Falkland Islands 
Company. 277 
Therefore, the islanders' resolute preference to rally to "the British Crown" has to 
be understood from the perspectives of their dependence on the Falkland Islands 
Company on the islands, and the uncertainties of their fate lying ahead. With the 
degree of uncertainties developing to the extent that no compensation had been 
mentioned in the sovereignty negotiations, 278 and that the islanders had no access to 
managing their future, a strong attachment to Britishness, consequently, could be 
taken. Upholding Britishness as this moment became an effective strategy as well as 
an emotive outlet to express their indignation. 
The irony was that the elite in the Islands who represented the vested interests 
were quite satisfied to see the "loyalist politics" coming into play. This was because 
upholding Britishness would overcome the islanders' ambivalent sentiments toward 
the Falkland Islands Company and distrust of the local Government . 
279 As Dillon 
explained, upholding Britishness became a primary concern and preferred strategy, 
because, as the situation deteriorated, loyalist politics would help the disgruntled 
islanders avoid confrontation with the elite. Instead, Britishness "provided vital 
symbolic cohesion for an otherwise fragmented and fearful community". 280 
Seen in this light, the Falkland Islands in the 1960s were an area where there 
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existed a higher level of "integral nationalism", defined as "the exclusive pursuit of 
national policies, the absolute maintenance of national integrity". 28 1 There might exist 
diverse opinions about the future. But when uncertainties arose, the forms of "acting 
together" sometimes would turn out to be the recipe. 282 The climate of the island 
community in the 1960s therefore can be seen as a "strong loyalism", which 
undermined the potentially different opinions, 283 to the extent that there arose 
It exaggerated mannerisms", whereby the islanders in the late 1960s made themselves, 
the British abroad, more British than the British at home. 284 This kind of integral 
nationalism therefore represented a typical jingoistic social mood when their future 
was under threat. Holding Britishness became an effort "laborious to exalt one nation 
at the expense of others'. 285 It would not be a surprise that once the catalyst was 
off 286 provided, agitation in a nationalist sense would easily spark Because of this 
observation, Femenia is certainly satisfied to explain the case based on the integral 
nationalism developed in the Falkland Islands. 
However, arguing in the above way will fail to consider a broader perception of 
Britishness in the British Isles, where the public saw things from a different 
perspective and it was this perspective that the Government in London was supposed 
to take care of In the late 1940s, Britain had already exhibited a case of liberal 
nationalism in which the British public expected a "redrawing of the political map of 
the world" without too heavy a burden from their old imperial days. 287 Down to the 
1960s, the British Isles could be described as a place of national disintegration where 
the spirit of common ties, the essence of traditional neighbourhood, and the rural lines 
288 
of local communities were on the decline. To the extent that industrialisation fully 
developed and frequency of social mobility increased, there was a generally sceptical 
attitude towards the traditional social relations in Britain during the 1960s. 289 It might 
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not be wide of the mark to argue that Labour's rise to power in the mid- I 960s was a 
rcflcction of this "inspiring and imaginative picture" of social trends in the British 
Isles. 290 Labour coming into power in the mid-1960s represented a society that was 
generally of the view that nationalistic egotism did not help but only made for 
intensifying power politics. 291 Thus, contrary to integral nationalism that was 
characteristic of the Falkland Islands community, the British Isles in the 1960s was a 
place, where nationalist appeal in foreign policy was thought of as the source of 
trouble. Different from the Falkland Islands characterised by paternalistic politics 
internally, the British Isles had lots of room for legal autonomy for certain groups 
with individualistic thinking. 292 
The contrast between the two societies reflected that identity, as a psychological 
force in the 1960s, could either be referring to a "conservative", "backward-looking" 
mindset as among the islanders on the Falkland Islands, or in a more "open-ended", 
receptive form as displayed by ordinary people in the British Isles. 293 In other words, 
identity, in the name of Britishness, cannot make a total claim without differentiation. 
In British sovereign territories, there existed different degrees of perception of self- 
identification, which did not exclude one another. 294 For this thesis, therefore, British 
national identity in the late 1960s as something that could possibly be translated into a 
factor in hostility to Argentines seemed to apply more squarely to the Falkland Islands 
community than to the British Isles. 
Perhaps Cohen's notion of "situational identity" helps this thesis to explain the 
contrasted picture more precisely. As Cohen rightly argues, individuals have the 
tendency to construct their own social identities no doubt. However, the effect of their 
constructive effort can be limited, because the effect may be sometimes subject to 
geographical locations. 295 This statement indicates that there is a need for the analysts 
of identity to take the process of identity formation seriously enough to its logical 
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conclusion in observing foreign Policy. 296 Indeed, with 8,000 miles of distance across 
the Atlantic, the British Isles and the Falkland Islands were supposed to have a 
different consciousness of self-identification. Analyses based on the notion of identity 
risk the danger of supposing two societies "to be governed by single patterns... of 
economic activity, political behaviour and cultural development". 297 They cannot only 
stress similarities, without mentioning differences. 298 Otherwise, it is hard for them to 
escape the criticism that they are making a total claim without differentiating the 
contrasted perception between the British Isles and the Falkland Islands community in 
the late 1960s. 
Lastly, the impact of "political identities", as an issue for decision-makers, is 
"relational" 
. 
299 To observe the concerns of decision-makers in London and their 
ensuing actions being aroused by an issue of identity, an analyst must embody more 
than one simple inference rule from everyday life . 
300 The fact was that, as Chalfont 
admitted, what concerned the decision-makers in London during the sovereignty 
negotiations were the public responses in the British Isles, not those from the Falkland 
Islanders. 301 Therefore, the perception of British identity among the islanders might 
have been powerful, but their concern could be sidelined by the decision-makers in 
London without too much effort. This was because the issue of national identity was 
essentially "interpretative". 302 To Put it otherwise, awareness of national identity did 
not imply consensus. When the one side calls for attention, the other side does not 
necessarily react. 303 There must be some contextual factors stimulating a collected 
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body to enhance or defend its shared identity. 304 This is particularly relevant in this 
case where the decisive power was apparently in the FO's hands. 305 The role of 
national identity cannot be overemphasised without other specific concerns being 
taken on board. 306 
In short, identity cannot be addressed simply in its own terms. To argue solely 
from the perspective of identity without reference to the development time sequence 
and space location is apparently insufficient. It was true that the Falkland Islanders 
felt their British identity under threat, but London rarely responded to that kind of 
concern. Discussants of identity cannot make a total claim without recognising that 
the people on the British Isles in the main had a substantially different perception of 
self-identity from those on the Falklands in the 1960s due to different life experience. 
When it comes to the cognitive functioning of identity, there is a need to consider the 
nature of the issue in question. 307 Without this concern, the literal meaning of the 
word-Britishness-cannot be taken for granted. 308 
6. The perspective of UK geopolitics 
From the perspective of UK geopolitics, Gamba-Stonehouse starts her argument 
from the assumption that the US-UK "special relationship" was the guiding principle 
of British foreign policy during the Cold War. Because of heavy weight having been 
placed on the East-West balance-of-power calculations in the British-American global 
strategy, argued Gamba-Stonehouse, Britain took a passive attitude in building its 
North-South relations including those with Argentina. South America subsequently 
occupied a lower priority in decision-making. This reactive mindset among the British 
officials brought about the British Government's underestimation of Argentina's 
strong appeal in the sovereignty negotiations. Misperception as a result occurred, and 
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Gamba-Stonehouse's inference is based on the perspective of UK geopolitics 
linked to the "special relationship". Her view is fundamentally the 
structural/hegemonic one, assuming the global competition between the two 
hegemonic powers during the Cold War as a decisive referent for many states in 
making foreign policy. 3 10 The US-UK "special relationship" as a result was taken as 
the highly relevant concerns for Britain's policy preferences in the Falklands policy. 
Nevertheless, this argument serves at best a correlational description. There is no 
coherent evidence from the perspective of UK geopolitics to show an immediate 
effect on Britain's first policy preference, nor on the decision not to let the 
Memorandum of Understanding come into the public in late 1968. This inference is 
plagued with explanatory gaps in three respects. 
The US-UK special relationship 
In the first place, this thesis argues that, for British Governments, the essence of 
the "special relationship" across the Atlantic might be more of "consultation", rather 
than an overbearing American influence on the British conduct of foreign policy in 
the 1960s. 311 More often than not, there existed policy conflicts between the Johnson 
Administration and the Wilson Government, and the causal effect of the US-UK 
"special relationship" during the Cold War therefore remained uncertain. 312 Vietnam 
policy, which was a key ideological and military battlefield between the West and East 
in the 1960s, is a case in point. 
In retrospect, Wilson's Vietnam Policy never came up to US expectations. 313 His 
reluctance to send in troops to help Johnson in the Vietnam conflict was a proof 
counter to Gamba-Stonehouse's understanding based on the "special relationship". The 
British decision not to offer military assistance to the US was not because of its lack 
of military capability. President Johnson had already made it clear that what 
concerned the US most was not how many British troops Wilson would send into 
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Vietnam, but "the number of 'flags' represented by [different] units, however 
small". 314 The US had good reason to harbour this expectation. As regards American 
foreign policy, Southeast Asia was the place "where Britain conformed with American 
wishes mostly". 315 To the US disappointment, nevertheless, Britain seemed 
determined not to join the US force in bombing Hanoi. And as it turned out, Wilson 
was hardly subjected to American pressure to dispatch soldiers to Vietnam. 316 His 
response in the Vietnam policy bore testimony contrary to Gamba-Stonehouse's 
proposition that the East-West confrontation or the "special relationship" occupied a 
dominant place in all of Britain's conduct of foreign policy, and the policy of the 
Falklands dispute was one of them. 
Hence, when making inferences from the world-system perspective in this case, 
caution is needed. A cornerstone of British-American foreign policy did exist, and the 
Wilson Government also reiterated that. 317 But this kind of mentality or perception 
could not deny other possibilities in formulating a foreign policy. Britain in the 1960s 
was also actively engaged in relation with Europe, the Third World and even Cuba. 318 
When the US placed the embargo on trade with Cuba in 1962, Britain continued its 
foreign relations with Cuba and the trade between Britain and Cuba was actually 
booming in 1964.319 In view of Britain's 1965 Defence White Paper, the Labour 
Government did not take a viewpoint on world politics consistent with either its 
predecessors or its US partner. It had begun to see a Soviet attack in Europe as a least 
likely case "even on a limited scale". 320 On the other hand, the enthusiastic effort of 
the Labour Government to enter the ECC during this period evinced that Britain took 
a perspective different from the argument made from the hegemonic perspective of 
the Cold War. 32 1 As Brown, Foreign Secretary in 1966-68, stated, "I do take the view, 
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and so does the Prime Minister and so do all my colleagues very strongly that I do not 
want the world to go on being polarised between vast giant superpowers". 322 Brown's 
remark explicitly showed that there were limitations on some analysts' viewpoints to 
make inferences from the concerns of the "special relationship" or the East-West 
confrontation. The Wilson Government was not ready to give in to the US global 
strategy when it came to making its own foreign policy. 
Indeed, making inference from the perspective of "the special relationship" can 
be problematic in this case. This was also because Britain's traditional foreign policy 
strategy had been characterised by three interlocking circles: the relationship with the 
Commonwealth, with the United States and finally with Europe. 323 Although the 
strategy seemed to a certain extent self-flattering down to the 1960s, 324 a British 
statesmen, " as Gamba-Stonehouse also acknowledged, had "deluded themselves on 
the need to rethink the country's role". 325 The British policy makers might have 
realised that they were incapable of supporting a policy backed by force at home, but 
they, rightly or wrongly, continued to believe in the advantages of keeping Britain as 
flexible as possible in its three-tiered foreign policy. 326 Owing to this illusion, the US- 
UK "special relationship" had to be reduced to a symbolic cornerstone rather than a 
decisive causal factor. The East-West confrontation could not be the overwhelming 
concern dictating to the British decision-makers'worldviews. 
The US staying neutral 
Another weakness in the argument made from the perspective of the world 
system as well as the "special relationship" stems from the US neutrality on the issue 
of the Falkland Islands before the war in 1982.327 When the British forced the 
Argentines out of the islands in 1833, the Monroe Doctrine had been in force for ten 
years. 328 Although the Doctrine was widely known as a principle against the European 
interference in the Western Hemisphere, Washington's reaction to the British military 
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act in 1833 was recorded as viewing it "calmly". It was said that the US believed a 
"British administration would be easier to deal with than an Argentine one". 329 
Similarly, when the Rio Pact was signed in 1947, on which occasion Argentina 
reiterated its sovereign claim over the Falkland Islands, the US continued its neutral 
stance on this issue. The US announced that the "Rio Treaty cannot influence the 
sovereignty or the national or international status of any of the territories" on the 
American continent. 330 This was a position in contrast to the Monroe Doctrine that 
upheld the idea of national independence at the same period. 331 In 1965, on the vote 
over the UN Resolution 2065, calling for negotiations to facilitate the process of 
decolonisation, the US abstained. Three years later in 1968, when the talks got under 
way between Britain and Argentina, the US still did not re. cognise Argentina's claim 
on the Falkland Islands. 332 In 1973, faced by Resolution 3 160, calling for Argentina 
and Britain to renew and accelerate their efforts to negotiate, the US abstained 
again. 333 The US keeping neutrality in the 130 years before the 1960s may prompt 
readers to infer this as the consequence of the "special relationship". However, this is 
unlikely if one looks at the post-WWII period, when there were joint efforts by 
Roosevelt and Stalin to uproot European colonisation. Britain's vested interests were 
under heavy threat because of this move. 334 A decolonisation perspective suggests that 
the causal effects of "special relationship" on this case were limited. 335 
The implications of SATO 
Gamba-Stonehouse's other argument, that South America occupied a low priority 
in the US-UK global strategy, is also problematic. Owing to its geographic proximity 
and security interests during the Cold War, the US had rarely relaxed its concern about 
its back yard. It used to hold up the South American states as barriers to 
communiSM. 336 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) as a result had intended 




Connell-Smith (19 82) *The OAS and the Falklands conflict", p. 34 1; Martynov (1984) "Position of 
the organisation ofAmerican states", p. 91. 
33 1 Robert H. Johnson (1985/86) "Exaggerating America's stakes in Third World conflicts", 
International Security, 10,3, p. 44. 
332 FCO 7/13 6, AA3/5, (20), Foreign Office to British Embassy, Buenos Aires, Tel. no. 258,3 April 
1968. 
333 Gustafson (1988) The sovereignty dispute, p. 180. 
334 Northedge (1974) Descentfrom power, p. 217. 
335 Jack Donnelly (1998) "Realism: Roots and renewal", Review ofInternational Studies, 24,3, p. 400; 
Frankel (1975) Britishforeign polic 336 y, p. 
205. 
Marianne H. Marchand (1994) "The political economy of the north-south relations", in Richard 
Stubbs and Geffrey R. D. Underhill (eds. ), Political economy and the changing global order (London: 
84 
to militarise the South Atlantic, based on the idea to establish an allied block as part of 
the global strategic framework. The proposal, dubbed SATO (South Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation) was in parallel with NATO. It was characterised by a defence system 
linking the South American states to South Africa in an attempt to ensure that the 
Cape Route would be free from the Soviet threat. 337 The importance of it cannot be 
lightly dismissed as a result. SATO was to be "the backdoor of NATO", 338 and had 
been proposed by the US three times during the Cold War. One was in the late 1940s, 
the other during the d6tente in the 1970s, 339 and another in 198 1.340 What deserves 
attention is that the US was earnest to float the idea of SATO. It had once tried to put 
the question of the Falkland Islands to Argentina. If the latter were willing to 
participate in SATO, the issue of the Falkland Islands could be resolved more quickly 
and successfidly. 341 
The implications for US planning of trading the settlement of the Falkland 
Islands for SATO, despite not coming true, is suggestive. It demonstrated that the 
consistent US position to stay neutral was derived from the fact that the issue of the 
Falkland Islands was secondary in the eyes of the hegemonic powers during the Cold 
War. It was secondary to the extent that the islands could be traded. Nevertheless, the 
other case that can be made is that under the circumstance that the issue of the 
Falkland Islands was a secondary issue, there was naturally an autonomous status of 
Britain's Falklands policy that could be managed without too much concern about the 
global strategy. This thesis as a result tends to see the issue of the Falkland Islands as 
separate from global strategy. 
To begin with, the ultimate reason for SATO's not coming into existence had 
nothing to do with the Falkland Islands. Britain indeed endorsed the proposal of 
SATO quite positively. In 1967, it gave up the command of Simonstown; the key 
naval base in the South Atlantic, to South Africa in exchange for the latter's 
willingness to commit its force to secure the sea routes to the Indian Ocean. 342 The 
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major reason for the failed effort to sell the idea of SATO was that Brazil, another 
important component state in the military alliance, withdrew from the framework. 343 
It had less to do with the Falkland Islands. 
The second reason to see the issue of the Falkland Islands as not being very 
clearly linked to the US-UK strategic concern was Britaiws downplaying military role 
in the Falkland Islands. The Government on the whole tended to see the Falklands 
Islands as making no contribution to Britain's maritime strategy. 344 The Defence and 
Overseas Policy Committee, for instance, reported in July 1967, "we had no defence 
interest in the Falkland Islands and indeed were unable to defend them cffectively". 345 
In other words, if Britain! s conduct of the Falklands, policy had followed the strategic 
thinking in the context of East-West confrontation, as the US stipulated, the Falkland 
Islands could have been heavily militarised, as was Diego Garcia in the Indian 
Ocean. 346 But Britain did not choose this option. Perhaps more problematic for 
Gamba-Stonehouse's claim that Britain took a passive attitude in building its relations 
with Argentina, was that its educational campaign showed that Britain was much more 
relaxed and willing to discuss the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina in late 1966. 
The shift of the negotiating principle to the interests of the islanders, as reviewed in 
Chapter 1, was in contrast to the present British policy on the issue of the Falkland 
Islands, where their wishes is strongly emphasised. Evidently, Argentina might have 
good reason to believe that all it had to do was to wait in 1966-68. 
Here, Gamba-Stonehouse's attribution of the cause of the British conduct of the 
Falkland policy to the structuml theory of hegemony is too broad to be convincing. 
Assumptions such as the US-UK "special relationship" and lower priority of South 
America are not helpful in making inferences and solving the puzzles contained in 
this thesis. Dillon advanced a fundamental point in this regard. He argued that the 
issue of the Falkland Islands was "isolated from superpower rivalries" and even 
" unconnected with any important regional strategic balance or with global strategic 
relationships". 347 This remark indicated that the hegemonic rules might exist during 
the Cold War. But they created an impact on the foreign policy only in the cases 
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where state actors believed the discourse of hegemony to exist. The issue of the 
Falkland Islands in the 1960s clearly did not fall into this discourse. Instead, the case 
might support at Howard when he argued that the polar-system during the Cold War 
could be "irrelevant to the low level and peripheral conflict". 348 
Hence, arguing from the perspective of a bipolar system does not locate the 
causal factors for solving the puzzles in this thesis. British foreign policy concerning 
the issue of the Falkland Islands in the 1960s did not respond faithfully to the East- 
West confrontation. It is highly likely that the proponents of world-system perspective 
being locked into the perspective of the Cold War is owing to the fact that their major 
sources of research are the American official papers, which are released a generation 
earlier than British documents. 349 This thesis has no doubt about the credibility of 
their sources, but the crux is that the US in this case had stayed neutral before 1982. 
For this thesis, therefore, the biggest question mark in this section hangs not over the 
difficulties in accessing the record of Britain's recent past, as Beck complained in his 
research on the issue of the Falkland Islands, 350 but over the world-system 
perspective, which develops arguments littered with charactern-less units. To sum up, 
when Gamba-Stonehouse's core assumptions of the US-UK "special relations" and the 
word-system perspective prove logically incoherent and without distinctive causal 
effect, the whole argument is disputable. 351 
7. The rational-choice perspective 
Rational choice models constitute one of the most promising tools now available 
for political analysis. Basically, rational choice models intend to provide causal 
explanations of political outcomes on the assumption of rationality. Decision-makers 
are seen as consciously to pursue self-intercsted utility when evaluating competing 
alternatives under uncertainties. 352 Here, the driving force is rationality, which is 
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understood as "an optimal correspondence between ends and means". 353 
In the literature of international cooperation, the conventional wisdom of rational 
choice models is firmly wedded to another agreed assumption that anarchy is the 
defining characteristic of the international system, wherein there is no central 
authority to enforce a binding agreement. Each state, as a unitary actor, will be 
sensitive enough to keep security or survival as the consistent concern in its policy 
preference about the issue of cooperation with others. 354 On this premise, there 
develop two divergent deductions: neoliberal institutionalist and neorealist theories 
that can be illustrated below. 
Neoliberal institutionalists subscribe to the view that the prospect of utilities for 
benefit and advantage constitutes a network of social bonds. 355 The bonds will affect 
states' behaviour in their relations with one another in international politics, and their 
most significant influence is to reduce Hobbesian fear derived from anarchy in 
international relations as perceived by realists. Thus, according to neoliberal 
institutionalists, in order to reduce the costs of conflict, or to maximise expected 
utilities, cooperation normally becomes a state's preferable choice in the process of 
interaction with other states. 356 As interaction goes on, reciprocity such as information 
provision and issue linkage will function as an effective restraint on a state's 
behaviour to opt for free riding. 357 State behaviour will therefore be transformed from 
358 
being preference-driven to institution-driven, and the institutions will, in turn, bring 
about states' willingness to pursue cooperation, seeing that free riding will be 
punished and cooperation rewarded. 359 
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However, the effect of institutions on states' decisions to engage themselves in 
international cooperation has been seriously questioned by neorealism, another 
competing school of rational choice theory. Neorealists argue that in anarchy, where 
today's allies may become tomorrow's enemies, to keep relative gain is the prior 
concern. 360 Each state as a consequence has no choice but to rely on a self-help effort 
to pursue security. 36 1 Neorealists contend that cooperation has rarely specified how 
the mutual gains will be distributed, so that institutions are at best a vehicle. 
Unfortunately, the dominant powers sometimes impose their will through this 
vehicle. 362 Therefore, it is admitted that inter-state cooperation should be encouraged 
and international institutions may have a role in the bargaining process towards 
cooperation, but states' decision not to co-operate with other states is caused by the 
constant relative-gain concerns in the process of gains-distribution. Because these 
relative-concerns are hardly subdued, international cooperation is often short-lived. 
States are less willing to co-operate than neoliberal institutionalists optimistically 
expect and, more often than not, they take a free ride even in the face of forthcoming 
institutional arrangements. 363 
The neorealist hypotheses 
Based on the concept of relative-gain concerns, a neorealist may argue that 
because British colonial ambition had vanished, the relative-gains concern 
diminished. The Wilson Government as a result showed no hesitation in pursuing 
cooperation with Argentina and the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands became 
negotiable in 1966. Conversely, when relative-gain concerns were aroused in 
December 1968, the Memorandum of Understanding in preparation was called to a 
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halt. Four neorealist hypotheses may subsequently be suggested to describe the 
development of the British conduct of the Falklands policy in the Falklands history. 
Hypothesis 1: with relative-gain concerns in its foreign relations with Argentina 
before the 1960s, the British Government firmly claimed its sovereignty over the 
Falkland Islands. It therefore had refused to talk about the issue of this territorial 
dispute for 130 years. There was as a consequence no cooperation before 1966. 
Hypothesis 2: with relative-gain concerns reduced in the 1960s, Britain decided 
to talk about sovereignty with Argentina in a cooperative mood in late 1966. 
Hypothesis 3: Cooperation ceased to exist at the end of 1968, because of relative- 
gain concerns re-emerging. 
Hypothesis 4: Fear of being exploited by Argentina was the consistent relative- 
gain concern of the British Government in the talks during this period under study. 
However, this thesis finds out that the role of relative-gain concerns as an 
independent variable was insignificant in this case. The refutation can be made as 
follows. 
Criticisms of the neorealist hypotheses 
To begin with, relative-gain concerns in this case had gone long before the mid- 
19th century. The Falkland Islands had once been planned as a naval base from the 
strategic and economic viewpoints, but the plan was only briefly discussed during the 
period between 1740-50 and then abandoned . 
364 Even though Britain repossessed the 
islands in 1833, it is worth noting that not until 1843, when Queen Victoria granted 
the Falkland Islands the status of a dominion, was a colonial administration 
established . 
365 This decision was made after a ten-year time lag. And it was not until 
another nine years later in 1852, the Falkland Islands Company received a royal 
charter from the Queen and began to develop the colony. 366 The developmental 
schemes enacted so late by the British Government can hardly be understood solely 
by the notion of relative-gain concerns, if this thesis puts Britain into the context in 
the South Atlantic. A plausible explanation for this time lag was that Britain's claim to 
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sovereignty on the Falkland Islands represented nothing but a "historical 
anachronism" . 
367 Relative-gain concerns in the mid- 1 9ýh century were not as 
significant as Hypothesis I suggests. 
The implication of Britain! s slowness in the management of the Falkland Islands 
after 1833 is straightforward. With the rise of economic pre-eminence in Buenos Aires 
after the mid- 1 9th century, 368 the firmly rooted economic relations and cultural 
mixture between Britain and Argentina had effectively kept both sides reticent on the 
Falklands issue before the 1930s, when nationalism in Argentina came to the fore. 369 
From 1833 to the 1930s, both sides had lived with the dispute, which became an 
accepted part" of the bilateral relations. 370 In the midst of the British-Argentine 
relations, the issue of the Falkland Islands was neither important enough to solve, nor 
unimportant enough to avoid . 
37 1 Relative-gain concerns in the British conduct of the 
Falklands policy before the 1960s were insignificant. 
Hypothesis I is therefore untenable. Its being disproved will render Hypothesis 2 
problematic too. With fewer concerns for relative gains before the 1960s, this thesis is 
bound to ask the question of where the concerns for relative gains sprang from, when 
Hypothesis 2 is under discussion. One possible answer is the pressure on British 
prestige in the world with the rise of the decolonisation movement. But the nature of 
this kind of concern is by no means "relative". It is more of a self-imposed 
consciousness that has to be referred to by the British Empire in the past. Since the 
early 20'h century, Britain had been purposefully avoiding the legal debates over the 
issue of the Falkland Islands. It ducked the issue not only because of a lack of 
confidence in its territorial claim over the Falkland Islands, 372 but also because of the 
concern that the loss of the islands could seriously humiliate Britain as a power in the 
eyes of the world. Consequently, "the correct policy", as was advised in 1936, was to 
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373 "sit tight on the Falklands Islands". In 1937, Anthony Eden flatly pointed out that 
the Falklands dispute was "essentially a matter of tactics and policy rather than 
la, V9.374 The fact that the British Government never referred the Falklands dispute to 
the League of Nations or the International Court of Justice might help readers to view 
the British attitude to this issue in this light. 375 It will be very hard to argue that, from 
the perspective of relative-gain concerns between the two sides, Britain intended to 
keep ahead of Argentina in respect of national prestige. Hence, toying with the 
concept of relative-gain concerns, neorealists will find a paradox in this case from the 
perspective of relative-gain concerns between the two sides. No matter that Britain 
decided or declined to have talks with Argentina during 1966-68, the issue of the 
Falkland Islands was more associated with a symbol of power, a kind of self-imposed 
concern, rather than the concerns of relative-gains. Neither Hypothesis I and 2 are 
persuasive. 
As to Hypothesis 3 that with relative-gain concerns re-emerging at the end of 
1968, one possibility to support it was the potential interests of oil and marine algae. 
The potential of oil was put forward by some Soviet scholars. They believed that oil 
was the major reason behind the unsettlement over the sovereignty issue, because the 
oil reserves in the Falklands' waters were more than the North Sea. 376 Marine algae, 
on the other hand, were reported as the "only large supply in the world", capable of 
bringing in annual income up to 12 million pounds. 377 Britain might have good reason 
not to cede away the Falkland Islands because of these two items of relative-gains. 
Nevertheless, the timing of the oil potential being known to the international 
society did not support Hypothesis 3. The potential of oil had rarely been seriously 
discussed before the end of 1968. Its value in making exploration was first perceived 
in 1969, not in 1968.378 The oil's economic potential was not substantiated until 1971, 
when the Shell Company and the University of Birmingham concluded with 
speculative reports about the oil deposits. 379 Meanwhile, the Wilson Government 
dismissed any optimistic prospect of marine algae. It considered the annual incomes, 
373 Ibid. (I 983c) "The Anglo-Argentine dispute*, p. 16. 
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380 
as reported by one commercial industry, "no more than a remote possibility". Seen 
in this light, the factors of oil and marine resource as explanations to the sovereignty 
impasse prove spurious for the period under study. Hypothesis 3 is hardly verifiable. 
Neorealists may retreat to the bottom line and defend Hypothesis 4 that there at 
least existed constant concern of being exploited in the two-year discussions about 
sovereignty between Britain and Argentina. However, this hypothesis is not verifiable 
either. Britain did not hesitate in its response to the UN's and Argentina's demands for 
sovereignty talks in late 1966. Talking about British foreign policy in this period, 
Foreign Secretary Brown argued that his basis of foreign policy was to follow the 
interests of Britain. And to do it, as Brown revealingly declared, was to give 
"wholehearted support to the United Nations and so to order our own behaviour that 
we set an example to others". 381 Stewart, who replaced Brown in March 1968, did not 
change this internationalist viewpoint. As Stewart insisted, "We are conducting talks 
with the Argentine about the long-term future of these islands in accordance with and 
in the spirit of the United Nations resolution, to which I should think both sides of the 
House would pay respect. In any case, this is our policy". 382 
The point to note is that the contradiction between the UN's positions on self- 
determination and the wording "people" in the related UN documents could not be 
unknown to the British Government in the late 1960s. 
383 Resolution 2065, for 
instance, contradicted the text of Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, the 
latter of which laid greater emphasis on the wishes of the people as a universal claim, 
while the former only looked at their interests. As political aspirations of both 
documents were identical-relief from the colonial framework, if the British 
Government had insisted, they might have based their stance on Article 73, instead of 
following Resolution 2065. Britain, indeed, was quite ready to do so in the case of 
Gibraltar, where the wishes of the Islanders was upheld and a referendum took place 
in 1968.384 
Alternatively, Britain could also be entitled to emphasise that the nature of self- 
determination inside the British Commonwealth could not be understood without 
380 Honeywell and Pearce (1982) FalklandslMalvinas, p. 20. 
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700. 
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examining the sentiment, influence and interests within the political entities proper. 381 
It could claim that Britain would follow the natural law school that simply took self- 
determination as the natural right. 386 Indeed, in the case of Gibraltar, Britain claimed 
that there was still much to explore with regard to local sentiment among the people 
there. 387 If inhabitants in Gibraltar had been offered a choice by expressing their 
wishes, Britain could as well have argued that the UN failed to base the same 
argument for the Falkland Islanders. However, Britain assumed a more 
accommodating attitude towards Argentina's appeal. No sooner did Resolution 2065 
determine that Britain's claim on the Falkland Islands needed to be settled peacefully 
by talks than Britain decided to change its pledge to the interests of the islanders as a 
guiding principle for the ensuing talks. This attitude inclines this thesis to conclude 
that the British conduct of the Falklands policy throughout the period in 1966-68 was 
hardly related to what Hypothesis 4 intends to explain from the perspective of fear of 
being exploited. 
To summarise, relative-gain concerns were marginal in the British conduct of the 
Falkland Islands before and after the 1960s. All the four hypotheses formulated from 
the concept of relative-gains concerns prove empirically debatable from the point of 
view of helping to solve the puzzles examined in this thesis. 
The neoliberal Institutionalist hypotheses 
In the spirit of neoliberal institutionalists, this thesis develops four working 
hypotheses to test causal power of neoliberal institutionalism in the case of the 
Falkland Islands. Neoliberal institutionalists may bring forward the first hypothesis 
that to keep Britain's prestige in the midst of the decolonisation movement, respecting 
UN Resolutions 2065 became a necessity. Britain as a result began the talks over 
sovereignty of the Falkland Islands (Hypothesis 1). 
Neoliberal institutionalists may also propose a second hypothesis and argue from 
the perspectives of issue linkage and reciprocity. The hypothesis may be formulated 
that, based on the assumption that the issue of the Falkland Islands had to be resolved 
before securing Latin American markets, Britain adopted the strategy of issue linkage, 
the 67th annual conference ofthe Labour Party (London: Transport House), p. 8 1. 385 Peter Madgwick (I 994a), 4 new introduction to British politics (London: Stanley Thomes), p. 447. 386 David B. Knight (1985) "Territory and people or people and territory? Thoughts on post-colonial 
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and so it began the sovereignty talks (Hypothesis 2). 
The above two hypotheses to explain Britain's willingness to have sovereignty 
talks with Argentina in 1966 are justifiable on the ground that keeping international 
prestige and expanding economic markets were two significant concerns of British 
decision-makers in the 1960s. On the one hand, the Falkland Islands admittedly was 
an obstacle to the trade and the overall British relations with South America. 388 To be 
sure, respecting UN Resolution 2065 could help relieve its pressure in a climate of 
decolonisation. Britain could be seen as adopting the strategy of issue linkage with a 
view to shedding this "embarrassing encumbrance to" its foreign policy in the 
1960s. 389 Moreover, the issue of the Falkland Islands was clearly a barrier to the 
potential markets, because the existence of the territorial dispute was interpreted as a 
colonial symbol. Talking about sovereignty could circumvent the barrier to 
markets. 390 Taken together, cession of sovereignty could be seen as a trade-off for 
British prestige and better chances of trade in South America. 
Meanwhile, the central concern of the neoliberal institutionalists is how to 
monitor a mechanism to enforce the institutions of cooperation in the longer term. 391 
Among the mechanisms, states' decisions not to co-operate are attributed to ideas 
being absent in the decision-making process. 392 This thesis subsequently puts forward 
another two hypotheses as follows. 
Based on the notion of ideas, one hypothesis can be formulated that the idea of 
anti-colonialism as part of Labour's ideology prompted the sovereignty negotiation 
with Argentina to take place in 1966 (Hypothesis 3). Neoliberal institutionalists can 
also produce the fourth hypothesis, arguing that reduction of the maximised gains led 
to Britain's reluctance to continue the discussion of sovereignty with Argentina in 
December 1968. Britain as a result called a halt to the signing of the Memorandum of 
Understanding that was supposed to be issued jointly with Argentina (Hypothesis 4). 
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Neoliberal institutionalism in this case seemed to carry more weight in 
explanation of Britain's policy preference in 1966 than that in 1968. However, 
neoliberal institutionalists have little cause for optimism. In terms of causal effect, the 
second turning-point policy preference emerging in December 1968 is the substantial 
evidence that renders the prior hypotheses made by neoliberal institutionalists 
untenable. 
Criticism of the neoliberal institutionalist hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1, with reference to prestige, proves the least sustainable in this case. 
Britain would have already known that arguing based on the wishes of the islanders 
was unacceptable to Argentina. The resumption of the negotiating principle--the 
wishes of the islanders-created nothing but a barrier to the success of the talks. Also, 
Britain could not have been unaware that upholding the wishes was not stipulated in 
the text of Resolution 2065. Its unilateral announcement in the talks was tantamount 
to denying the UN legal authority in maintaining an international order. Britain might 
have already anticipated that Argentina would not keep silent in the international 
forum after Britain's changing the negotiating line. Argentina's vocal protest in the UN 
could be more disturbing to Britain's prestige. Despite these concerns, the second 
British policy preference hastily came to the fore in late 1968. In this respect, Brown 
and Stewart clearly had bitten off more than they could chew. 
Banking on Hypothesis 2, characterised by issue linkage as a strategy, is also 
problematic. Britain seemed quite slow in response to secure these possible gains of 
prestige and potential markets. From the perspective of issue-linkage, when over 100 
MPs were united in expressing their concern, which came as an obstruction in the 
process of talks, the Government should have pressed on with their initiative rather 
than passively retreat. The Wilson Government should have granted compensation in 
an attempt to encourage concessions from the islanders. They should also have 
redefined the given issue by making the resolution of the dispute attendant more 
heavily on, for instance, national security. 393 However, to the disappointment of the 
neoliberal institutionalists, the policy outcomes proved the opposite. The Wilson 
Government followed neither option that neoliberal institutionalists are ready to 
suppose. First, the British Government did not offer any side-payment. It was said that 
393 H. Richard Friman (1993) uSide-payments versus security cards: Domestic bargaining tactics in 
international economic negotiations", International Organisation, 47,3, p. 405. 
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Argentina would provide side-payment to the islanders. 394 Secondly, the Wilson 
Government even in the heated parliamentary debates in 1968 did not make an 
attempt to redefine the issue such as the one talking about the potential trade with 
Argentina. In the midst of doubts that Britain was to sell frigates to Argentina in 
exchange for title over the islands, and that Britain discussed with the Australian, New 
Zealand and Canadian Governments about accommodating the islanders, the Wilson 
395 Government just flatly dismissed both speculations as unfounded. With no evidence 
of side-payment having been raised by the British Government, and no effort of 
redefining the issue, the claim of neoliberal institutionalist to maximise the British 
interests is doubtful. The doubt will render Hypothesis 2 invalid. 
The idea of anti-colonialism or self-determination as a binding force in 
Hypothesis 3 also proves incoherent. During the talks, rumours circulated among the 
islanders. It was said that if the islanders would not accept the arrangement, economic 
sanctions could be applied against them in five years. 396 It was also said that the 
negotiations would eventually bring about a transfer of sovereignty. 397 Nevertheless, if 
ideas of the world view and Labour's ideologies of anti-colonialism did specify the 
policy orientation, as many neoliberal institutionalists claiM, 398 why did the Wilson 
Government pay little attention to the democratic need of the islanders but only talk of 
their interests before the end of 1968? Why were the interests as a guiding principle in 
sovereignty negotiations put in such an abstract form? Why were the interests of the 
Islanders so arbitrarily subject to the British officials' interpretation? The principle of 
respecting the islanders' life style in this case seems to be left with a piece of rhetoric 
without having real meaning in it. 
More devastating to Hypothesis 3, the Wilson Government seemed never to have 
seriously thrashed out answers to the following central intriguing questions. If the 
Government was fully aware of the Argentine public claim that no agreement would 
be concluded without the transfer of sovereignty, 399 and, if the sovereignty was no 
doubt legally and exclusively British, as the FO reiterated, then what was the point of 
the talks? These dilemmas make this thesis wonder whether ideas as a causal force 
394 Hoffmann and Hoffmann (1984) Sovereignty in dispute, p. I 11. 
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can be sustainable without other concerns. It seems that there was little contact 
"between ideas seeking access to policymakers and policymakers seeking access to 
ideas" in late 1968, when Britain decided to suspend the Memorandum of 
Understanding. 400 The doubt prompts this thesis to question the effect of ideas in 
Hypothesis 3.401 
Neoliberal institutionalists may defend Hypothesis 4 by arguing that, because of 
non-existence of maximised gains, Britain was unwilling to continue the talks, and 
subsequently the negotiating principle was changed. But evidence to verify 
Hypothesis 4 is also hard to muster. On reflection, if one observes British investment 
opportunities in Argentina in the mid- I 960s, one would find that the prospect of gains 
from trade with Argentina in 1966-68 was generally on the rise. During the period 
under study, Juan C. Ongania's regime was devoted to policies of economic growth by 
changing the previous management into a far more liberal style. 402 Controls of 
imports were abolished, 403 and economic progress by 1968 had been remarkable. The 
growth of industrial production soared seven times from 1.6 per cent in 1966 to 11.1 
in 1968. Public investment also increased at an annual rate of 22 per cent . 404Whether 
this would close the cycle of economic instability remained to be seen, but more 
notably, in an attempt to dismiss the speculation before the world, the Ongania 
Government launched a policy to devalue the Argentine peso down to 40 per cent 
once and for all. The sharp devaluation did not lead to a self-generating inflationary 
mechanism as it did with the previous regimes, but proved a success. 405 The 
devaluation helped the Argentine Government become capable of financing its needs 
through the sale of treasury notes and medium-term bonds and successfully stabilised 
the economy. 406 The financial stability in turn greatly strengthened Argentina's 
purchasing capability, 407 which made its federal deficit significantly decrease from 25 
408 
per cent in 1966 to 5 per cent at the end of 1968 . The annual inflation rate also fell 
429. 
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from 30 per cent to 8 per cent . 
409 The rise of gold and foreign exchange holdings in 
1968 was four times Argentina's holdings in 1966.410 
From the perspective of neoliberal institutionalism, the liberation of trade in the 
Argentine market, the resumption of economic growth, and the economists' terms of 
"supply and demand" could not have come at a better time for British capital to be 
invested. Neoliberal institutional ists can hardly deny that all these economic prospects 
were promising gains. And indeed, after the decision to integrate the Latin American 
Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market was declared in 
April 1967, British overseas representatives also began to talk about the potential 
gains from the Latin American Common Market. 41 1 The problem, however, was that, 
despite the inducement of potential trade in Argentina, the Wilson Government's 
ultimate rejection of the mutual agreement on the Memorandum of Understanding did 
not come to terms with this orthodox description of demand and supply in economics. 
Why did the Wilson Government withdraw the designated policy, given the promising 
prospect of gains? Hypothesis 4 presents this thesis with another puzzle rather than an 
answer. The FO's eventual decision to reject the mutual agreement in 1968 indicates 
412 that governments "are not merely the victims of economic trends". The assumption 
of rationality in neoliberal institutionalism is economic terms rather than 
psychological one. 413 But an economic factor is insufficient. The case of the Falklands 
indicates that it will be more pointed to think about economic motivation within the 
political context in this case. 414 The opposite cannot be helpful. 
Neoliberal institutionalists may retreat to the bottom line and try to defend their 
position by arguing from the perspective of reciprocity. Neoliberal institutionalists 
argue that iteration in "the shadow of the future" can reduce the security concern in the 
Prisoner's Dilemma and keep cooperation sustainable in prospect ofjoint gainsý 15 
interpretation (Austin & London: University of Texas Press), p. 202. 
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Therefore, a case can also be made that, if one puts the issue into a longer time frame, 
one can observe that there had already been an institutional framework existing after 
the talks between 1966 and 1968. Indeed, the FCO after 1968 kept on forwarding 
proposals to solve the issue in the following decade. These may be the direct 
monitoring effect of neoliberal institutionalism. However, the element of iteration 
remains empirically unsubstantiated in this case. From 1966 to 198 1, just before the 
war, a 15-year effort in negotiation was not too short a time frame. Iteration did occur 
between the two sides, but dilemmas about how to solve the issue remained acute for 
Britain, particularly the Thatcher Government after 1979.416 The failure in restraining 
a dormant dispute from escalating into war, in turn, makes this thesis deeply aware 
that "reciprocity is no panacea in bilateral relationships". 417 Reciprocity as a factor in 
this case seemed to be even marginalised in the following 15 years leading up to the 
war. 
Taken together, the British policy on the issue of the Falkland Islands from 1966 
to 1968 exemplified a weak case to support the neoliberal institutionalist claim. 
Despite the idea of self-determination and the concern for British prestige in the UN, 
as Brown and Stewart had been so keen to cast in international politics, Britain still 
failed to meet these ideal, legal and moral expectations. A lack of corresponding 
action by Britain to secure the absolute-gains in 1966-68 through issue-linkage also 
proves devastating to what neoliberal institutionalists assume. Even if this thesis puts 
these kinds of concern into a longer time frame, the neoliberal institutionalist model 
remains misleadingly restrictive in providing a satisfactory explanation in this case. 
The factor of "process" 
The failure of the rational-choice models in explaining the issue during the 
period under study lies in the tendency of international cooperation to be highly 
U context dependent". 41 8 An analyst has to be aware that when contextual factors 
change, changes of decision-makers' belief systems and interests sometimes take 
place, and the policy preferences change as well. Of course, rational choice models 
cannot be cnticised for this. Their theoretical focus is not on the decision-making 
and cooperation (London: John Wiley & Sons), p. 8. 
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processes. Given this, the search for causes is bound to come up short. As Keohane 
suggests, the lack of concern for contextual factors will obscure the source of changes 
in the decision-makers' conscious preference, and therefore prove incapable of being 
relied upon with a possible answer to the puzzles in this stud Y. 419 Perhaps for this 
reason, there has already existed the call for attention to the decision-making process 
since the late 1970S. 420 Indeed, looking into the process as an important 
methodological concern is most relevant in the British case, because, as Hill 
complains, there was "little work on the foreign policy-making process with structured 
case studies in Britain". Even less are "in the areas of political psychology and group 
dynamics" where the "analysis of top-level policy formulation in Britain" was the 
f CUS. 
421 
0 It is owing to this concern that a decision-making model concerned about 
process becomes the candidate of choice. 
8. Conclusion 
As Chapter 2 draws to a close, it seems fair for this thesis to report as follows. 
Arguments based on British imperialism, historical narratives, patriotism, domestic 
politics, cultural conflict, national identity, the US-UK "special relationship" and 
global strategic concern, and the rational-choice models have proved 
methodologically insufficient in solving the puzzles why Britain changed the 
negotiating principle from the wishes of the islanders to their interests and then back 
to their wishes again in 1966-68. The Soviet perspective and the argument of identity 
provide a distorted or static picture of the historical background. Patriotism needs a 
precise definition. Cultural and domestic politics approaches have omitted the 
important factor in respect of the subjective force of a conscious decision-maker. 
Historical narratives and the perspective of UK geopolitics prove far-fetched. Rational 
choice theories are also incapable of explaining consistently the preference reversals. 
A coherent answer still lies hidden. This wider exploration into the existing 
literature has helped clarify different dimensions of this territorial dispute. However, 
these dimensions are insufficient to provide a coherent synthesis in a more organised 
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manner. 422 Their failures indicate that the factors, reviewed in this chapter, are in need 
of being integrated into a systemic design in order to identify a generally behavioural 
pattern in British decision-making in the issue of the Falkland Islands. 423 In other 
words, there is a need to look for a particular model in existence in an attempt to draw 
on themes interlacing concepts and propositions from more than one of the above 
conceptions or approaches. 
At least one thing is pretty sure. From the rational-choice perspective, or from 
the long-run historical understanding, the two British turning-point policy preferences 
on the issue of the Falkland Islands were an anomaly. But we are not discouraged by 
this anomaly. This is because the "perception of anomaly is often a preliminary to 
discovery". It, in turn, justifies and encourages the effort of conjecturing "about a 
more satisfactory general theory that could avoid such anomalies". 424 The enquiry in 
Chapter 2, above all, has marked a start toward that end and a methodology to handle 
this challenge is waiting in the wings. 
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CHAPTER THREE-PROSPECT THEORY AND ITS METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 3 is concerned with the role that prospect theory can play with reference 
to the two British turning-point policy preferences in the sovereignty talks with 
Argentina in respect of the issue of the Falkland Islands from 1966 to 1968. 
The chapter consists of six sections. Section I introduces the main characteristics 
of prospect theory and the key relevant concepts from the International Relations (IR) 
literature. Section 2 justifies the choice of theory. Section 3 deals with the concept of 
framing, the explanatory variable of prospect theory. Section 4 examines the current 
conceptual and methodological problems of prospect theory. Section 5 elaborates the 
basic key word of prospect theor)-framing--to facilitate further observation. ' And 
finally in section 6, this thesis presents four hypotheses, setting the framework for 
empirical observation in the following chapter. 
1. Content of prospect theory 
The two-phase description 
Prospect theory is a utility model to explain decision-making. It divides the 
practice of decision-making into two phases-editing and evaluating. In the editing 
phase, prospect theory adopts the concept of representativeness, with which a 
decision-maker simplifies the complex external realities. The concept of 
representativeness is borrowed from cognitive psychology. Representativeness is 
characterised by similarities to the properties of past events. Based on the concept of 
representativeness, prospect theory argues that if a decision-maker faces a complex 
issue, representativeness becomes possible in use, because representativeness is, 
functionally speaking, image provocative as well as reflective. 2 It Will lead decision- 
makers "to magnify conditional probabilities of events" owing to the similarity in 
question, 3 or helps simplify the complexities of an issue for the decision-makers. 
Through the effort of magnification or simplification, representativeness helps 
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decision-makers grasp the background information for further inference. In the 
process of achieving this end, according to prospect theory, decision-makers will try 
4 to identify or locate a reference point as a short cut in the editing phase. 
The term "reference point" is a key word that has to be clarified at this stage. 
Referent points can be understood as the "indicators" in the decision-makers' minds 
alongside the decision-making process. It is an indicating operator, sending signals to 
a perceiver as the judging criterion for the perceiver to decide whether to go ahead in 
pursuit of what has been viewed, or to halt the action until the next reference point is 
searched out. 5 Theoretically, a reference point can be seen as a substantive form of 
representativeness in mental activities. 
The point to note in prospect theory is that the effect of a reference point is not 
restricted to the editing phase. According to prospect theory, decision-makers, after 
passing the editing phase, will proceed with their reference point of an issue into the 
evaluating phase, and it is in the second phase of mental activities that subjective 
values enter into the equation. Dccision-makers in the evaluating phase will make 
analyses of offered prospects, and encode the consequent outcomes to decide whether 
the outcomes are gains or losses. In encoding various possible outcomes as gains or 
losses, the decision-makers will also consider their subjective values such as their 
motivations or the designated goals, before they make a choice between prospects for 
6 gains and likelihood of losses. At this juncture, the reference point again plays a 
decisive role. It becomes an interpretative operator and criterion of measurement. 
Prospect theory foresees that decision-makers will exhibit a strong tendency to have 
their reference points serve as the judging criterion of choice in the evaluating phase. 7 
In terms of the editing and evaluating phases, locating a reference point becomes 
not only a way to reduce the manifest complexities of an issue to an acceptable level, 
8 but the major causal factor in decision-making. The act of locating or identifying the 
4 Robert Axelrod (I 976a) "Decision for neo-imperialism: The deliberations of the British Eastern 
Committee in 1918", in Robert Axelrod (ed. ), Structure ofdecision: The cognitive maps ofpolitical 
elites (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 78, p. 95. 
5 Ruth M. Corbin (1980) "Decisions that might not get made", in Thomas S. Wallsten. (ed. ), Cognitive 
processes in choice and decision behaviour (NJ, Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaurn Associates), p. 57. 6 Norman H. Anderson (1986) "A cognitive theory ofjudgement and decision", in Berndt Brehmer, 
Helmut Jungermann, Peter Lourens and Guje Sevon (eds. ), New directions in research on decision 
making (Amsterdam, NY, Oxford & Tokyo: North-Holland), p. 65. 
7 Jack S. Levy (1996) "Loss aversion, framing, and bargaining: The implications of prospect theory for 
international conflicf', International Political Science Review, 17,2, p. 180. 
8 Daniel Kahnernan and Amos Tversky (1979) *Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk", 
Econometrica, 47,2, p. 274. 
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reference point is termed by some analysts as framing. Prospect theory expounds the 
idea that policy preference is ordered by framing. Various experimental findings prove 
that framing is one of the critical components of decision-making that can compete 
with other competing factors such as script and identity. 9 Since a reference point helps 
a decision-maker to ponder in the editing phase and to reflect in the evaluating phase, 
it becomes the essential root of framing. Decision-maker's cognitive response in the 
editing phase and policy preferences in the evaluating phase are believed to be under 
the influence of the reference point, to the extent that prospect theory is taken as a 
reference-dependent theory. 10 
The causal mechanism applied to IR 
What merits attention is the causal mechanism derived from prospect theory in 
the IR literature. The hypothetical mechanism of prospect theory takes framing as the 
explanatory variable, and risk-oriented behaviour, the dependent variable. It stipulates 
that decision-makers are often influenced by the way an issue is framed. ' I If an issue 
is involved with distribution of gains or losses, framing an issue with an anticipated 
effect in positive or negative terms will bring about different risk behaviour. 12 More 
precisely, if an issue is framed in terms of gains in prospect, decision-makers will be 
risk-averse. Their policy preference in the course of action tends to be self-restrained. 
Conversely, if an issue is framed in terms of losses, decision-makers will be risk- 
acceptant (or risk seeking) in an attempt to reverse the expected losses. 13 Prospect 
theory also invokes the following three variables to explain causal relations, namely, 
loss avoidance and status quo bias, decision weight, and preference reversals. 
9 P. Robert Abelson (1981) "Psychological status of the script concept", American Psychologist, 36,7, 
p. 722; Baruch Fischhoff, Paul Slovic and Sarah Lichtenstein (1988) "Knowing what you want: 
Measuring labile values", in Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, Descriptive, normative, andprescriptive 
interactions, p. 399; R. Spears, Abraham S. C. S., Abrams D. and Sheeran P. (1992) "Framing in terms 
of 'high-risk groups' versus 'risky practices' and prognoses of HIV infectioW', European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 22,2, p. 200. 
10 John C. Hershey, Howard C. Kunreuther and Paul J. H. Schoemaker (1988) "Sources of bias in 
assessment procedures for utility functions", in Bell, Raiffa and Tvcrsky, Descriptive, normative, and 
prescrl tive interactions, p. 439. 
rwin P. Levin, Sara K. Schnittjcr and Shannon L. Thee (1988) "Information framing effects in social 
and personal decisions", Journal ofErperimental Social Psychology, 24,5, p. 527; Paul Slovic, Baruch 
Fischhoff and Sarah Lichtenstein (1988) "Response mode, framing, and information-processing effects 
in risk assessment", in Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, Descriptive, normative, andprescriptive interactions, 
vi 165. 
C. Miguel Brendl, E. Tory Higgins and Kristi M. Lemm (1995) "Sensitivity to varying gains and 
losses: The role of self-discrepancies and event framing", Journal ofPersonality and Social 
Psychology, 69,6, p. 1046. 
13 Chris Tallant and Robert Strachan (1995) "Ibe importance of framing: A pragmatic approach to risk 
assessment", Probation Journal, 42,4, p. 205. 
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Loss avoidance and status quo bias 
In contrast to most rational choice theories that tacitly assume gains-seeking as 
the primary concern, proponents of prospect theory are of the view that the dynamic 
part of decision-making in the evaluating phase is characterised by the notion of loss 
avoidance (or loss aversion). This is because, according to Tversky and Kahneman, 
the phenomenon of diminishing retums-the value of a good diminishes with 
continual increases in its gains-takes place. 14 Secondly, loss avoidance takes place 
because it is much more difficult for people to adjust to losses than to gains. Because 
the perception of loss often looms disproportionately larger than that of gains, 
whenever a decision-maker is required to leave the status quo, 15 he or she will 
perceive the change as making the situation worse. 16 In Levy's words, the 
psychological temperament of loss avoidance is significant, because human beings 
"tend to value what they have more than comparable things they do not have, and also 
because the dis-utility of relinquishing a good is greater than the utility of acquiring 
it". 17 To the extent that loss avoidance is conspicuous, there develops the notion of the 
status quo bias in decision-making. 18 It is reported that decision-makers in bargaining 
normally have a strong inclination to keep to the status quo when there are 
competitive sets of framing in respect of a same issue. 19 Some adherents of prospect 
theory argue that, because the perceived psychological pains of giving up current 
possessions is so pronounced, the framing in terms of gains will give ground to the 
framing in terms of losses. 20 Brooks argues that the status quo bias is a dominant 
14 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (I 982a) "The psychology of preferences", Scientific American, 
246,1, p. 162. 
15 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1990) "Experimental tests of the 
endowment effect and the case theorem", Journal ofPolitical Economy, 98, p. 1342; Jack Knetsch 
(1989) "The endowment effect and evidence of non-reversible indifference of curves", American 
Economic Review, 79,1, p. 1282; Richard Thaler (1980) "Toward a positive theory of consumer 
choice", Journal ofEconomic Behaviour and Organisation, 1, pp. 43-7. 
16 Janice Gross Stein (1993) "International co-operation and loss avoidance: Framing the problem", in 
Janice Gross Stein and Louis W. Pauly (eds. ), Choosing to co-operate: How states avoid loss 
(Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press), p. 2 1. 
17 Levy (1997a) "Prospect theory, rational choice", p. 89. 
18 William Samuelson and Richard Zechhauser (1988) "Status quo bias in decision making", Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty, 1, pp. 7-8. 
19 David E. Bell (1988) "Disappointment in decision making under certainty", in Bell, Raiffa and 
Tversky, Descriptive, normative, andprescriptive interactions, p. 359; Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. 
Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (199 1) "Anomalies: The endowment effect, loss aversion, and status 
quo bias", Journal ofEconomic Perspectives, 5,1, p. 198; Jack Knetsch and J. A. Sinden (1984) 
"Willingness to pay and compensation demanded: Experimental evidence of an unexpected disparity in 
measures of value", Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, XCIX, pp. 507-2 1. 
20 Els C. M. van Schie, and Joop Van der Plight (1990) "Problem representation, frame preference, and 
risky choice", Acta Psychologica, 75, p. 257. 
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factor in decision making. It dominates the decision-makers' perception to the extent 
that prospect theory is a structural model corresponding to neorealism. As Brooks 
concluded, neorealism is but the "representative of prospect theory". 21 
Decision weight 
The second axiom of prospect theory is the idea of decision weight. Decision 
weight is a psychological force that is said to be able to "multiply" the expected value 
of each possible outcome, and, to a large extent, determine where a reference point 
lies in decision-making. 22 According to prospect theory, decision-makers are "more 
akin to [use] estimation" than objective probability in making judgements. 23 Even if 
there is statistical probability available for decision-makers' reference, decision 
weight will normally replace objective probability, 24 or at least render it "less 
representative" in a risk equation. 25 
The implications of decision weight are twofold. First, decision weight leaves a 
lot of room for subjective value-systems to operate in decision-making. Therefore, 
prospect theory admits the existence of human bias when elucidating reasons for some 
26 choice errors or risky choices. Second, decision weight strikes a balance of 
description in decision-making because, when decision weight enters the decision- 
making process, the pure cognitive function of representativeness, which this thesis 
will take issue with later, will be subdued. 
Preference reversals 
In explaining decision-making, prospect theory does not stress the notion of 
to 27 consistency". Instead, it argues that, although inconsistency may create certain 
negative meanings for those who perceive it, it is rarely considered as unacceptable, 
21 Stephen G Brooks (1997) "Duelling realisms", International Organisation, 51,3, p. 454. 22 Schie and Plight (1990) "Problem representation", p. 244. 
23 Manuel Leon and Norman H. Anderson (1974) "A ratio rule from integration theory applied to 
inference judgements". Experimental Psychology, 102,1, p. 34. 
24 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1982b) "On the psychology of prediction", in Kahneman, 
Slovic and Tversky, Judgement under uncertainty, p. 48; Yaacov Trope (1982) "Inferences of personal 
characteristics on the basis of information retrieved from one's memory", in ibid., p. 387. 25 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1973) "On the psychology of prediction", Psychological 
Review, 80,4,23 8; Kahneman and Tversky (I 982c) "Subjective probability: A judgement of 
representativeness", in ibid. p. 32. 
26 Karen E. Jacowitz and Daniel Kahneman (1995) "Measures of anchoring in estimation tasks", 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2 1,11, pp. 1161-2, p. 1165. 27 Hillel J. Einhom and Robin M. Hogarth (1988) "Behavioural decision theory: Process ofjudgement 
and choice", in Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, Descriptive, normative, andprescriptive interactions, p. 116. 
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because, as McGuire explains, human beings are adaptable. 28 Prospect theory is of the 
view that decision-makers are pursuing policy as they hurtle along in the changing 
environment. A policy should be seen in the form of "zigs and zags", 29 because a 
decision-maker is capable of accommodating the realities. 30 "We may have to accept 
that", as Comford explained, "any modem government is an incoherent system". 31 
Therefore, the concern for consistency cannot be overwhelming. And indeed, 
decision-makers normally are capable of explaining away the inconsistencies in order 
to keep their evaluation congruous with the existing frame of reference. 32 According 
to the causal mechanism built up by prospect theory, a risk-averse choice, for 
instance, is made because the payoffs are seen as significantly better than the current 
reference point. If, with the passage of time, the payoffs are perceived worse than the 
current reference point, a decision-maker will become risk-acceptant to defend the 
current utilities. In other words, as long as the alternative choices remain relevant to 
the existing set of framing, any decision-making is to be seen by prospect theory as a 
congruent part of choice behaviour. 33 Consistency or not may not be a major concern 
of a decision-maker. 34 
This inattention to consistency in decision-making is certainly in sharp contrast 
to rational choice theorists. The latter school sees a decision from the perspective of 
final expected utilities. 35 A choice is the end product of mathematical calculation, in 
which process decision-makers are "gain-maximising initiators". Decision-makers in 
rational choice theory are also expected to be free from bias because they presumably 
concentrate on measuring final expected utilities. 36 Policy preference is taken as 
consistent and transitive within a defined period as a result of mathematical 
28 William J. McGuire (1967a) "The current status of cognitive consistency theories", in Martin 
Fishbein (ed. ), Readings in attitude theory and measurement (NY. Wiley & Sons), p. 415; McGuire 
(1967b) "Cognitive consistency and attitude change", in Fishbein, Readings in attitude theory, p. 357. 
29 Roger Hilsman (1967) To move a nation (NY. Doubleday), p. 5. 
" Berndt Brehmer (1976) *Social judgement theory and the analysis of interpersonal conflict", 
Psychological Bulletin, 83,6, p. 1000. 
II Comford, J. P. (1974) "Review article: The illusion of decision", British Journal ofPolitical Science, 
4,2, p. 239. 
" Tadeusz Tyszka (1986) "Information and evaluation process in decision-making: The role of 
familiarity", in Brehmer, Jungermann, Lourens and Sevon, New directions, p. 160. 
33 Robert J. Reilly (1982) "Preference reversal: Further evidence and some suggested modifications in 
experimental desigif', American Economic Review, 72, p. 582. 
34 David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa and Amos Tversky (1988) "Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive 
interactions in decision making", in Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, Descriptive, normative, andprescriptive 
interactions, p. 25. 
33 Klemens Szaniawski (1980) "Philosophy of decision making", Acta Psychologica, 45, p. 339. 
3" Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (1989) "Rational deterrence theory: I think, therefore I 
deter", World Politics, 41,2, p. 2 10. 
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calculation. 37 It is in this sense that preference reversals are behavioural anomalies for 
rational choice theorists. 38 They reflect failure of decision-makers in following a 
normative procedure in decision-making. 39 But prospect theory finds no problem in 
providing explanations for the phenomena of preference reversals to occur. This is 
because prospect theory is more inclined to see people choose an option on the 
principle of "being satisfying", meaning "good enough", 40 instead of "maximising" 
alternatives assumed by rational choice theorieS. 41 Viewed in this light, a reference 
point can be dynamically re-located by a decision-maker with a change of contextual 
information. In other words, framing is always subject to counter-framing. 42 There is 
no sense of irrationality in preference reversals. 43 
Taken together, the tendency to avoid losses, the weight of subjectivity and the 
violation of the major tenets of rational choice models in respect of consistency 
constitute three basic characteristics of prospect theory. Although Tversky and 
Kalmeman restrict the application of prospect theory to description, 44 they have 
roundly asserted that rational choice models are not empirically sustainable and 
fundamentally flawed. They argue instead that individual decisions found in their 
laboratory prove not supportive of the standard decision-making theories based on the 
assumption of rationality and consistent behaviour in decision-making. Their findings 
seem to have elevated prospect theory to a level competing with the theories of 
rational choice. 45 It is this promising prospect that this thesis now turns. 
2. Justiflcation of the choice of prospect theory 
A decision-making process perspective 
37 George A. Quattrone and Amos Tversky (1988) "Contrasting rational and psychological analyses of 
political choice",, 4merican Political Science Review, 82,3, p. 720. 
" Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger (1989) "Should social scientists care about choice 
anomalies? ", Rationality and Society, 1,1, pp. 10 1-22. 
39 Martin Hollis (1996) Reason in action: Essays in the philosophy ofsocial science (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), p. 2; Werner W. Pommerehne, Friedrich Schneider and Peter Zweifel 
(1982) "Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon: A re-examination", 
American Economic Review, 72, p. 569; Amos Tversky, Paul Slovic and Daniel Kahneman (1990) "The 
causes of preference reversal", The American Economic Review, 80,1, p. 215. 
40 Stuart A. Ross (1976) "Complexity and the presidency: Gouverneur Morris in the constitutional 
convention", in Robert Axelrod (ed. ), Structure ofdecision: The cognitive maps ofpolitical elites (NJ: 
Princeton University Press), p. I 11. 
` Tore Sandven (1999) "Autonomy, adaptation, and rationality-A critical discussion of Jon Elster's 
concept of 'sour grapes', part 11", Philosophy ofthe Social Sciences, 29,2, p. 201. 
"' Zeev Maoz (199 1) "Framing the national interest: The manipulation of foreign policy decisions in 
f3roup settings", World Politics, 43,1, p. 89. 
Tversky and Kahneman (199 1) "Loss aversion in risk choice", p. 1057. 
Ibid. (1986) "Rational choice and the framing of decision", Journal ofBusiness, 59,4, p. s272. 
45 Ibid. (1979) 'Prospect theory", p. 263. 
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The first point to justify the choice of prospect theory as the methodology lies in 
a different perspective that prospect theory holds. To begin with, in the realm of 
decision-making literature, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism have proved 
singularly un-illuminating with regard to the two British turning-point policy 
preferences in 1966-68. But it has to be noted that these two rational choice models 
are looking for expected utilities as an explanation, rather than taking interest in 
46 
enquiries into the process of choosing. Viewed in this light, this thesis may hit on a 
proper track if it adopts the perspective of prospect theory, because in cases of 
qualitative research, the process of policy development is an important perspective, 
especially for understanding the happening of preference reversals . 
47 With its two- 
phase hypothetical construct, prospect theory represents exactly this kind of concern. 
Briefly speaking, representativeness in the editing phase will have cognitive function 
"from the point of view of processes". Alongside the process, location and re-location 
of a reference point in the evaluating phase may be a viable chain alongside the 
decision-making process. 48 
Next, the choice of theory can also be justified from the point of view of 
evaluating prospect theory. As Farnham urged, to build up the explanatory power of 
prospect theory, it must "be evaluated in the light of its competitors". 49 Although the 
explanatory difficulties of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism shown in 
Chapter 2 have been demonstrated, their fundamental weakness in explanation does 
not mean that prospect theory will have a better claim. To respond to Farnham's call 
for a test in a competitive manner, this thesis so far has not fulfilled its task. A 
verification of prospect theory is still wanting. 
More specifically, the dispute over the Falkland Islands is a territorial issue. As 
Stein argues, a territorial dispute can be seen as being characterised by a "static" 
preference pattern with the end utilities approximately the same in most human 
negotiations. 50 Levy concurs, by maintaining that "power and territory are notoriously 
resistant to the type of interval level of measurement required by either expected 
46 Richard K. Ashly (1984) "The poverty of neorealism", International Organisation, 3 8,1, p. 59. 
47 Graham Allan (199 1) "Qualitative research", in Graham Allan and Chris Skinner (eds. ), Handbook 
for research students in the social sciences (NY & London: Falmer), p. 179. 
48 j. I- Anderson (1983) Yhe architecture ofcognition (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: Harvard 
University Press), pp. 46-7, 
4' Barbara Farnham (1992) "Introduction", Political Psychology, 13,2, p. 168. 
50 Stein (1993) "International co-operation and loss avoidance", p. 12. 
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utility theory and prospect theory". 51 Indeed, for most sovereign states, the framing of 
a territorial issue is static, as territoriality is inseparable from the concept of 
sovereignty. For revisionists, framing can also be static because a territorial issue is 
52 involved with seeking to reverse an imbalance of interests. Even for institutionalists, 
framing of a territorial dispute can also be static in that territoriality is taken as vital to 
the extent -of being the root of social meaning. 53 Therefore, in light of a territorial 
dispute being an exceptional case due to uncompromising framing, the issue of the 
Falkland Islands becomes the "least-likely" case to fit prospect theory. 54 With a view 
to advancing the explanatory terrain of prospect theory, the testing effort is 
worthwhile. 
Secondly, the test of a territorial dispute is worthwhile because a territorial 
dispute is a new frontier in application of prospect theory. Exponents of prospect 
theory rarely extend their cases beyond the domains of economic issues, 55 and the 
institutional framework of alliance. 56 Klinger may be an exception. He applies 
prospect theory in the case of the American Civil War, which can be seen as a similar 
case on territorial conflict. However, his approach in observation is highly debatable 
because, as Klinger admits, military strategy consists of strategic, operational and 
tactical levels. Klinger did not differentiate them in the analysis, and his findings as a 
result remained inconclusive. 57 Hence, examining the Falklands dispute can be seen 
as an effort to explore a new frontier that Klinger has not finished. The selection of 
the issue is helpful to theory evaluation in that the case is ideally characterised by 
11non-typicality". 58 
51 Jack S. Levy (1992) "Prospect theory and international relations: Theoretical applications and 
analytical problems", Political Psychology, 13,2, p. 293. 
52 Hans J. Morgenthau (1978) Politics among nations: The struggleforpower andpeace (NY. Alfred 
A. Knopo, p. 321. 
53 James A. Caporaso (1992) "International relations theory and multilateralism: The search for 
foundations", International Organisation, 46,3, p. 127. 
54 Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George (1997) "Research design tasks in case study methods", 
draft paper presented at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Belfer Centre 
for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA), Harvard University, 17-19 October. 
" Robert Jervis (1992) "Political implications of loss aversion", Political Psychology, 13,2, pp. 187- 
204; Pauly (1993) "The political foundations of multilateral economic surveillance", pp. 94-127. 
56 Stephen G Walker (1995) "Psychodynamic process and framing effects in foreign policy decision- 
making: Woodrow Wilson's operational code", Political Psychology, 16,4, pp. 697-717; Stephen Walt 
(199 1) "Alliance formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and bandwagoning in cold war competition", 
in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (eds. ), Dominoes and bandwagonings: Strategic beliefs and great 
power competition in the Eurasian Rimland (NY & Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 54. 
'7 Jane M. Klinger (1999) Hen in the realm oflosses: Prospect theory and decision making in war, 
paper presented at the International Studies Association, 16-20 February, p. 16. 
`8 King, Keohane and Verba (1994) Designing social inquiry, p. 42. 
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Killing two birds with one stone 
59 To minimise bias and to take a systematic observation, this thesis is not 
satisfied with Wendt's remark that "issues of substance" are more meaningful than 
choices of methods. 60 This thesis, instead, is of the view that looking at substance 
exclusively tends to commit the fallacy as the analyses following the historical 
approach. To avoid this, the concerns of selecting theory and methods have better be 
integrated and mutually supportive. A theory in choice can be justified by the 
possibility of elevating the representative status of a case under research, while case 
selection can advance a theory by the possibility of reinforcing the explanatory power 
of a theory in evaluation . 
61 In this sense, the goal of this thesis can be made clearer at 
this stage. The purpose of this thesis is to identify behavioural patterns in British 
decision-making on the issue of the Falkland Islands, and to test theories with results 
62 to share with IR students. To use Little's expression, this thesis intends to "kill two 
birds with one stone-providing an improved understanding" of British cooperation 
with Argentina over the Falklands issue in the 1960s, "while demonstrating the virtues 
of a scientific approach to foreign policy analysis". 63 
3. The criticisms of prospect theory 
Nevertheless, prospect theory meets with counter-arguments. The first doubt 
about prospect theory concerns the effect of framing. It has been contended that, 
because the findings are mainly from the laboratory, 64 the framing effects are 
uncertain in application . 
65 Some scholars find that "the shifts from risk-taking to risk 
aversion are less pronounced than those obtained by Tversky and Kahneman in the 
human life tests". 66 Therefore, it is contended that framing effects are limited in 
59 King, Keohane and Verba (1995) "The importance of research design", p. 478. 
60 Alexander Wendt (1998) "On constitution and causation in international relations", Review of 
International Studies, 24, Special Issue, December, p. I 11, p. 115. 
61 David E. Apter (1957) "Theory and the study of politics", American Political Science Review, 51,3, 
p5 6i 7 4. Ernest Nagel (1968) The structure ofscience (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), pp. 455-6; Charles 
C. Ragin (1994) Constructing social research: 7he unity and diversity ofmethod (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Pine Forge), p. 33. 
63 Richard Little (1988a) "The study of British foreign policy", in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and 
Brian White (eds. ), Britishforeign policy. Tradition, change and transformation (London: Unwin 
Hyman), p. 247. 
64 Roderick M. Kramer (1989) "Windows of vulnerability or cognitive illusions? Cognitive processes 
and the nuclear arms race", Journal ofExperimental Social Psychology, 25,1, p. 97. 
65 Schie and Plight (1990) "Problem representation", p. 244. 
66 Joop van der Plight and Els C. M. van Schie (1990) "Frames of reference, judgement and 
preference", in Wolfgang Stroebe and Miles Hewstone (eds. ), European Review ofSocial Psychology, 
vol. I (Chichster: John Wiley & Sons), p. 70. 
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practice. 67 Levy complains that prospect theory has failed to provide IR students with 
a theory of collective decision-making. It is as a result limited in its application to the 
level of individuals' choices onl Y. 68 In addition, the status quo bias is still 
69 
questionable. Levy, for instance, claims that the status quo bias is "mis-specified". 
The "bias", argues Levy, "is really a referent point bias, a greater tendency to move 
toward the reference point than expected-utility predicts". 70 Another question is posed 
by this thesis as follows: since decision weight is characterised by subjective values at 
work, under what circumstances does decision weight comes to the fore? 
The foregoing criticisms-methodological ambiguity about the effect of framing; 
evidence found only at the level of single individual's choice; and uncertainties about 
the status quo bias and decision weight-are by no means insignificant. They 
constitute issues confronting the legitimate position of prospect theory in the aspects 
of definition, empirical observation and methodologies. Although all these 
uncertainties, believes Levy, arise from no clear theory to guide the way to observe 
how "an actor frames a choice problem", 71 this thesis cannot intellectually stop here. 
To adopt prospect theory as the perspective for understanding the British conduct of 
the Falklands dispute in the 1960s, this thesis takes issue with the above, and leaves 
the status quo bias issue to the empirical observations in the next chapter. 
4. Responses to the criticisms of prospect theory 
To reflect, not to simplify 
This thesis contends that prospect theory is not for studying an individual's 
choices only. There have been many reports confirming the effect of framing at group 
level. 72 In the literature on cognitive psychology, which takes representativeness as an 
explanatory variable, there is evidence showing that employment of a reference point 
67 Elaine Vaughan and Marianne Seifert (1992) "Variability in the framing of risk issues", Journal of 
Social Values, 48,4, p. 123. 
68 Levy (1996) "Loss aversion, framing, and bargaining", p. 184, p. 192. 
69 Ibid., p. 189. 
70 Ibid. (I 997a) "Prospect theory, rational choice", p. 9 1. 
71 Levy (1992) "Prospect theory and international relations", p. 291; Levy (1996) "Loss aversion, 
framing, and bargaining", p. 19 1. 
72 Philip Bobko, Larry Shetzer and Craig Russel (199 1) "Estimating the standard deviation of 
professors' worth: The effects of frame and presentation order in utility analysis", Journal of 
Occupational Psychology, 64,2, p. 18 1; Baruch Fischhoff (1983) "Predicting framing", Journal of 
Experimental Psychology., Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9, p. 116; Gordon F. Pitz (1980) 'The 
very guide of life: The use of probabilistic information for making decisions", in Wallsten, Cognitive 
processes in choice, p. 91; Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly (1982) "Egocentric biases in availability and 
attribution", in Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, Judgement under uncertainty, p. 187. 
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for social decisions is conspicuous, and that the degree of risk-orientation is 
reinforced at collective levels. 73 These explain that framing may not always be 
confined to the individual level. 74 
For those scholars who think prospect theory is exclusively for understanding an 
individual's choice, they confuse the assumption of prospect theory with its entailing 
argument. It is true that prospect theory assumes an individual perspective. 
Nevertheless, the purpose of prospect theory starting the argument from the 
assumption of the individual-actor level is to set a boundary for observation. But to 
set a boundary does not mean to limit the effect of the analytical power of prospect 
theory, given that the policy preferences of the FCO have to be analysed contextually 
and conditionally. As far as a foreign policy goes, this concern about the individual- 
actor assumption can be relaxed. Because in foreign policy, there are some actors 
whose concerns are "decisive enough" and cannot be reduced to the level of other 
individuals or other collective groups. 75 Foreign Secretaries of the United Kingdom 
and Presidents of the United States of America in the decision-making literature are of 
this type. It is some individuals' thinking patterns that govern the "thinking and 
behaving" of their inferiors in the bureaucratic echelons. 76 Hence, in terms of foreign 
policy, it is justifiable to structure the groups under observation as a "personalised" 
view, because the influence can be seen as coming from the top down to the bottom. 
As Tony Benn, Minister of Technology 1966-70, observed, "the conduct of [British) 
Government business can be said to reflect a personal and automatic, rather than a 
collective and democratic, spirit". 77 Dunsire shared a similar view. He found that 
despite the call for political neutrality, civil servants are rarely neutral in exercising 
their powers. Their expressed opinions (subjective value-systems) hardly go beyond 
the interests and concerns of their working units. The collective opinion of the 
working units in turn is subject to the Ministers, Secretaries or Prime ministers in the 
" Jeffrey Berejekian (1997) "The gains debates: Framing state choice", American Political Science 
Review, 91,4, pp. 789-805; Ruth P. Mack (197 1) Planning on uncertainty: Decision making in 
business and government administration (NY. Wiley-Interscience), p. 126; David M. Messick (1986) 
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and Sevon, New directions, p. 223. 
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bureaucratic echelons. 78 They could be seen as one distinctive body because, 
ultimately, the interests of both ministers and civil servants within the same 
department can be identified. As Weir and Beetharn observed, "they act as a partisan 
arm of the executive". 79 and should be seen as "partners in government" . 
80 These 
remarks lend much weight to the assumption of prospect theory. They indicate that the 
"state-as-individual" assumption remains closely contingent in terms of "collective 
responsibility" in British politics. There will be no problem to take this individual- 
actor assumption to reflect the internal dynamic of the British Foreign Office. 
Thirdly, a "personalised" view is by no means an individual one in practice. This 
is because personal influence in the context of foreign policy can be limited in "time 
and energy". 81 Therefore, despite the unitary-actor assumption, it does not mean that 
observation of grpup activities can be omitted. With the function of representativeness 
at work, as stressed by prospect theory, policy calculation "is not simply something 
inside the head of an individual" . 
82 Rather, the result of decision-making has to be 
taken as a reflection of a social and historical collective endeavour. The formation of 
policy preferences should be treated as collective effort. 83 
In fact, with the function of framing based on the notion of representativeness, it 
will become difficult for an observer to tell exactly whether a foreign policy is made 
at the individual or collective level. Owing to this difficulty to differentiate, the 
criticism whether a decision is made at the individual or collective level in a 
bureaucratic framework seems not to be a dire threat to the unitary-actor assumption 
made earlier in Chapter 1, or adopted by prospect theory. This assumption by no 
means implies that it will restrict observation to only one or two decision-makers, or 
disregard group activities. 
To summarise, this thesis does not sympathise with the criticism that the 
application of prospect theory is limited to individual choice only. On the contrary, the 
testing results of prospect theory in the published literature have already suggested the 
" Andrew Dunsire (1988) "Bureaucratic morality in the United Kingdom7, International Political 
Science Review, 9,3, p. 187. 
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potential interplay between individual and collective choice. The fundamental point is 
whether the level of analysis highlights "the nature of the problem and the questions 
posed" or not. 84 As long as an analyst explores the case in a systematic manner 
corresponding to prospect theory, the findings cannot be lightly dismissed. 
A critique of the concept of framing 
What concerns this thesis most is the criticism that the concept of framing is 
ambiguous. Indeed, to evaluate prospect theory, what is at stake is an unclear 
boundary of framing for empirical observation and information-gathering in a 
systematic manner. Because of the ambiguity, many case studies either did not capture 
the spirit of what is afoot in prospect theory, or adopted the weakest part of it in their 
applications. Since the major concern of this thesis is theory evaluation, 85 some key 
points in methodology have to be clarified before setting out the task of falsification. 
Framing not solely given 
Part of the criticism comes from the fact that Tversky and Kahneman, forefathers 
of prospect theory in the realm of economics, have not provided the analysts with a 
clear concept of framing. Framing, for Tversky and Kahneman, refers to the "frame of 
reference", which gives rise to an organising principle for decision-makers to 
understand an issue and formulate a policy. By using framing with the connotation of 
"frame of reference", Tversky and Kahneman argue that the representativeness can 
86 
strengthen the influence of framing on the ordering of policy preferences. This 
emphasis on representativeness inclines the IR analysts to read into framing a rule to 
govern the decision-makers' understanding of a complex issue. Under this rubric, 
some IR scholars exclusively present framing in descriptive terms, such as the domain 
of frame or "dominance of explicit information". Some report that framing consists of 
"the basic units of thinking", 87 which helps "define a decision maker's subjective sense 
88 of situation" and even motivations. Others declare that framing will differentiate 
" Paul Martin and Patrick Baterson, Frs (1993) Measuring behaviour. An introductory guide 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 9. 
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issues among different sorts of reality, 89 and help a decision-maker to recognise "the 
importance of the situation". 90 Some are even quite satisfied with a general rule of 
thumb and suggest that "frame, framing and framework" were actually similar in 
connotations. 91 
The crux here is that, Tversky and Kahneman are too ready to stress the 
determinant impact of cognitive representativeness in framing without realising that 
this kind of understanding about framing is at best a contextual factor. 92 It is only 
relevant to "the surface appearance of' a newly emerging issue. It does not correspond 
to the whole content of the task of choice in question described by prospect theory. 93 
By referring to "the frame of reference", Tversky and Kahneman seem to identify 
framing as a mentally structural hold in the editing phase of prospect theory. But their 
having taken representativeness as the core of prospect theory has led astray some 
analysts of prospect theory. To the extent that the followers apply the meaning of 
framing exclusively to the editing phase, the existence of subjective forces in the 
evaluating phase is disregarded. 94 Policy preferences in these circumstances become a 
pure cognitive response to the frame of an issue. This is misleadingly restrictive in 
respect of description, and methodologically unhelpful, in terms of theory evaluation. 
For instance, in the analysis of Eisenhower's decision making in the 1956 Suez 
Crisis, McDermott argued that the main reason for the US not to intervene with force 
was that Eisenhower enjoyed a domain of gain. Before the eruption of the crisis, 
Eisenhower was "an overwhelmingly popular president". When the crisis broke out, 
Britain and France intended to reverse the situation, caused by Nasser's nationalising 
the Suez Canal. But Eisenhower, despite the concern of the western alliance, was 
quite satisfied with the new status quo created by Nasser. According to McDermott, 
because Eisenhower was "so firmly entrenched in the domain of gains", he was 
influences motivation and emotion", Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2 1,11, p. 1152. 
" Erving Goffman (1974) Frame analysis: An essay on the organisation ofexperience (London: 
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cautious. Eisenhower, as a result, made a risk-averse decision not to use force. 95 This 
explained in part why Eisenhower did not support Anthony Eden's demand for 
intervening with force. From the perspective of prospect theory, concluded 
McDermott, the result of risk-aversion in the US decision-making was within the 
framework of prospect theory. 
Clearly, following Tversky and Kahneman, McDermott could well justify her 
finding. Given the definition of framing, understood exclusively as the domain of 
frame, McDermott might well preclude the influence of Eisenhower's individual 
attitudes, private intention, the US disposition and desirability. But McDermott has to 
be reminded that research bearing on the domain of frame is insufficient so far as 
prospect theory is concerned. Practically, without observing the subjective force 
working as a filter in interpreting the incident, how can we expect Eisenhower's 
established representativeness in the Suez Crisis to be sustainable? Why can 
McDermott confidently report that Eisenhower's insistence that "risk should never be 
driven by fear of the future" was on the grounds of his domain of gains? 96 How can 
Eisenhower be said to see "possibilities of improvement in the Middle East, although 
the present developments [of the crisis] were adverse ot? 97 For sure, it is problematic to 
discuss decision-making proportionately within the domain of frame, without even 
mentioning Eisenhower's political motivation behind. McDermott could hardly 
disregard the internal motives of the actors, such as motivation and desire, from the 
point of view of prospect theory. 98 
McDennott's problem on methodology is suggestive. It shows that to define 
framing as "dominance of explicit information" or the "organisation of experience" is 
partial and insufficient. 99 First of all, the definition of framing falls exclusively into 
the language of "decision frame" or representativeness is a result of its being unevenly 
covered by Tversky and Kahneman. Framing under this circumstance is constructed 
exclusively within cognitive psychology. 100 But this kind of definition is in practice 
unconvincing. If framing is understood in the way that Tversky and Kahneman 
95 Rose McDermott (1998) Risk-taking in internationalpolitics: Prospect theory in Americanforeign 
&04 u7 (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press), pp. 143-5, p. 155. lb d"p. 162. 
97 Ibid., p. 144. 
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suggest, or in the ways that IR analysts think Tversky and Kahneman intentionally 
suggest, we will end up with too mechanical a description of decision making. Risk- 
averse or risk-acceptant propensity will be restrictively interpreted as a structural 
product without realising that information encoding may not happen in accordance 
with the perception of the decision-makers. 101 
Prospect theory, with its two-phase practice in decision making-editing and 
evaluating-is by no means a pure context-dependent theory. Tversky and Kahneman 
clearly have not offered a balanced definition of framing corresponding to both the 
editing and evaluating phases of prospect theory. Pragmatically, a decision cannot be 
interpreted as a "biological" or "intuitive" response to human surroundings. 102 It is for 
this practical concern that prospect theory becomes a competitive model of decision- 
making. The degree of receiving a given set of input data, or in other words, 
perception, will depend on both "the context and the status of the perceivers". 103 
Part of the reason for this under-estimation of the internal dynamic of decision- 
making in prospect theory is that Tversky and Kahneman have neglected it. They do 
mention the intervening element of subjective force in the evaluating phase, but, 
unfortunately, they do not sustain their argument by elaborating on the way 
representativeness is filtered, and then adopted, as a reference point when decision 
making comes to the evaluating phase. Rather, they pay more attention to status quo 
bias and loss aversion, under the name of "reflection effect". 104 Their emphasis is of 
course helpful in distinguishing prospect theory from rival models. However, the 
uncritical use of the terms framing across the two phases, editing and framing, has 
weakened the explanatory force of prospect theory and created methodological 
problem in observation. 105 Tversky and Kahneman justify their silence in this area by 
openly admitting the difficulty of gauging subjective probability in mental 
Behavioural decision making (NY & London: Plenum), p. 79. 
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representation and by reporting that there is no "formal theory of framing". 106 
Nevertheless, this thesis does not share the view that the report of no theory can 
suffice as a legitimate reason. To claim that "there is no theory" is not enough. There is 
also no uniform theory of cognitive responses in the decision-making process. 107 The 
causal assertion of representativeness is still considered no more than "an artificial 
science". 108 Current understanding about the exact causal explanation of the mental 
behaviour remains hypothetical. 109 No definitive answer and agreed analysis can be 
offered at present. ' 10 We do not really know to what extent human preference is 
affected by representativeness alongside the cognitive processes, and, ultimately, all 
the common themes for discussion of representativeness have to be treated as a 
hypothetical construct. "' However, Tversky and Kahneman seem to borrow the idea 
of representativeness with confidence. They put it to use in describing the editing 
phase without questioning that representativeness is also a relatively new branch in 
cognitive psychology. 112 By this token, why cannot they borrow other factors from 
other disciplines to deal with the evaluating phase in prospect theory and create a 
balanced viewpoint? When Tversky and Kahneman intend to elevate the persuasive 
status of representativeness in prospect theory, by arguing that causal data have 
greater impact than incidental data, 113 without subjective judgement playing a part, 
how can we tell which data are causal and which, incidental? 
Indeed, subjective force in the decision-making process can hardly be subdued, 
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because these characters are often pre-disposed before an issue emerges. ' 14 As Toda 
rightly noted, the cognitive decision system cannot operate without the help of 
subjective force such as "desires, loves, and hates". ' 15 Disregarding the motivation at 
the receiving end, just as McDermott did in her research of Eisenhower in the Suez 
Crisis, is to take the evaluating phase out of the classic concern of prospect theory. 
This omission destroys the theory per se. 
Unfortunately, contrary to the analysts of prospect theory mentioned above, there 
are also some analysts, who define framing as "the identification of reference 
points", 116 or "selecting a particular referent point in terms of which decision options 
are made more salient". 117 They tend to see framing as "the process by which a 
communication source, such as a news organisation, defines and constructs a political 
issue or public controversy". " 8 Defining framing in this way is to put the concept into 
another extreme. Because it only describes how a decision-maker uses all available 
information to pre-empt or evade the imposition of exogenous cognitive processes 
without proper consideration of broader contextual factors. This attitude is 
unconvincing. A policy outcome and behaviour of decision-making cannot be 
explained solely by reference to the structure of the frame. It will leave reader a self- 
contained notion of policy preferences in views without paying attention to the 
structural constraints. Richardson's study of the same subject, the Suez Crisis, in the 
light of prospect theory will betray this weakness. 119 
Framing not solely chosen 
Richardson in her analysis of the Suez Crisis argued that the US decision process 
was cautious and sensitive to various adverse consequences. Different from 
McDermott's argument based on the impact of the domain of gain, Richardson 
reported that Eisenhower displayed himself as a good example of rational choice 
114 Charles Vlek (1987) "Towards a dynamic structural theory of decision behaviour", 'Icta 
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models throughout the crisis. 120 With this reasoning, Richard thought that explanation 
from the perspective of rational choice remained superior. She did not think that 
prospect theory outdid rational choice models in this case. Although there was no 
evidence that the US decision-makers were risk-seeking during the crisis, Richardson 
believed that the lack of evidence did not support prospect theory with much force. 
For Richardson, instead, the US policy preference seeking to avoid the higher 
expected losses seemed to "correspond more closely to an orthodox utility 
maximisation model". 12 1 This was because, as Richardson observed, the US decision- 
makers during the crisis behaved in a way that "approximated [to] rational choice". 122 
Richardson was therefore more convinced of rational choice models. She concluded 
that framing, as the explanatory variable of prospect theory, is questionable. Since the 
US was capable of controlling the situation, "frames are not given, but chosen". 123 
This thesis has no quarrel with Richardson over the finding that there was a large 
proportion of rationality in US decision-making in the Suez Crisis. But what cannot 
suffice in Richardson's conclusion is the statement that framing is chosen, not given. 
Richardson has clearly pushed the argument into another extreme. It is not too 
difficult to find a contradictory example in Richardson's writing to refute this rash 
conclusion. Richardson needs to be reminded that there was another analogue- 
appeasement of Hitler, the so-called Munich complex- in her study of the Suez 
Crisis. According to Richardson, the British decision-makers had a strong imperative 
to avoid the symptom of appeasement from reoccurring during the Suez Crisis. This 
powerful image of the Munich complex led Britain to be inclined to respond by using 
force and to "discount almost completely the risks of' taking military action. 124 The 
point to note here is that Richardson's description of the Munich image deeply rooted 
in the British psyche could hardly be a chosen or a self-imposed reference point. 
Rather, the Munich complex should be properly seen as a pre-ordained lesson living 
in the history of the British mind that Eden, the Prime Minister, found it so hard to 
escape from. When it came to the crisis in 1956, as a result, the framing impact of this 
historical lesson, as Richardson also agreed, has actually presented a contradictory 
picture to the conclusion Richardson reached that framing is chosen not given. 
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Still, it is very hard to judge whether the US policy makers' sensitivity to the 
analogue of "anti-colonialism" leading to the decision not to intervene, as Richardson 
argued, was a result of its chosen reference point or historical aspiration. It will not be 
without foundation to argue that anti-colonialism during the crisis as a reference point 
around which the US framing was formulated could also be a reflection of the US 
historical isolationist awareness, to keep a distance from the European colonialist 
image. 125 At this juncture, it will be debatable to conclude that the US decision- 
makers chose framing as they intended. It seems safer to argue that framing is not 
solely chosen, nor is it subject to the decision-makers' wishes. 
As Richardson's case analysis stands, researchers who take cognitive power out 
of framing will restrict the explanatory power of prospect theory, and this will entail 
an arbitrary leap in making inference. This is not the essence of prospect theory. 
Richardson is right up to a point in the evaluating phase, where decision weight 
characterised by subjective value systems plays an important part during the crisis in 
1956, but she is right only up to this point. The epistemological sources of framing 
have to be sustained from both subjective power and cognitive factors. Framing 
cannot be a good for a decision-maker to choose at will. 
5. A reinforced understanding of prospect theory 
Hence, framing is neither mentally structural, nor chosen at one's will. But what 
is it? Entman, in communication theory, has expressed the concern that the idea of 
framing is conceptually scattered. 126 Entman's complaint is important in its own right, 
but complaint simply will not do. The cause of the problem is the lack of rigour in the 
field in appraising the theory under discussion. Unfortunately, there exists an 
"unwillingness" to specify what constituted the main body of a theory, and a tendency 
to adopt "Auxiliary propositions to explain away flaws" rooted in the theory in 
question among the IR students. 127 
In "Framing Japan['s] problem: The Bush administration and the structural 
impediments initiative (SH)", Mastanduno applied prospect theory to his analysis of 
the interaction between Japan and the US. Mastanduno tried to explain why the US 
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President Bush, when faced with the impatience of the US Congress, signed the 
structural impediments initiative (SII) in 1989, rather than placing the Super 301 
Provision as a measure of sanction against Japan. Mastanduno argued that, the Bush 
Administration decided to sign the SII as a result of loss avoidance. The losses 
referred to the trade policy slipping out of the hands of the Bush administration, and 
destabilising the long-term multi-lateral trading system. However, the framing on the 
side of the US Congress was also consistently shown in terms of loss. 128 Mastanduno 
therefore found it difficult to explain why the Bush administration could be so 
effective in winning over the opposition and getting its policy accepted in the face of 
pressure from the US Congress. Mastanduno sought help in the notion of power, and 
declared that it was the high-level intervention by Bush earlier in March 1990 that 
explained the decision to ratify the SII. 129 
In "Co-developing the FSX fighter: The domestic calculus of international 
cooperation", 130 Spar set out to analyse the negotiations between the US and Japan 
about the FSX fighters in 1988. Spar argued that the Pentagon's framing in terms of 
absolute losses carried more weight than the framing formulated by the Commerce 
Department, who was against the co-development of FSX fighters because of the 
relative-gain concern. 13 1 As regards the question as to why the Pentagon won the 
policy debates with the Commerce Department about the FSX programme, Spar again 
found his explanation of loss avoidance unsustainable. 132 Spar did not delve into the 
understanding but stopped here instead. He concluded that the Pentagon was a 
"powerful internal player" in the domestic bargaining process. 133 
Mastanduno and Spar, to name but two, exemplified the tendency of the analysts 
concerned to bear a shallow understanding of the notion of framing. It is also 
infinitely easier to behead problems by invoking the notion of power at the 
concluding parts and shifting the attention from the core of prospect theory to other 
expedient excuses. Apparently, there is a need to reverse the meaning of framing to its 
original state in classical prospect theory terms. To fulfil this task, this thesis is 
obliged to add greater clarity about definition of framing. 
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Laying down the definition of framing 
To get back to the essence of prospect theory, this thesis thinks that it is helpful 
to undo the ambiguous package of framing by separating it into the domain of frame 
and motivated framing with a view to facilitating observation through hypothesising. 
Let this thesis borrow the idea of cognitive response and define the domain of 
frame as "the cognitive operations responding to a structure with the function of 
representativeness that helps simplify an issue and provide" an influential signpost for 
policy preference. 134 Also, let this thesis borrow the idea of strategic thinking and 
define the motivated framing as an act of "steering the reasoning processes by 
increasing the representativeness of the desired outcomes". 135 However, just as the 
editing and evaluating phases in prospect theory are not exclusive, the motivated 
framing and domain of frame have to be seen as "two different but intertwined 
processes" pointing towards the formation of certain policy preferences. 136 Ultimately, 
the barrier between the domain of frame as an explanatory scheme and motivated 
framing as an internal explanatory one can be terminological rather than real. 
In justification, this thesis assumes the domain of frame as a primitive force in 
the editing phase. As Stein and Welch argue, "any attempt to apply prospect theory to 
the study of foreign policy choice at present requires treating reference points" in the 
editing phase "as exogenous". 137 This ontological status of reference points in the 
editing phase can be justified, partially by the understanding that political leaders can 
hardly manufacture policy making at the very beginning, 138 and partially by the 
reasoning that "new programs cannot be constructed on green field sites". 139 Normally, 
when an issue emerges, decision-makers do "not know what to model" at the initial 
phase of their encounters. This makes decision-makers usually the "inheritors before 
they are choosers", as they are sometimes "introduced into a policy environment dense 
with past commitment". 140 The past commitment can be profoundly influential. As 
"' McDermott (1998) Risk-taking in internationalpolitics, p. 20, p. 27. 
135 Best (1995) Cognitive psychology, pp. 390-1. 
136 Gregory R. Lockhead (1980) "Know, then decide", in Wallsten, Cognitive processes, p. 144. 
137 Janice Gross Stein and David A. Welch (1997) "Rational and psychological approaches to the study 
of international conflict: Comparative strengths and weaknesses", in Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz 
(eds. ), Decision-making on war andpeace: The cognitive-rational debate (Boulder & London: Lynne 
Rienner), p. 63. 
138 David Dolowitz and David Marsh (1996) "Who learns what from whom: A review of the policy 
transfer literature". Political Studies, 44, p. 355. 
139 Patrick Humphreys (1986) "Intelligence in decision support", in Brehmer, Jungermann, Lourens and 
Sevon, New directions, p. 333. 
14' R. Rose (1993) Lesson-drawing in public policy: A guidance to learning across time and space (NJ: 
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Weldes argues, there has been an established image of an issue held by the state 
officials when they "approach international politics with an already quite 
comprehensive and elaborate appreciation of the world, of the international system 
and of the place of their state". 141 
Thus prompted, in applying prospect theory, this thesis thinks it appropriate to 
begin with observations from the perspective of the domain of frame, based on the 
assumption that it is exogenous to the decision makers' general perception of this 
issue. In this regard, data rooted in social context as a source of perceptions and 
meaning are what this thesis is to observe. In Lebow's words, "It is necessary to show 
that policymakers understood these constraints and opportunities and formulated the 
initiatives in response to" the context. 142 
This thesis then observes the motivated framing in the evaluating phase by 
searching for data related to argumentation. Observation will include decision-makers' 
acts of debating, arguing and defending their policy preference in public or private 
talks. 143 Basically, this thesis assumes that process of making a choice is a striving 
towards a better ground of argumentation in an attempt to stand by a policy 
preference. 144 The so-called "better ground" is understood as an argument justified or 
supported by the people concerned. 145 This understanding is relevant to the British 
foreign policy faced by the parliamentary system. 146 Hence, decision-makers' arguing 
for the chosen reference point is presumed as an act to prove that they know the game 
well, 147 because they have "experienced high evaluative and/or discriminative 
choice". 148 Therefore, when Giddens argues that the source of arguments comes from 
Chatham House), p. 78. 
141 Jutta Weldcs (1996) "Constructing national interests", European Journal ofInternational Relations, 
2,3, p. 280. 
141 Richard N. Lebow (1999) "The rise and fall of the Cold War on comparative perspective", Review of 
International Studies, 25, special issue, December, p. 37. 
143 Paul Pierson (1993) "When effect becomes cause: Policy feedback and political change", World 
Politics, 45,4, p. 616. 
144 Henry Montgomery (1987) "From cognition to action: The search for dominance in decision 
making", in Henry Montgomery and Ola Svenson (eds. ), Process and structure in human decision 
making, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons), p. 23. 
145 Oswald Huber (1989) "Information-processing operators in decision making", in ibid. p. 33. 
146 Robert de Hoog and Godfriend van der Wittenboer (1968) "Decision justification, information 
structure and the choice of decision rules", in Brehmer, Jungermann, Lourens and Sevon, New 
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147 Martin Hollis (1994) Thephilosophy ofsocial science: An introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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148 Ivan D. Steiner (1980) "Attribution of choice", in Martin Fishbein (ed. ), Progress in social 
psychology, vol. I (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), p. 28. 
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power in interaction, 149 Giddens has apparently put the cart before the horse. The 
source of power should be seen as the effect of persuasion. Power cannot be sustained 
without establishing a supportive public opinion. 150 Before getting a better ground of 
the power, justification of it is the prior concern. 15 1 The effort ofjustification has to be 
understood as effective argumentation, where reasons and action mutually contribute 
to the confirmation (or rejection) of one's reference point about the debated issue. In 
other words, to consolidate a reference point, a decision-maker has to argue, defend, 
and debate. This kind of act, in turn, constitutes an effective pointer for decision- 
makers to reflect where the motivated framing lies. 
Observing dramatic events 
Nevertheless, if making framing empirically observable is the goal, to provide a 
set of definitions of framing is insufficient. It, at best, offers a static view. The thesis 
can hardly avoid the criticism of being ignorant of the gap between the domain of 
frame, as the "objective levels of the stimuli", and the motivated framing as 
"subjective values". 152 It seems that, instead of laying down the definition of framing, 
there is still a need to make it clear what links the domain of frame to motivated 
framing and what constitutes the interaction between the two forces. In other words, 
this thesis is forced to face the question, given that policy "change does not occur 
automatically", 153 what causes the interaction between the domain of frame and 
motivated framing, leading to a confirmation and relocation of a reference point? 
To answer this methodological question in observation, this thesis has to relate it 
to decision weight, which is still an outstanding problem in prospect theory. For the 
purpose of analysis, this thesis adds the view that a dramatic event is entitled to be 
one valid decision weight. This is because, firstly, a dramatic event is a moment for 
decision-makers to realise the existence of contextual factors such as 
representativeness, or potential reference points that they have not paid enough 
"' Anthony Giddens (1974) "Elite in the British class structure", in Philip Stanworth and Anthony 
Giddens (eds. ), Elites and Power in British society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 19; 
Giddens (1995) A contemporary critique ofhistorical materialism (London & Basingstoke), p. 105. 
150 Vera Daniel (1952) "Physical principles in human cooperation", The Sociological Review, XLIV, 1, 
132. 
M. Bertilsson (1997) "The theory of structuration: Prospects and problems", in Christopher Q A. 
Bryant and David Jary (eds. ),. 4nthony Giddens: Critical assessments, vol. I (London & NY- 
Routledge), p. 55. 
"2 John Richard D. (1987) "Making judgements when information is missing: Inference, biases, and 
framing effecte',, lcta Psychologica, 66,1, p. 72. 
153 Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson (1999) "Altered states: Explaining domestic institutional 
change", British Journal ofPolitical Science, 29,1, p. 19 1. 
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attention to. Functionally speaking, because a dramatic event is rich with recognisable 
informative elements, ' 54 it is a social chance for decision-makers to enter or confirm 
their decision weight in the process ofjudgement. 1 55 
To be succinct, from the point of view of decision-makers, a dramatic event is an 
objective commodity that represents "communicative knowledge". 156 It has the 
potential to attract the attention of decision-makers, 157 because it is characterised by 
"typicality", "similarity", "vivid-ness", "salience", "familiarity" or "concrete-ness" of the 
issue in question. 158 As a result, a dramatic event is expected to lead decision-makers 
to exaggerate its effect or consequence when they perceive it., 59 It will either provide 
the decision-makers with stronger incentives to re-locate a reference point, or 
communicates directly with the audience, whose opinions, in turn, often pressurise the 
decision-makers to relocate the reference point. 160 Arguably, a dramatic event can be 
seen as an occasion in which cognitive representativeness and strategic thinking are 
linked. It exhibits a strong signal and may either soften, or intensify, the current 
interaction of the decision-maker's motivated framing and domain of frame. Indeed, 
the occurrence of a dramatic event will influence the existing reference point in use 
and indirectly give impact to the existing domain of frame. That explains part of the 
reason why Harold Wilson would admit that his government had been "blown of 
course" due to the pressure of dramatic events in the late 1960s. 161 
154 David Austen-Smith (1992) "Strategic models of talks in political decision making7, International 
Political Science Review, 13,1, p. 57. 
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The implications of observing dramatic events are threefold. Admittedly, a 
dramatic event in the decision-making process does not necessarily mean an explicit 
causal factor. This is because strategic learning existing within the motivated framing 
process about a dramatic event "is basically inductive in nature". 162 There is no 
certainty as to whether the perceivers' selecting operators will function properly to 
catch the strong signals, or interpret the signals as expected by the senders. Therefore, 
a causal response has to be left with a reasonable degree of suspicion. 163 However, 
since a dramatic event is enriched with potential reference points available for being 
taken as representativeness in decision-making, an analyst, seeking to explain changes 
of policies, will find in it an opportunity to observe a new representativeness of the 
issue on the horizon against a larger context. 164 
Secondly, with the notion of dramatic events, the challenge to the ontological 
assumption about the domain of frame can be effectively subdued. This is because a 
dramatic event is loaded with new information. It makes the domain of frame more 
dynamic than the so-called primitive force of ontological structure. Assisted by a 
dramatic event as a good predictor of decision-making and policy reversals, a 
detached observer in doing research will tacitly assume that structural impact can be 
instantiated, reproduced, and transformed by human action. 165 It also prevents an 
observation of strategic thinking from falling prey to reductionism. 166 Therefore, 
taking note of a dramatic event alongside the decision-making process, the 
observation can be kept dynamic. 
Thirdly, it is acknowledged that "process tracing" is an important element of 
prospect theory that stresses the decision-making process. 167 However, emphasising 
U processes" is insufficient to "understand how history smoothes some paths and closes 
162 Hillel J. Einhorn (1980) "Learning from experience and sub-optimal rules in decision making", in 
Wallsten, Cognitive processes in choice, p. 3. 
163 Oswald Huber (1986) "Decision making as a problem solving process", in Brehmer, Jungermann, 
Lourens and Sevon, New directions), p. 113; Kenneth R. MacCrimmon and Ronald N. Taylor (1975) 
"Problem solving and decision making", in Marvin D. Dunnette (ed. ), Handbook ofindustrial and 
organisationalpsychology (Chicago: Rand McNally), p. 1399; U. Neisser (1983) "Components of 
intelligence or steps in routine procedures", Cognition, 15, p. 189.. 
164 Maria E. Q. Gonzales, Tony French and Paul Treffner (1990) "A naturalistic approach to mental 
representation", in Gilhooly, Keane, Logie and Erdos, Lines ofthinking, p. 61. 16 16 A. E. Wendt (1987) "The agent-structure problem in international relations theory", International 
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others offi. 168 It still bears too much similarity to the historical approaches, of which 
we have been critical in Chapter 2. To be distant from the historical approaches, 
discussants of prospect theory in their observation can single out dramatic events from 
other trivialities along with the effort of "process tracing", 169 based on the assumption 
that the effect of dramatic events may help attract the attention of decision makers. 170 
As Jervis notes, decision-makers do not simultaneously estimate several utilities. 171 
Instead, they look at only one or two "salient" values in policy calculations, 172 
whereupon decision weight multiplies the salient effect of the reference points in 
question. Apparently, observing a dramatic event may fill this demand. 
To sum up, in light of the essence of prospect theory, focusing on dramatic 
events in the effort of "process tracing" can help evaluate the contextual meaning of 
an issue (i. e. domain of frame). 173 It also opens access to observing the change of 
strategic thinking with the passage of time (i. e. motivated framing). 
A summary of the approach in this thesis 
Let this thesis briefly recapitulate the main argument of this section. First, for the 
purposes of analysis of the British intention, desirability, and interests in decision- 
making, exponents of prospect theory need take a balanced point of view about the 
unitary-actor assumption. Second, it is no longer satisfactory to have the ostensible 
comment that framing has "direct influence on the choice available". 174 There is a 
need to treat framing as an independent variable seriously. To meet this need, this 
thesis makes a distinction between the domain of frame and motivated framing. The 
distinction not only demonstrates a mental picture corresponding to what prospect 
theory describes, but may help this thesis explore a case study systematically both 
from a structural perspective and the perspective of rational strategic thinking. 
Meanwhile, the interaction of the two distinct dimensions will be reinforced by the 
"' Pierson (1993) "When effect becomes cause", p. 616; Robert D. Putnam (I 993b) Making democracy 
work. Civic traditions in modern Italy (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 18 1. 
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"0 Ralph Norman Haber (1983) "Can information be objectivised? ", Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 
6,1, p. 71. 
171 Robert Jervis (1988) "Realism, game theory, and cooperation", World Politics, 40,3, p. 32 1. 
172 Ibid. (1976) Perception and misperception in international politics (NJ: Princeton University Press), 
13 7. 
Robert Axelrod (I 976b) "Results", in Robert Axelrod (ed. ), Structure ofdecision: The cognitive 
maps ofpolitical elites (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 244; Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon 
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related dramatic events taking place during the period under study. The observation of 
dramatic events will keep this thesis from being bogged down by too many variables 
in the effort of "process tracing", and help meet the requirement of keeping 
observation task-specific. On the other hand, it has to acknowledge that the above 
imperatives do not exhaust the immediate task in observation. But it at least gives this 
thesis a starting point of it. 
6. The four hypotheses and their justification 
To explain the two British turning-point policy preferences in 1966-68, Section 6 
offers four hypotheses in the light of prospect theory. Hypothesis I and 2 are the 
testing grounds for the first policy preference in 1966. Hypothesis 3 and 4, the second 
in December 1968. The subject under observation is the Foreign Office (FO) of the 
Wilson Government, 1966-70. 
Hypothesis 1: Let this thesis suppose at this stage that in late 1966, Britain 
framed the solution of the Falklands dispute in terms of gains. The Government 
therefore was risk-averse and tended to talk about the sovereignty of the Falkland 
Islands with Argentina. 
Hypothesis 2: Let it, for a moment, be granted that Britain framed the solution of 
the issue in terms of losses-losses including trade opportunities with South 
American countries and Britain's world reputation. In view of prospect theory, the 
Government was risk-acceptant and decided to hold talks with Argentina. 
Hypothesis 3: Let this thesis agree for now that, in 1968, the British Government 
framed the issue in terms of losses, so that it changed the policy line by upholding the 
wishes of the islanders again. The change of policy preference was therefore 
understood as a display of risk-acceptant behaviour under the condition that the 
British Government knew only too well that there would be a potential threat from 
Argentina. 
Hypothesis 4: Let it, for the moment, be accepted that Britain framed the solution 
of the Falklands issue in terms of gains, so that the Government decided to change the 
policy preference in pursuit of gains. The change was a case of risk-averse style of 
decisional behaviour. 
These four hypotheses will indicate the line of enquiry in the next chapter. 
Meanwhile, because Hypothesis I contrasts with Hypothesis 2, whereas Hypothesis 3 
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is the opposite of Hypothesis 4, testing the two sets of hypotheses will bring about 
exclusive results. It is expected that verification of one hypothesis (Hypothesis I and 
3) will be to the exclusion of the other (Hypothesis 2 and 4), and vice versa. This 
counter-factual arrangement can be justified by the premise that any hypothesis can be 
possibly true or false, "with no definitive view being held" before proceeding to a 
test. 175 Because of this uncertainty, the counter-factual arrangement constitutes an 
exploratory basis for the puzzle stated in Chapter 1.176 
Some preliminary clarifications are in order, nonetheless. First, the four 
hypotheses may be suggested in an arbitrary manner. This is because proposing 
hypotheses is subject to no strict logical rules through deduction or induction. 177 
Somehow, presenting hypotheses "involves guessworle', which act "has always 
something arbitrary" inside the innovative process. 178 That said, it is pointless to 
attempt a comprehensive portrayal of what causes are behind the formulation of 
hypotheses. The premise of suggesting these hypotheses, instead, is to have them 
"uncertain to some extent". 179 
However, reservation to supply effective justifying reasons for the four 
hypotheses does not mean that "inventive talent" alone produces them. 180 It seems 
appropriate for this thesis to hold the line that the guesswork has to be disciplined by 
relevance to the British foreign policy during the period under study. 1 81 In this regard, 
when the hypotheses argue that the Wilson Government framed the issue in terms of 
gains, and alternatively, in terms of losses, they can be justified by the following 
reasons. Firstly, as Chapter 1 and 2 have noted, the utilities throughout the decision- 
making process in 1966-68, such as good relations with Argentina, Britain's 
175 Nicholas Rescher (1964) Hypothetical reasoning (Amsterdam: North-Holland), p. 4; James D. 
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international reputation, Labour's ideology of internationalism and the Argentine 
potential market, etc. were reiterated on many occasions by British officials. They 
were not those utilities that had rarely entered into the policy equation in the British 
FO. For instance, British Foreign Secretary Brown told Costa Mendez, Argentine 
Foreign Minister, with such typical directness, "We British are interested in two 
things: in keeping a good friendship with Argentina and in having better 
communications and better trade" with it. 182 Stewart admitted in July 1968, "it is 
commonplace today that the task that takes up more of the time and energy of the 
diplomatic service than any other is the commercial task, the task of helping British 
export". 183 From these remarks, the four hypotheses meet the basic line of plausibility 
requirement. They at least do not commit the fallacy of an "illegitimate use of the 
imagination". 184 
7. Conclusion 
Chapter 3 investigates the contents of prospect theory with a view to facilitating 
empirical observation concerning the two British turning-point policy preferences in 
the conduct of the Falklands policy in 1966-68. After examining the main points of 
prospect theory and justifying the choice, this thesis argues that the gap between the 
individual and collective behaviour in drawing inference can be superficial, because a 
policy preference can be seen as a reflection of attitude within a working unit. The 
policy outcomes as a result can be taken as a co-ordinated effort, reflecting the 
interplay between individual and collective choice. 
This thesis, then, criticises the customary usage of the term framing, which has 
been understood exclusively from the cognitive perspective. Discussants of prospect 
theory have neglected to observe the conscious acts of argumentation, which are an 
important part of human thinking and decisions. ' 85 This thesis is of the view that 
framing cannot be purely cognitive work. To solve a complex issue, the psychological 
part characterised by subjective value-systems has to be included in the decision- 
182 Michael Charlton(l 989) The little platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands dispute (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell), p. 100. 
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133 
making literature. 186 This thesis as a result calls for balanced attention to the two- 
phase operation of framing in future observation. 
To do this, this thesis first divides the concept of framing into the domain of 
frame and motivated framing. It then defines the domain of frame as "basic operations 
that simplify and provide an influential signpost for choice". The idea of domain of 
frame is corresponding to "situated cognition", where decision makers immerse 
themselves. 187 Hence, the variables such as organisational goals and contextual 
atmosphere presumably become the resources for policy calculation in the editing 
phase. 188 
On the other hand, the domain of frame and the resource dependencies it entails 
are not fixed. This thesis acknowledges that the decision-makers concerned can, and 
do, negotiate and renegotiate different domains of frame. This thesis, as a 
consequence, adds the reflective element of strategic thinking in the name of 
motivated framing into the definition of framing. It takes motivated framing as a 
conscious effort in "steering the reasoning processes by increasing the availability or 
representativeness of the desired outcomes". Motivated framing, understood in this 
way, becomes a deliberate act of "goal framing" with the implication of political 
manipulation, because it is decision-makers that interpret and negotiate constraints or 
opportunities! 89 Methodologically, an observer can be assured of the force, as long as 
the observed preference, or reference point, has been seriously argued or defended in 
an open policy debate. 
Nevertheless, this thesis is fully aware that the two definitions only provide a 
static picture. To invigorate a dynamic description of the foreign policy decision- 
making process, this thesis thinks it important to identify dramatic events as the 
operators that often have impact on the decision-makers' policy equation. This 
arrangement appears to let this thesis off the hook, because, presumably, with the 
assistance of dramatic events in observation, it will help the "process tracing" distant 
from the pure historical approaches, and become more task-specific. Hopefully, with 
the methodological design consisting of cognitive response, subjective force, and the 
186 Mark Snyder and William B. Swann Jr. (1976) "When actions reflect attitudes: The politics of 
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intervening force of dramatic events, the framework for observation is clarified, and 
the road for falsification of the theory thus opens up. Lastly, this Chapter presents four 
hypotheses in light of prospect theory, and purposefully arranges them in a 
counterfactual form. 
Limitation has to be in order, however. This thesis does not hesitate to admit that 
the methodological framework presented here is neither exhaustive nor all 
encompassing. Many factors that could affect the two policy preferences in the issue 
of the Falkland Islands during the period under study can inevitably be ignored. This 
is because the researcher's sensitivity to the data may be unconsciously regulated and, 
somehow, bounded, after moving into hypothesis testing in Chapter 4.190 
Nevertheless, the above hypothetical framework leads to the expectation that a 
systematic observation of the historical archives and relevant biographies may throw 
some light on what this thesis is concerned about. 191 In this regard, official papers in 
the archive are thought to be "the backbone of the FCO". 192 Hansard, on the other 
hand, is taken by this thesis as a guide, because in the policy debate, Hansard 
"contains calm, deliberate speeches in which ministers describe with clarity and detail 
the objectives they expect". 193 With the assistance of the above, this thesis in the 
following chapter seeks to fill in the gap between the particular details and general 
knowledge of this case, and to extend prospect theory beyond its present explanatory 
terrain. 194 
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CHAPTER FOUR-TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
Chapter 4 examines the process of evolution of the two turning-point policy 
preferences in Britain's conduct of Falklands policy from 1966 to 1968. To fulfil this 
task, it will observe the archive in Public Record Office released after 1999 as well as 
the Hansard record. It then identifies the behavioural patterns of the British Foreign 
Office (FO) in the light of prospect theory, tries to explain systematically the changes 
of policy preferences, and assess the four hypotheses fon-nulated in Chapter 3. 
The time frame of this case study ranges from 1965, when "the issue was first 
brought formally to international attention", ' to December 1968, when Britain rejected 
the Memorandum of Understanding. The observation of the archive, however, has to 
end in early November 1968, because no official papers about the case of the Falkland 
Islands have been released since that date to the time of writing. The explanatory 
framework consists of two dimensions: (1) domain of frame (2) motivated framing. 
Based on this framework, this thesis will conclude with an assessment of the four 
hypotheses, fon-nulated in Chapter 4, and produce a report of the ambiguities in and 
limitations of the test. 
1. The observation 
From intransigence to flexibility 
On 16 December 1965, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2065. It 
demanded that Argentine and British Governments "proceed without delay with the 
negotiations recommended by the Special Committee [of 24] with a view to finding a 
peaceful resolution" to the dispute concerning sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. To 
this end, the Resolution stipulated that both sides take into account the interests of the 
inhabitants. Britain abstained during the voting on the grounds that the Falkland 
Islands were not a colonial territory. 2 
Two weeks later in January 1966, Michael Stewart, British Foreign Secretary, 
paid a visit to Buenos Aires, where he was greeted by vociferous nationalist groups, 
'British Government (1983) Falkland Island review. - Report ofa committee ofprivy councillors, 
Cmnd. 8787 (London: HMSO), p. 4. 
2 FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (17), B. L. Barder, UK Mission in NY, to E. G Donohoe, Commonwealth Office 
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urging a resolution of the issue. Stewart, however, was adamant. He stressed that the 
importance of respecting the wishes of the islanders should be part of the settlement, 
and suggested a need to re-open the lines of communication cut off by Argentina. On 
the other hand, Stewart was emphatic that Britain "did not consider that the United 
Nations Resolution had any relevance to the question of sovereignty", although he 
also expressed his willingness to discuss many aspects of the issue. 3 Ajoint 
communiqu6 by Britain and Argentina was issued on 14 January 1966. Both sides 
reiterated their hope to of entering into the discussions "without delay" as demanded 
.4 
'in mid-July, 1966 .5 bytheUN This was 
followed by the second joint communique 
The official papers show that Britain remained unyielding for the best part of 
1966. Despite Argentina% pressure for a "return" of the islands, 6 sovereignty was not 
negotiable and the wishes of the islanders were the primary concern. 
The first visible evidence of a change of attitude on the British side emerged at 
the third round of talks held between 28 November and 9 December 1966. Henry 
Arthur Frederick Hohlcr and Trafford Smith, two British Assistant Under-secretaries 
of State, proposed to freeze the legal position on the Falkland Islands for forty years, 
and at the end of this time-frame, the islanders would be allowed to choose between 
British and Argentine sovereignty. The proposal was flatly rejected by the Argentine 
representative, Brigadier Don Eduardo McLoughlin, Argentine Ambassador to 
7 Britain. As no progress was made thereafter, the thirdjoint communique was issued 
with nothing of note in the text. More specifically, despite the three joint 
communiqu6s intending to reaffirm the "cordial atmosphere" in the talks, 8 neither side 
showed any sign of giving ground regarding their respective sovereignty claims. 9 
On 5 January 1967, Argentina announced the establishment of a new department 
aimed at recovering the Falkland Islands. Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez 
(CO), restricted, 8 February 1967. 
3 FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (1), T. C. Barker, to News Department and UN Political Department, secret, 22 
November 1968, enclosing "Anglo-Argentine talks on the Falkland Islands". 
4 FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (17), Barder to Donohoe. 
3 Ibid.. 
6 Ibid.. 
7 United Nations General Assembly, "Falkland Islands (Malvinas): Working paper prepared by the 
Secretariat", A/AC. 109/L. 35 8, distribution limited, 2 February 1967. 
8 "Falkland Islands: Working papee,. 
' Hansard (Commons) vol. 733, col. 239,8 August 1966. 
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openly expressed his firm resolve that Argentina's revolution would not be complete 
unless Britain returned the Falkland Islands. 10 The FO certainly did not miss the 
strong signal or underestimate the significance of it. In his report to the FO, Michael 
Creswell, British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, expressed his concern about the 
change in Mendez's attitude. " Despite this, the UK Mission in New York (UKMIS), 
in the following rounds of talks with McLoughlin held from late January to mid- 
February 1967, kept as its bottom line the need to respect the wishes of the islanders. 
They argued that "the Falklands Islanders could not be expected to acquiesce in 
Argentine rule unless the islanders had some personal knowledge" of Argentina. 
McLoughlin seemed to be persuaded, 12 but he complained that Argentina could not 
just wait for the slow progress of the negotiations, always appearing to end with the 
conclusion-2we are still talking", because there was strong domestic pressure in 
Argentina. To further pressurise Britain, McLoughlin hinted that Argentina might 
raise the issue again at the UN in April 1967.13 
What made Argentina's complaint more substantial was that in late February 
1967, McLoughlin received the news that Smith would postpone a trip to the Falkland 
Islands with him until October 1967-a disappointing move that was interpreted by 
McLoughlin as a delaying tactic. 14 Argentina began to bank on the general trend of the 
decolonisation movement as pressure on Britain. In February 1967, Argentina enlisted 
the support of 21 Latin American and Caribbean countries for its claims to the 
Falkland Islands at the meeting of the Preparatory Commission in Mexico City, where 
the major purpose ironically was to ratify a nuclear test ban treaty. The statement was 
issued under the subject "Situation of the Falkland Islands in the framework of the 
Treaty with reference to Argentina's claim to sovereignty" on 13 February 1967. 
Although it was odd to integrate the issue of the Falkland Islands into the framework 
of a nuclear test ban, the move to single out Britain for criticism proved a success. 
Argentina had shown the world that there was a widespread recognition of Argentina's 
claim on the issue of the Falkland Islands and sent another strong signal to Britain that 
10 FCO 7/148, AA 415, (1), J. T. Caff, British Embassy, Buenos Aires (BEBA), to M. W. Atkinson, 
American Department, FO, restricted, 5 January 1967. 
11 FCO 7/126, AAI/I 1, (1), Michael Creswell, BEBA, to John. G S. Beith, FO, confidential, 10 
January 1967. 
12 FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (5), H. A. F. Hohler to Trafford Smith, CO, confidential, 6 February 1967. 
13 Ibid., (9), Smith to Hohler, "Conversation with the Argentine Ambassadoe', 14 February 1967. 
14 FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (15), Smith to Hohler, personal and confidential, I March 1967. 
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Argentina meant business. 15 
The FO immediately sent Hohler to express its concern. Britain protested that 
the resolution was obviously an "ill-conceived manoeuvre", because the resolution in 
Mexico City concerning the Falkland Islands was irrelevant to nuclear bans- the 
main purpose of that meeting. 16 Notwithstanding this protest, Argentina clearly 
succeeded in sending a stronger signal to Britain. The FO began to realise the need to 
take the issue of the Falkland Islands seriously to prevent further unexpected harm to 
Britain's international reputation. On 20 February, Robin Edmonds, Head of the 
(Latin) American Department, referred to the talks with Argentina over the Falklands 
dispute as "formal" for the first time. 17 This change of reference was apparently a 
result of the awareness that waves of Argentine diplomatic offensives in the name of 
anti-colonial "have-not" petitioners could be detrimental to Britain's prestige, despite 
the friendly climate alleged in the previous joint communiqu6s. 
One week after the Mexico City resolution was announced, the foreign ministers 
of American countries at the plenary session of the OAS (Organisation of American 
States) Conference in Caracas were motivated to announce another resolution 
(Resolution 96) urging Britain to move more quickly on this issue., 8 Creswell was the 
leader of the British observer team at the Conference. He was quick to counter that the 
international atmosphere had been prejudiced by the Mexico City resolution. The 
original phrase in the UN resolution aimed at resolving the dispute about sovereignty 
was "inaccurate". Britain had no doubt about its sovereignty. The talks could be 
regarded only as "discussions", not "negotiations". 19 At this juncture, however, 
Creswell's insistence on differentiating between "negotiation" and "discussion" as a 
way to keep British sovereignty found no support from London. In the draft 
Resolution 96 that Creswell had sent back to the FO twice for endorsement, the FO 
showed little interest in amending the text of the resolution from "negotiations" to 
"discussions". 20 This indifference in London indicated that the FO began to have 
15 FCO 7/150, AA4/7, (1), BEBA to American Department, FO, restricted, 17 February 1967; FCO 
7/150, AA4n, clipping, New York 71"mes, "Latin A-ban Treaty nearly completed"t 13 February 1967. 
16 Ibid., (2), AA4n, FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 118, confidential, 21 February 1967. 
17 FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (10), R. H. G Edmonds to Creswell, secret, 20 February 1967. 
18 FCO 7/15 1t AA4/8, (2), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 126,25 February 1967. 
19 Ibid., (1), Creswell, BEBA, to FO, Tel. no. 125, confidential, 25 February 1967. 
20 FCO 7/15 1, AA4/8, (3) FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 13 1, unclassified, 27 February 1967; AA4/8t (6), Sir 
M. Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 130, confidential, 27 February 1967; (7)t FO to BABE, Tel. no. 140, 
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second thoughts about its sovereignty claim in this territorial dispute. Indeed, the 
following archive will show that, in an attempt to save its international prestige and 
mitigate its impatient counterpart, Britain seemed ready to see its policy change from 
intransigence to flexibility. 
The first turning-point policy preference strengthened 
Between 9-16 March 1967, one week before McLoughlin returned to Buenos 
Aires for routine consultations, there were discussions among the ministers and 
officials on the British side concerning the future of the Falkland Islands. The major 
concerns of the policy discussions were compensation to be given to the islanders, the 
exact period of transition and the possibility of a referendum. 
Regarding compensation, the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee was of 
the view that to strengthen the British position, Britain could compensate for the 
disturbance caused to the islanders in the process of negotiations. 21 Edmonds, 
however, did not think the proposal of compensation advisable. He insisted that there 
was no need to mention compensation in the talks, because it would be more 
appropriate to see compensation "fall[s] on the Argentines rather than on the British 
taxpayer". Besides, as Edmonds was also aware, if the talks about compensation "got 
to the cars of the Islanders themselves", they "would have a demoralising effect". 22 
Regarding the referendum, the British Embassy in Buenos Aires had no 
confidence in proposing a referendum owing to the fact that it was once suggested to 
Argentina but was rejected in late 1966. Pakenharn in his letter to Hohler stressed that 
Argentina was fully hostile to a referendum so the proposal would not help the talks. 
The proposal might, on the contrary, prompt the Argentines to make a "premature 
report" to the UN in April. 23 In respect of the transitional period, Hohler was 
obviously the one who had exerted marked influence on the reduction from 40 years 
to 20 years. He justified the reduction of the transitional period because 20 years were 
not significantly different from the period he offered in the talks in late 1966.24 
confidential, 27 February 1967. 
21 FC07/140, AA4/2, (23), Edmonds to Hohler, 16 March 1967. 
22 Ibid.. 
23 Ibid., (17), Pakenhain, BEBA, to Hohler, FO, Tel. no. 167, secret, 13 March 1967. 
24 Ibid., (16), Hohler to BEBA, Tel. no. 162, secret, 13 March 1967. 
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To defend this attitude change, Hohler's argument seemed self-contained. As 
Hohler explained, twenty years were a period "long enough to allow the older 
generation to disappear from the scene, but not long enough to entangle the question 
of the Falkland Islands with that of the Antarctic", which would come up for review 
25 from 1991 onwards. No evidence shows that there was strong and effective 
opposition to this explanation at this stage. 
The only exception was Cosmos Haskard, Governor of the Falkland Islands. In 
the process in which the first preference came to the fore, it is noteworthy that a 
mixed sense of shock and worry could be heard from him. On 13 March 1967, no 
sooner had Haskard been informed about the development of the whole issue, than he 
wrote to Brown, reminding Brown of the existing contradiction between the two sets 
of statements: Britain had no doubt about British sovereignty, while it "prepared in 
principle to cede sovereignty" . 
26 "1 strongly urge that there should be no haste in this 
matter", protested Haskard, because the "inhabitants are unprepared for an early 
development" along the policy lines set out by the FO. The Governor insisted that the 
FO be frank in its policy as to what kind of supports and to what degree the islanders 
could expect from the British Government, if the transfer of sovereignty occurred. In 
addition, added Haskard, Argentina had to be precise in what kind of guarantees it 
could offer to the islanders. 27 Nevertheless, Haskard had apparently been isolated 
from the decision-making process since November 1966. The only response made by 
the FO was to emphasise confidentiality. 28 
On 17 March 1967, before Foreign Secretary Brown met McLoughlin, the newly 
emerging Falklands policy was shaping up. It was characterised by a twin-track 
approach, the logic of which went as follows. (1) Britain decided to announce its 
position to "be prepared in principle to cede sovereignty over the Islands". However, 
Britain would make it clear that this concession could not be justified, unless it took 
place "in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants". To facilitate the integration 
of the Falkland Islands into Argentina, therefore, a referendum with a period of 
transition would be needed. (2) However, Britain did not expect Argentina to accept 
25 Ibid.. 
26 Ibid., (21), Haskard to Secretary of State, CO, Tel. no. 46, secret, 13 March 1967. 
27 Ibid., (22), Haskard to Secretary of State, CO, Tel. no. 47, secret, 14 March 1967. 
28 Ibid., (24), Secretary of State, Commonwealth Office to Haskard, Tel. no. 66, secret, 23 March 1967. 
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the proposal of a referendum, and the talks could quite likely break down. (3) In order 
to prevent Argentina from walking away and again making rattling noises 
embarrassing Britain in the UN, an "interim agreement" would be proposed as a 
second-track. 
The second track strategy could be summarised as follows. (1) Britain would 
announce its determination to cede sovereignty as long as the change was acceptable 
to the islanders. (2) Argentina needed to offer guarantees to the islanders. (3) Britain 
would propose a resumption of communication means between Argentina and the 
Falklands, and ask for the freezing of legal claims on both sides for at least 20 years. 
(4) This interim agreement would be subject to review at the end of 10 years. 29 
On 17 March 1967, McLoughlin called at the FO before his leaving for Buenos 
Aires. Brown communicated to him the British attitude to the issue of the Falkland 
Islands. As planned, he first reminded McLoughlin that Britain had already made a 
great breakthrough, because this was the first time in the Falklands history that Britain 
had announced its desire to cede sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. 30 
Nevertheless, if a referendum were held immediately, it was highly likely that the 
inhabitants would opt for the UK. Therefore, as Brown proposed, a referendum after a 
transitional period would be a better choice. McLoughlin did not give in. He replied 
that the only proposal presented by Argentina was to return the Falkland Islands to 
Argentina. He believed that Britain "should be capable of obtaining a certain degree of 
acquiescence on the Islanders' pare'. Having noticed that the first-track strategy had 
failed to trap McLoughlin, Brown put forward the altemative-the interim agreement 
as planned. It is important to note that, in offering McLoughlin the second-track 
proposal, Brown combined point (3) and (4) by halving the transitional period from 
20 years to 10 years. With this, Brown dropped the hint that the transition could be 
even shorter, and it might not necessarily take ten years for the islanders to have a 
fresh look at the current situation. McLoughlin took the message and returned to 
29 FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (20), Secretary of State, CO, to Sir C. Haskard, Falkland Islands, Tel. no. 49,9 
March 1967. 
30 [bid., (24), R. Q H. Edmonds to Secretary of State, confidential, enclosing, enclosing (1) "Speaking 
notes", "Falkland Islands: Anglo-Argentine dispute", "Call of the Argentine Ambassador on Friday 17 
March at 3.30 p. m. "; (2) "rhe Secretary of State's second alternative proposal, given to the Argentine 
Ambassador on 17 March", 16 March 1967. 
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Buenos Aires. 31 
Despite the emphasis on confidentiality, the FO clearly did not anticipate the 
mass media lurking in the wings. The contents of the talks on 17 March were carried 
by the Argentine news agency, Saporiti, and it was picked up by Associated Press and 
BBC Radio Newsreel on 22 March 1967.32 This was another disagreeable surprise to 
the FO. Brown promptly instructed the British Embassy in Buenos Aires to alert 
Argentina to the need to keep the talks on a confidential basis, as confidentiality was 
uas much in their interests as in ours", without which, as Brown warned, it would 
"have a deplorable effect on public opinion". 33 On the domestic front, the FO had the 
News Department hold a news conference. The News Department admitted that the 
subject of the Falkland Islands had been discussed with Argentina, but it was "untrue" 
that Britain had decided to recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands. 34 In 
any discussions about this subject, reiterated the FO, the "wishes of the inhabitants 
must be the cardinal factor". 35 To cope with the protests emanating energetically from 
the Members of Legislative Council in the Falkland Islands, Brown warned Haskard 
not to go beyond the statement issued by the News Department. Instead, Haskard was 
instructed to emphasise "the necessity to keep the talks entirely confidential at the 
present stage" in order to avoid unnecessary press speculation. 36 
On that same day, 22 March 1966, Pakenharn went to the Argentine Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and put forward Brown's point about confidentiality. Argentina was 
apparently willing to co-ordinate and its response was quite positive. It agreed to deal 
with the issue as "technically" as possible, decided to abandon the previous position to 
treat the Falkland islanders as "invaders", 37 and even acknowledged that McLoughlin's 
symbolic visit to the Falkland Islands would still be premature. 38 Pakenharn was most 
31 Ibid., (25), American Department, departmental distribution, Amendment Slip, secret, enclosing 
"Record of conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Argentine Ambassador held at the FCO 
on Friday, 17 March at 3.30 p. m. ", secret, 28 April . 1967; FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (33), Secretary of State, 
CO, to Haskard, Tel. no. 61, secret, 22 March 1967. 
32 Ibid., (43), Haskard to Secretary of State, CO, Tel. no. 54, secret, 25 March 1967. 
33 Ibid., (28), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 190, confidential, 22 March 1967. 
34 Ibid., (27), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 189, FCO/CO/WH distribution, 22 March 1967. 
35 Ibid., (32), FO and CO to certain missions, guidance no. 5 1, FCO/CO[WH distribution, restricted, 23 
March 1967. 
36 Ibid., (34), Secretary of State, CO, to Sir C. Haskard, Falkland Islands, Tel. no. 66, secret, 23 March 
1967. 
31 Ibid., (3 1), Pakenham, BEBA, to FO, Tel. no. 176, unclassified, 22 March 1967. 
38 FCO 7/149, AA 4/6, (22), Creswell to FO, confidential, 14 March 1967. 
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encouraged by these friendly responses. In his report sent back to the FO, he 
commented upon the Argentine attitude quite positively, which might consolidate the 
FO's attitude. The text went as follows: 
it is appropriate to emphasise the decision of the Argentine 
Government to achieve the unification of national territory 
according to the standards ofjustice and equity which inspire the 
nation's home and foreign policy; in accordance with its traditional 
attitude there is no doubt that the Republic will take due account of 
the interests of the inhabitants of the Islands. 39 
Pakenham's observation represented a sympathetic view towards Argentina. One 
of the officials sharing this view was Creswell. The latter met Quijano, Argentina's 
Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in early 1967. After the meeting, 
Creswell seemed satisfied and impressed by Quijano's pledge to keep the issue in low 
profile. In his report the FO, Creswell confirmed that there were indications that 
Argentines had "disposed of the matter", and "the matter was now of historical interest 
only" . 
40 As Creswell commented on the factor of timing to the talks and urged an 
earlier settlement of the dispute, 
it was a peculiarly favourable moment for the Argentine 
Government to deal with the subject without emotion or demagogic 
appeals, since the parties were in suspense and there were no votes 
to catch. It -was to be hoped therefore that we might profit by these 
favourable circumstances to come to an Agreement while the going 
was good. 41 
The important thing to note is that Creswell and Pakenham were not alone in 
holding this optimistic view towards Argentina. Hohlerjoined the side and expressed 
a similar view. As Hohler put it analytically: 
the important thing is that the present Argentine Government is very 
well disposed and anxious to arrive at an honourable solution of this 
long-standing dispute. Their attitude contrasts very favourably with 
39 FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (30), Pakenham, BEBA, to FO, Tel. no. 175, unclassified, 22 March 1967. 
40 Ibid., (47), Creswell, BEBA, to Edmonds, American Department, FO, on "Falkland Islands", 
confidential, 7 April 1967. 
41 Ibid.. 
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that of the Spaniards. Also, unlike their predecessors, they have the 
necessary authority to carry out any engagements into which they 
may enter. 42 
By interpreting the Argentine attitude as "well-disposed", Hohler, one of the 
negotiators in the talks, was not only flexible towards the sovereignty claim but also 
confident about the talks, where he expected cooperation from his counterparts as 
well. Regarding the negotiating strategy in the talks, he postulated that 
there are also a number of possible ways in which we could 
improve the review procedures, some of which might appeal to the 
Argentines. For example, the agreement could be reviewed annually 
or every five years by an Argentine and British representative, with 
a representative of the Islands as an observer. 43 
The FO had already known that Argentina was more interested in the second 
proposal--the interim agreement that Brown had suggested to McLoughlin on 17 
March 1967.44It was also fully aware that Argentina was very sensitive to the 
distinction between the interests and the wishes, especially the provision that the 
change had to meet with the islanders' acceptance. To tide over this difficulty, it 
seemed that the FO needed to sideline the wishes of the islanders, as this principle 
constituted the major thrust of the argument that the FO found hard to cope with. On 
19 April 1967, Edmonds suggested that "the wishes of'be deleted from the draft. 45 
This proposal was officially adopted later on 28 April in the so-called "Amendment 
Slip", which was distributed among Private Office and UKMIS. 46 Deletion of the 
wishes constituted explicit evidence for the first turning-point policy preference. This 
change clearly indicated that the British officials at this moment were quite disposed 
to helping Argentina settle down the wording. 
To justify this sensitive change in wording, Brown explained to McLoughlin at 
the meeting on 26 April 1967 that liability to the islanders' acceptance as a provision 
42 Ibid., (53), Edmonds to Hohler, secret, 25 April 1967, enclosing (1) "Speaking notes", "Falkland 
islands: Anglo-Argentine dispute", "Call of the Argentine Ambassador on Wednesday, 26 April, at 3 
P in. "; (2) Hohler to MacLehose, secret, 25 April 1967. 
CY Ibid., (58), Hohler to Creswell, secret, I May 1967. 
44 Ibid., (48), Edmonds to Hohler, on "Falkland Islands", confidential, 19 April 1967. 
45 Ibid., (49), Edmonds to Hohler, on "Falkland Islands", confidential, 19 April 1967. 
46 Ibid., (57), American Department, FO, distributed, confidential, 28 April 1967. 
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to a settlement was "deliberately phrased to be as flexible as possible". 47 In other 
words, "a referendum would not be the only possible means of ascertaining the wishes 
or 48 of the islanders . Brown conveyed his confidence by expressing the view that a 
formula that "must be found whereby the population of the Islands would be seen 
themselves to have been persuaded of the advantages of a change of sovereignty". 49 In 
respect of the advantages, Brown in front of McLoughlin, ascertained that the second- 
track proposal was a constructive one, through which Britain "intended to give 
Argentina every opportunity to explain to the Islanders the advantages of a change of 
sovereignty". 50 It is interesting to note that, at this juncture, the importance of a 
referendum was no longer emphasised by Brown. The 170's emphasis changed. The 
islanders "advantage" seized the diplomatic rhetoric. 
The meeting on 26 April was a short-term success for both sides. McLoughlin 
seemed convinced of Brown's sincerity, because the islanders' interests were evidently 
accentuated by the talk of advantages, upon which the first policy preference was 
found. In his written reply, McLoughlin admitted that the process of transfer ought not 
to be in a hurry. 51 Although Costa Mendez, on 2 May, changed McLoughlin's 
language, asking Creswell to increase the tempo of the negotiations, 52 Mendez's 
demand did not go contrary to Brown's main objective in the talks-. 1o make 
progress, not simply to keep the ball in play". 53 
On the British side, the first policy preference, characterised by emphasising the 
islanders' "advantages" began to show signs of strength after the meeting in early 
May. Hohler became more confident. He reported that "the Argentines have moved 
one step in our direction, by accepting the principle of a transitional period, during 
which freedom of communications would be restored and legal rights frozen". 54 In 
respect of the view held by the Commonwealth Office that Haskard had to be 
47 Ibid.. 
48 Ibid., (53), "Speaking notes"; ibid. (50), Edmonds to Hohler, on "Falkland Islands: The Argentine 
Ambassador's call on Friday, 21 April at 4 p. m. ", secret, 20 April 1967. 
49 Ibid. (50), Edmonds to Hohlcr, on "Falkland Islands". 
50 Ibid., (54), "Record of conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Argentine Ambassador 
held at the Foreign Office on Wednesday, 26 April at 5 p. m. ", secret, 27 April 1967. 
51 Ibid., (65), Edmonds to Hohler, on "Suggested tactics for meeting with the Argentine Ambassador on 
[sic) May", secret, 8 May 1967. 
2 Ibid., (59), Creswell to American Department, FO, Tel. no. 221, confidential, 4 May 1967. 
53 Ibid. (66), Hohler to D. Allen, confidential, 10 May 1967. 
54 ibid., Hohler to Creswell, secret, I May 1967. 
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consulted about the interim agreement, Hohler was critical of the attitude of the 
Commonwealth Office for its being "tiresome". He thought that the intransigent 
attitude was inappropriate particularly as the FO had reached the moment at which to 
"get down to drafting" an interim agreement. Since Costa Mendez had already told 
Creswell that Argentina was under domestic pressure to produce finther and 
significant progress, Britain, went the argument, had no reason to do anything harmful 
to the cooperative effort. 55 
On the other side, the proposal of a referendum had been carefully withdrawn at 
this stage. In a letter to Creswell, Hohler defended the designated policy by 
dismissing the idea of a referendum. Because, as Hohler argued, "the Argentines feel 
so strongly about referenda, it should not be beyond the wit of man to devise a means 
of ascertaining the wishes of a community of some two thousand people in a less 
formal manner". 56 To this suggestion, Creswell's response was also straightforward 
and positive. As Creswell wrote: 
I am sure that both we and Argentines [sic] have equally strong 
reasons for disliking a referendum. From our point of view a 
referendum which closed the door on any possibility of change 
would deprive us of [our] ability to resume negotiations later, and 
might be thought to make it impossible for us ever to transfer the 
territory. It would also be most illogical if we used a referendum 
over Gibraltar with this very object in mind, but at the same time 
pressed for one over the Falkland Islands upon which our minds are 
much more open. This would indeed cast doubt on our sincerity. 57 
All the above memos were suggestive of the whole atmosphere of the FCO 
towards the dispute in mid- 1967. Apparently, what Brown urged to make progress in 
the sovereignty talks was what his staff understood to be as flexible as possible in the 
British attitude to the issue. The first British policy preference on the issue of the 
Falkland Islands was thus effectively constructed. 
Actions guided by the first turning-point policy preference 
55 Ibid., (66), Hohler to Allen. 
56 Ibid.. 
57 Ibid., (59), Creswell to American Department. 
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To find the right counterpart 
After clarifying Britain's attitude to the Argentine Government, Hohler met 
McLoughlin on 16 May 1967 in an attempt to evaluate Argentina's exact bottom line 
to facilitate the next step. The FO was confident in its policy shift. To Hohlees 
thinking, Britain would hand over a working document to McLoughlin by the end of 
May 1967 in order to speed up the process of the talks. 58 
Nevertheless, it proved to be wishful thinking. Despite the FO being resolved to 
help Argentina out of the wording problem in the draft, and Hohler's clear intention 
was to compel McLoughlin to "get down to brass tacks", 59 the talks on 16 May did not 
make any progress. While Hohler was trying to be flexible on the distinction between 
the principles of the wishes of the islanders and their interests, McLoughlin remained 
intransigent on the clear distinction. 60 Hohler was apparently disappointed at 
McLoughlin's "inexperience and hesitancy". He complained that McLoughlin was 
only geared to playing "his gramophone record". 61 
The disappointment, however, did not lead to any change in the British intention 
to speed up the process of talks. To seek a further breakthrough, the FO followed 
Creswell's recommendation, echoed by Hohler '62 to side-step McLoughlin. It sought 
for direct talks with Costa Mendez, who, in the eyes of the FO, was a better 
alternative because of his having effective control over leaks to the press and the 
confidence of President Ongania. 63 The FO took the initiative on the other hand, 
starting to draft a working document by 21 June 1967. The purpose of this draft was 
twofold. Firstly, the FO managed to create a situation where "the ball is squarely in 
the Argentine court", 64 as it began to realise that it was Britain that had "made all the 
running so far". 65 Secondly, according to Brown, "a document of this nature would 
also strengthen the UK's position in the United Nations in the event of the talks 
66 breaking down". Obviously, the reason implied that the concern for Britain's prestige 
58 Ibid., (68), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 3 11, confidential, II May 1967. 
59 Ibid., (66), Hohler to Allen. 
60 Ibid., (71), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 337, confidential, 16 May 1967. 
61 Ibid., (82), Edmonds to UK Mission in NY, Tel. no. 3133, confidential, 21 June 1967. 
62 Ibid., (74), Hohler, FO, to Sir M. Creswell, BEBA, secret, 25 May 1967. 
63 Ibid., (61), Creswell to Hohler, FO, secret, 4 May 1967. 
64 Ibid., (82), Edmonds to UK Mission in NY. 
65 Ibid.,, (89), Edmonds to UKMIS, telegram, 3205, confidential, 22 June 1967. 
66 Ibid., (88), CO to Falkland Islands (0. A. G), telegram 120, secret, 21 June 1967. 
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in the UN debates was most relevant in decision-making at this stage. 
On 23 June 1967, in the meeting between Brown and Mendez, Britain tried to 
make Argentina recognise that "it is up to them to create the conditions in which the 
islanders would wish to join the Argentine Republic". 67 However, the concern for 
wording resurfaced. Jose Maria Ruda, the Argentine representative in the UN, 
admitted to Brown that the "problem was to find a form of words which would enable 
the Argentine Government to start the process of attracting the islanders without 
losing face". 68 The meeting on 23 June did not make any significant progress. But the 
FO's confidence in its current Falklands policy did not weaken. This confident mood 
was partly because Ruda was thought a better negotiator than McLoughlin, and partly 
because both sides reached the consensus that a statement was needed to inform 
public opinion. The only difference was that what Mendez suggested was a unilateral 
statement. Although his suggestion did not go beyond Brown's idea of a working 
agreement that had been under consideration on the British side, 69 the FO seemed to 
be inclined to see the issue settled with a more explicit result. For the FO, a unilateral 
statement to put down the different positions in a written form did not faithfully 
reflect either the aim or the effort of the talks. The FO instead preferred a working 
agreement in a bilateral form, because, as the FO averred, a unilateral statement 
"would serve only to disturb public opinion" both in the island and in the British Isles, 
if the statement ended with no practical results. 70 A bilateral statement, by contrast, 
could have more restraining force. As far as this thesis can determine this preference 
for a bilateral statement might have set the foundation for the emergence of a draft 
Memorandum of Understanding in late 1968. 
The FO interpreted the talks on 23 June 1967 as another step forward. 
Nevertheless, not all the British officials were of the same optimistic view. Creswell 
reported to the FO that he could not sense sufficient attention having been paid by 
Costa Mendez, particularly with respect to the need for Argentina to have "a realistic 
appreciatiorý' of the currently slow progress in the talks. 71 Nevertheless, Creswell's 
67 Ibid.. 
68 Ibid., (90), UK Mission in NY to American Department, FO, Tel. no. 1500, confidential, 23 June 
1967. 
6' Ibid., (68), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 311, confidential, II May 1967. 
70 Ibid., (94), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 479, confidential, 29 June 1967. 
71 Ibid., (100), Creswell to American Department, FO, Tel. no. 349, confidential, 5 July 1967. 
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concern seemed irrelevant under the condition that the first policy preference had 
gained ground. To prevent the newly formulated Falklands policy falling apart, Britain 
continued the talks with Argentina in July 1967. The two sides tried to sort out the 
wording to facilitate the birth of the draft agreement at this stage. On 14 July, Ruda 
tabled the proposal that Britain "will recognise the sovereignty of Argentina over the 
Islands provided that the interests of the inhabitants are duly taken into consideration". 
Unsatisfied, Hohler presented his version that Britain will be prepared to recognise 
the sovereignty of Argentina "provided that the guarantees and safeguards for the 
islanders' interests offered by the Argentine Government are acceptable to them". 72 
Ruda responded on 24 July, stating that "to agree on a formula referring to the 
interests of the Falkland Islanders would not mean that the Argentine side was against 
any consideration of the wishes of the Falkland Islanders". Rather, continued Ruda, 
"this was a problein[j which did not concern Argentina: this concerned only Britain 
since the population was now under her control". Besides, as Ruda added, talking 
about interests only could be helpful to the FO's position when the issue came to 
public discussion. It would give the FO "enough flexibility to deal with Parliament 
and with public opinion" . 
73 To this, Britain's response was no less clear-cut. Q 
Thomson, the British representative, in his response to McLoughlin, made clear that 
the FO would not use its influence "in any way[j which would run counter to the 
possibility of achieving a good settlement of this old dispute". 74 
Preparation of the educational campaign 
In the latter part of 1967, with the emergence of trade quarrels over foot-and- 
mouth disease in Argentine meat products (discussed later), the sovereignty 
discussions over the Falkland Islands began to recede from the focus of British- 
Argentine relations. But this was not a red herring for the FO. The FO instead became 
active in initiating solutions to the dispute. The two Governments met on 21 
September and 2 October 1967. When McLoughlin expressed the view that the 
islanders "would have something to gain" in the transfer of sovereignty, 75 Britain was 
72 FCO 7/130, AA2/4, (1), Lord Caradon, UKMIS, to FO, Tel. no. 1762, confidential, 14 July 1967. 
73 Ibid., (5), "Record of meeting between the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and the Argentine 
Permanent Representative at the United Nations held at the Foreign Office on 24 July 1967, at 10.15 
AM", secret. 74 Ibid.. 
75 FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (65), ibid.. 
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obviously satisfied with Argentina's pledge. 76 In an attempt to accentuate this 
viewpoint, McLoughlin, in mid-September 1967, re-initiated a proposal to the FO for 
a visit to the Falkland Islands. 77 Even when McLoughlin backed down later on the 
grounds that he would wait patiently for the right time, 78 Britain was not discouraged. 
Instead, it initiated a plan for an educational campaign in December 1967, aimed at 
"improving communications and relations with Argentina, [with the aim ofl possibly 
79 leading to a transfer of sovereignty". In January 1968, it was proposed that under the 
circumstance that the draft of Memorandum of Understanding was completed, Lord 
Shepherd, Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, should lead the visiting team 
and begin the campaign. 80 Although sinister weather had been anticipated and the visit 
might cause suspicion among the Falkland Islands community, the FO was still 
convinced that, so far as the implementation of the first policy preference was 
concerned, the educational campaign would be worthwhile. 81 
The above accounts indicated that, although these meetings ended with no public 
statement having been issued, the two sides saw no difference in the negotiations. 
Britain had expressed the intention to "give Argentina every opportunity to explain to 
the Islanders the advantages of a change of sovereignty", 82 while Argentina was more 
willing to wait for the right timing. 
From "talks" to "negotiations" 
In mid-November 1967, Britain was supposed to prepare a joint statement that 
would be presented to the UN Fourth Committee for approval. The statement was to 
cover the progress of the talks over the Falklands problem in the past year. 83 During 
the drafting period, both sides were again stuck debating the wording. The FO 
76 FCO 7/155,44/4/13, (1), memorandum of the American Department, FO, 'Anglo-Argenfine talks on 
the Falkland Islands", secret, 20 November 1967. 
77 FCO 7/235, AAF3/1, (1), J. S. Bennett, Gibraltar and South Atlantic Department, CO, FCO, to C. E. 
Diggines, American Department, FO, 15 September 1967. 
7' Ibid., (2), Diggines to Bennett, unclassified, 18 September 1967. 
79 Ibid., (6), John Beith to Creswell, confidential, 6 December 1967. 
so FCO 7/126, AA 1/11, (1), Creswell to John Beith, FO, confidential, 16 January 1968. 
81 FCO 7/235, AAF3/1, (10), Beith to Creswell, restricted, 20 December 1967. 
82 Ibid., (54), "Record of conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Argentine Ambassador 
held at the Foreign Office on Wednesday, 26 April at 5 p. m. ", secret, 27 April 1967. 
83 FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (37), Lord Caradon, UKMIS to FO, Tel. no. 3836, confidential, 12 December 
1967. 
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demanded to replace "talks" by "negotiations" in the joint report, 84 as it thought that 
the word "negotiations" might "stimulate premature public interesf' in the issue . 
85 The 
Argentines disagreed. They argued that "talks" had connotations of an informal 
meaning, and that it would be fair to say that the two sides had reached the stage of 
"negotiations". 86 What if the joint statement failed to be presented in the UN in time? 
To avoid the risk of debate in the UN because of disagreement about the preparation 
of a joint text, Britain backed down. The insistence on differentiation between "talks" 
and "discussions" was given up. 87 
On 15 December 1967, the Fourth Committee adopted the draft consensus report 
on the current development of the talks over the Falklands issue. 88 Four days later, the 
General Assembly approved the consensus report . 
89 For Britain, the result was relief 
from UN's pressure. But more positively, the talks boded well for a settlement of the 
Falklands dispute. Even though Argentina took a pro-Spanish position on the issue of 
Gibraltar in the Fourth Committee, 90 and the Argentine nationalists presented written 
petitions to the UN about the Falkland Islands, 91 there was no panic from the FO. The 
FO felt assured that the protests would not "spoil the atmosphere" in the talks about 
the Falklands. 92 
The first turning-point policy preference on the defensive 
At the end of January 1968, the FO presented its first draft Memorandum of 
Understanding for inter-departmental discussion. 93 When the Memorandum of 
Understanding came into the public domain for discussion, its legitimacy began to be 
questioned. More disturbing to the FO was that some of the public became 
increasingly impatient about the uncertain future of the Falkland Islands in February 
84 FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (34), Caradon, UKMIS to FO, Tel. no. 3748, confidential, 9 December 1967; 
FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (35), FO to UKMIS, Tel. no. 7330, confidential, II December 1967. 
8' Ibid., (38), FO to UKMIS, Tel. no. 7398, confidential, 13 December 1967. 
86 Ibid., (36), UKMIS to FO, Tel. no. 3835, confidential, 12 December 1967. 
87 Ibid., (39), FO to UKMIS, Tel. no. 7474, confidential, 14 December 1967. 
88 Ibid., (48), UKMIS to FO, Tel. no. 3968, confidential, 16 December 1967. 
89 Ibid., (49), Lord Caradon, UKMIS, to FO, Tel. no. 3968, confidential, 16 December 1967. 
90 Ibid., (50), D. M. Summerhays, BEBA, to Diggines, American Department, confidential, 
confidential, 12 January 1968. 
9' Ibid., (52), Petition to U Thant, UN Secretary-General, A/AC. 109/PET. 898,27 December 1967. 
92 Ibid., (40), UKMIS to FO, Tel. no. 3874, confidential, 14 December 1967; ibid., (42), C. E. Diggines, 
FO, to C. P. Hope, UKMIS, confidential, 15 December 1967. 
93 FCO 7/155, AA4113, (2), Draft Memorandum of Understanding by C. E. Diggines to Bennett, secret, 
29 January 1968. 
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1968.94 Although the members of the Executive Councils in the Falkland Islands had 
been vowed to secrecy after Haskard revealed part of the Government's plans to 
them, 95 some members began to feel uneasy and were ready to make their "appeal". 
Through the appeal, they attempted to alert the MPs in London that the length to 
which the FO had gone in their secret talks with Argentina were not fully disclosed to 
96 the Commons. 
On 15 March 1968, with the headline "The Government abandoned people who 
trust it" in The 71"mes, Peter Scott wrote that "In Buenos Aires I found a general 
impression that any minute from now the Isles Malvinas would be a part of 
Argentina". 97 This report came as the first challenge to the FO's Falklands policy. 
Although only a spark, the effect started a prairie fire in Parliament. The archive 
shows that both Lord Chalfont and Goronwy Roberts, two Ministers of State for 
98 Foreign Affairs, were put under heavy parliamentary pressure in mid-March 1968. 
The FO was certainly reluctant to witness the issue developing beyond their 
control. Now that the legitimacy of the draft Memorandum of Understanding was 
being challenged, and public interest in the confidential negotiations was stirred up, 
the FO was forced to stand up for their policy preference. To do this, it authorised the 
News Department to admit that there were talks with Argentina. But different from 
the position in March 1967, when the FO denied that talks were about sovereignty, the 
FO this time insisted that the talks were instead about the long-term future of the 
Falkland Islands. 99 
Meanwhile, the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee (FIEC) was set up in 
London on March 25. Important members of the FIEC included Sir John Barlow, who 
was later elected as the Chairman, Hunter Christie, former British diplomat in Buenos 
Aires, and two MPs, Clifford Kenyon and John Smith. A meeting was held on the day 
when it was established. Having considered that the issue could be better supported if 
94 FCO 7/157, AA4/15 (44), C. E. Diggines, American Department, to John Beith, Parliamentary 
Office, on "Falkland Islands: Parliamentary Questions", I April 1968. 
95 FCO 7/157, FCO 7/157, AA4/15 (44), C. E. Diggines, American Department, to John Beith, 
Parliamentary Office, on "Falkland Islands: Parliamentary Questions", I April 1968. 
96 Robert Elgood (1999) Draft of Franks Report, p. 10. 
97 Ibid.. 
98 Hansard (Lords) vol. 290, cols., 205-11,13 March 1968; Hansard (Commons) vol. 761, cols., 31-4, 
18 March 1968. 
99 FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (3), Diggines to Beith, Private Secretary, confidential, II March 1968. 
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to expose it to the public, the FIEC decided to inform the press, through which voice 
it exerted pressure on the Government. To do this, the FIEC issued a manifesto, 
bringing to the notice of the British people the wishes of the islanders. The main 
argument of the manifesto was as follows. 
Are you aware that negotiations are now proceeding between the 
British and Argentine governments which may result at any moment 
in the handing over of the Falkland Islands to the Argentine? Take 
note, that the inhabitants of the Islands have never yet been 
consulted regarding their future. They do not want to become 
Argentines... There is no racial problem, no unemployment, no 
poverty, and we are not in debt. Are you aware that the people of 
these Islands do not wish to submit to a foreign language, law, 
customs and culture? Because for one hundred and thirty five years 
they have happily pursued their own peaceful way of life, a very 
British way of life... Is our tiny community to be used as a pawn in 
power politics? Do you feel ashamed that this wicked thing may 
suddenly be foisted on us? '00 
The above lines were indeed provocative. Perhaps having anticipated a possible 
row, Stewart, who had just succeeded Brown in mid-March 1968, decided to 
intervene. Firstly, Stewart suspended the educational campaign in an attempt to 
market the idea of the Memorandum of Understanding under preparation ever since 
December 1967.101 Next, on 27 March, Stewart made a statement to Parliament about 
the negotiating principles underlying the issue, 102 and the next day, he informed the 
Cabinet of the FO's twin-track strategy that the FO had adopted to cope with the issue. 
This was the first time in the history of the Falkland Islands that the British Foreign 
Secretary had publicly admitted that sovereignty had been discussed with Argentina. 
With the decision coming into public view, the policy declaration was more a 
reflection of public pressure than a policy initiative. It seemed to indicate that the FO 
was on the defensive about its first policy preference. Viewed in this light, the effect 
of the FIEC's manifesto cannot be lightly dismissed. 
Despite the fact that the FO was on the defensive regarding its first policy 
" Ibid.. 
101 FCO 7/156, AA4/14, (8), A. N. Galsworthy, CO, to Leslie Glass, UKMIS, 18 March 1968. 
102 FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (5), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 242, confidential, 26 March 1968. 
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preference, when the issue came to public notice in March 1968, the sense of crisis in 
the FO should not be exaggerated. Records indicate that the FO as well as the Wilson 
Cabinet faced the parliamentary enquiries in quite a calm manner. 
In Parliament, both Chalfont and Roberts explained confidently to the Houses 
about the rationale behind the talks. Both officials confirmed that the "talks have 
proceeded and are proceeding". And they declared that the talks "cover a wide range 
of subjects. It is too early to specify what form the consultations will take". Therefore, 
as they tried to persuade the backbenchers, "These negotiations are delicate and must 
be confidential". 103 Also, to explain the need for secrecy, Chalfont argued that "I 
believe it would not be in the interests of this House, of this country or of the people 
of the Falkland Islands to disclose now what those negotiations are about". 104 
Inside the FO, these parliamentary enquiries were perceived as an opportunity to 
advance the FO's view on the issue. C. E. Diggines, who took over Edmondspost as 
Heads of American Department, was optimistic about the response in Parliament. He 
argued that the MPs' enquiries were "an opportunity to make it clear that the question 
of sovereignty cannot be excluded" from the talks, as long as "there will be 
consultation with the population of the Islands about their future". As regards the 
essence of consultation, however, the FO insisted that the interests of the islanders as 
the negotiating principle remained prioritised. Diggines argued that "it would not be 
desirable to give the outright assurance asked for" by either the islanders or the 
opposition in Parliament. This was because, as Diggines explained, "the tiny 
population of the colony should not have what might amount to an absolute right to 
veto" this policy preference for sovereignty talks. Based on this reasoning, it was 
apparent that what worried Diggines was the possible effect of giving the power of 
veto to the islanders. In other words, if the islanders were given this veto power, the 
islanders' opposition to the talks could in turn "lead the Argentines to break off further 
negotiations". 105 To reduce this concern, Diggines saw the parliamentary enquiries as 
good opportunities to explain the rationale of the government stance on this issue. 
The Cabinet was clearly influenced by the FO's attitude at this moment. In the 
103 Hansard (Conunons), vol. 761, ibid.. 
" Hansard (Lords), vol. 290, col. 208. 
105 FCO 7/157, AA4/15, Part A, (17), Diggines to Beith, confidential, 12 March 1968. 
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Cabinet meeting, the Foreign Secretary took the view that the parliamentary rows in 
March 1968 were "absurd". When Stewart reported that the FO was preparing the 
ground for the government to recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland 
Islands according to the interests of the islanders, there was no opposition voiced in 
the Cabinet. The only exception was James Callaghan, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. He asked whether to keep this disputed territory would be of any use to 
Britain. To this question, all the Cabinet agreed that the answer was negative and that 
the talks were worth continuing, despite the parliamentary uproars. Stewart seized the 
opportunity and pledged that "I thought that I had better get firmly established on one 
stool". Wilson responded, saying that "Yes, we know. You raced ahead of your stool 
and have defused the situation". According to Castle, it "was the first time in a long 
time we had had a good laugh at [the] Cabinet". 106 Castle's remark was suggestive. It 
indicated the atmosphere in the meeting was relaxed. It also suggests that so far as the 
first policy preference was concerned, Stewart was "quite pleased with the way he had 
managed this so as to prevent talks being called offp. 107 As Chalfont confidently 
pledged the FO's respect for the wishes of the islanders in the House of Lords on 27 
March, "there is no question of Britain ceding the islands to Argentina immediately, 
but cession is a possibility in the future should an agreement be reached with 
Argentina which the islanders accept as fully satisfying their interests in all 
respects". 108 
Chalfont's statements indicated that the British attitude towards Argentina about 
the Falklands issue remained consistently following the twin-track strategy. The FO 
knew only too well that Argentina would only be satisfied to have the interests of the 
islanders as the guiding principle, so that Stewart was cautious when defending the 
policy by speaking of their wishes in Parliament. To avoid any unnecessary negative 
impact, Stewart, in fact, had called in McLoughlin before the Parliamentary debates 
on 27 March, explaining to McLoughlin that the reference to the wishes of the 
islanders in Parliament was a necessity. 109 Creswell in Buenos Aires also visited Costa 
Mendez on 3 April. He reassured the Argentine Foreign Minister that, despite the 
press reports in London that the British Government denied any immediate transfer of 
" Barbara Castle (1990) Yhe Castle diaries, 1964-1976 (London: Papermac), p. 207. 
107 Castle (1990) The Castle diaries, p. 207. 
log Glasgow Herald, 28 March 1968. 
109 FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (5), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 242, confidential, 26 March 1968. 
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sovereignty, there was still "sufficient room for manoeuvre", which enabled 
negotiations to continue. Creswell was tactful. He followed the discourse around the 
interests of the islanders and encouraged his Argentine counterparts that "the Islanders 
would no doubt judge their own interests in the light of the safeguards and guarantees 
offered by Argentina". Therefore, Argentina "would have to be able to convince the 
Islanders by constructive actions that a new relationship would be in the Islanders' 
own interests". On the other side of the ledger, Creswell, in an attempt to keep the 
cooperative mood in the process of settling the issue, seemed to be more anxious 
about the possible press release in Buenos Aires as a result of the parliamentary rows 
in London. He reminded Mendez that "Britain still thought that the talks had better be 
kept confidential" with a view to giving room for "patient diplomacy"! 10 
The parliamentary uproars receded in early April 1968 with the Fo's 
maintenance that "sovereignty over the islanders will not be transferred to Argentina 
unless the islanders consider this to be in their interests". Both the FIEC and the media 
seemed satisfied with Fo's replies! 11 However, the opposition seemed unaware of the 
distinction between the wishes and the interests. Their satisfaction made the FO more 
convinced of the twin-track strategy with the effect to sideline the wishes of the 
islanders. 112 Perhaps what made the FO more confident about its designated policy 
was that, according to the FO, Argentina's general treatment of the issue in March 
1968 had been ". surprisingly moderate in tone"! 13 Even Cronica, a press used to beat 
the nationalist drum in Buenos Aires, was exceedingly patient. Cronica was emphatic 
that "the negotiations are developing favourably for Argentina", because, as Cronica 
explained, the British Government had ruled out a referendum in the Falklands 
Islands. 114 The FO interpreted the calmness on the Argentine side as the result of 
practical thinking, because it was in the interest of Argentina not to make into 
headlines in Buenos Aires the British Parliamentary discontent. 115 Following this 
interpretation, the FO after March 1968 began to realise that the opposition that put 
110 FCO 7/13 6, AA3/5, (2 1), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 227, confidential, 3 April 1968, enclosing 
"Interview with Nicanor Costa Mendez on 3 April, 1968, confidential". 
... Daily Sketch, 28 March 1968; The 71mes, 29 March 1968. 
112 Interview with Francis Mitchell, Secretary of FIEC; Daily Sketch, 28 March 1968; The 771mes, 29 
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113 FCO 7/136, AA3/5, (16), J. F. R. Martin, BEBA, to Atkinson, American Department, restricted, 25 
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115 FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (7), FO/CO/WH distribution, guidance no. 89, unclassified, 29 March 1968. 
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the FO and its first policy preference on the defensive was not external, but 
domestic. 116 The FO as a result became cautious not to accelerate the tempo of 
progress in the talks. In late April, for instance, it was mooted inviting the islanders to 
visit Buenos Aires. The invitation was declined by Diggines, who thought the 
suggestion premature, arguing that "the question of any return invitation for the 
Argentines to visit the Islands cannot be considered for the time being". 117 
More significantly, the FO remained highly sensitive about the wording between 
the wishes and interests of the islanders in the parliamentary debates. In Stewart's 
written replies to Parliament, Diggines was particularly cautious not to let the 
Government's statement go beyond the settled definition, i. e. the interests of the 
islanders. ' 18 In one of Stewart's statements responding to Knox Cunningham, MP, 
Stewart argued that "I can only add that H. M. Government will not fail to take into 
account the wishes of the inhabitants of the Islands". On this, Diggines was quick to 
point out that the term--4he wishes of the islanders- had not been used as a formal 
reply before. Nevertheless, as Diggines also admitted, respecting the wishes of the 
islanders had to be expressed "under this circumstance". 119 
Diggines' instinctive response was revealing. It showed that wording of the 
wishes at this stage was at best an expedient response under the condition of strong 
parliamentary opposition. But it at maximum rhetoric. Speaking of the wishes of the 
islanders was by no means a true rcflection of the government position, or any 
departure from the negotiating principle having been held since mid-1967. The first 
policy preference had been constructed in the way that a series of supplementary 
actions were coming into play. 
The second turning-point policy'preference emerging 
On I May 1968, Stewart received McLoughlin to discuss the draft Memorandum 
of Understanding. Their talks were based on the consensus reached in mid-1967. 
However, there were signs of departure in the FO's strategy, despite these did not 
116 FCO 7/156, AA4/14, (7), (YC3/1), CO to Falkland Islands, confidential, 15 March 1968; FCO 
7/155, AA4/13, (4), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 239, unclassified, 25 March 1968. 
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necessarily mean that FO had radically changed its attitude towards this dispute. The 
archive shows that, in addition to stating the objective of the Memorandum commonly 
shared by the two sides, the FO put forward two different versions of the draft in 
paragraph 4 as follows: 
The British draft: The Government of the United Kingdom have 
indicated that as part of such a final settlement they will recognise 
Argentine sovereignty over the Islands with effect from a date to be 
agreed, in the event that the Government of the United Kingdom 
may consider that the population of the Islands regard their interests 
as secured by the safeguards and guarantees offered by the 
Argentine Governrnent. 
The Argentine draft: As part of such a final settlement, the United 
Kingdom Government will recognise Argentina's sovereignty over 
the Islands, with effect from a date to be agree, at such time as the 
United Kingdom Government considers that the guarantees and 
safeguards offered by the Argentine Government, on which 
consultations will be held with the population of the Islands, duly 
secures the latter's interests. The Argentine Government and the 
United Kingdom Government will consider those interests in the 
light of Resolution 2065 (XX) of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. 120 
With these two versions of paragraph 4 in the draft, Stewart made clear three 
principles held by the FO in their further talks. First, Britain genuinely wanted to 
reach an agreement regarding the dispute. Secondly, Britain, however, did not believe 
that it would be right to ignore the wishes of the islanders in the process of 
sovereignty transfer, because it would not be honourable for any British government 
to do so. Thirdly, Britain as a result thought it important that "it was necessary in the 
modem world for small communities to be in a working relationship with the nearest 
neighbours to which they are related by geography". 121 
120 FCO 7/158, AA4/15, Part B (95), C. W. Wallace to Beith, "Falkland Islands: Parliamentary 
Questions", 27 June 1968, enclosing (1) Talkland Islands: Record of conversation between the Foreign 
Secretary and the Argentine Ambassador held at the Foreign Office on Wednesday, I May 1968 at 12 
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of Understanding as of I May 1968", secret; (3) "Record of a conversation between Mr. Beith and the 
Argentine Ambassador held at the Foreign Office on T'hursday, 2 May at 3.45 p. m. ", secret. 
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To this departure, McLoughlin, nevertheless, responded positively. He 
recognised the importance of the principle of consulting the islanders from the 
humanitarian point of view. As McLoughlin agreed, Argentina had to be patient. A 
transition of time was needed because the loyalties of the islanders apparently 
remained with Britain. 122 
McLoughlin's pragmatic view showed that the meeting on 1 May was another 
high ground in the progress of the sovereignty talks. The result of the meeting 
convinced the FO that Argentina was becoming "increasingly aware that the barrier of 
suspicion they had created had to be demolished and they would have to make a 
major effort to woo the islanders". 123 On 5 July 1968, McLoughlin returned with the 
Argentine draft of the Memorandum of Understanding, expressing a willingness to 
guarantee "the interests of the islanders by making full use of modem techniques". 124 
Based on this pledge, Argentina admitted that the "cultural and economic links" in the 
text were too restrictive and declared that more effort on the Argentine side was 
needed. 125 Argentina also showed its intention to pay for the building of an airfield in 
the Falklands and to resume a flight service. 126 From August to October, there also 
appeared reports that Baring Brothers, one of the biggest companies in Buenos Aires, 
was proceeding with plans for a possible take-over bid for the Falkland Islands 
Company. 127 All the proposals that could bring the islanders closer to Argentina were 
welcomed by the FO, since both Governments had fully agreed that the "process of 
enlightening the Islanders about this country and gradually improving their attitude 
towards Argentina was fundamental to the solution of the whole problem". 128 
Obviously, the proposals made by Argentina reinforced the FO's confidence in its 
current policy preference in the talks, and the source of confidence also came from 
Argentina's successful effort not to let the press stimulate unnecessary nationalist 
122 Ibid.. 
123 FCO7/152, AA4/9, (9), C. W. Wallace to C. E. Diggines, restricted, 15 August 1968. 
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sentiment against the cooperative mood alongside the process of sovereignty 
discussions. 129 Even the Queen's decision not to visit Argentina in 1968 was 
favourably interpreted by the press in Buenos Aires as "a triumph for both Argentine 
and British diplomacy", exemplifying "British pragmatism and tactfulness" not to 
arouse the nationalist mood in Argentina. 130 The Argentine interpretation of the British 
attitude in turn reassured the FO that its current policy preference, based on the 
interests of the islanders, was realistic, workable and on the right track. It would not 
be a surprise,. as a result, to observe a sense of confidence in Creswell's report a few 
days after the meeting on I May. Creswell noted, "I thought that the situation now 
looked better than it has [sic] for some time", because "our own position had been 
clearly defined in the Parliamentary statements made by the Secretary of State in April 
and May" of the previous year. 131 
Despite this confidence, there had been a slight departure in the content of the 
policy preference after Stewart resumed the post as Foreign Secretary in March 1968. 
This sign of attitude change became visible when McLoughlin questioned the real 
meaning of "consultation" in the context of the draft Memorandum of Understanding. 
On 2 May 1968, McLoughlin asked what consultation meant when the FO said that it 
would consult the islanders. Did consultation mean to consult about sovereignty, or 
about the proposed Argentine guarantees and safeguards? Stewart seized the chance 
and explained that London treated these two consultations as inseparable. 132 Although 
the FO made clear that the reason for having to have two different drafts in paragraph 
4 was merely "a matter of courtesy", that was misleading. The difference, as the FO 
admitted, lay in the fact that "the British draft allowed that the Islanders would 
express their opinion, while in the Argentine draft the decision about the future of the 
Islands was left to Her Majesty's Government". 133 
The existence of the different versions of Paragraph 4 implied that the FO at this 
stage was caught in a policy dilemma. On the one hand, it managed to keep the 
cooperative mood in the sovereignty talks with Argentina. Argentina's patience and 
129 FCO 7/157, AA4/15, Part A, (70), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 305, confidential, 2 May 1968. 
130 FCO 7/137, AA3n, (33), J. Martin, BEBA, to Atkinson, American Department, FO, restricted, 8 
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calmness strengthened the confidence of the FO in its current policy track. On the 
other side, the pressure from Parliament was building up. On 20 May, a motion was 
carried unanimously in the Falkland Islands Legislative Council that "the wishes of 
the Islanders were an absolute condition in determining the sovereignty of the 
Falklands". 1 34 The FO did not miss the strong signal. Stewart's two versions of 
paragraph 4 were more than suggestive. They clearly reflected that moral concern for 
the wishes of the islanders began to gain ground. Nevertheless, so far as Argentina's 
calmness was concerned, the twin-track policy could not be criticised as ineffective. It 
effectively absorbed the negative impact of the existing dispute over the Falkland 
Islands. Argentina since April 1967 had rarely made an issue of it in other 
international forums, which was exactly to the FO's expectation. 
The first turning-point policy preference lurching forward 
On 9 August 1968, a politico-legal arrangement aimed at circumventing the 
sovereignty impasse was reached between Britain and Argentina on the text of the 
draft Memorandum of Understanding about the Falkland Islands. 135 The exact detail 
of the text is not available in the Public Records Office at the time of writing. This 
thesis can only record the essential points from the Franks Report issued in 1983 as 
follows: 
The Government of the United Kingdom as part of such a final 
settlement will recognise Argentina's sovereignty over the Islands 
from a date to be agreed. This date will be agreed as soon as 
possible after (i) the two governments have resolved the present 
divergence between them as to the criteria according to which the 
United Kingdom Government shall consider whether the interests of 
the Islanders would be secured by the safeguards and guarantees to 
be offered by the Argentine Government, and (ii) the Government 
of the United Kingdom are then satisfied that those interests are so 
secured. 136 
The Memorandum of Understanding represented "the high water mark" in the 
134 FCO 7/15 8, AA4/15, (103), Diggines to Beith, restricted, 4 July 1968. 
135 FCO 7/149, AA 4/6, (55) A. M. Warburton, FO, to J. D. B. Shaw, UKMIS, confidential, 19 August 
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discussions of the transfer of sovereignty". 137 It had successfully grasped the spirit of 
the 170's effort in cooperation with Argentina. It also sidelined the wishes of the 
islanders that had been reiterated earlier in March 1968 before the two Houses. This 
Memorandum, indeed, set a conscious basis for further efforts in cooperation with 
Argentina in the process of solving the long-running territorial dispute. At the meeting 
to discuss the draft in the FO on 13 September, the consensus was reached inside the 
FO that it would be a political decision to sign this Memorandum. 
Despite this consensus, Stewart's concern after mid-1967 did not diminish. It 
instead became more manifest as the public concern increasingly seized the spotlight 
through the media. On 8 October 1968, the Daily Express in New York carried an 
article, saying that Britain had determined to bow to the "inevitable" happening to the 
future of the Falkland Islands. According to the Daily Express, "the British 
Government was to keep the problem 'on ice' for a while until the Argentine ... gives 
assurance that she is ready to 'do something"'. It commented that the issue at that 
moment was "just a question of working out the timetable". The transfer of 
sovereignty, by report, would take only 5 to 10 years. 138 
The impact of the news release on the FO was complex. This complexity might 
have strengthened the FO's concern about the legitimacy of the first policy preference 
talking about the interests of the islanders exclusively. Superficially, the FO remained 
adamant. It went on with statements such as "there is no change in H. M. S. 's policy", 
and "there will be no transfer of sovereignty against the wishes of the inhabitants". 139 
However, the pressure had apparently sensitised the FO to the public pulse to a 
considerable degree. Stewart became more and more concerned about the lack of 
correspondence between the text of the joint memo and what the FO reiterated. "Our 
difficulty", as Stewart admitted later in October 1968, "arises largely from the fact that 
the Memorandum contains no explicit reference to the wishes of the Islanders and we 
think that it might therefore be represented (wrongly in my view) as denying the 
islanders the right to decide on their future". 140 Nevertheless, acknowledging the 
"'Douglas Kinney (1985)"Anglo-Argentine diplomacy and the Falklands crisis", in Alberto R. Coll 
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difficulties did not mean that Stewart would back down from the designated policy 
preference that had been continued for more than one and a half years since mid- 
1967. 
The public pressure cannot be exaggerated at this stage, however. The room for 
manoeuvre was still spacious. Perhaps because of Stewart's earnest attempt to settle 
, 
the dispute earlier, Stewart began to think of avoiding an Act of Parliament. 141 Having 
been aware that an agreement reached with Argentina about this issue would be 
debated in Parliament, Stewart anticipated that there would be parliamentary rows 
before the Memorandum of Understanding was effected. 142 However, the issue was in 
need of settlement. This was the main policy objective that was consciously supported 
in the Cabinet. Under this circumstance, Stewart's intention was crystal clear. To 
dispel the concern about another parliamentary row, he intended to make a detour to 
evade opposition. A leading question was therefore put to his staff. Stewart asked 
whether "an Act of Parliament would be needed to implement a transfer of 
sovereignty". 143 
Nevertheless, this intention met opposition from F. Burrows, the assistant legal 
adviser in the FO. Burrows argued that, although the Falkland Islands were not part of 
a self-governing Dominion and, indeed, could well be ceded away without the 
concurrence of Parliament, it would be politically desirable to submit the case to 
Parliament for ratification. 144 No further document indicates Stewart's response to this 
comment. But Burrows'written answer seemed to be another challenge to undermine 
the first policy preference. 
On 26 September 1968, the draft of Memorandum of Understanding was fully 
discussed for one-and-a-half hours in the Cabinet. The length of the discussion 
indicated that the issue of the Falkland Islands was no longer as minor as it had been 
before 1964. Members of the Cabinet expressed their worries about another wave of 
October, 1968, Falkland Islands". 
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parliamentary opposition, if the FO published the Memorandum of Understanding. 
Stewart remained adamant. "Yet, retorted Michael", as Castle noted, "we should 
certainly have a hostile reaction in the UN and there might even be armed clashes 
with the Argentines which-Denis Healey warned-we couldn't meet except by an 
enormous increase in expenditure". 145 Castle cut in at this juncture, suggesting that 
Britain insert the word "views" before "the interests of the islanders" in the 
Memorandum of Understanding. In other words, the text would be: "the views and the 
interests of the Islanders would be secured". Stewart refused, arguing that this 
suggestion "would be utterly unacceptable to the Argentine Government". 146 
The meeting in the Cabinet ended without any clear decision being made. This 
indecision in the Cabinet did not alter the FO's designated terms in the joint 
memorandum, but it surely made Stewart further aware that, with the Memorandum 
of Understanding coming into the open, the issue would become thornier. The , 
inten-nediate aim for the FO therefore was to work out acceptable conditions with a 
certain degree of consensus for the islanders in order to avoid unmanageable 
backfires. To meet this task, the FO thought that the time was appropriate to 
reconsider the idea of the educational campaigns that had been put to one side in 
March 1968.147 
With regard to the question that who would be the Minister to visit the Falkland 
Islands, John Beith in the American Department was of the view that "it would be 
reasonable now to see the visit ina slightly different guise. Incidentally, the 
Commonwealth Office have in mind Mr. Whitlock, the Parliamentary Under- 
Secretary, and not Lord Shepherd". 148 Beith's proposal about whom to take on the 
visiting team was revealing. The decision to designate Lord Shepherd, who was with 
the FO, had been made in early 1968 . 
149 But to choose Whitlock, who was in 
Parliament, instead of Lord Shepherd in late 1968, as the FO admitted, was due to 
FO's increasing concern over the strong adverse reactions from the Falkland Islanders, 
who had developed an unfavourable image of the FO in the previous few months. The 
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FO seemed keenly aware that their hostility towards the FO's first policy preference 
would be highly likely to bring about a chain reaction in Parliament again. 
It was also agreed in the FO that the proper time for a visit would be a few days 
before the parliamentary debates. 150 However, Thomson, the Commonwealth 
Secretary, urged a quicker decision. 151 According to Thomson, "the timing of [the] 
agreement on the Memorandum had slipped", 152 so that the visit would be advisable to 
take place "during, or shortly before, the Christmas recess". 153 Thomson's remarks 
might have already given a clue to what Stewart intended. For Stewart, since both 
Governments had tacitly accepted the Memorandum of Understanding, any delay in 
publicising the Memorandum would probably be unacceptable to Argentina. 154 As 
Stewart averred, "I do not think that it would be advisable to defer the Ministerial visit 
until the Christmas recess, as this would mean in effect that it would not take place 
until January, 1969". With this reasoning, Stewart issued the instruction that, if the 
draft Memorandum of Understanding could be approved in the Cabinet, it would be 
better for the ministers to launch the educational campaign in late November or early 
December 1968.155 
The FO at this stage would haye been cheered by Caradon's message from the 
UN. Caradon reported that "there is no question of the Falklands [issue] being raised 
in the Committee of 24 on 23 September, nor do we expect any discussion of 
substance at a later stage of the Committee's work". 156 More soothing to the FO was 
Ruda's assurance that "the Argentine had waited 130 years for the Falklands and could 
well afford to wait another few months for an agreemed. 157 On 26 September 1968, 
Caradon and Ruda sent in a joint statement to the UN Special Committee of 24.158 
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The statement was presented on an earlier annual date than it used to be. Britain 
affirmed in the UN categorically that "the greatest difference between London and 
159 Buenos Aires had been solved". Perhaps with these positive signs, the FO still 
thought it worthwhile to stick to its first policy preference. 
The second turning-point policy preference coming to the fore 
The observation of the archive has to end here. No official papers have been 
released beyond early November 1968 at this writing. Nevertheless, a picture of the 
policy switch in December 1968 can be developed from other published literature and 
it has been summarised in Chapter 1. 
On 1 November 1968, Argentina urged an increase in the tempo of the 
negotiations. 160 Britain responded positively by launching the educational campaign. 
On 27 November there occurred another unauthorised landing of an Argentine 
aircraft-the third since 1965 . 
161 At this precise moment, ironically, Chalfont was 
becoming the first minister to visit the Falkland Islands, with the major purpose of 
convincing the islanders where their interests lay, and why transfer of sovereignty was 
the best course. In London, another wave of parliamentary rows was gaining 
momentum. The FIEC this time got 100 MPs behind its stance. The FCO officials 
were pressurised into explaining their Falklands policy in Parliament again, but to 
their embarrassment, they found not a murmur of support from their own 
backbenchers. 162 On 3 December, Chalfont, upon returning from the Falkland Islands, 
was forced to repeat the rhetoric in the House of Lords that "there will be no transfer 
of sovereignty against the wishes of the islanders... their wishes in this matter are 
paramount". 163 Fred Mulley, Minister of State at the FCO, reconfirmed in the House 
of Commons that it was not the government policy to "transfer sovereignty against the 
wishes of the islanders". 164 
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But the situation spun out of control. The next day in the House of Commons 
there exploded a series of questions : why were not the wishes of the islanders to be 
respected as before? Why did the FCO maintain that a referendum was superficial or 
premature? Was it a Freudian slip to talk about strengthening communications on the 
one hand and the wishes of the islanders prevailing on the other? Why could not the 
House be told what Chalfont had said to the islanders? Why ought sovereignty to be 
on the agenda? 165 One week later, Chalfont made his second attempt at clearing the air 
of suspicions by reiterating that the Government "insisted on the paramountcy of the 
Islanders' wishes". 166 However, the MPs had no confidence in Chalfont's pledge. 
When Chalfont claimed that "it is we who decide whether that sovereignty can be 
disposed of", 167 the MPs were not convinced by this kind of rhetoric. Uproar followed. 
"My Lords", as the Marquess of Salisbury quipped, "the noble Lord seems to think 
that we are silly; we think that he is shifty-and very shifty". Lord Bowles echoed her, 
"too clever by half". 168 The discredit of the Government was more than manifest. The 
Government's skilful practice in the past two years, having its replies shuttling 
between the wishes and interests under the so-called double track policy, came under 
heavy fire. The legitimacy of the first policy preference in the talks was seriously 
undermined. 
On II December, having seen the situation deteriorate from bad to worse, the 
Cabinet came to the rescue and subsequently rejected the draft Memorandum of 
Understanding. 169 Stewart was instructed by the Cabinet to make a statement on 
Government policy over the Falkland Islands. 170-His restatement in Parliament was, 
understandably, an unbearable moment. According to Edmonds, Stewart "was howled 
down on the floor of the House... Howled down by members, and nobody, no 
Member of Parliament in any party, and above all not in his own party, ever forgot 
i1 171 V. The embarrassment, nevertheless, was not exclusively confined to the FO. From 
the perspective of collective responsibilities, the decision to withdraw the 
Memorandum of Understanding and to uphold the wishes of the islanders as the 
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guiding principle in the talks represented a failure of the government policy that had 
been so keenly followed since mid-1967. Calling the preparation of Memorandum of 
Understanding to a halt, as Benn noted, Wilson "was a bit embarrassed because he 
was pretty heavily tied up in this [first policy preference] as well". 172 According to 
Zielger, before December 1968, "Wilson still entertained high hopes that the issue 
could be "disposed of by transferring sovereignty to the Argentinians on terms 
acceptable to the inhabitants". 173 But now that the whole plan had fallen flat, the 
second turning-point policy preference geared to the wi. shes of the islanders replaced 
interests in December 1968, and the draft Memorandum of Understanding was put 
aside. 
On 12 December, Stewart regained his composure. He articulated the essence of 
the "new" policy track by emphasising that what "I will tie myself to is this, that, 
whatever the form, one of the provisions must be that we should not be in a position 
where we could be required to hand over the islands against the wishes of the 
islanders. I really think that that ought to do". 174 
Stewart's remark at this final moment can be seen as a deliberate one, reflecting 
the effect of the crisis in late November and early December 1968. It indicated a 
significant divergence of policy making from what the FCO claimed before. The 
second policy preference, respecting the wishes of the islanders, was thus 
consolidated; despite the latter term was quite short-term and had been repeatedly 
replaced in the next 14 years leading to the war. 
In retrospect, the FO's policy preference concerning British sovereignty over the 
Falkland Islands had changed from Stewart's Position that British sovereignty was not 
negotiable in early 1966, to Brown's flexible strategies that sovereignty could cede 
away as long as there was a transitional period. In respect of the transitional period, 
the attitude change was also phenomenal. The FO since late 1966 had reduced the 
transition period from 40 years, as proposed in November 1966, to 20 years, and then 
down to 10 years, as Brown proposed to McLoughlin on 26 March 1967. In October 
1968, rumour had it that it had been reduced again to 5 from 10 years. On the matter 
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of the negotiating principle, the wishes of the islanders that the FO reiterated before 
early 1967 had also been sidelined. The interests of the islanders in the name of 
"advantages" came into centre stage and set the foundation for the emerging draft 
Memorandum of Understanding at the final stage of the talks in late 1968. 
Paradoxically however, the nearer it approached the final stage of the sovereignty 
talks, the more mounting pressure was on the publication of Memorandum of 
Understanding and the FO's first policy preference. ' 75 
Understandably, the final decision to pledge that the wishes of the islanders were 
paramount was a reluctant one. It was reluctant in the sense that the long-running 
dispute might have been resolved once and for all, but for, in Stewart's words, "the 
plain British man in the street's view". 176 What explanations can prospect theory 
provide? 
2. The explanation from the perspective of the domain of frame 
This thesis finds that, before the end of 1967, the British Government under 
Wilson's premiership enjoyed a golden period of popularity that, in the language of 
prospect theory, can be described as a domain of gains. The rosy picture sprang from 
public confidence in Wilson's heroic leadership and the optimistic economic outlook. 
Nonetheless, as time went by, the domain of gains began to dwindle as Wilson's EEC 
policy exerted a considerable negative impact on cohesion among Labour MPs. It was 
further damaged by devaluation of the pound at the end of 1967, leading to a series of 
confidence crises nation-wide. The Government's domain of frame as a result slid into 
a domain of losses after the end of 1967, particularly when the trade quarrels between 
Argentina and Britain occurred due to the foot-and-mouth disease. 
Enjoying the domain of gains 
Lacking a unifying consensus had been a consistent phenomenon in Labour's 
tradition. Incompatibility between moral values and their real practice used to 
embarrass the policies of Labour when in office, and this incompatibility was 
particularly manifest in foreign affairs. 177 From October 1964 onwards, however, an 
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unusual party unity emerged. 178 Faced by the narrow victory, with a tenuous majority 
of four, 179 members of the Labour Party, including some active backbenchers, seemed 
fully aware of the need to surrender their divergent opinions temporarily, otherwise, 
Government policies might easily have been defeated. ' 80 The compromise engendered 
by the call for party cohesion, in turn, consolidated Wilson's heroic leadership. 181 
Wilson indeed was extremely capable of exploiting the chance of a narrow 
margin in Parliament. 182 After succeeding Hugh Gaitskell as leader of the Labour 
party in 1963,183 he marketed himself as a "vigorous leader committed to 
technological advance", 184 always appearing his best before the mass media. 185 This 
domain of gain that had been successfully created, was further reinforced by Labour's 
second victory eighteen months after the 1964 election, with the result that his 
majority shot up to 97.186 The landslide was the first time in the twentieth-century that 
a Prime Minister had led his party to a second electoral victory with an increased 
majority. It placed Wilson at the pinnacle of power and even the opposition had to 
concede that he was the Party's winning asset. 187 More significantly, Labour in 1966 
proved it was the party "most in touch with the rising new post-war generation" whose 
choice of it was a reflection of the new British mood. 188 As David Triesman, leader of 
CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament), admitted, "I was imbued with the idea 
that a Labour government would produce some profound change in British 
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And indeed, alongside this enhanced popularity, Labour policy lines were 
attractive as well. The new Government was earnest in showing itself more disposed 
to combating economic problems than its predecessors. British society witnessed a 
wide series of economic reforms being launched. Under the pledge of "the white heat 
of technological revolution", the Government showed no hesitation in taking an 
interventionist approach in an attempt to regain Britain's position in the world 
economies. 190 Meanwhile, the Government was also confident in its wisdom of 
planning. According to the "National Plan", 191 the Government's targeted growth in 
industrial output was set as high as 25 per cent by 1970.192 As Wilson confidently 
pledged, "I am here ... to give the marching orders to industrial leaders in what must 
be for this country a crusade. It is a crusade on which the whole future of Britain 
depends". 193 
The short-term achievements were impressive. 194 In the fourth quarter of 1966, 
there had emerged a visible prospect of a trade surplus and balance of payments. 195 
And there was renewed hope of economic stability in early 1967.196 In his budget 
speech, James Callaghan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, produced a neutral budget 
with no net tax change. His utterance---ý'steady as she goes"-was impressive and 
echoed by the Board of Trade. 197 With this optimistic mood, Wilson even proclaimed 
that in the coming year, 1967, Britain would "break out from the vicious restriction, 
constriction, of the balance of payments deficit from which we have suffered so 
long". 198 
From the perspective of prospect theory, the Wilson Government in 1966, when 
the issue of the Falkland Islands emerged, was in a domain of gain. The growing 
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public confidence and auspicious economic outlook gave the Wilson Cabinet an 
enlarged space for manoeuvre in both domestic matters and foreign policies. Despite 
conflicts resurfacing within the Labour Party after the election victory in March 1966, 
the Government showed no sign of holding back in its dealing with opposition. In the 
six-week seamen's strike in May 1966, it disseminated the idea that the strike was 
possibly communist sabotage and put down the unrest. 199 It won the vote on the 
critical motion concerning its Vietnam policy in June 1966.200 It refused to declare the 
devaluation of the pound in the latter part of 1966, believing in a "more fundamental 
and long-term structural reform7 . 
20 1 The reshuffle of the Cabinet in August 1966 was 
admired as Wilson's "smartest piece of Worle'. 202 To the extent that the domain of 
gains dominated the general perceptions of the Government, Reynold found that 
"Wilson was becoming trapped by preference and commitment into putting the status 
symbols of world power before his goal of economic regeneration" during this 
observed phase. 203 The Defence White Paper issued in February 1965 stating that "for 
maintaining world peace, Britain must meet her obligations to Commonwealth and 
allied countries, [and] maintain a capacity for providing military assistance in many 
parts of the world". 204 The White Paper demonstrated Wilson's firm belief that Britain 
was still a world power. 205 At the end of 1966, when Wilson began the campaign to 
enter the Common Market, there was a strong political inspiration held by Wilson, 
who revealingly asserted that "We are embarking on an adventure of the kind that 
enabled the merchant ventures... We go forward in the same spirit of enterprise today. 
I believe the tide is right, the time is right, the winds are right to make the effort". 206 
Being in this domain of gain, the Wilson Government was willing to talk about 
the second track strategy in March 1967--to reduce the transitional period step by 
step, and to prepare the working agreement with Argentina in May 1967. Indeed, 
under the shelter of confidentiality in the talks, the FO found spacious room for 
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manoeuvre regarding the development of the foreign policy on the issue of the 
Falkland Island. While it confidently spread the news that Britain would not recognise 
Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands in mid- 1967, and the wishes of the 
islanders were the guides, the FO actually sidelined the pledge that it made before 
1966. It progressively moved to accommodate the Argentine burning desire for 
sovereignty with a view to settling the historical dispute as early as possible. 
Of course, there is no one-to-one and immediate correspondence between the 
domain of gains and the motivated framing in terms of gains. Foreign affairs should 
be considered a "kaleidoscope". 207 It is hardly "a matter of cogs and levers", 
interconnecting neatly between cause and effect, but a question of mood and climate 
of opinion. 208 However, with the assistance of prospect theory, it is well argued that 
the domain of gain made the FO confident enough to hold an optimistic view about 
the sovereignty talks. A self-confident policy-making style with encouraging 
economic outlooks gave the Wilson Government sufficient room to reconsider a new 
set of preference ordering in the dispute with Argentina. Indeed, Stewart had been 
aware of Britain's sinking economic status, 209 and Brown also passionately sought a 
fresh outlook for British foreign relations. 2 10 Their domain of gains can hardly be said 
irrelevant in this case. As Edmonds admitted unhesitatingly, the FCO "had solved or 
attacked so many intractable problems". When it came to the issue of the Falkland 
Islands, "really anything was worth a go". 211 
The domain of gain dragging down 
However, Wilson's domain of frame in terms of gains did not last long. The 
domain of gains met its first wave of hostile challenge when Wilson's approach to the 
Common Market was announced, and conflict on it within the Labour Party came to 
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light in October 1966.212 For Wilson and Brown, the EEC policy was pragmatic rather 
than ideological. 213 For the leftists, nevertheless, the decision for entry owed more to 
political expediency than conviction. 214 They were of the view that the EEC 
represented increased living costs and the exacerbation of the balance of payment 
215 
situation. Britain should look beyond, globally, for better trade opportunities rather 
than joining an inward-looking bloc . 
21's By March 1967, when both Wilson and Brown 
was making an exploratory tour of some EEC member states, 217 the left wing of the 
party began to protest loudly over the policy change and the Labour Government 
found itself seriously torn between intellectual and moral predicaments .2 
18 The 
foundation of Wilson's domain of gains began to shake. As far as this thesis can 
determine, this was the first wave of loss concern entering into the domain of frame in 
the coming year 1967-68, as keeping party unity was Wilson's major governing 
style. 219 When the policy dilemma about the EEC entry threatened "to divide the party 
seriously", 220 no other factor could be more detrimental to Wilson's perception of the 
domain of frame. 
The currency confidence crisis exploded when the devaluation of the pound was 
announced on 18 November 1967. Before that, Wilson had been a vigorous defender 
of the pound, and been cautious not to have the Labour Party labelled as a party of 
devaluation. He was convinced that devaluation was wrong and that skilful 
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management could avoid it. Indeed, that the Wilson Government had been unwilling 
to announce the devaluation during the sterling crisis in mid-1966 could demonstrate 
this conviction. 22 1 Nevertheless, with the added effect of the shortage of oil resulting 
from the Six-day War in the Middle East in June 1967,222 the Government found that 
the value of the pound was unsustainable. It was forced to announce devaluation 
reluctantly by about 14 per cent. 223 The devaluation dealt a huge blow to the 
credibility of the Wilson Government in several important aspects. 
The immediate impact of devaluation was a cut in the defence budget, which 
forced the Cabinet to reconsider Britain's presence East of Suez. On 16 January 1967, 
Wilson announced to Parliament the decision to phase out forces East of Suez by the 
end of 197 1.224 In the perception of the Government, the decision to withdraw was "so 
reluctant as to have been unintended until almost the last moment". 
225 Indeed, as 
Wilson later admitted, he was the last to be converted. 226 This reluctance was 
understandable. To deploy forces East of Suez had been taken as essential by Wilson's 
Cabinet before 1966.227 The decision to withdraw was seen as "a great moment of 
defeat" in the light of Wilson's pledge in the policy debate, 228 either when he 
emphasised in Parliament the British role in the world, 
229 or when the Defence White 
Paper of July 1967 was issued . 
230 The psychological impact on the Goverm-nent's 
perception of the domain of frame cannot be under-examined. 
Following the announcement of devaluation were the heavy cuts in public 
expenditure. 23 1 The success opportunities of National Planning that the British public 
had rarely harboured doubt about in the 1960s were therefore seriously diminished. 
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For the past three years, the public had been taught to believe that devaluation was "a 
disgrace" and "a dishonour" by this Government. 232 Now the argument was reversed. 
It was argued that "the pound in your pocket has not been devalued", despite the 
devaluation. 233 The credit of the Wilson Government was thus seriously challenged. 
Despite the domain of gains, it was faltering. When the FO intended to lift the 
ban on arms sales to South Africa, the issue of arms sales locked the whole 
234 Government into an unwelcome domain of losses. Initially, Foreign Secretary 
Brown planned to lift the ban in an attempt to moderate the economic difficulties 
through increasing exports. Among the arms for sale were Buccaneer aircraft and 
naval equipment. 235 Unfortunately, this move was interpreted as a step back from its 
original position in 1964, when the purpose of the ban was to protest against South 
Africa's apartheid policy. The plan to lift the ban as a result invited harsh criticism. 
The Cabinet was blamed for viewing the arms sales entirely from the economic 
standpoint without any moral concerns. This criticism triggered an explosion of anger, 
extending from the hard left to the moderate party members within Labour. 
Although the South African arms issue finally reached the conclusion that 
Britain's embargo would continue, the issue of arms sales proved detrimental to the 
moral standing of Wilson and the FO. The result in turn weakened the Government's 
manoeuvrability in foreign policy for the future. This thesis finds that the previous 
domain of gains, up to this point, promptly fell apart, as several policy debates began 
to transform into the issue of Wilson's leadership and personal credit. 236 On 18 
December 1967, some sectors of the press waged a "Wilson must go" campaign with 
the statement "Enough is enough... give us a fresh leader". Wilson, for the first time in 
his administration, was forced to admit in public that his government promised much 
more than they could deliver, and the creditability of the Government was at stake. 237 
With the domain of gains being dragged down and the FO's confidence in its 
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Falklands Policy weakened, the FO's suspension of the educational campaign that had 
been prepared since December 1967 can be understood in this light. From the 
perspective of prospect theory, the FO found its room for manoeuvre in framing 
Falklands policy increasingly restricted. This restriction was particularly relevant after 
the Wilson Government moved into 1968. 
A sombre prospect in 1969-A domain of loss 
The domain of losses continued its psychological hold over the British leadership 
in 1968. Controversial policies regarding the widening trade gap, as well as the 
outflow of funds, fallen gold reserves, and the highest unemployment rate since 1940 
dealt a heavy blow to Wilson! s domain of frame. 238 The GovernmenVs popularity hit a 
trough when the Government abandoned its target of 500,000 houses, 239 reintroduced 
prescription charges that it had axed in 1964 '240 and postponed the raising of the 
school-leaving age to 16 . 
241 These expenditure cuts in social policies inevitably 
caused several party revolts in parliament, and accompanying these revolts were 
waves of challenge directed to the Government's credit and Wilson's leadership. 242 
But the pressures facing the Government were not exclusively domestic. On the 
foreign policy front, the Government also found itself increasingly constrained. In 
1968, Britain's international prestige had become tied to the outcome of the Rhodesia 
crisis and the Nigerian Civil War. However, the inconclusive negotiations with Ian 
Smith's minority Government in Rhodesia, left nothing but embarrassment in the 
Wilson Cabinet. 243 The Government was bitterly attacked in the House from its own 
backbenchers for "selling out" Rhodesia to Smith's white minority. 244 On the Nigerian 
Civil War, the increasingly widespread coverage of the worsening situation in Biafra 
since early 1968 also had heavily impaired the Wilson Government's standing. 
245 As 
the war dragged on, both Wilson and Stewart became the target of heavy criticisms for 
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their deception in keeping the British stance neutral, and their wrong estimation of the 
length of the war. 246 The seesaw of the warfare in Nigeria in mid-1968 subsequently 
brought about the most heated debates in the British Parliament since the Suez Crisis 
247 in 1956. As things stood, the two cases caused nothing less than a Government 
status crisis both home and abroad. 
In retrospect, it may be too harsh for Crick to name the period of government as 
"the three wasted years", i. e. 1966-68,248 but it is safer to say that the climax of 
Wilson's best time was over after the end of 1967. Pimlot describes the bleak domain 
of loss lying ahead as follows. 
Wilson and his Government did come to accept that conditions had 
changed, and were not as they had at first imagined. It became, after 
its early almost utopian phase, a government of transition: presiding 
over Britain's hesitant switch from a "world" to a regional role. 
There was no precise moment. Rhodesia, devaluation, the end of 
Suez and the EEC bid all played their part, marking the gradual 
recognition by ministers of the new reality. 249 
The above description throws much light on the impact of the domain of loss 
perceived by the Wilson Government in 1968. This perception of loss could be 
particularly strong for Wilson personally because Wilson had been characterised as 
man obsessive credit-taker" . 
250 As a result of having gone through a series of crises 
within only two years, Wilson became such "a figure of the pasf. 251 In Healey's 
252 
words, his governance was "bizarre". Complaints abounded in the Cabinet that 
decision-making in 1968 often lacked a clear focal point. 253 In addition, inter-personal 
relations became another hindrance to improving the domain of loss. On 15 March 
1968, Foreign Secretary Brown resigned, 254 leaving with the remark that "I don't like 
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the way you run your government". 255 
Subsequently, when the Falklands policy was being hotly debated in March 
1968, criticism of the Wilson Government's credibility became a powerful tool for the 
opposition. 256 The advocates of the first policy preference were forced on the 
defensive, and the educational campaign under preparation had to be temporarily 
suspended. However, the sense of crisis to the whole Wilson Government in March 
1968 should not be exaggerated. The immediate effect of the domain of losses was not 
such an enormous threat to the whole scheme. The domain of loss was relevant, but it 
was still indeterminate. The FO did not call a halt to its first policy preference. 
Instead, in defence of its designated policy, the FO continued its twin-track strategy to 
formulate a set of two-pronged motivated framing. This motivated framing, as a 
continuous effort of the twin-track strategy, proved capable of resisting the opposition 
for another six months. 
Nevertheless, the domain of loss did not cease deteriorating after the foot-and 
mouth disease broke out in October 1967.257 Overall, deteriorating domain of loss 
made the first policy preference more and more difficult to implement. 
The poor-boding outlook of British-Argentine relations 
The domain of loss in 1968 described above shows a generally optimistic 
background to the Wilson Government. However, a gloomy portent more relevant to 
the British-Argentine relationship was the British ban on meat products imported 
from South America on 4 December 1967, because Britain suspected that the foot- 
and-mouth disease had come from South America. 258 The ban, though only temporary 
and selective, apparently crippled Argentine exports. Economically, one third of 
Argentine meat was exported to Britain. The influence could not be under- 
estimated. 259 On the other hand, the British ban in late 1967 had a huge psychological 
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impact on Argentina as well. Argentina took pride in its meat business. 260 It could 
hardly believe that the finger of suspicion pointed at Argentine mutton as the source 
of the epidemic. 261 
Meanwhile, Britain was also the major victim of this epidemic. By May 1968, 
nearly half a million animals had been slaughtered. 262 Nevertheless Britain apparently 
did not anticipate that the effect of the ban would make such an excessively emotional 
impact on Argentina, 263 to the degree that the ban politically brought to the forefront 
other trading issues as well. Although Argentina protested that the British ban was a 
protectionist measure against the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 264 
evidence soon showed that Argentina also took steps to bar British exporters from 
obtaining contracts with the Argentine Government departments and the armed 
services. 265 The FO was certainly annoyed by this retaliation as it regarded the export 
figures as a vital factor in the hard-pressed economic situation after devaluation in late 
1967.266 Several meetings as a result had been held bilaterally between Argentina and 
Britain after the foot-and-mouth crisis. The FO reiterated that it had evidence of 
President Ongania's instructions to discriminate against British exporters, 267 and 
indeed, at least eight cases of British export orders were found held up. 268 The FO as a 
result urged Argentina to eliminate any discrimination in order to improve British- 
Argentine relations. 269 
Despite this urging, the Argentines denied any knowledge of such 
discrimination. 270 According to the Argentine Government, the British ban had to be 
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261 FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (70), Financial Tmes, "Argentina lifts 'ban' on UK contracts", 25 July 1968. 
262 The Economist, p. 67. 
263 FCO 7/137, AA3n, (4), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 777, unclassified, 30 December 1967. 
264 FCO 7/170, AA7/3, Part A, (62), Argentine Meat Board, London, "The foot and mouth epidemic and 
imported meat", February 1968. 
263 Daily Mail, 13 February 1968. 
266 FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (9), Malcolm Gale, BEBA to Diggines, ECO 6/3/29, confidential, 2 February 
1968; ibid., (19), Gale to FO, Tel. no. 125, confidential and neutral, 23 February 1968. 
267 FCO 7/137, AA3n, (6), C. R. Cann, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, to Barker, 
American Department, FO, 8 January 1968, enclosing "Draft paragraphs for cable to Buenos Aires"; 
FCO 7/168 AA6/24, (11), minute by Malcolm Gale, on meeting with Krieger Vasena, Argentine 
Minister of the Economy, confidential, 5 February 1968; ibid., (10), 8 February 1968; ibid., (46), 
Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 278, confidential and neutral, 20 April 1968. 
268 FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (3), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 8, confidential, 22 January 1968; FCO 7/165, 
AA6/5, Part B, (104), Diggines to Creswell, confidential, 29 July 1968. 
269 Ibid., (26), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 202, confidential, 20 March 1968; (27), Diggines to O'Brian, 
confidential, 21 March 1968; (29), FO to BEBA, confidential, 22 March 1968. 
270 FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (48), Creswell to American Department, FO, Tel. no. 27 1, confidential and 
181 
lifted because Britain had made irresponsible scientific statements and Argentines 
could accept this. 271 Public opinion and meat exporters in Argentina on the whole 
could not be reassured by the reports. 272 
Britain clearly read this dissatisfaction on the Argentine side and the ban was 
273 
actually lifted on 15 April 1968, with the exception of Argentine mutton. If one 
compares the British response with those on the US and Spanish sides, it is fair to say 
that the lifting of the ban on imported beef was a concession on the British side. In 
comparison, the US response was to cancel all the orders on the grounds that the 
disease might infect domestic herds. 274 The US was following its own strict code 
without giving Argentina any chance to retort. 275 The Spanish, on the other hand, 
refused to take any Argentine meat, unless Argentina bought its processing 
equipment. 276 In contrast, the British ban on the meat was selective, moderate and 
temporary. More relevant to the concern of this thesis, the FO was found to be making 
every effort to reverse the unfavourable domain of loss shadowing British-Argentine 
relations, which was apparently caused by this retaliation. 277 In reply to enquiries in 
the House of Commons, the FO apparently suppressed the facts. It instead argued that 
"we believe that no discrimination is now being practised in Argentina against British 
supplies". 278 
However, despite the FO's efforts, the profile of the issue on the Argentine side 
remained stubbornly high and there was no sign that Argentina was to lift the 
discriminatory order against British trade. Argentina in late June 1968 published its 
White Book, stating that the foot-and-mouth disease had been endemic in Britain 
since 1892. Argentina was not to blame . 
279 This statement certainly upset the 
atmosphere that the FO had taken pains to maintain. It in fact had forced the already 
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existing domain of loss, perceived by the FO, on to "remarkably stony ground" . 
280 
The irony that Britain's decision to lift the four-month beef ban did not draw out 
of Argentina an explicit assurance of no discrimination was embarrassing to the FO. 
The logic of Argentina was that it had never admitted discrimination, and therefore it 
found no basis to publicly declare removal of obstacles in the way of British exports 
to Argentina. 28 1 To the FO's disappointment, as a result, the retaliation was not 
softened following Britain's concession on its ban. 282 Although it was reported that the 
Argentine navy was contemplating placing an order worth fI 50m for two submarines 
and one frigate in early May 1968,283 these did not materialise and, indeed, much 
British trade was lost by then. On 24 June specifically, with a superficial excuse that 
Argentina required different specifications, the Argentine navy changed its plans to 
buy British submarines and bought German instead. 284 In August, there came another 
disappointing report that an order for eight H. S. 748 aircraft for the Argentine air 
force was lost to Fokker '285 an American aircraft industry, 
despite the effort that the 
FO had made to strike a deal. 286 
By the end of October 1968, overall, the trade quarrel between the two sides had 
not receded, even after the lifting of the ban on beef 287 The domain of loss hardly 
improved, and this domain of loss could hardly escape the FO's eyes. As Diggines 
noted with deep foreboding at the end of July 1968, "there was a general sense of 
disappointment here about the fact that we have not yet secured a significant number 
of the major contracts for capital goods which have been pending in Argentina for 
about six months". 288 
280 FCO 7/168, AA. 6/24, (50), Malcolm Gale to Diggines, ECO 6/4/(38), restricted, 26 April 1968. 
281 FCO 7/158, AA4/15, Part B, (9 1), FO to Prime Minister, 28 May 1968. 
282 FCO 7/165, AA. 6/5, Part B, (39), L. Sherbourne, BEBA, to Diggines, restricted, 3 May 1968; FCO 
7/168, AA6/24, (52), L. Sherbourne to Diggines, ECO 6/4/39, restricted, 3 May 1968. 
283 FCO 7/157, AA4/15, Part A, (86), A. C. Russell, Ministry of Technology, to Atkinson, restricted, 14 
May 1968. 
284 FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (58), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 370, confidential, 12 June 1968; FCO 7/176, 
AA10/14, Part B, (103), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 420, confidential, 24 June 1968; ibid., (107), Creswell 
to FO, Tel. no. 390, confidential, 26 June 1968. 
285 Ibid., (105) L. Sherbourne, BEBA, to 1. D. S. Brown, Board of Trade, confidential, 26 July 1968; 
FCO 7/174, AA. 10/9, (6), Creswell to Stewart, confidential, 23 August 1968. 
286 FCO 7/168, AA6/24; (68), ibid., FCO 7/164, AA6/5, Part A, (99), Diggines to Beith, confidential, 12 
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287 FCO 7/17 1, AA7/3, Part B, (129), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 625, confidential and neutral, 7 October 
1968. 
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What was worse still was that the FO seemed unable to prevent the negative 
domain of frame from deteriorating. As things stood, the sense of disappointment and 
the failure in preventing retaliation aroused criticism of the FO's policy towards 
Argentina being too lenient. As one commentator among the FO's colleagues put it 
ironically, "It would be particularly ridiculous... after the Foreign Office had pressed 
hard against the continuation of the ban on Argentine meat and after our success, we 
" 289 were to find after all that all [purchasing] orders were not available . Cledwyn 
Hughes, Minister of Agriculture, concurred. He was not convinced by the FO's saying 
that Britain had "no machinery for carrying out" retaliation against Argentina. Rather, 
he insisted that Britain could easily bring the Ongania Government in Argentina to its 
knees by refusing to import canned meat for health reasons. 290 C. J. MacMahon from 
the Board of Trade echoed this view. He affirmed that the imposition of quotas on 
Argentine products "could be done with a stroke of the pen". 291 In late June, Argentina 
published its White Book, arguing that foot-and-mouth disease had been endemic in 
Britain since 1892.292 This response put the British FO under heavy fire again from its 
colleague departments. On 5 July, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
levelled its charge against Creswell. It was said that the White Book issued by 
Argentina was exceedingly "disturbing" and that the British Embassy in Buenos Aires 
was failing "to persuade them to take a more intelligent attitude". 293 All these 
comments brought the FO's policy in dealing with Argentina into discredit among 
colleague departments, and constrained the FO's room for manoeuvre on the 
Falklands dispute-another important dimension in the British-Argentine relationship. 
As Diggines admitted, "we deployed every argument we could think of in favour of 
permitting imports of Argentine meat [, but] made ourselves pretty unpopular in the 
process". 294 
Although it is risky to argue that the domain of loss was a decisive factor leading 
to the British perception of loss perception, from the perspective of prospect theory, 
289 FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (33), P. F. Hancock to Uffen, 25 March 1968. 
290 FCO 7/164, AA6/5, Part A, (97), Cledwyn Hughes, Minister ofAgriculture, to Stewart, 30 June 
1968. 
291 FCO 7/165, AA6/5, Part B, (103), C. J. MacMahon, Board of Trade, to Beith, FO, 25 July 25. 
292 FC07/17 1, AA7/3, Part B, (114), L. Sherbourne, BEBA, to Atkinson, confidential, 27 June 1968. 
293 Ibid., (115), D. Evan, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, to Atkinson, American 
Department, 5 July 1968. 
294 Ibid., (38), Diggines to M. Gale, BEBA, restricted, II April 1968, enclosing *Article published in 
the Cronista Commercial of 3 April Meat: Shipments will not be resumed to the UK". 
184 
taking the foot-and-mouth disease as the primitive force in the whole argument cannot 
be wide of the mark. As early as the end of 1967, Creswell had expressed this concern 
by reporting to the FO that the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease "coming on top of 
the Falklands question" was an unfortunate event, and it would have "brought 
relations once again under strain". 295 Chalfont agreed that the discrimination was a 
patent "means of applying pressure" on Britain over the Falklands. 296 Mendez also 
expressed his regret that the trade quarrel was by no means "a blessing in disguise". 297 
These remarks made by the decision-makers across the two sides lent much weight to 
the main argument in this section. That is, the domain of loss was a negative force 
against the implementation of the FO's first policy preference. It explains, at least 
partially, why Stewart became slow and cautious in progressing with the designated 
policy since March 1968. This thesis is inclined to argue that the FO was caught in a 
policy dilemma when it brought forward two different versions of paragraph 4 in the 
draft Memorandum of Understanding in mid-1968. 
It was not until mid-October 1968 when the Argentine navy expressed its interest 
in purchasing British-made aircraft carriers that there emerged a sign of a resumption 
of trade, 298 and this emergence of trade inclines this thesis to see the domain of loss 
stopping its further decline. The Foreign Office obviously perceived the newly 
emerging domain of frame characterised by a slice of gain prospect. Commonwealth 
Secretary Thomson urged a quicker move. He proposed that the FO resumed the 
educational campaign that had been suspended since March 1968. Based on this 
consideration, Stewart decided to launch it before it was too late. The agony was that 
the Argentine discrimination against the British exports lasted almost for a year. The 
negative psychological effect might not be what both sides had anticipated. When 
Stewart began to launch educational campaigns with the improving domain of frame, 
the timing was no longer right. In mid-October 1968, the Daily Express had begun to 
criticise the Falklands policy. The published feature lasted for ten days, which turned 
out to be influential enough to catch the sympathy for the islanders and constrained 
the FO's further initiatives in the conduct of the Falklands policy. 299 
295 FCO 7/137, AA3n, (3), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 776, confidential, 29 December 1967. 
296 FCO 7/164, AA6/5, Part A, (98), Tony Crosland, Board of Trade, to Stewart, 9 July 1968. 
217 Ibid., (39), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 643, confidential, I October 1968. 
298 FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (20), Caradon, UKMIS to FO, Tel. no. 2498, unclassified, 14 October 1968. 
299 Ibid., (18), D. M. Summerhays, BEBA, to Atkinson, restricted, 4 October 1968. 
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3. The explanation from the perspective of the motivated framing 
The Antarctic Treaty-motivated framing in terms of gains 
The thesis argues below that the initial British motivated framing of the issue in 
the 1960s was around the Antarctic Treaty as a reference point. This reference point 
helped to simplify the issue in question and it was formulated in terms of gains. 
To begin with, the issue of the Falkland Islands was peripheral before 1965 when 
Argentina raised it in the UN. It was dormant for Britain because the islands were 
remote and the population, declining and small . 
300 During the 13 years of 
Conservative rule before 1964, no British official at the ministerial level ever visited 
the islands. 301 Statistics publicised in April 1968 showed that there were only 2,117 
inhabitants, among which just 140 citizens were entitled to obtain full UK 
passports. 302 From 1962 to August 1966, before the official talks began, only one MP, 
Charles Taylor, asked the British government about the policy in the Falklands. 303 
Knox Cunningham and Anthony Hurd also raised concern, but their enquiries had 
nothing to do with sovereignty. 304 In late 1966, only Gordon Oakes asked for a 
statement about the talks held in London and the illegal landings in the Falklands. 
305 
To the extent that the tiny population escaped public notice, when the issue of 
Falkland Islands caught the eye of the FO, it was highly likely that most officials in 
the FO did not have much background knowledge of the issue. When the issue of the 
Falkland Islands emerged in the mid- I 960s, the Antarctic Treaty clearly represented a 
symbolic model. From the perspective of representativeness, the "Antarctic factor" 
coming into the equation was quite a natural and understandable response. It helped 
analyse away the uncertainties through the function of representativeness due to 
geographic similarities. 
Historically, the Antarctic factor bearing on the territorial dispute over the 
300 John Darwin (1988) British and decolonisation: The retreatfrom empire in thepost-war world 
(London: Macmillan), p. 3 11. 
101 Hansard (Lords), vol. 290, col. 210,13 March 1968. 
3'2 Hansard (Commons) vol. 76 1, cols., 242,26 March; vol. 762, col. 25,1 April, 1968. 
103 Ibid., vol. 659, col. 21,8 May 1962. 
314 Ibid., vol. 667, col. 118,20 November 1962; vol. 689, col., 216-7,19 February 1964; vol. 695, col. 
118,15 May 1964; vol. 699, col. 357,30 July 1964. 
"' Ibid., vol. 733, col. 89,2 August 1966; vol. 733, col. 239,8 August 1966; vol. 735, col. 59,1 
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Falklands was a relevant dimension that could hardly be disregarded. The British 
claim in Antarctica centred on Graham Land, plus the South Orkneys and South 
Shetlands. 306 This claim overlapped that of Argentina, who considered it possessing 
rights through succession from Spain. 307 Tensions between Argentina and Britain 
arose from 1947 onwards when Peron attempted to demonstrate the legitimacy of the 
Argentinian claim in Antarctica. Britain in response launched Operation Tabarin, 
aimed at protecting the route around Cape Horn through Drake Passage. Peron reacted 
by sending warships cutting into the islands in Antarctica claimed by Britain . 
308 There 
occurred as a result notable incidents including Argentine troops firing on the British 
base under construction at Hope Bay in 1952, and Britain's removing Argentine huts 
at Deception Island the next year. 309 In 1957, Argentina redefined its Antarctic claim. 
The so-called "Argentine See was threatening to the British claim again as the 
claimed territory ran from the Falkland Islands through South Orkney, South Shetland 
and down to the Antarctic Peninsula. 310 With this map in mind, Argentina was 
emphatic that what at stake were "not merely economic resources and strategic assets, 
but something of the soul of the nation itself'. 311 
Despite the discord around Antarctica, the programme of International 
Geophysical Year (IGY) advocated by a group of scientists in the early 1950s 
effectively kept this tension at bay. Applying the concept of terra communis, 312 IGY 
was dedicated to exploring Antarctica regardless of territorial rivalries. The 
programme proved a success, and it seemed appreciated by both Argentina and 
Britain. 313 Antarctica since then had represented the "continent for science", 314 which 
306 Peter J. Beck (1990) "Antarctic as a zone of peace: A strategic irrelevance? A historical and 
contemporary survey", in F_ A. Herr, H. R. Hall, and M. G, Haward (eds. ), Antarctica'sjuture: 
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p. 119; Christopher C. Joyner (1985) "Anglo-Argentine rivalry after the Falklands: On the road to 
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310 Jack Child (1988) Antarctica and South American -geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum (NY. Praeger), p. 
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313 J. A. Heap (1983) "Cooperation in the Antarctic: A quarter of a century's experience", in Francisco 
187 
was used "exclusively for peaceful purposes". 315 The successful efforts further led to 
the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 by 12 states including Britain and 
Argentina, and it entered into force in 196 1.316 Symbolically, the Treaty presented two 
unusual features in international politics. First, according to Rosenau, it "was the first 
arms control agreement of the Cold Warm. 317 All nuclear weapons and military 
exercises were, and still are, prohibited in Antarctica. Secondly, all signatory countries 
agreed to set aside territorial claims for the duration of the Treaty-30 years. 318 It was 
believed that this arrangement might not solve the territorial questions, but it froze the 
territorial quarrels and left a lot of room for scientific collaboration internationally. 319 
The point that caught the British eye was that Argentina, despite its exclusive 
claim, had been an active member in supporting the IGY programme and the drafting 
of the Antarctic Treaty. 320 "The Antarctic Treaty", recalled Edmonds, "was of 
fundamental importance in relation, not just to the Falklands dispute, but to all our 
territorial disputes then outstanding". As Edmonds emphasised, the Treaty "stood as a 
symbol holding out the possibilities of a new internationalism in foreign policy". 321 
Therefore, to the extent that the Treaty was taken as the reference point for British 
officials in the sovereignty negotiations over the Falkland Islands, the evidence was 
significant. As Edmonds pointed out, the Antarctic Treaty was an important and 
relevant factor in the FO's perception because there was at least a case to be made by 
the FO in trying to convince the British Admiralty from the point of defence 
expenditure. Amidst the doubts over whether the Argentines would honour the Treaty 
in early 1960,322 one FCO official argued, 
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Once the Antarctic Treaty is ratified by the signatories and the new 
regime is seen to be working satisfactorily, and provided that we 
can dispel any false ideas which other States may have got into their 
heads about the Falklands, then there will be no need to keep a 
vessel such as H. M. S. PROTECTOR continually in the area during 
the Antarctic summer. If we can dispense with such a vessel, it will 
substantially ease the serious manning problem with which the 
Royal Navy is faced at the moment and which is likely to continue 
to exist for many years. 323 
The above statement displayed a large amount of imagination among the FO's 
officials in the 1960s. Instead of taking it as the ontological reference point against 
uncertainties in this area, the FO also carefully chose it with the expectation for 
maintaining British sovereignty through acts of scientific collaboration. 324 From the 
perspective of prospect theory, by anchoring the Antarctic Treaty as a reference point, 
Britain could transform the territorial dispute with Argentina into a prospect that there 
might be some benefits through a joint scientific effort. 325 This framing effort also 
indicated that taking the Antarctic Treaty as a reference point was an act of 
formulating the 170's motivated framing in terms of gains, which act was 
corresponding to the evaluating phase of decision-making described by prospect 
theory. 
One important point to support this optimistic view is that, as early as 1960, the 
FCO had made it clear by reference to the value of HMS Protector touring in the 
Antarctic area. It argued that "The Argentines recently got the wrong idea that we 
might be willing to make concessions over the Falklands. We should like to see these 
thoughts quite dead before taking any step which might give the appearance of 
weakening [on] our part". 326 And indeed, in the cases of South Georgia and South 
Sandwich Islands, Britain before 1962 had already entered the two territories into its 
Antarctic claim. 327 
Admiralty, no. 178/NP/4, secret, 29 January 1962. 
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Hence, the decision to launch the sovereignty talks in late 1966 seemed 
straightforward. For Britain, since the Antarctic Treaty was a model of international 
cooperation, as long as the Treaty could be maintained, the restrained behaviour of 
both sides in the past decade might augur well. The FO's reference point consequently 
climbed up from the original level of the status quo that insisted on sovereignty before 
1966 to the level of aspiration. The issue was formulated in terms of gain in prospect 
and a preference reversal took place as a result. As Edmonds confidently inferred, "if a 
problem as complex and as vast as that one could solve... given time, the other 
equally difficult disputes elsewhere in Latin America-difficult because they involved 
actual inhabitants-could be solved" . 
328 The first policy preference emerged. It 
conditioned the atmosphere of the talks in most part of 1967. 
All the risk-averse patterns of behaviour during this period including the 
emphasis on a cordial atmosphere in the talks but insisting on the respective 
sovereignty in the communiqu6s can be understood in this light. This emphasis was a 
response corresponding to the mechanism of prospect theory that foresees an issue 
formulated in terms of gains leading to risk-averse policy orientation. The FO's Policy 
conduct at this stage nicely captures the description as the result of framing in terms 
of gains. 
The reference point in terms of gains nonetheless was challenged for the first 
time by a dramatic event. On 28 September 1966, the Operacion Condor incident 
took place. A small group of Argentine nationalists hijacked an Argentine aircraft and 
illegally landed at Port Stanley, capital of the Falkland Islands. 329 Nevertheless, the 
FO was more ready to solve the problem through diplomatic means, rather than by 
drastic gestures. To the anti-British protests in Buenos Aires, where the British 
Embassy came under fire after the Operacion Condor incident, the FO responded by 
keeping events low-keyed and termed the incident as "an illegal landing". Moreover, 
despite the "illegal landing", the FO declared that Britain had no intention of handing 
over the hijackers to The Hague Court. 330 
328 Charlton (1989) The litileplatoon, p. 11. 
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However, Operacion Condor was also dramatic in the sense that it made Britain 
increasingly aware that the Argentine attitude on the Falkland Islands had become 
militant by late 1966. Several diplomatic gestures including Argentina's refusal to 
freeze sovereignty in November/December 1966; the establishment of an Argentine 
department seeking to gain control of the Falkland islands in January 1967; and 
Argentina's applying pressure time and again at the international occasions. All these 
acts on the Argentine side were dramatic in the sense that they questioned the 
legitimacy of the reference point anchoring on the Atlantic Treaty on the British 
side. 33 1 The FO as a result began to realise the need to locate another reference point 
for its version of motivated framing. 
Britain's reputation and the status quo 
On 16 March 1967, the British Embassy in Buenos Aires warned the FO in 
London that Argentina could not be satisfied merely by the saying that "talks were in 
progress". 332 It would, instead, raise the protest in the UN due to its dissatisfaction. 
This worried the FO. As Creswell indicated to Edmonds, "the United Nations were 
entitled this time to expect us to report on the progress made at the talks and not just 
on the fact that talks were proceeding". 333 
Both Creswell's and Pakenham's messages reflected a typical and constant 
concern among British officials about British prestige in the UN. Edmonds, for 
instance, fully saw the need to strike an agreement in the talks. On 2 February 1966, 
he issued two instructions stating that "UKMIS should be instructed to accept the 
Argentine text and to concert action simultaneously with the Argentine Mission". This 
was because, as Edmonds explained, the "balance of advantage now lies in avoiding 
any suspicion in the United Nations of inconsistencies or foot-dragging by accepting 
the Argentina draft as it stands". 334 Edmonds' remark was significant. It suggested 
that, when it came to the issue of the Falkland Islands in mid-1960s, there was a 
pervasive sense of incompetence at managing the issue with a view to "getting due 
331 FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (2 1), UK mission in New York to FO, Tel. no. 423, confidential, 10 March 
1967. 
332 FCO 7/148, AA4/5, (3), H. D. V. Pakenham, BEBA, to Edmonds, American Department, FO, 
confidential, 16 March 1967. 
333 FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (5 1), Creswell to Edmonds, restricted, 14 April 1967. 
334 FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (8), Edmonds to Hohler, confidential, 2 February 1967; ibid., (11), FCO to 
UKMIS, Tel. no. 348, confidential, 3 February 1967. 
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attention paid to the interests/wishes of the inhabitants". 335 Barder, a member of the 
negotiating team in New York, for instance, pointed out the vulnerability of the British 
position in the issue compared with the issue of Gibraltar. He stated that "Although 
both lots are white, the Gibraltarians give a clear impression of representing a genuine 
national community with its own characteristics and personality, whereas the 
Falklanders would probably strike many at the UN as undisguised English-or at best 
Scottish". 336 Indeed, the islanders on the Falklands were of British descent. The 
inhabitants of Gibraltar by contrast were mostly Genoese, Portuguese and Maltese. 337 
While keeping Gibraltar had less negative implications, Britain's holding the Falkland 
islands would inevitably evoke the image of British Empire. It would damage 
Britain's reputation in the eyes of the decolonisation movement. For the FO as a 
result, there was a need to distinguish the difference between the two cases. 
Now that Argentina threatened to raise the issue in the UN in April 1967, and it 
had succeeded in Mexico City two months earlier, it was reasonable for the FO to 
anticipate that taking the Antarctic Treaty as the reference point was problematic. It 
would not reduce the tension between the two sides. An appropriate reference point 
was needed. The FO in mid-1967 was forced to relocate its reference point. This 
reference point seemed no longer appropriate to stay at the level of aspiration, namely, 
to follow the model of the Antarctic Treaty. Rather, there was a need to pull it down 
from the level of aspiration, i. e., the Antarctic Treaty, to that of the status quo, i. e., 
British reputation in the UN. In other words, the motivated framing in terms of gains 
had to be replaced by another reference point around which it constituted motivated 
framing in terms of maintaining the status quo. A preference reversal in British 
decision-making thus took place. 
To sum up, the anchoring effect of the Antarctic Treaty in terms of gains had 
been weakened by Operacion Condor, Argentina's flat rejection of the sovereignty 
freeze and varied moves in mobilising support for its claim before the international 
community in late 1966 and early 1967. The FO at this critical moment placed its 
decision weight on Britain's reputation, which subsequently became the Fo's 
` Ibid., (2), G W. Harding, American Department, to Barder, UK mission in New York, restricted, 24 
January 1967. 
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reference point to anchor upon. In other words, seeking to protect Britain's world 
reputation became a new but dominant motivated framing. Evidence can be found 
from its effectively toning down the other competing sets of motivated framing in 
1967. 
Competing sets of motivated framing in 1967 
After the Antarctic Treaty lost its representative status as a reference point, there 
existed two sets of motivated framing competing with the FO's major concern about 
British prestige. The first set was the motivated framing in terms of gains, which was 
formulated by the FO. Another was the motivated framing in terms of losses, 
sustained in the main by Governor Haskard. Both competed with the reference point 
mentioned above, the British reputation. However, neither of the two could effectively 
occupy a dominant place before the end of 1967. 
The competing framing in terms of losses 
The set of motivated framing in terms of loss came mainly from Haskard, who 
saw the newly emerged policy preference for sovereignty transfer as detrimental to 
government credibility. Since March 1967, Haskard had filed a series of protests, 
urging the FO to decelerate the tempo of the transfer in the decision-making process. 
He pessimistically anticipated that the question would come up for public debate at 
the beginning of May 1967 and until then, the government and its policy would be 
embarrassed. 338 Cyril Osborne and Frank Kenyon, two MPs, who visited Lord 
Chalfont in London and expressed similar views on 4 May 1967, echoed Haskard's 
concern for government credibility. According to the documented papers, Kenyon 
added a much more circumstantial description of the mind of the Falkland people that 
might lead to the criticism of the Government's sell-out. "They had been distinctly 
rattled by the Operacion Condor Incident and the length of time it had taken for [the 
icebreaker] Protector to arrive". 339 Another source in this line of reasoning came from 
P. Mansfield, the official in the British Embassy, Buenos Aires. Mansfield reported 
detemination and statehood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 52. 
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that the islanders "were anxious for restoration of communications with Argentina". 340 
Creswell, on 18 May 1967, also shared this kind of concern by writing that "to 
pronounce on the inhabitants interests without consulting their wishes would be 
suggestive ofjust that paternalistic colonial attitude of which our critics have accused 
US". 34 1 Taken together, this motivated framing was characterised by eye-catching 
phrases such as "a sell-out", being "anxious" or "embarrassing". 
The 170's response to this set of motivated framing was, however, disappointing 
to Haskard. While stressing the need to keep confidential about the bargaining points 
as well as the FO's true intention regarding its policy preference, the FO clearly de- 
emphasised the possible uproars in the Falkland Islands with a view to not provoking 
Argentina. 342 In respect of Haskard's complaint that the change of the first policy 
preference, talking about the interests exclusively and sidelining the wishes of the 
islanders, came too soon, the FO remained indifferent. London was of the considered 
opinion that the transitional period could not be extended further. Any further delay of 
this transfer of territory, as the FO argued, "would involve a real risk of souring the 
atmosphere with the Argentines". At this juncture, when both the FO and Haskard 
framed the issue in the same terms of loss, Haskard's version of it seemed less 
convincing to most staff in the FO. Creswell, for instance, sympathised with Haskard, 
but remained adamant and apparently standing on the FO's side. Creswell argued that 
"I know that the Governor would shudder at the prospect of having to talk in this 
strain to his Islanders, but really it is what the Government ought to do if we really 
want to get anywhere". 
343 
Creswell's statement indicated the degree of confidence in the whole FO in mid- 
1967. It also revealed that, theoretically, loss avoidance is a vague concept that fails to 
explain the two contrasting opinions both formulated in terms of loss. In a telegram 
replying to Haskard, who proposed to visit London in May, Brown did not feel that 
his designated policy was threatened by this proposed meeting. He told Haskard to 
bring the statistics forward to London, and the data could show to the FO about "the 
land and property values, numbers of people who might wish to join relatives outside 
340 FCO 7/152, AA4/9, (2), P. FL A. Mansfield to Creswell, restricted, 12 May 1967. 
341 Ibid., (72), Creswell to Foreign Office, Tel. no. 255, confidential, 18 May 1967. 
342 FCO 7/140, A4/2, (26), Secretary of State, CO, to Sir C. Haskard, Falkland Islands, Tel. no. 56, 
secret, 18 March 1967. 
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the Islands or be assured of compensation, or who would otherwise wish to leave the 
Islands in the face of an uncertain future, and those who might stay on". 344 
No evidence could be more obvious than this typical directness. The FO had 
sidelined Haskard's version of motivated framing in terms of losses. And indeed, the 
FO's confidence seemed founded on better arguments. Argentina had already 
exhibited a cooperative and friendly "frame of mind". The newly reformulated 
policy-gearing to the interests of the islanders---ýwould afford the best hope of 
achieving an amicable settlement of the dispute". 345 Therefore, although Haskard 
reiterated his warning and expressed uneasiness for the islanders, the FO found no 
difficulty in justifying the need to keep the negotiations secret. Based on concern for 
Britain's international prestige, the FO justified the need to keep the talks confidential 
by arguing that "any leakage would lay the UK open to a breach of faith by the 
Argentine". 346 For the FO, consciously or unconsciously, the reformulated policy 
preference in March 1967 was sensible, risk-averse, and worth implementing. This 
was not only because Argentina "had been taking a much less intransigent line", 347 and 
"the Argentines have moved one step in our direction", 348 but also because the British 
reputation was the bottom-line that it had to defend. Judged from its motivated 
framing in terms of the status quo, and the reference point anchored on British 
prestige, the FO could be seen as risk-averse. It was careful not to breach the promise 
over the sovereignty with a view to defending national prestige. 
The competing framing in terms of gains 
In mid-1967, Creswell came up with his personal idea for a possible solution. He 
suggested that "the Argentine would be more likely to convince the Islanders if they 
could hold out some prospects of economic development". In this way, as Creswell 
averred, the islanders "would have something to gain from a change of 
sovereignty". 349 To substantiate the idea that "a selling campaign is no good if you 
`3 Ibid., (61), Creswell to Hohler. 
344 Ibid., (42), Secretary of State, CO to Haskard, Falkland Islands, Tel. no. 73, secret, 31 March 1967. 
345 Ibid., (26), Secretary of State, CO, to Sir C. Haskard, Falkland Islands, Tel. no. 56, secret, 18 March 
1967. 
346 Ibid., (4 1), Secretary of State, CO to Haskard, Falkland Islands, Tel. no. 72, secret, 31 March 1967. 
347 Ibid., (56), Foreign Office to BEBA, Tel. no. 267, secret, 27 April 1967. 
348 Ibid., (58), Hohler, Foreign Office, to Sir M. Creswell, BEBA, secret, I May 1967. 
349 Ibid., (59), Creswell to Hohler. 
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really have nothing to sell"'350 Creswell also put forward various schemes including 
the development of the South of Patagonia, with which the islanders could share 
benefits. 35 1 These schemes were impressive to the extent that even Haskard aroused a 
hope of gains. For a short while, Haskard had sat himself on the fence and argued that, 
only if the Argentines had no "real proposals for economic development of islands, 
we can justifiably claim that they are being more 'colonialist' than we are". 352 
However, the kind of motivated framing in terms of economic development 
looking for potential gains did not become the dominant force. The possible reason 
for its failure has to be attributed to the FO's inability to convince its colleague 
departments through argumentation. Basically, most departments in the Wilson 
Government, except the FO as well as one or two military attach6s in Buenos Aires, 
353 resisted such a suggestion that there would be gains in prospect. 354 They argued 
that it might be timely to talk about sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, but it was not 
the right moment for trade with South America. The Treasury, for instance, was 
suspicious of Argentina's general inflationary tendencies and debt problems in 1967. 
The Board of Trade, on the other hand, took a rather dimview about the potential 
gains from trade with Argentina: 
the ideas in the Foreign Office paper about increase[d] aid, technical 
assistance, and, in particular, about how aid could be used to finance 
down payments on large contracts, never has a chance of getting off 
the ground; ... any improvement is, however, likely to take time and 
this raises the question... of now or never. Have we then missed the 
bus? At the risk of seeming to make a virtue of necessity, I think 
probably not. ... If 1966 was still not too late to catch the bus, 
perhaps 1970 will prove no worse. 355 
The FO was clearly dissatisfied with the above report that rendered the FO's 
potential motivated framing in terms of gains aborted. Edmonds argued that that "until 
110 Ibid., (61) Creswell to Hohler. 
351 Ibid.. (59), Creswell to Hohler. 
352 Ibid., (72), Creswell to FO. 
353 FCO 7/174, AA 10/9, (1), Creswell to FO; FCO 7/166, AA6/12, (1), Q J. MacGillivray, BEBA, to 
L. F. Crick, Bank of England, 17 March 1967. 
354 Ibid., (3), D. J. Halley, Treasury Chambers, to D. P- Ford, Department of Economic Affairs, 26 
January 1967. 
355 FCO 7/56, A6/3 1, (1), T. W. Carvey to C. O'Neill, "Working group of trade Policy towards Latin 
America", confidential, 23 December 1966. 
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the rest of Whitehall and British industry do reach the conclusion that Latin America 
should be treated as something better than a Cinderella, we cannot expect to exert 
much political influence in the area". 356 
Nevertheless, seen from the exchange of arguments within the Wilson 
Government, the motivated framing in terms of gains before 1967 proved superficial. 
The Wilson Government had good reason to be suspicious about the financial 
capability of the Argentine Government. That was because Argentina in mid- 1967 was 
still faced with balance of payment difficulties. 357 Even the general attitude in the FO 
towards the trade with Argentina remained uncertain. In the departmental debates over 
the Argentine request for stand-by credit in March 1967,358 for instance, the FO 
refused to offer governmental guarantee to the civil banks for the proposed standby 
credit to Argentina. 359 This was a stance quite opposite to that of France. 360 Therefore, 
although both Argentina and Britain sides agreed that indirect benefits accruing as a 
result of British industrial investments could be substantial, it was apparent that 
Argentine purchasing policies tended to favour those countries increasing purchases 
from Argentina. 361 
Secondly, Argentina was interested in purchasing some British military 
hardware. This intention clearly met Stewart's major purpose of boosting exports. 362 
However, there was external constraint and this constraint came from the US regional 
security concern. Although the US kept neutral in the issue of the Falkland Islands, as 
Chapter 2 states, the US was keen to oppose this kind of transaction between Britain 
and the South American states. The sale of Sea-Hawk fighters was a case in point. In 
early February 1967, the American Embassy protested against Britain's selling Sea- 
356 FCO 7/20, A2/19, (1), Edmonds to Sir Denis Allen, "British Policy towards Latin America", 14 
February 1967. 
337 FCO 7/164, AA6/5, Part A, (5), A. F. Toms, minute on "Argentina: Note of meeting with leaders of 
Argentine delegation to Kennedy Round Talks", 7 February 1967. 
358 FCO 7/166, AA6/12, (4), P. Reilly, British Embassy, Paris, to Foreign Office, Tel. no. 277, 
confidential, 31 March 1967. 
351 Ibid., (6), Foreign Office to British Embassy, Paris, Tel. no. 858, confidential, 5 April 1967; (8), D. 
H. T. Hildyard to Edmonds, secret, 6 April 1967. 
360 Ibid., (3), Edmonds to E. R. D. Hildyard, 28 March 1967; (7), Reilly to Foreign Office, Tel. no. 283, 
confidential, 5 April 1967; (9), S. Goldmanto C. J. Morse, Bank of England, confidential, 6 April 1967. 
361 Ibid., (6), BEBA, to Brown, despatch no. 6 (E) (1132/67), restricted, 9 February 1967. 
362 David Thomas (1989) "The United States factor in British relations with Latin America", in Victor 
Bulmer-Thomas (ed. ), Britain and Latin America: A changing relationship (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), p. 69. 
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Hawks to Argentina. 363 Britain explained that Sea-Hawks had only secondary strike 
capability, obsolete and defensive-purposed. They would not risk the danger of 
tipping the power balance among the South American states, because Sea-Hawks 
were incapable of competing with American Sabres that had been widely sold to Latin 
America. 364 But the US was not convinced. According to the US, the sale "would have 
an extremely negative impact on the objectives my Government is pursuing in Latin 
America in its efforts to limit the application of financial resources for defence 
purposes". 365 The US protest led Britain to cancel the contract. The cancellation 
indicated that when Argentina seemed to focus exclusively on military hardware, 366 
the market opportunities would be significantly reduced. 
In short, the FO's motivated framing in terms of gains before 1967 did not 
become a dominant one. One of the reasons was clearly the lack of immediate 
evidence to support its legitimacy. However, when the domain of frame deteriorated 
with the rise of foot-and-mouth disease and Argentina's trade retaliation, as well as the 
Government's credibility hitting the trough on the domestic front, the FO was forced 
to further reinforce its motivated framing. To do this, the FO strategically combined 
the motivated framing in terms of gains with the reference point-Britain's 
prestige-anchoring at the level of status quo, despite the former prospect of gain 
remained controversial among the colleague departments. With this, a two-pronged 
motivated framing emerged in early 1968. 
The FO's two-pronged motivated framing in 1968 
Stewart after the parliamentary rows in March 1968 became gradually aware that 
the first step toward fulfilling a transfer of sovereignty would hinge on the agreement 
of the draft Memorandum of Understanding both at the inter-departmental meeting, 
and in Parliament. 367 To enter the FO's version of motivated framing into the policy 
debates and make it acceptable, the FO in 1968 took pains to sort out a new motivated 
framing. This motivated framing created a broad spectrum of views sweeping upward 
363 FCO 7/173, A Ion, (1), minute by T. J. B. George to Figg, restricted, 3 February 1967. 364 Ibid., (6), Creswell to Edmond, secret and guard, 5 May 1967. 
365 Ibid., (3), Jonathan D. Stoddart, political-military affairs, US Embassy, London, to Leonard Figg, 
Defence Department, Foreign Office, confidential, 29 March 1967. 
166 Thomas, p. 8 1. 
367 FCO 7/156, AA4/14, (19), Diggines to Dennis Allen, Private Secretary, confidential, 5 September 
1968. 
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to the level of gains and downward to the level of losses in measurement. It was 
characterised by three bargaining levels, consisting of the level of the status quo, that 
of loss and that of gain. 
To put it succinctly, the FO justified its draft Memorandum of Understanding by 
putting forth, firstly, a motivated framing in terms of losses with a reference point 
anchoring on the British-Argentine relationship. The FO argued that partially because 
Argentina pressed the claim so vigorously in the UN, and partially because the 
Argentine policy followed peaceful means, the newly formulated Falklands policy, 
speaking of the interests of the islanders, was a worthy proposal in correspondence to 
the Argentines' psychological need. If the British public did not appreciate this newly 
formulated policy, and if this led to no progress towards an agreement with Argentina, 
the FO foresaw that it "would inevitably have a negative effect on our relations with 
almost all other Latin American countries". The negative effect, according to the FO, 
included the present Argentine pragmatic strategy in pursuance of the claim being 
replaced by a nationalist one, and that "the climate for increasing our exports in a 
large and expanding market would be seriously prejudiced". Because of this kind of 
concern for losses, the sovereignty talks as a result were seen as a wiser choice. 
Secondly, this new motivated framing became more powerful when the FO 
justified its position by emphasising the importance of Britain's prestige, another 
reference point anchoring at the level of status quo. As Stewart explained to 
parliament, 
We should not treat Resolution [2065] passed in the General 
Assembly simply with silence, still less with contempt. In the kind 
of world in which we live it is of great importance to maintain this 
principle, if it can be done, the building up of the authority of the 
United Nations is of enormous importance both to us and to 
mankind. This is in accordance with Her Majesty's Government's 
policy of working within the United Nations. These talks have 
proceeded and are proceeding. They cover a wide range of subjects. 
It is too early to specify what form [that] the consultations will take 
368 
place. These negotiations are delicate and must be confidential. 
368 Ibid., col. 1459,26 March 1968. 
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The point to notice here is that, as Hennessy observed, "There may be rare 
occasions when it is desirable to emphasise the importance of some decision by 
stating specifically that it is the decision of Her Majesty's Government". 369 When 
Stewart used "Her Majesty's Government's policy" to defend his policy preference, no 
implication could be more straightforward than this resolve to keep Britain! s prestige 
before the world forum. In other words, if Britain could not put forward the 
Memorandum of Understanding in time, and settle the dispute earlier, the British 
status as well as its influence in the UN Security Council "would be seriously 
underminedý'. 3'0 To prevent this loss, went the argument, Britain "must rely on Latin 
American support in any subject of major concern" in the UN. 371 
Accompanying this motivated framing, the FO also tried to formulate a sense of 
no alternative. As Goronwy Roberts, the Foreign Minister, explained the unavoidable: 
"The islands have constituted a running sore in our relations with Argentina for over a 
century. Without betraying our obligations to the islands we want to do what we can 
" 372 to improve relations with Argentina and Latin America as a whole . Therefore, the 
Falkland Islanders, as the FO argued, "should seek neighbourly relations with 
Argentine on the neighbouring Latin-American continent". 373 
A more persuasive part of this motivated framing was geared to the weak British 
defence capability regarding the Falkland Islands. As St J. Sugg, Minister at the 
Commonwealth Office, pointed out, "the difficulties of defending the Falkland Islands 
is clearly one of the reasons for HMG wishing to enter into an agreement with the 
Argentines". 374 As D. M. Surnmerhays argued, 
one should not lose sight of the fact that the present regime is a 
military one, brought to power in 1966 by the Armed Forces. It has 
a strong nationalist school of thought, both within and outside the 
Armed Forces which is inclined to criticise the [Argentine] 
Government for any sign of weakness. The Government has 
369 Peter Hennessy (1986) Cabinet (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 8, p. 11. 
370 FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (2), Diggines, FO, to J. S. Bennett, CO, secret, 29 January 1968. 
371 FCO 7/15 8, AA4/1 5, Part B, (114), Chalfont to Michael Clark Hutchison, MP, I October 1968. 
372 Daily Mail, 29 March 1968. 
373 FCO 7/158, AA4/15, Part B, (114), Chalfont to Michael Clark Hutchison, MP, I October 1968. 
374 FCO 7/156, AA4114, (17), St J. Sugg, CO, to P. F. Hobday, MoD, secret, 6 September 1968, 
enclosing 'Defence: Falkland Islands". 
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announced its intention to regain possession of the Falkland Islands, 
and in the event of repeated failure to obtain its aim by other means, 
it might as a last move be tempted to take military action to this end. 
As you will see, the Argentine capability for airborne operations is 
increasing. 375 
What caught the eye further was that the FO did not exclusively dwell on the 
sense of loss or inevitability in its arguments. Rather, it tried to persuade its colleague 
departments that there was no sense of loss. The Argentine claim, as the FO 
explained, was based "mainly on her view of her juridical rights to the territory" and 
there was something wrong to be put right. According to the FO, Argentines had 
expressed the wish to let the islanders remain on the same land, and apparently they 
had no need for more territory. Therefore, the logic went, what the FO pursued in the 
talks was meaningful and with no sense of loss. 
The persuasiveness of the two-pronged motivated framing did not stop here. The 
FO was motivated to stretch its motivated framing towards the other end of the 
spectrum. It argued that the talks were not only because of the concern for losses, but 
for gains. If the Cabinet could ratify the Memorandum of Understanding, many 
contracts, for instance, would "greatly increase the level of British exports in 
Argentina". This kind of encouraging argument was not baseless, as Argentina's 
376 
economic policies and performance had been relatively successful so far. Thus 
prompted, the FO was making an attempt to set up a language of gains in prospect. It 
intended to propagate the window of opportunity for trade, despite there being a 
considerable degree of exaggeration in its argument. Chalfont, for instance, used to 
show his sympathy for the Board of Trade that the timing was not right for British 
investment. 377 However, when it came to the debates over the Falkland Islands, the 
FO seemed fully engaged in manipulating the framing of this issue in terms of 
potential gains. They relentlessly spread the view that the bilateral relationship 
remained "cordial", and "problems of common interests are being satisfactorily 
375 FCO 7/24 1, AAF 10/1, (87), D. M. Surnmerhays, BEBA, to Diggines, secret, 31 May 1968. 
376 FCO 7/2 1, A2/19, Part B, (78), R. C. Samuel to Rodger, 23 January 1968, enclosing "Expert working 
group on Latin America, 7- 10 November, 1967: The situation in Latin America', issued by NATO, 
confidential. 
377 FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (62), memorandum by P. H. Gore-Booth, Tornmercial relations with 
Argentine, confidential, 26 June 1968. 
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handled". 378 In other words, the FO had been trying to create a picture that there was 
an amicable atmosphere in the talks. By doing this, it attempted to reverse the bleak 
domain of losses for the most part of 1968, despite the purposeful retaliation by 
Argentina. 379 The FO was ready to respond to the sour atmosphere with the positive 
thinking that "we are engaged in sincere consultations with a friendly sovereign 
state". 380 
The two-pronged motivated framing with a package of reference points 
anchoring on the British reputation, foreign relations and potential trade was thus 
fon-nulated. It proved a tentative success, as it seemed persuasive enough to justify the 
Government stance in a series of parliamentary enquiries from March until mid- 
November 1968 . 
38 ' During this period, there was a stereotypical reply coming in the 
main from Chalfont. "I cannot say what the outcome of the talks will be", explained 
Chalfont, but the FO was "guided by [a] strong regard for the interests of the people 
of the Falkland Islands, and [we] will see that there is the ftillest consultation with 
them". 382 With regard to the idea of "interests", Stewart continued with his 
paternalistic view and harped on the designated motivated framing that the FO 
"believed that a greatly improved relationship between the Islands and their nearest 
neighbour, Argentina, is in the best interests of the Islanders". 
383 In retrospect, Stewart 
might have been aware that the FO's policy preference for taking the interests of the 
islanders as the principle in the talks could not be fully convincing. He might also 
realise that there were complaints among the colleague departments about the lenient 
policy towards Argentina. But as long as it effectively cooled down the Argentine 
nationalists, the policy could hardly be criticised as unintelligent or unacceptable. 
Competing sets of motivated framing in 1968 
There are two sets of motivated framing demurring against the above FOls 
---- - ------ 
378 FCO 7/158, AA4/15, Part B, (100) and (102), Parliamentary question, John Biggs-Davison 
(Chigwell), 8 July 1968: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether he will make a 
statement on Anglo-Argentine relations. 
379 FCO 7/164, AA6/5, Part A, (96), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 447, confidential, 15 July 1968. 
311 Hansard (Lords) vol. 293, cols., 1392-3,26 June 1968. 
381 Hansard (Commons) vol. 773, col. 872,18 November 1968. 
382 FCO 7/157, AA4/15, Part A. (5), Diggines to Lord Hood, 19 March, enclosing Talkland Islands: 
Replies to MP's letters"; ibid., (6), Chalfont to J. Hiley, 20 March 1968; ibid., (7), Chalfont to E. S. 
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383 FCO 149, AA4/6, (73), Brief no. 2, "Secretary of state's visit. 
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version in 1968. One was Haskard's motivated framing in terms of losses that 
continued to exist. The other was the motivated framing that sought to link the issue 
to Gibraltar, which was formulated by G, Lathbury, the Governor of Gibraltar. 
Nevertheless, the FO effectively subdued both sets of motivated framing even though 
they were formulated in terms of loss. 
Haskard's motivated framing in 1968 
It became evident that Haskard's motivated framing was transformed into moral 
concerns, although the concerns could hardly compete with the dominant one 
produced by the FO. On 19 January 1968, Haskard wrote to the Commonwealth 
Office (CO), "I have recently become increasingly concerned that the cardinal factor 
in Falkland Islands, namely the human problem, is in great danger of being 
overlooked". Subsequently, the "absence of first-hand knowledge of the Falkland 
Islands human problem could so easily result in the risk of wrong decisions being 
taken". 384 Earlier in an interview, Haskard, without the FO's official permission, 
publicly remarked that "he felt this coming Southern winter would be a period of 
increased tension and the likelihood of a small scale landing [would be] much 
greater" . 
385 Haskard's remarks indicated that he was gasping at straws by scare 
mongering. He apparently made an attempt to force a motivated framing into the 
domain of the issue by emphasising the moral concern of loss. 
Nevertheless, Haskard's version of motivated framing could not effectively 
prevent the FO's policy from focusing. on the policy objectives of following the 
guidance of the interests of the islanders. In February 1968, Haskard visited London, 
seeking to reverse the FO's policy orientation. The visit did not achieve what Haskard 
wanted. On his return to the Falkland Islands on 16 February 1968, Haskard was 
instructed to express the view that he had taken "the opportunity of stating the 
viewpoint of the Falkland Islanders in general terms. The negotiations are not yet 
terminated and the talks are still confidential. In these negotiations, the British 
Government is being guided by strong regard for the interests of the people of the 
384 FCO 7/156, AA4/14, (2), Haskard to Arthur Galsworthy, CO, Tel. no. 14, secret, 19 January 1968. 
385 FCO 7/24 1, AAF 10/1, (8 1), P. F. Hobday, MoD, to Atkinson, American Department, FO, covering 
secret, 29 April 1968, enclosing "Extract from Naval Party Periodic Report: I February to 12 March 
1968". 
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Falkland Islands". 386 
Again in late September 1968, the pressure of the Executive Council in the 
Falkland Islands built up as the result of the news coverage by the Daily Express in 
New York. On 8 October, the Daily Express reported that the calculated move of 
British Government about the future of the Falkland Islands. According to the Daily 
Express, Haskard personally "knew that the moves were under way but had been 
forbidden by London to talk about them". 387 The effect of the prompting text was 
dramatic. The Falkland Islands Members of Council put forward the hearsay to 
Haskard, and Haskard was found in a weak position no longer capable of sticking to 
the so-called twin-track argument based on both consultations [with the islanders] and 
confidentiality [in the talks]. 388 
When Haskard urgently called for guidance due to the pressure, he was told to 
wait and not to reveal the FO's intention to get the Memorandum of Understanding 
approved through the Cabinet. The FO wanted Haskard to keep patient, because, 
389 
according to the FO, "this matter has to be handled in the next two months". 
Therefore, the FO instructed, "it would be desirable to postpone the meeting of the 
Legislative Council" until the publication of the Memorandum of Understanding. 390 
The FO's response to Haskard indicated that Haskard's moral concern might be 
capable of challenging the legitimacy of the FO's motivated framing, but the FO 
found no difficulty in coping with the frontal attack delivered from the perspective of 
moral concern. In response to the complaints that the government statement on the 
issue was "evasive", Chalfont asserted that the 170's negotiating principle based on the 
interests of the islanders was consistent, rather than evasive, in the past six months. 391 
To the criticism that property values in the Falkland Island had dropped sharply due to 
uncertainties caused by the 170's first policy preference, Chalfont bluntly rebutted that 
"farming land in the Islands seldom changes hands"; and housing prices in Stanley, the 
1968". 
386 FCO 7/235, AAF3/1, (27), Beith to Lord Hood, confidential, 16 February 1968, enclosing 
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387 FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (13), Beith to Diggincs. 
388FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (13), Beith to Diggines. 
389 Ibid., (14) CO to Haskard, Tel. no. 220, secret, 24 September 1968. 
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39 1 FCO 7/15 8, AA4/15, Part B, (115), Chalfont to Captain Kerby, 4 October 1968. 
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capital of the Falkland Islands, were "very reasonable". 392 Chalfont assured the MPs as 
well as members of the Falkland Islands Legislative Council that "we have studied 
those wishes constantly in the course of negotiations". 393 Modem facilities such as the 
hospital, school, and air service in Buenos Aires, as the FO maintained, would provide 
easier access for the islanders, and they were less expensive than travelling back to 
Britain. 394 In a reply to John Rodgers, MP, who seemed unconvinced and still stressed 
the wishes of the islanders, Chalfont replied as follows. "I don't think the Falkland 
Islanders are supposed now to know all the details of the United Kingdom nationality 
laws", as Chalfont lectured. "We do not believe that it is necessary to hold any 
plebiscite at present in the Falkland Islands to make known the wishes of the 
population". 395 
Lathbury's motivated framing in 1968 
As reported earlier, the FO's motivated framing was broad, but it was not broad 
enough to link the issue itself to the similar case of Gibraltar. Lathbury, the Governor 
of Gibraltar, was more ready to link these two cases and took a sympathetic stance 
with the Falkland Islands. Lathbury argued from the perspective of issue-linkage that 
the FO had to respect the psychological value of the Falkland Islanders, because both 
pieces of territory should reflect "the existing constitutional practice". The link 
therefore constituted a symbol that "we shall not hand over either the people [or) 
territory to another state against their wishes". Having noticed that "there are not 
proposals for constitutional talks" in the Falkland Islands, Lathbury argued that "If 
there were to be a revision of the Falkland[s] constitution which necessitated a new 
order in council we should be willing to include a preamble similar to the one we shall 
be including in the Gibraltar ordee'. 396 
Despite this moral concern, Lathbury's argument proved to be unpersuasive to 
the decision-makers in the FO. The FO, in a telegram sent to Lathbury on 23 July 
1968, expressed its view that "it is undesirable to confirm so positively as you suggest 
that there is a direct connection between the cases of Gibraltar and the Falkland 
392 Ibid., (122), Chalfont to Lord Balniel, MP, 18 October 1968. 
393 FCO 7/157, AA4/15, Part A, (56), Chalfont to Arthur Jones, MP, 8 April 1968. 
394 FCO 7/158, AA4/15, Part B, (114), Chalfont to Hutchison. 
395 FCO 7/157, AA. 4/15, Part A, (82) Chalfont to John Rodgers, MP, 15 May 1968. 
396 FCO 7/158, AA4/15, (109), G. Lathbury, Gibraltar to CO, Tel. No. 158, personal and secret, 22 July 
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Islands", because, explained the FO, "the parallel situation does not at present 
397 
arise". To make the official position clear and to dissipate the unnecessary effect as 
a result of Lathbury's argument, the FO explained that "it would be wrong for 
Ministers at this stage explicitly to link the Falklands with Gibraltar... [although] it 
should be sufficient to say there are similarities". 398 More significantly, in its unilateral 
statement attached to the draft Memorandum of Understanding, the FO indicated its 
perception of the settlement as an exclusive package. "The questions still to be 
resolved are complex", as the draft went. The FO "will ask the Islanders to regard the 
question of the efficacy of the safeguards and guarantees and that of the possible 
cession of sovereignty to Argentina as a single issue". 399 Arguing in this way, the FO 
seemed to know only too well that only by keeping a distance from the issue of 
Gibraltar could it contain a possible solution of the Falklands question within 
manageable proportions. It therefore had to silence Lathbury. 
In retrospect, the FO's two-pronged motivated framing effectively subdued 
Haskard's and Lathbury's versions of motivated framing in terms of loss and human 
concerns. The wishes of the islanders, persistently formulated by Haskard, and echoed 
by Lathbury, were kept at bay before December 1968. The FO with its version of 
motivated framing delivered a promising perspective in terms of gains from trade, and 
was toning down the fear of a minor loss-the Falklands. It was confident that the 
Government was rightly situated in the centre of framing about the issue of the 
Falkland Islands, to the extent that Haskard's and Lathbury's were sidelined. More 
reassuring of this view was that, with the Memorandum of Understanding on the 
verge of being publicised in late 1968, the Falkland Islanders were reported as having 
become more realistic and the Argentines' expressed intention to keep the issue distant 
from nationalistic lines, as time went on. 400 On 29 August 1968, the FIEC presented 
its solution to this dispute in which there were 8 points raised. 
401 But Creswell and 
Diggines effortlessly rejected the suggestion on the grounds that it was "completely 
1968. 
397 Ibid., (I 10), CO to Governor Gibraltar, Tel. no. 3 10, personal and secret, 23 July 1968. 
398 Ibid., (108), C. W. Wallace to Beith, restricted, 23 July 1968. 
399 FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (73), Brief no. 2, "Secretary of state's visit". 
400 FCO 7/235, AAF3/1, (84), Creswell to Diggines, confidential, 20 September 1968. 
401 FCO 7/235, AAF3/1, (83) Haskard to J. C. Morgan, confidential, 29 August 1968, enclosing "Paper 
prepared by the Falkland Island Emergency Committee in July 1968: Suggested solution for the 
Falkland Islands controversy". 
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unrealistic" and not "a realistic answer to the Argentine's claiM". 
402 
British identity- The reference point 
Reserving a section to discuss British identity does not mean that the impact of 
this reference point can be taken as exclusive. British identity as one of the moral 
concerns undoubtedly went in parallel with Haskard's version of motivated framing in 
terms of losses and with Lathbury's argument based on issue-linkage. But it should be 
seen as one reference point integrated with the above two. Because of the integration, 
its influence was progressively strengthened and proved capable of undermining the 
FO's two-pronged motivated framing, however rational the latter could be. 
As things stood, British identity emerged as one candidate reference point as 
early as March 1968. The emerging source of it could be traced to mass media. Most 
mass media after early 1968, when the issue came into public, tended to make their 
reports with the prompting conclusion such as "Almost all the inhabitants of these 
somewhat inhospitable islands off the southern tip of South America are of British 
403 
(mostly Scottish) descent; five-sixths of them were born there". On 25 March 1968, 
for example, the Falklands dispute made the headlines on BBC TV's programme, 
"Twenty Four Hours". A. Barton, the representative of the Falkland Islands in London, 
sensationally described the issue as "a matter of prestige", and the islanders "the most 
loyal little community in the world". Firmly standing behind the idea of British 
identity, Barton argued that the islanders would find it difficult to remain loyal both to 
the Queen and the Argentine republiC. 404 That was a moral appeal that was 
momentous enough to raise eyebrows of the backbenchers, as some of them were 
inclined to take moral concern as their chances to express their view freely in 
Parliament. 405 In the following week, with the publication of the, manifesto issued by 
the FICE, the issue of the Falkland Islands made the headlines in Britain. The views 
expressed can be summed up from the Daily Mirror that went as "the Falkland Islands 
402 ibid., (84), Creswell to Diggines, confidential, 20 September 1968; ibid., (95), Diggines to Tait, 
confidential, 16 October 1968. 
403 Spectator, March 29 1968. 
404 FCO 7/235, AAF3/1, (56), "Verbatim transcription from BBC Twenty Four Hours-Falkland 
Islands, broadcast on 25 March 1968. 
405 Austin Mitchell (1994) "Back-bench influence: A personal view", Parliamentary Affairs, 47,4, p. 
699. 
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are as British as Hampstead Garden Suburb". 406 Since then, the framing of the issue 
was characterised by the language that British identity was under threat and it began 
to gain momentum in the British mass media. In mid-1968, George Bolton, Chairman 
of the Bank of London and South America got the notion of identity to Stewart's ear. 
Bolton wrote that the key to the emotive aspect that had affected the islanders and the 
Falklands lobbyists was the question of nationality. 407 In October, the Daily Express 
also put the issue in a suggestive and sensational manner. It reminded the readers of 
the islanders' identity by writing that "almost all of them [are) of Scottish descents". 408 
Efforts to relocate the reference point 
However, British identity, among other different sets of motivated framing, 
cannot be seen as if it had swimmingly approached the FO's perception exclusively 
and without other preconditions involved. This thesis argues that it was the unceasing 
act of motivated framing in terms of loss in the past two years, reinforced by the 
contextual factors also characterised by loss perception that constituted an effective 
push to undermine the FO's two-pronged motivated framing. 
In mid-1968, the FO began to search for a more appropriate reference point from 
the historical archive. Three cases were under survey. They were the issues of 
Heligoland, the Gambia and Los Islands, and Jubaland. A lengthy report was 
presented to Stewart on 6 October 1968. According to this report, consultation based 
on the wishes of inhabitants in these cases could not have been stressed more in the 
policy debates. This finding served as another window for the FO through which to 
consider other potential reference points worth anchoring upon. 
The FO's research into the historical archive represented its new effort of 
relocating a more contingent reference point in this issue. To start with, all three cases 
were colonial territories ceded away peacefully by Britain. Heligoland switched to 
German hands in 1890. The Gambia and Los Islands were ceded to France as part of 
the Gambia Protectorate in 1904. Jubaland changed sovereignty to Italy in 1924. They 
functionally provided representativeness for the image of the issue of the Falkland 
406 Woodrow Wyatt (1968) "Stand firm on Falklands", Daily Mirror, 29 March 1968. 
407 FCO 7/137, AA3n, (3 1), George Bolton, Bank of London and South America, to Stewart, 18 June 
1968. 
408 FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (13), Beith to Diggines. 
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Islands. With this representativeness, it was likely that the FO would cast its doubt on 
the legitimacy of the first policy preference for respecting the interests of the islanders 
only, while in contrast, Britain emphasised the wishes of the inhabitants in the three 
historical cases. 
In other words, although the principal of self-determination was far less 
influential in these three cases, the wishes of the inhabitants in the transfer were 
highlighted. In the case of Heligoland and Jubaland, the parliamentary debates were 
mostly involved with questions of whether there were sufficient attempts to consult 
the native population, and whether compensation was made. 409 These cases exhibited 
a sharp contrast to the FO's Falklands policy preference in 1966-68. 
In the second place, it was admitted that there was no parliamentary question on 
the grounds of secrecy in the case of Gambia and Los Islands, and that debates over 
the cession of Gambia had more to do with the 20'h century blueprints of the Empire 
than any moral concerns. "O However, no matter whether the policy was secret or not, 
British nationality was the major concern in the decision-making process, except in 
the case of Jubaland, where the inhabitants were largely Africans. British nationality 
was important in the case of Gambia and Los Islands, to the extent that Britain 
rejected the French proposal that people opting for British nationality should 
withdraw. The emphasis on British nationality was a contrast to the British conduct of 
the Falklands policy. It was certainly ironic that the FO could not find a firm basis for 
its policy preference for respecting the interests, instead of their wishes. In terms of 
nationality, additionally, it could be even more difficult to argue that the islanders 
were not of British identity. 
Bennett, the writer of the report, used more space in description of the case of 
Heligoland. According to Bennett, on I July 1890, the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty 
was signed by Germany, which thereby gave up its enormous colonies in Uganda and 
Witu in exchange for a tiny island, Heligoland, which the German Reich thought 
409 FCO 7/160, AA4/17, (6), J. S. Branncy to C. E. Diggines, secret, 10 October 1968, enclosing (1) L. 
Branney to J. S. Branney on "Previous cessions of British territory", secret, 6 October 1968, and (2) 
"Memorandum of the nationality provisions, safeguards, and the consideration given, especially in 
Parliament, to the inhabitants' wishes, in certain cessions of British territory". 
410 Afred Collin (1965) Baffiourý burden:, Irthur Batrour and imperial preference (London: Anthony 
Bond), p. 11, p. 2 10, p. 257. 
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strategically important . 
41 1 Historically speaking, the Treaty was a success for the 
Salisbury Government. It helped Britain secure the sources of the Nile valley, 412 and 
had Bismarck subordinate his colonial ambitions in the interests of German-British 
relations .4" The Treaty was a milestone 
for the "coming of the British Empire" in East 
Africa. 414 However, before the decision to transfer Heligoland was made, 
apprehension was explicitly expressed in the British Parliament. The Government was 
criticised for "failing to provide for the yet unborn children of present Heligolanders 
opting for British identity". 415 Although the Liberal Oppositions and his own 
Conservative Party placed a lot of store by Salisbury's foreign policy in Africa, 416 and 
identity was by no means an important factor in the management of the past 83-year 
possession of Heligoland, 417 Salisbury still found it difficult to cope with the 
opposition. William Gladstone on the opposition, for instance, found British 
nationality an effective tool to embarrass the Government in Parliament. 418 
Conditional factors 
This thesis has no evidence to show the effect of Bennett's report on Stewart. To 
reinforce the argument, conditional factors characterised by dramatic events have to 
be counted in. These events could include the poor-boding outlook for British- 
Argentine trade relations in 1968; the increased coverage of the issue by the mass 
media after March 1968; the unexpected leak about the Government's twin-track 
strategy in early October; the relentless protests launched by the FIEC in the language 
of a "sell-out" as a result of the news coverage; and the Argentines' illegal landing. 
Other contributing factors to this argument included the words to Stewart from 
"'Andrew R. Carlson (1970) Germanyforeign policy, 1890-1914, and colonialpolicy to 1914: A 
handbook and annotated bibliography (NJ: Scarecrow Press), p. 96. 
"" Ronald F. Dreyer (1987) The mind ofofficial imperialism: British and Cape government perceptions 
of German rule in Namibiafrom the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty to the Kruger telegram (1890-1896) 
(Essen: Reimar Hobbing Verlag), p. 9 1. 
113 Winfried Baumgart (1982) Imperialism: The idea and reality ofBritish and French colonial 
expansion, 1880-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 148-9; Edgar N. Johnson and John Dean 
Bickford (1927) "The contemplated Anglo-German alliance: 1890-190 1", Political Science Quarterly, 
62,1, p. 4. 
414 Ronald Robinson, John Callagher and Alice Denny (196 1) African and the Victorians (London: 
Macmillan), p. 294. 
415 FCO 7/160, AA4/17, (6), Branney to C. E. Diggines. 
416 D. R. Gillard (1965) 'Salisbury's Heligoland offer: The case against the 'Witu Thesis?, The English 
Historical Review, 80,3, p. 55 1. 
417 R. Heron-Fermor (1890) Speech in condemnation ofthe cession ofHeligoland, delivered in 
Brighton on July 9,1890. 
418 Paul M. Kennedy (1980) The rise ofthe Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: George 
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Bolton, Chairman of the Bank of London and South America in mid- 1967, Lathbury's 
motivated framing in terms of issue linkage to the case of Gibraltar, and more 
generally, a series of policy crises home and abroad in 1968. 
Perhaps a more immediate factor to strengthen British identity as the reference 
point was Chalfont's educational campaign that was put in motion in late November 
1968, and proved counter-productive. As Chalfont recalled the general mood in the 
Falkland Islands, when he launched the educational campaign in late November 1968, 
'The response was one of scepticism, to put it mildly. The view was quite simple, and 
I thought somewhat simplistically, 'We are British. We are not interested in your plans 
for any future world in which we should become Argentinians. We are British, that's 
all there is to itm. 419 Chalfont's description suggested that the strength of the motivated 
framing in terms of loss, loss of Britishness came into the fore. It moved the framing 
of the issue toward an insurmountable reference point that the FO's two-pronged 
version of motivated framing, however rational, found it hard to cope with. Therefore, 
it seems remarkable to argue that Bennett's report might have had a certain reinforcing 
impact, strengthening the motivated framing in terms of British identity, under the 
circumstance that Bennett's research was instructed to do. The instruction could not be 
baseless. It, in turn, might prove that the FO was faced with a policy dilemma, so that 
it made an attempt to look for more sensible reference point in late 1968. 
Indeed, Britishness means more than "a matter of paying taxes, voting, using 
state welfare services". 420 It could become more eye-catching than all the previous 
ones, with the effect enlarged to such a deplorable degree that any British bystanders 
would find it hard not to be in sympathy with it. Britishness at this critical moment 
became a powerful reference point for the Falkland Islands community in the sense 
that, after two years of disquieting rumours, enough was enough in December 1968. 
For the Cabinet as a whole, the decision-makers also found no reason not to avow 
their sympathy when faced by the simple sentence that "we are British". Stewart's 
motivated framing at this stage, by contrast, gave nothing but an impression of 
Allen & Unwin), p. 208. 
419 Charlton (1989) Yhe littleplatoon, p. 23. 
420 Asad Talal (1990) "Multiculturalism and British identity in the wake of Rushdie affair", Politics & 
Society, 18,4 1, p. 458. 
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deviousnesS. 421 From the perspective of interaction between the 170's motivated 
framing and that of the Falkland Islands, Britishness as a reference point was capable 
of drawing the FO's decision weight to be with the Falkland Islands particularly when 
the FO was faced with a deteriorating domain of loss in late 1968. 
4. Evaluation of the four hypotheses 
The section is to evaluate the four hypotheses made in Chapter 3. This thesis 
starts from Hypothesis 4, which goes as follows: Britain framed the solution of the 
Falklands issue in terms of gains in late 1968. Because of this perception of gains, the 
Government decided to change the policy preference in pursuit of gains. It began to 
sideline the previous principle of respecting the wishes of the islanders. Instead, it was 
inclined to see the interests of the islanders as the guiding principle in the talks for the 
next two years. The policy change, in accordance with the mechanism of prospect 
theory, was a case of a risk-averse style of decisional behaviour. 
A closer reading of the archive shows that Hypothesis 4 is problematic. To begin 
with, when the issue of the Falkland Islands approached the final stage in late 1968, 
the FO became increasingly aware that the motivated framing in terms of loss could 
be an insurmountable challenge to the implementation of its designated policy 
preference. Despite the persuasive argument based on the two-pronged motivated 
framing, the concern of loss was evident in Stewart's putting forward to McLoughlin 
the two different versions of paragraph 4 in the draft Memorandum of Understanding. 
It was also manifest in Stewart's failed attempt to make a detour to evade opposition 
in Parliament. 
The FO went to great pains to sustain its motivated framing of the issue in terms 
of gains for most part of the period. But the result was not up to the FO's expectation. 
The model of the Antarctic Treaty turned out to be wishful thinking and the call for 
the exertion of political influence in South America through trade expansion proved 
superficial. This failure to continue the motivated framing in terms of gains has to be 
attributed to the deteriorating domain of loss in 1968. The declining domain of frame 
was exacerbated by the Argentine discrimination against the British exports after late 
1967. Haskard's and Lathbury's motivated framing in terms of loss, in addition, 
became even more difficult for the FO to subdue, as the dominant reference point 
421 Castle (1990) The Castle diaries, p. 285; Benn (1988) Office with power, p. 134. 
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bearing on this issue began to anchor on British identity and eventually rendered the 
educational campaign in late November 1968 aborted. Faced by the second wave of 
parliamentary rows occurring within one year, the Wilson Government had no choice 
but to back down. The retreat reflected both the impacts of the domain of loss 
perceived by the Wilson Government, and that of motivated framing around 
Britishness, which turned out to be a powerful appeal with the occurrence of 
unauthorised landing of an Argentine aircraft at the eleventh hour. 
Hypothesis 4 is problematic also because the policy shift in late 1968 was a risk- 
acceptant, not a risk-averse, decision from the perspective of British-Argentine 
relations. According to the, MoD, military action against the Falkland Islands would 
be most likely, when Argentina perceived that all diplomatic means of achieving their 
aims had been exhausted in December 1968. With the prospect of withdrawing the 
Memorandum of Understanding, the MoD foresaw the Falkland Islands to be "a 
tempting target for a military operation designed to embarrass the British 
Governmenf'. 422 The MoD also admitted that the likelihood of a military clash was 
elevated from the point of view of timing and capability. In respect of capability of 
defence, the MoD admitted that there were no friendly airfields, through which 
Britain could project an immediate task force. Although, the Argentine forces were 
"only moderately effective by European standards", as the MoD averred, if Argentina 
decided to launch them, their relative strength in the neighbouring area would 
"constitute a serious threat to the Falkland Islands and Dependencies", which had only 
symbolic and vulnerable forces committed to them. 423 The crux is that, despite the 
military concern emerging in mid-1968, the FO still decided to make a policy shift by 
re-emphasising its respect for the islanders' wishes in December 1968. This pledge to 
take the wishes of the islanders as the guide by no means indicated that the FO had 
not been aware of potential threats from Argentina. On the other hand, the policy shift 
was also tantamount to a vitally insurmountable barrier to further negotiations, as the 
issue could have been resolved in the last minute but for abandoning the draft of 
Memorandum of Understanding. For the FO, as a result, the policy shift in late 1968 
was grudging and risky. 
Hypothesis 4 is as a result invalid. Refutation of Hypothesis 4 inclines this thesis 
422 FCO 7/156, AA4/14, (17), ibid.. 
423 Ibid.. 
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to accept Hypothesis 3 as follows. The British Government framed the issue in terms 
of losses in late 1968, so that it changed the policy line by upholding the wishes of the 
islanders again. The change of policy preference was, therefore, understood as a 
display of risk-acceptant behaviour under the condition that the British Government 
knew only too well that there would be a potential threat from Argentina. 
Nevertheless, the evaluation of prospect theory has not been completed yet. 
Regarding the first policy preference for respecting the interests of the islanders, this 
case study finds out three weaknesses in Hypothesis 2. For this moment, let this thesis 
repeat Hypothesis 2 as follows: Britain framed the solution of the issue in terms of 
losses in late 1966. The perception of loss included trade opportunities with the South 
American countries and Britain's world reputation. From the mechanism of prospect 
theory, this thesis expects that the Government would be risk-acceptant due to 
perception of loss. Britain therefore decided to hold talks with Argentina. 
Firstly, as this case study shows, the first policy preference for respecting the 
islanders' interests was a result of the Government's enjoying a domain of gain. And 
because of this domain of gain, the FO formulated the issue in similar language 
characterised by looking for gains. Some decision-makers in the FO including Foreign 
Secretary Brown admitted that the issue of the Falkland Islands was a minor concern, 
and they did not mind letting the Falklands go. There was also no sense of crisis when 
the talks were launched. The dominant framing during this period was one of 
optimism: For Britain, the political concerns of the dispute over the Falklands with 
Argentina were "short-term in nature". 424 Britain would have something to sell in 
exchange for long-term interests in South America. The islanders, in addition, would 
gain something in returns after a transfer of sovereignty. This description of the frame, 
either referring to motivated framing or domain of frame, as a result contradicts what 
Hypothesis 2 presents. 
Secondly, from the perspective of the dependent variable--the risk orientation, 
the decision to hold talks with Argentina in late 1966 could hardly be interpreted as 
risk-acceptant either towards Argentina or domestic opposition. Even in late 1966 
when Operacion Condor incident took place, Britain was more ready to solve the 
424 Richard Ned Lebow (1989) "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The origins of the Falklands 
wae,, in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds. ), Psychology and deterrence 
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conflict through diplomatic means instead of other drastic gestures. For the whole 
Wilson Government, although there emerged a decline of domain of gains, and the 
reference point going from the level of aspiration (the Antarctic Treaty) down to the 
level of status quo (preservation of British reputation), Britain had no explicit 
intention to walk away from the talks. The FO understood pretty well that walking 
away might annoy Argentina. Evidently, it is difficult to argue that Britain was risk. 
acceptant toward British-Argentine relations before December 1968. This thesis is 
more inclined to see a risk-averse pattern of behaviour on the British side, which 
finding will render Hypothesis 2 problematic. 
The risk-averse pattern of behaviour was significant as well on the domestic 
front. To be sure, the FO's effort to tone down Haskard's motivated fi-aming in terms 
of losses and Lathbury's motivated framing in terms of issue-linkage did not mean 
that the FO paid no attention to moral concern. Quite on the contrary, because of 
moral concern, confidentiality was strongly emphasised among the officials, the 
suspicion that the Government was looking for gains was flatly rejected in Parliament, 
and the educational campaign in preparation was delayed in March 1968. 
Thirdly, Hypothesis 2 is problematic in that the perception of loss in this 
hypothesis does not exactly correspond to what prospect theory assumes. When 
Hypothesis 2 takes trade opportunities as one element of motivated framing and 
characterises it in terms of loss, i. e., the loss of trade potential, it has, with benefit of 
the hindsight, been found exaggerated. Most departments in the British Government 
did not think that the timing of trade was appropriate, however prosperous the 
Argentine economies appeared to be. By this understanding, loss of trade potential in 
Hypothesis 2 has to be seen as an appeal, reflecting the FO's aspiration and its version 
of motivated framing with a view to influencing the colleague departments in the 
whole cabinet. The appeal of trade potential with Argentina seems to communicate to 
the audience that here was an appeal lying ahead and that Britain had better not miss 
the chance. In other words, if Britain had mishandled the issue or refused to start the 
talks, the prospect of potential gains would come to naught. The result would entail 
the reference point-expected utilities of trade-droppin g from an aspired level of 
expectation to the status quo. The loss perception in Hypothesis 2 as a result could be 
(Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 124. 
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seen as an appeal to avoid psychological disappointment. 
Nevertheless, Hypothesis 2 clearly commits the error of confusing the motivated 
framing in ten-ns of loss stipulated by prospect theory, with the notion of loss 
avoidance, which is a constant in human behaviour, relative to expected utilities. 
Basically, the notion of loss avoidance is broader than the classic terms of loss in 
prospect theory. In prospect theory, loss perception, or framing in terms of loss, refers 
to loss of utilities worse than the status quo. It gives the reader a clear picture of 
mechanism for framing an issue either in terms of gains or losses. The notion of 
avoidance, in contrast, refers either to the concern of loss of utility better than that of 
the status quo (i. e., potential trade), or to that worse than the status quo (i. e., Britain's 
prestige). That said, loss avoidance is a catchall definition consisting of reference 
points both at the level of aspiration and that of the status quo. Its broader perception 
of loss is elusive, so far as a mechanism in prospect theory is concerned. It can lead an 
analyst onto the horns of a dilemma in a case study without exactly knowing which 
kind of framing in prospect theory (in terms of gains or losses? ) that a decision-maker 
has taken into his/her strategic thinking. 425 
If one looks from the perspective of the FO, which situated itself between the 
Falkland Islands and Argentina, one can find that the 170's decision-making 
represented a decision-making style characterised by loss avoidance throughout 1966- 
68. The FO, for instance, was deeply aware of the threat of leaks to the mass media by 
cmphasising confidentiality. It was carefully keeping the moral concern at bay, 
separating the issue from the case of Gibraltar, making effort to improve the 
deteriorating British-Argentine relations against the trade retaliation. Indeed, even 
openly declaring to respect the wishes of the islanders could be taken as a decision 
reflecting loss avoidance with a view to preserving the Government's creditability 
faced by the parliamentary rows. However, closer scrutiny shows that taking loss 
avoidance as an explanatory variable does not throw much light on the mechanism of 
prospect theory. There are no coherent and unequivocal relations to be generated 
between loss avoidance and risk-orientation behaviour. Given the expectation for 
good relations with Argentina owing to loss avoidance, why did the FO take 
Britishness as the final obstruction to the talks? Given the possible domestic 
425 Edward Rhodes (1998) "Book review", American Political Science Review, 92,4, p. 986. 
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opposition, why did the FO relentlessly propose the talks? Loss avoidance lacks much 
force in explanation. It seems proper to treat loss avoidance as a dependent variable, 
instead of an explanatory one. More relevantly, the fear of losing utilities cannot be 
taken as the specific claim in prospect theory, because loss avoidance may occur 
whenever "individuals feel incapable of coping with the threat". 426 
Taken together, this thesis falsifies Hypothesis 2. The refutation is not only 
because the FO exhibited a risk-averse behavioural pattern towards both Argentina 
and the domestic opposition, but also because the notion of loss avoidance risks a 
catchall definition and it can be elusive to account for a mechanism of explanation. 
Loss avoidance, at best, can be seen a constant phenomenon. It has gone beyond what 
prospect theory can precisely define, and but does not lead to the true understanding 
of prospect theory. 
In short, refutation of Hypothesis 2 inclines this thesis to conclude that it is safer 
to accept Hypothesis I- Britain framed the solution of the Falklands dispute in terms 
of gains in late 1966. The Government therefore was risk-averse and tended to talk 
about the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands with Argentina. 
Caution, however, is needed after evaluating the above four hypotheses. To 
begin with, the two policy preferences can be interpreted as the result of the combined 
effect of the domain of framing and the motivated framing in terms of gain/loss. 
When a series of reference points including the Antarctic Treaty, Britain! s prestige, 
better relations with Argentina, potential trade and preservation of Britishness came 
forward in the policy calculations, these reference points were functioning as 
representativeness in a cognitive sense. However, after most reference points proved 
problematic in defence of the Government's policy, and after dramatic events 
including news leak and parliamentary rows challenged the first policy preference, 
strategic thinking became the decisive force in relocating other reference points and 
preference reversals therefore took place. 
Thus prompted, strategic thinking, based on subjective values, should not be 
under-estimated, otherwise prospect theory can be mistakenly considered as a 
421 Ronald W. Rogers and C. Ronald Mewbom (1976) "Fear appeals and attitude change: Effects of a 
threat's noxiousness, probability of occurrence, and the efficacy of coping responses", Journal of 
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structuralist view. On the other hand, because strategic thinking is heavily influenced 
by subjective values, motivated framing in the evaluating phase of decision-making is 
not necessarily formulated in an exclusive or static form. Framing in terms of gains 
does not exclude the possibility to frame the same issue in terms of losses, and vice 
versa. That said, motivated framing can be broadly formulated and consist of 
prospects of both gains and losses. During the period from mid-1967 to late 1968, the 
FOIs two-pronged motivated framing was a case in point. Because of a broader 
viewpoint, this two-pronged motivated framing proved more persuasive than other 
competing motivated framing and, to a considerable degree, helped the first policy 
preference move forward to the final objective against the declining domain of frame. 
The last point suggests the next. Since the FO occupied better ground in 
argumentation (assisted by confidentiality in the talks, of course) during the period, 
Haskard's motivated framing in terms of moral concern and Lathbury's in terms of 
issue-linkage were not effective competitors, despite that their versions of motivated 
framing were in terms of loss. With this finding, it will be sensible to conclude that 
framing in terms of losses is not necessarily a decisive force to shift a policy 
orientation. In other words, so far as a decision-maker is concerned, a reference point 
set at the level of aspiration does not necessarily give ground to one set at the level of 
the status quo. Levy is therefore correct to contend that the status quo bias is "mis- 
specified". 427 The status quo bias cannot be taken as unchangeable. Indeed, before late 
1968, suppressing the competing sets of motivated framing in terms of losses 
reflected the FO's earnest effort to keep the issue under control. This earnest effort to 
sort out a compromise with Argentina, in turn, reflected the FO's pragmatic diplomatic 
approach with a subjective value behind it. An observer could hardly find fault with 
the FO's toning down the competing sets of motivated framing in terms of loss, and 
Browifs emphasis on confidentiality, as talking about the interests of the islanders 
exclusively could leave room of freedom for policy manoeuvre. 
Overall, this section argues that the two policy preferences in 1966-68 were the 
results of the combined effect of domain of frame and motivated framing. However, 
to avoid a structuralist claim, framing as a concept needs more precision in 
Personality and Social Psychology, 34,1, p. 60. 
427 Jack S. Levy (1996) "Loss aversion, framing, and bargaining: The implications of prospect theory 
for international conflict! ', International Political Science Review, 17,2, p. 189. 
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explanation. Britain neither framed the solution of the issue in terms of gains so that 
the talks began, nor did it frame the issue in terms of loss so that the draft of 
Memorandum of Understanding was abandoned. Different domains of frame that the 
Wilson Government was situated in are a contributing factor that cannot be under- 
estimated. This distinction between the motivated framing and domain of frame, 
again, justifies the effort of this thesis in Chapter 3. 
Secondly, motivated framing is not necessarily formulated in an exclusive form. 
It can broadly consist of different bargaining levels with the reference points both 
anchoring at the level of aspiration and the level of status quo. 
Thirdly, the status quo bias is, as a result of the above finding, not necessarily a 
dominant reference point. As the case analysis shows, there were occasions when the 
status quo bias in terms of loss was replaced by motivated framing in terms of gain, 
such as in late 1966 when Britain set the Antarctic Treaty as a model for the Falklands 
dispute. On the other hand, the case study also demonstrates that loss avoidance may 
be a constant phenomenon in human behaviour. Since loss avoidance cannot be taken 
as a specific claim in prospect theory, taking loss avoidance as explanation may not 
advance prospect theory very far. 
5. Report of the ambiguities 
Given the explanation from the perspective of prospect theory, uncertainties 
remain that can be illustrated as follows. First, to what extent did Bennett's research of 
the three historical cases affect the FO's policy orientation after October 1968? There 
was no official paper to show Stewarfs response, and, admittedly, Stewart was not 
obliged to respond. 428 Secondly, it is not certain whether the two policy preferences 
were a reflection of Wilson's personality, or his style of leadership. In this regard, 
there were reports that Wilson was good at balancing between losses and gains. As 
Wilson personally admitted, he preferred the so-called Attlee's method, characterised 
by evasion, 429 whenever faced with uncertaintieS. 
430 It was recorded that Wilson made 
428 Naeem Inayatullah (1997) "Theories of spontaneous disorder", Review ofInternational Political 
Economy, 4,2,31948; Tversky and Kahneman (1986) "Rational choice and the framing of decision", 
Journal ofBusiness, 59A p. s251; Charles Lipson (1984) "International cooperation in economic and 
security affairs", World Politics, 37,1, P. 17. 
429 Martin Francis (1997) Ideas andpolicies under labour, 1945-1951: Building a new Britain 
(Manchester & NY. Manchester University Press), p. 23 1. 
411 Wilson (197 1) The Labour government, p. 48 1. 
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a concession on less important issues for the sake of party unity. 43 1 This thesis is 
bound to raise the question: is personality a variable that makes the argument co- 
relational rather than causal? Thirdly, was secret diplomacy, rather than rationality in 
policy debates, the decisive factor that FO's motivated framing could tone down the 
opposition? Given that the sense of loss avoidance was consistent, as this thesis has 
examined, why did the FO choose Chalfont to visit the Falkland Islands since it had 
already been aware that the islanders bore an unfavourable image of the FO. Why did 
the FO not foresee that the educational campaign could fail due to strong suspicion? 
More specifically, if the policy switch was the causal result of framing, then why, after 
the wishes of the islanders had been confirmed as paramount, did the FCO still make 
unceasing effort in proposing talks with Argentina? This thesis will try to deal with 
some of these ambiguities in Chapter 5 and leave the rest for further study. 
6. The limitation of the test 
This thesis has to acknowledge the limitation in this test. While recent releases of 
the FCO's documents have been encouraging, constraints still operate. This thesis 
finds that the current British Government remains deeply cautious in their release of 
the archive concerning the issue of the Falkland Islands during the period under study. 
For instance, the full and final version of Memorandum of Understanding at the end 
of November 1968 has not been de-classified. 432 Quite the opposite, its reservation 
period has been extended from 30 to 40 years. In addition, the Falkland Islands 
Government's documents, kept in File 80, can be expected to contain transcripts of the 
opinion exchanged between Governor Haskard and his bureaucratic branches. 
Observation of them helps analyse the internal dynamic of the Falklands society in the 
late 1960s. However, all the related legislative and executive council minutes as well 
as administration records have been removed from this file. In addition, the newly 
established National Progress Party in the Falkland Islands and their activities can be 
an important dimension for this thesis to observe the development of ethnic 
nationalism in this case. 433 Their party activities, according to the index, should have 
been filed under CO 1024/566. To the disappointment of this writer, no record of the 
431 Wyatt (1977) Na6 left ofthe Labourparty?, p. 80; New Society (1967b) "Labour and 
unemployment", 10,26 1, p. 419. 
432 FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (67), American Department, Foreign Office (FO), Memorandum of 
Understanding, closed until 2008,24 October 1967. 
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related information has been released so far. The extension of 10 years to keep some 
essential data from the customary 30 years is telling. It indicates that the dispute over 
the Falkland Islands remains a sensitive issue and that Britain is still addressing it 
with care. 
Secondly, despite the effort in the past year and the snowballing technique being 
used, the result of the 10 personal interviews (See Appendix Q is very limited and not 
as helpful as this thesis initially imagined. The major difficulties lie in three aspects. 
First, sadly, many of the people who were in the thick of it during this period are now 
deceased. 434 The interviewees currently involved with the issue, by contrast, have 
little knowledge of the issue owing to confidentiality. From Sir Rex Hunt the eldest 
among the interviewees, to the youngest, Saul Pitaluga, they all admitted their 
inability to provide exact information about the period under study, although they 
were helpful in introducing the concerned individuals to this writer. Because of this 
low response rate and low representation in sampling, this thesis has to limit the use 
of interviewing data. 
435 
Secondly, with the lapse of 30 years, the memories of some the interviewees are 
very sketchy. Robin Pitaluga, father of Saul Pitaluga, complained that his personal 
records no longer existed. Cosmo, Haskard, perhaps for his personal politeness, even 
suggested that the Public Record Office could be a better place for this writer to 
explore than doing a personal interview with him. But are they really forgetful? The 
suspicion of this thesis reinforces the view that the issue remains sensitive. 
Finally, in the process of snowballing, the writer had an opportunity to be 
introduced by Robin Pitaluga to Frank Mitchell, one of the members of the FIEC in 
1968. The writer made contact with Mitchell via the Falkland Islands Association's 
London office in May 1999. Mitchell, however, set the condition that the interview 
had to be held in the Taiwanese Embassy, 50, Grosvenor Gardens, London, because, 
433 FCO 7/136, AA3/5, (6), Creswell to FO, confidential, 13 November 1967. 
434 This writer obtained from Osgood the name list of the FIEC in 1968. Among the 15 members, the 
whereabouts of two (Dr. Robin, Director of Polar Research, and Professor Metford, Bristol University) 
were unknown, and 12 were deceased. The names of the deceased were A. Q Barton, R. V. Goss, S. 
Miller, Sir John Barlow, Hunter Christie, Sir Miles Clifford, N. X. Cameron, Clifford Kenyen, John 
Smith, W. W. Blake, A. A. Blake, and J. R. Yorath. Other people outside the FIEC that were relevant 
were Creswell, Sir J. Boyd-Carpenter. 
435 Douglas R. Berdie and John F. Anderson (1974) Questionnaires: Design and use (NJ: Scarecow), p. 
14. 
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as he insisted, the interview should be formal. However, despite this writer's effort, 
this request was rejected by the Taiwanese Embassy. Part of the reason, this writer 
ventures to guess, was that theTaiwanese Embassy was afraid of other implications 
from the firing on a Taiwanese fishing boat in the Falklands' waters in mid-1999. The 
refusal subsequently forced the writer to call off the interview. 
Nevertheless, the data taken from the personal interviews are taken as 
supplementary, as Chapter I supposes. The case analysis and the explanation made 
from the perspective of prospect theory still constitute the essential concern of this 




Chapter 5 is dealing with the implications in the sense of logical entailment. It 
consists of two parts. Empirically, this thesis argues that the British conduct of the 
Falklands policy from 1966 to 1968 was pragmatic in policy style. The three options 
raised in Chapter I including leaseback, shared sovereignty and integration into the 
Antarctic Treaty System will be assessed based on this argument. Looking into the 
foreseeable future, this thesis expects that Argentina will continue to press Britain for 
sovereignty talks. The current British Government, on the other hand, is likely to find 
the issue increasingly difficult to treat as a doing-nothing one. However, any 
arrangement aimed at circumventing the sovereignty impasse will only postpone the 
problem to another day. 
Secondly and theoretically, this thesis explores the strengths and weaknesses of 
prospect theory. It argues that framing, as an explanatory variable in prospect theory, 
provides a coherent explanation for decision-making and risk-oriented propensity. 
Prospect theory proves more powerful than the notion of representativeness in 
cognitive psychology. The theory is also more of value than the concern with utilities 
in rational choice theories. 
This thesis, however, has to report that there is tension existing between a 
reference point and a set of motivated framing in prospect theory. The decision 
outcome may not necessarily be reference-dependence, because, as the case shows, 
motivated framing can be one thing, and a reference point can be another. The two 
notions are be automatically corresponding. This finding will undermine the view that 
prospect theory is a reference-dependent theory, as is understood in Chapter 3. Also, 
caution is needed in applying prospect theory solely from the perspective of loss 
avoidance or the status quo bias. Loss avoidance is a vague term that embraces 
diverse, but sometimes compatible, utilities. Finally, this thesis concludes by 
suggesting an agenda for further study. 
1. The empirical implications 
Pragmatic policy style 
If policy style is understood as "the main characteristics of the ways in which a 
given society formulates and implements its public policies", ' a convincing case can 
I John Baylis (1989) British defence policy, striking the right balance (London: Macmillan), p. 10; 
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be made in which Britain's conduct of the Falklands policy from 1966 to 1968 
featured a significantly pragmatic policy style. The sense of pragmatism, nevertheless, 
should not be interpreted as an impromptu performance of the FO. Rather, pragmatic 
policy style here has to be understood as a result of interaction between the FO and 
the overall framing of this issue in the late 1960s. 
The most elementary point to support this interpretation was that the first policy 
preference emerging in late 1966 reflected FO's understanding of this issue that "the 
policy of status quo" was not "necessarily opposed to any change whatsoever". 2 
During this period, there were hardly any sign of a pre-defined notion of sovereignty, 
acting as a legitimate force leading the way to deny Argentina's burning desire for 
retaking the Falkland Islands. Rather, Britain sought to build a mechanism, 
emphasising cooperation instead of the risks after the series of the sovereignty talks. 3 
The FO was readier to compromise, as long as its long-term interests, including a 
better relationship with Argentina and Britain's prestige in the UN, could be 
maintained. The first preference reversals in the whole history of the Falkland Islands 
thus took place in late 1966. 
In order to cope with the domestic suspicion, from mid-1967 to December 1968, 
this pragmatic attitude was further strengthened. The FO was actually flexible enough 
to have the principle of this newly designated policy dancing between the wishes and 
interests of the islanders. With this rhetorical strategy, it embarked on a course of 
profound policy change by producing a two-pronged motivated framing to defend its 
policy orientation. This dual set of motivated framing proves a success. It helped the 
FO hold a bargaining position broadly straddling both the level of aspiration in terms 
of gains and the level of status quo in terms of losses. Despite the poor-boding 
outlook of British-Argentine relations in 1968, it made the FO's argument persuasive 
and effective, to the extent that Haskard, Governor of the Falkland Islands, who 
consistently questioned the legitimacy of the FO's policy with his motivated framing 
in terms of losses, had to acquiesce. Viewed in this light, the FO's first turning-point 
Jeremy Richardson, Gustafsson Gunnel and Jordan Grant (1982) "The concept of policy style", in 
Jeremy Richardson (ed. ), Policy style in Western Europe (London: George Allen and Unwin), p. 2. 
2 Hans J. Morgenthau (1966) Politics among nations: Yhe struggleforpower andpeace, 3 rd edition 
(NY. Alfred. A. Knopt), p. 42. 
3 David Strang (199 1) "Anomaly and commonplace in European political expansion: Realist and 
institutional account", International Organisation, 45,2, p. 162; Andrei P. Tsygankov (1997) "From 
international institutionalism to revolutionary expansionism: The foreign policy discourse of 
contemporary Russia", Mershon International Studies Review, 41,2, p. 249. 
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policy preference could hardly be criticised as unreasonable or irrational. The dual set 
of motivated framing both in terms of gains and losses was, in Morgenthau's words, 
4 
the "art of diplomacy". From the initial contact between the two sides about the issue 
in late 1966 to the educational campaign in late November 1968, the FO's decision- 
making exemplified a self-interested state-actor developing "processes for making 
joint decisions" with Argentina, in an attempt to solve "dilemmas of common interests 
or common aversions". 5 Seen from the decision-making and implementation of it, the 
first turning-point policy preference in late 1966 reflected a typical case of political 
realism that sovereignty is not an absolute concept for foreign policy. It was instead 
subject to "reinterpretations", and after the FO's artful framing of the issue, the wishes 
of the islanders that were iterated before 1966 were, indeed, sidelined. 6 
The second point bore witness to the view that the FO was pragmatic is that the 
Government was not blinded by the effectiveness of the rhetoric strategy that had 
worked quite well in most part of this period. When the Government was faced with 
strong opposition from the domestic front in December 1968, concerns for British 
prestige and better relations with South America became less relevant. When the 
7 domain of frame deteriorated from a prospect of gains to that of losses, and when 
relentless opposition framed the issue as a sell-out in December 1968, the FO did not 
stick to its original premise that the designated policy for talks was for Britaiws long- 
term interests and prestige. The Government instead was quick to realise that there 
8 
existed no supporting mechanism to produce intended results. It subsequently 
rejected the Memorandum of Understanding that it was supposed to issue jointly with 
Argentina at the end of 1968 and it changed the negotiating principle from the 
interests of the islanders to their wishes. Here the FO in late 1968 demonstrated its 
policy style characterised by pragmatism again. It had never presumed the 
contemporary condition under which foreign policy operated should be consistent or 
unquestionable. 9 The second preference reversal thus took place. Perhaps more 
significant is that the eventual shift of policy preferences back to the wishes of the 
Morgenthau (1966) Politics among nations, p. 54 1. 
Arthur A. Stein (1990) My nation co-operate: Circumstance and choice in international relations 
jIthaca & London: Cornell University Press), p. 54. 
Ibid., p. 313. 
Simon James (1994) "The Cabinet system since 1945: Fragmentation and integration", Parliamentary 
Affairs, 47,4, p. 628. 
John Orbell (1991) "A'cognitive miser' theory of co-operator's advantage", American Political 
Science Review, 85,2, p. '525. 
9 Morgenthau (1966) Politics among nations, p. 9. 
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islanders was by no means irrational. The reversal of policy preference can be seen as 
a means of dealing with the imbalance of government power and government 
responsiveness, caused, first of all, by the lack of Falklands lobbyists before March 
1968, when the FIEC was established. ' 0 
From the perspective of prospect theory, the reason for this imbalance was that 
there were not enough reference points for further inference in policymaking. As 
Evans observed, when international negotiations were initiated, they were hardly a 
direct response to the pressure from the local constituency. " This in part explained 
why the voice of the lobby groups had rarely been heard up to the point when the 
draft Memorandum of Understanding came out for public discussions among 
colleague departments in early 1968. 
Likewise, this lack of sufficient reference points available not only explains the 
immediate influence of the Antarctic Treaty and British prestige on the decision- 
makers, but reflected a typical British mindset in the 1960s, when most of the British 
public did not "care about the issue", owing to its being minor. On the other hand, 
even if some did care, these people lacked "the power, to act upon those 
preferences". 12 Thus, the FO found little difficulty to locate the Antarctic Treaty and 
British prestige as the initial reference points. The two reference points, chosen earlier 
in late 1966 and early 1967, could be ready-made and were located quite conveniently 
in light of the fact that room for manoeuvrability remained spacious for the FO before 
the domain of frame of this issue deteriorated. 
Of course, it has to be admitted that this imbalance of government and lack of 
responsiveness were also caused by the FO's deliberate effort to sideline moral 
assessment, and instead to emphasise confidentiality. 
13 This effort, indeed, reflected 
the impetus of motivated framing of this issue as described in the evaluating phase of 
the prospect theory. Nevertheless, stressing confidentiality in the talks has to be seen 
" Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (1965) The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in 
five nations (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 476. 
1 Peter B. Evans (1993) "Building an integrative approach to international and domestic politics", in 
Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds. ), Double-edged diplomacy: 
International bargaining and domestic politics (Berkeley, CA & London: University of California 
University), pp. 397-430. 
12 Peter F. Trumbore (1998) "Public opinion as a domestic constraint in international negotiations: Two- 
level games in the Anglo-Irish peace process", International Studies Quarterly, 42,3, p. 561. 
11 Hansard (Commons) vol. 76 1, cols., 14-5,34,1461,1466,18 March 1968; vol. 762, col. 5,1 April 
1968; vol. 775, col. 242,16 December 1968; vol. 763, col. 479,25 April 1968; vol. 764, col. 32,6 May 
1968. 
226 
as a calculated move. It was no means irrational. It highlighted the FO's pragmatic 
strategic thinking in its attempt to bring the sovereignty talks under control. Without 
this effort, the FO could have found it difficult to keep reasonable room for policy 
manoeuvre against the unfavourable domain of loss setting after the end of 1967. It 
also explained why, when Argentina rejected the proposal of a sovereignty freeze in 
November 1966, the FO readily replaced it with British prestige. The relocation of the 
reference point illustrated Britain's constant concern owing to some hostile Argentine 
moves on different international occasions in respect of the Falklands dispute. 
Overall, stressing confidentiality was a practical necessity under this circumstance. It 
was this practicality that constituted the FO's pragmatic policy style concerning this 
dispute. 
However, when the FO at the final stage became aware that Britishness proved 
an irresistible motivated framing, it capitulated. The capitulation cannot be interpreted 
as reflecting an inconsistent policy style. Rather, in the light of social meaning, the 
capitulation was, again, necessary because the FO at this moment was forced to 
realise that Britishness in late 1968 became the major reference point. Britishness 
indicated where prestige and power of the Wilson Government lay and the FO found 
quite difficult to argue down in a perfectly rational form. 
14 The policy shift in 
December 1968 emphasising the wishes of the islanders, as a result, was exactly what 
Morgenthau subscribed to. It showed that the moral concern for protecting "cultural 
identity against encroachments by other nations" did play a part in decision-making. 15 
As Morgenthau warned, "only foolhardy egocentrics are inclined to pursue a policy of 
prestige for its own sake". 
16 When the overall framing of the policy was transformed 
by Falklands lobbyists into "a sell-off of the British identity", it was unreasonable for 
the FO not to square up to this kind of motivated framing and to reject what had been 
deliberately planned. The reference point anchoring on British prestige in the UN had 
to be given up. 
As this case illustrates, the second policy preference was an unintended outcome. 
The decision to call a halt to the Memorandum of Understanding in preparation was 
14 Dennis Chong (1992) "Social incentives and the preservation of reputation in public-spirited 
collective action", International Political Science Review, 13,2, p. 195. 
15 Hans. J. Morgenthau (195 1) In defence ofthe national interest: A critical examination ofAmerican 
foreign policy (NY. Alfred A. Knopf), p. 972; Robert Jervis (1994) "Hans Morgenthau, realism, and the 
scientific study of international politics", Social Research, 61,4, p. 858, p. 867. 16 Ibid., p. 79. 
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hurriedly made. The FO took unwillingly a guiding principle in the talks to respect the 
wishes of the islanders, and the declaration in late 1968 was risk-acceptant. 
However, it was not unintended in the sense of being unacceptable to the Wilson 
Government. Indeed, the reversal of policy preference taking place in late 1968 
should be seen as an extension of Wilson's pragmatism. This argument is plausible, 
because Wilson often "talked about politics in the crudest nationalist terms" even 
when he enjoyed his enviable domain of gains before 1968.17 He seemed fully aware 
that there would be considerable degree of folder to supply its governing power by 
upholding the perception of Britishness as part of national sentiment under the 
heading of "making Britain great" or "the spirit of Dunkirk". 18 By this token, when the 
Government's credibility hit the trough in 1968, the motivated framing with a 
reference point around Britishness could be still helpful. It at least did not fall beyond 
Wilson's appetite so far as his pragmatic policy style was concerned. In other words, 
the reference point anchoring on Britishness, however unintended and threatening to 
the FO's pragmatic scheme concerning this dispute in the past two years, could still be 
seen as Wilson's pragmatic governing style. It would have been irrational to fail to 
perform an action or to adopt a policy preference that was practically necessary. 
On the other hand, given the unintended outcome, the switch of policy 
preferences was, pragmatically speaking, what the legitimacy of government. As 
Alderman rightly argued, "it is the business of the government, and of the organs of 
government, to do what the citizens of the state want, not what it is thought is in their 
interests. In a democracy it is the wishes of the people [italicised by Alderman], not 
their interests (defined by whom? ) which are paramount". 19 The second policy 
preference has to be seen in this light. It would have been not reasonable, if the 
Wilson Government had disregarded where the power sources came from and had 
continued its first policy preference in late 1968. To continue the former policy was to 
leave "out of account the principal channels through which the mass of the citizenry 
brings influence to bear on the decision makers", 20 and that was detrimental to the 
sustainability of source of power for that government. 
" Paul Foot (1968) Thepolitics ofHarold Wilson (London: Middlesex), pp. 332-3. 
18 Ibid.. 
11 Geoffrey Alderman (1984) Pressuregroups andgovernment in Great Britain (London & NY. 
Longman), p. 143. 
20 R L T. McKenzie (1968) "Parties, pressure groups and the British political procese, in Robert 
Benewick and Robert E. Dowse (eds. ), Reading on British politics and government (London: 
University Of London Press), p. 142. 
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This thesis also sees the second policy preference coming to the fore as evidence 
to support the assumption of prospect theory that consistency or not is a secondary 
concern in decision-making and decision-makers are adaptable. Decision-makers are 
quite capable of explaining away, at least to themselves, the inconsistencies of their 
policy-making. 21 The policy shift in late 1968 was a moment that highlighted a 
"dialectical interaction" between the government and its social structure. 22 To give up 
the designated policy preference held in 1966-68 reflected the FO's recognition that 
the policy designated in mid-1967 had "gone beyond socially tolerable bounds". 23 
Under the dual pressure of motivated framing in terms of loss, and the ill-conceived 
domain of loss in 1968, the FO's giving prominence to a particular code of moral 
conduct, i. e. the British way of life could not be seen as uncommon. 
However, this did not mean that morality excelled at the final hour so that it 
would be taken for granted by the FO. The policy shift for the FO was a matter of 
pragmatic response, not of moral rightness. Otherwise, there would have been no 
further sovereignty talks in the 1970s. Despite giving ground the concern of 
Britishncss in late 1968, the FO clearly understood that moral assessment could do 
harm to foreign policy in terms of national interests and moral standards were 
applicable only to a limited range. 24 This understanding was indeed the essence of the 
FO's pragmatism. The shift of policy lines from the interests of the islanders to their 
wishes was a practical necessity against the framing in terms of losses. It struck a 
balance between government and responsiveness, and this seemed a satisfactory 
solution in terms of power stability, despite temporarily, for the Wilson Government 
in late 1968. 
However, the degree of influence to the decision to give up the Memorandum of 
Understanding from the FO's strategic thinking should not be exaggerated. There 
were, admittedly, practical difficulties both in cognitive capability and power of 
judgement. In retrospect, there were decision-makers, such as Brown, Hohler and 
Chalfont, who failed to grasp the magnitude and complexity of the problem; solely 
21 Berndt Brehmer (1976) "Social judgement theory and the analysis of interpersonal conflict", 
Psychological Bulletin, 83,6, p. 1000; Leon Festinger (1957) A theory ofcognitive dissonance 
(London: Tavistock), pp. 1-2; Charles. E. Osgood and P. Tannenbaum (1955) "The principle of 
congruity and the prediction of attitude change", Psychological Review, 62, p. 43. 
22 Walter Carlsnaes (1992) "The agency-structure problem in foreign policy analysis", International 
Studies Quarterly, 36,3, p. 261. 
23 Morgenthau (1966) Politics among nations, p. 228-30. 
24 Felix E. Oppenhcim (1987) "National interest, rationality, and morality", Political Theory, 15,3, p. 
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setting the reference point at the level of aspiration. There were also those, such as 
Edmonds Diggines, who did realise the complexity of this problem, but whose 
proposed solutions were equally simplistic. There were others, such as Haskard and 
Lathbury, who might really care and had tried to initiate their motivated framing in 
terms of loss, but found it difficult to cope with the two-pronged motivated framing. 
There were still some, who had been struggling to no avail and suffering from this 
policy dilemma, such as Stewart and Creswell. 
In gathering implications, this thesis is deeply concerned not to be trapped into a 
structuralist perspective. It believes it unfair for Klein to comment that the Wilson 
Government "derived policies from the circumstances rather than from aims" due to a 
domain of loss in 1968.25 Instead, the FO's Falklands policy, during the period under 
study, exemplified a state-actor's strenuous effort to manipulate the changing 
circumstances, given the domain of framing sliding down from gains to losses. The 
two British policy preferences in the conduct of the Falklands policy from 1966 to 
1968 were pragmatic in policy style with a view to promoting the interests of Britain. 
Both policy preferences "were ultimately disposed through the absence or presence of 
social validation". 
26 They were timing responses and pragmatic options, because, 
ultimately, in "circumstances of confusion and pressure, instinct or tradition frequently 
prevails". 27 
The two policy preferences reflected the FO's pragmatic attitude in its conduct of 
Falklands policy. With the benefit of hindsight, the FO's primary objective in the 
sovereignty talks with Argentina in 1966-68 was to absorb the negative impact as 
prudently as possible against the wave of decolonisation movements in the 1960s. 28 
This attitude became increasingly manifest with the Government's standing being at 
stake in 1968. Despite the emphasis on economic integration, international institutions 
and norms on different occasions, these ideas did not have an autonomous influence 
on the FO. Instead, the FO seemed fully aware of "the sharp distinction between the 
383. 
25 Rudolf Klein (1968a) "Labour's loves losf', New Society, 12,313, p. 460. 
26 Emanuel Adler (1992) "The emergence of cooperation: National epistemic communities and the 
international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control", International Organisation, 46,1, p. 108. 
27 David Reynolds (199 1) Britannia overruled: British policy and worldpower in the twentieth century 
(London & NY. Longman), p. 63. 
28 S. M. Smith (198 1) "Traditionalism, behaviouralism and change in foreign policy analysis", in Barry 
Buzan and R. J. Barry Jones (eds. ), Change and the study ofinternational relations: The evaded 
dimension (London: Frances Pinter), p. 194; Philip Darby (1977) "East of Suez Reassessed", in John 
Baylis (ed. ), British defencepolicy in a changing world (London: Croorn Helm), P. 56. 
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desirable and the possible". 29 With several policy failures home and abroad, and, more 
specifically, with the Argentine retaliation against British exports due to the meat ban, 
some officials in the FO might pessimistically realise that a co-operative attitude 
towards Argentina had little to do with the realities. 30 In other words, decision-makers 
in the FO did acknowledge the importance of British prestige and better relations with 
Argentina. But when the designated policy exploded into a crisis, prestige and 
prospects of gains, in Morgenthau's words, became "at most the pleasant by-product 
of foreign policies" .31 The FO as a result perceived the need to sideline these 
kinds of 
concerns, however grudgingly. This was a pragmatic response, as far as the prestige of 
the Government was concerned. Ultimately, according to Morgenthau, the objectives 
of foreign policy "are not the reputation for power but the substance of power". 
32 At 
that critical moment in December 1968, the substance of power apparently lay in the 
domestic realm. 
A response to motivated framing, not to reference point 
The second empirical finding of the thesis is that the reversal of policy 
preference from the interests to the wishes in late 1968 was the FO's hasty response to 
the motivated framing in terms of losses, but not a response to the reference 
point-British identity. 
To begin with, the FO rarely dwelt on the notion of British identity throughout 
the policy debate either in Parliament or in memos. Despite the motivated framing in 
terms of a sell-out, formulated by the mass media, the FIEC and the backbenchers, 
there were few remarks made by the FO that communicated the idea of British 
identity. This lack of mentioning of British identity, either in the official papers or oral 
debates, indicated that morality was secondary in the policy calculation. The FO was 
pragmatic enough to guard against "overrating" this conceM. 
33 Having no interest in 
framing the issue in terms of British identity, the FO showed that there was a 
fundamental difference in the way of locating the reference point between those 
opposed to the designated policy and the FO. The motivated framing banking on 
British identity was not what the FO intended to uphold. Despite having been 
criticised in the parliamentary debate, the FO's reference points remained firmly 
29 Morgenthau (1966) Politics among nations, p. 7. 
30 F. H. Hinsley (1986) Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 1. 
31 Morgenthau (1966) Politics among nations, p. 79. 
32 Ibid.. 
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located in a broader spectrum straddling prospects of both gains and losses. British 
identity was rarely the FO's language. The second policy preference should be seen as 
a political expedient, adjusting to the deteriorating domain of losses. The expediency 
indicated that what was surrendered in late 1968 was the 170's motivated framing, not 
its reference points. It also explains why in the next decade after 1968, when chances 
allowed, the FCO would persistently advise the Cabinet that "a transfer of the islands 
to Argentine sovereignty was the only policy consistent with the need to protect 
British interests in Latin America". 34 This is precisely because, despite the pressure 
stemming from the opposition, the FCO still took better relations with Argentina and 
Britain's prestige in the world forum as the reference points in policy calculation. The 
view for the FCO was a long and pragmatic one. 
The difficulty of the FO's motivated framing in competing with the one 
formulated by the Falkland Islands in 1968 is understandable. If "Britishness" is "a 
matter of one's very make-up, one's flesh and blood", 
35 the islanders fall right within 
this ethnic boundary. They are linked to Britain by Britishness in that they are a self- 
aware group, possessing the emotional elements of a national image, and a common 
British way of cultural life. More specifically, they share historical memories with 
their ancestry that can be traced back up to six generations there as British. 36 The 
debates in December 1968 therefore represented the rise of ethnic nationalism, and 
this belief was grounded in "shared ancestry or genetic bons'. 37 What made the debate 
even more difficult for the FO to cope with was that some MPs including John Biggs- 
Davison, Julian Amery, Knox Cunningham, and Cyril Osborne, took the lead 
opposing the FO's first policy preference. These people tended to see the issue as an 
occasion to find an outlet for their nationalist fervour. Eight months before, they were 
quoted as commenting that Enoch Powell in the Birmingham speech was not a racist, 
but was exposing the problematic relationship between state and society in Britain. 38 
It is not a concern of this thesis whether they made a correct comment about Enoch 
33 Ibid., p. 233. 
34 J. E. Spence (1984) "British foreign policy: Tradition and change", in R. L. Borthwick and J. E. 
Spence (eds. ), British politics in perspective (NY. * Leicester University Press and St Martin Press), p. 
222. 
3' Jessica Jacobson (1997) "Perception of Britishnese', Nations and Nationalism, 3,2, p. 19 1. 
36 Michael Billing (1995) Banal nationalism (London: Sage), p. 8; Walker Connor (1978) "A nation is a 
nation is a state is an ethnic group is a Ethnic and Racial Study, 1,4, p. 3 88; John Patten (1989) 
"The Muslim community in Britain", The Y11mes, 5 July. 
37 Neil MacCormick (1996) "Liberalism, nationalism and the post-sovereignty state", Political Studies, 
44, p. 563. 
38 Labour Research Department (1969) Powell and his allies (London: LRD), p. 18. 
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Powell. But they might correctly point out the imbalance of attention paid by the 
Wilson Government in respect for governance and responsiveness this time. 
Looking ahead, it may not be wide of the mark to argue that the FO will continue 
with this pragmatic attitude in dealing with the issue of the Falkland Islands. If the 
domain of frame bodes well, the FCO may take initiatives to set its motivated framing 
in terms of gains, looking forward to settling the issue even multilaterally. If, 
however, motivated framing in terms of a "sell-out" emerges, the FCO may again 
come to defend its policy by strengthening its reference points, characterised by a 
broad spectrum rationally covering both gains and losses. Nevertheless, if there are 
dramatic events taking place and prove unfavourable to the overall domain of gain, to 
the extent that they create a domain of loss, the FCO will subsequently adjust the 
reference point back to the status quo. 
The agreement reached on 14 July 1999 among the Falkland Islands, London and 
Buenos Aires has to be understood on this basis. In his letter to this writer, Rex Hunt, 
Chairman of the Falkland Islands Association, made a positive comment on the 
agreement on the ground that "the majority [of the islanders] had decided that, taking 
the package as a whole, the benefits outweighed the dangers". 39 Hence, when the 
Government talked about the "excellent" relations, booming markets in Argentina, and 
cooperation, 40 the FCO's motivated framing in terms of gains, just as that in 1966, has 
actually come back. This certainly encourages development of good neighbourly 
relations in the process of managing the potential risk .41 However, it is still premature 
to make judgements as this thesis has only a year in which to review the results of the 
current talks. 42 It is premature also because the anchoring effect of the war in 1982 is 
still fresh; the islanders' attitude towards Argentina has not relaxed and the Blair 
Government seems more willing to leave the issue of sovereignty to the islanders. 
The problem is that when London leaves the issue of sovereignty to the islanders 
in the name of their wishes, the issue is sometimes easily transformed into an emotive 
one. On the other hand, although the Blair Government is apparently attempting to 
build an economic relationship between the two sides, an issue "relating to political 
39 Letter from Sir Rex Hunt to this writer, 22 July 1999. 
"' Falkland islands News Network, 7 March 2000. 
41 Falkland islands News Network, 28 January 2000. 
42 Falkland islands News Network, 17 October 1999. 
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identity and legitimacy cannot be resolved by economic means alone". 43 Prospect 
theory prompts this thesis to ask: what if the risks outweigh the benefits, when the 
Government's domain of frame turns sour? It is reasonable for this thesis to expect 
that when the motivated framing in terms of losses comes back; i. e., when the domain 
of loss occurs, Britishness as the reference point will, again, become powerful enough 
to tip the whole balance of the Government's scheme in pursuit of a permanent 
solution. 
Assessment of the three policy proposals 
The last point anticipates the whole argument of this section. Seen from prospect 
theory, the surface attraction of the three policy proposals, which have been discussed 
in Chapter 1, including the ideas of leaseback, shared sovereignty and integration into 
the Antarctic Treaty System, conceal conspicuous difficulties, if the passage of time is 
not long enough. 
The idea of leaseback 
In any Icascback arrangement following the Hong Kong model, the discussion is 
always hindered by the motivated framing in terms of "keeping the British way of life" 
under the pledge of the wishes of the islanders. From the perspective of argumentation 
based on British nationality, indeed, it is exceedingly hard to draw a parallel from the 
case of Hong Kong. There is no local lifestyle that can represent a "people" in Hong 
Kong. According to Baker and Lau, people living in Hong Kong have little feeling of 
local community. 44 By contrast, the Falkland Islanders have a strong sense of 
community and they rarely think that they are a "transient population"ý'5 It is said that 
geographical remoteness has little diminished their sense of British identity. As Biggs- 
Davison emphatically noted, the islanders were "more British than the population of 
London". 46 Therefore, when Beck harped on the idea of leaseback with the excuse of 
its being "less painful" to Britain than to Argentina, his prescription is filled with 
difficulties. Beck has to be reminded that the suggestion of the Hong Kong model will 
"' Muthiah Alagappa (1995) "Regionalism and conflict management: A framework for analysie, 
Review ofInternational Studies, 2 1, p. 3 82. 
44 Hugh D. R. Baker (1995) "Hong Kong: A view from both sides", Asian Affairs, 24,1, p. 12; Siu-kai 
Lau (1992) "Colonial rule, transfer of sovereignty and the problem of political leaders in Hong Kong", 
Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 30,2, p. 226. 
45 David Thomas (199 1) "The view from Whitehall", in Waynes S. Smith (ed. ), Toward resolution? The 
FalklandslMalvinas dispute (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), p. 19. 
46 Michael Charlton (1989) The littleplatoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands dispute (oxford: Basil 
Blackwell), p. 80; Colin Phipps (1977) "atfuturefor the Falklands (London: Fabian Tract), p. 6. 
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mean no more than surrender to the Argentine appetite for sovereignty in the eyes of 
Falklands lobbyists. Beck may be correct in extracting the specific lesson from 1966, 
when the sovereignty discussions began in a "cordial" atmosphere. However, he 
definitely commits a fallacy in applying the lesson without regard to the impasse in 
late 1968. So far as this thesis can determine, on the other hand, the power of the 
motivated framing in terms of loss together with the domain of loss cannot be lightly 
dismissed. Beck's prescription has apparently run ahead of the empirical tests. What 
concerns this thesis even more is that an adequate standard by which the international 
community can judge the justice of distribution of interests with "less pains" in this 
47 
case has not been readily at hand . 
The interpretation of "being less painful" will be 
made at great cost to the concern ofjustice either from the perspective of "consensus" 
or from that of the "reasonable comprehensive view it . 
48 
Integration into the Antarctic Treaty System 
Another suggestion is that Britain ought to resume the Antarctic Treaty as the 
reference point. 49 It is admitted that the Antarctic Treaty is an appreciable multi- 
lateral approach to the arbitration of different claims to sovereignty in this area. It may 
furthermore restrain risk-seeking behaviour on both sides. However, the fundamental 
point is that Argentina has consistently expressed its suspicion about introducing other 
factors into the framework of the Treaty. Malaysia, for instance, sought to enter the 
concept of "community heritage of mankind" into the Antarctic structure. 50This 
viewpoint met strong opposition from Argentina. Roberto Guyer, the Argentine 
Ambassador to Germany, argued that "Any attempt to internationalise the region 
would not only mean the end of the Treaty-i. e. the end of an understanding among 
the countries directly concerned-but also the beginning of a critical period of 
confrontation". 51 Indeed, the Antarctic Treaty by nature is more law-declaring than 
law binding. It is declarative in the sense that the Treaty represents what "was already 
47 Raymond Plant (1984) Equality, markets and the state (London: Fabian Society), p. 2. 
48 John Rawls (1972) A theory ofjustice (Oxford: Clarendon), p. 581; Brian Barry (1995) "John Rawls 
and the search for stability", Ethics, 105,4, p. 90 1, p. 914. 
49 Jack Child (1988) Antarctic and South American geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum (NY. Praeger), pp. 
88-9. 
" I- A. Herr, H. R. Hall and M. G Haward (1990) "Antarctica's future symbols and reality", in R. A. 
Herr, H. R. Hall and M. G Haward (cds. ), Antarctic'sfuture: Continuity or change? (Hobart Tasmania 
Australia: Australian Institute of International Affairs), p. 12. 
51 Roberto E. Guyer (1983) "Antarctic's role in international relations", in Francisco Orrego Vicuna 
(ed. ), Antarctic resources policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 275. 
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agreed to as a matter Of CUStOM". 52 In other words, the current achievements of the 
Treaty cannot be taken for granted. It needs caution to maintain the delicate status 
quo. Accordingly, adding an issue of sovereignty into this framework may rekindle 
the dormant sovereignty dispute at any moment. 53 The general rule must be to keep 
the long-running friction over the Falkland Islands from infecting the situation in 
Antarctica. 
Besides, it is also hard to see what political advantages will accrue to Britain 
from placing the Falklands factor into the framework of the Antarctic Treaty, given 
the character of the Treaty that every participant state has strenuously sought to 
protect. This thesis, accordingly, sees no practical reason for Britain in the near future 
to choose this option. It seems sensible for Britain not to rock the boat to add the 
destabilising element-the Falklands dispute-into the status quo in Antarctica. 
Shared sovereignty 
Perhaps the notion of shared sovereignty is a worthwhile alternative. To start 
with, the notion of shared sovereignty recasts the relevance of the concept of 
community, which is a distinctive idea that New Labour intends to Ushake up the 
party's thinking" before the 1997 election, 
54 and to build an interdependent 
relationship between "self-interests and altruism" as its philosophical basis. 55 
Regional community has been held by New Labour as an "over-reaching concept of 
the public interest" invoked in support of the "merits of a competitive market 
economy" that the old socialists find scarcely compatible. 56 As an attack on the 
framing around identity, Blair's words come readily to mind. "We do not lose our 
identity in our relations with others", as quoted by Rentoul. Blair went on and asserted 
that "we achieve our identity by those relations". 57 Although this remark does not 
necessarily indicate a decline of nationalistic attitude, which still constitutes a basic 
52 William Thomas Jr. Mallison (1974) "Legal implications: International Law", in Schatz, Gerald S. 
(ed. ), Science, technology, and sovereignty in thepolar regions (London: Lexington), p. 41. 
53 Bruce Davis (1990) "Science and politics in Antarctic and southern oceans policy: A critical 
assessmenf', in R. A. Herr, H. R. Hall and M. G Haward (eds. ),, 4ntarct1c`sfuture. Continuity or 
change? (Hobart Tasmania Australia: Australian Institute of International Affairs), p. 4 1. 
54 Peter Mandelson and Roger Liddle (1996) The Blair revolution: Can New Labour deliver? (London 
& Boston: Faber and Faber), p. 19. 
55 Steven Fielding (1995) Labour: Decline and renewal (London: Baseline), p. 102. 
56 Tudor Jones (1996) Remaking the Labour Party: From Gaitskell to Blair (London & NY. Routedge), 
ri 13 6. 
John Rentoul 0 995) Tony Blair (London: Warner), p. 43. 
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characteristic of western culture, 58 it certainly reflects recognition of the current 
European elite that, to compete economically world-wide, Britain has to put aside 
political nationalism, and stress the functions of regional frameworks. 59 
Nevertheless, the notion of community is, at most, a signpost for the path to a 
solution of the issue, it is not promising. 60 The practical situation between the 
Falklands and Argentina is far more complex. To uphold the idea of community gives 
no indication that competition and conflict owing to different values will be 
consequently undermined. 61 Judging from the argument that the basis of political 
community is to define the appropriate boundary between belonging and not 
belonging, 62 one will find that the talks of a community in the full sense of the term 
may be premature in this case. 
Practically, in respect of "a community-based political subjectivity", 63 Argentina 
has done less than enough. The Argentine Government seems to perceive a double 
standard towards the calls for environmental protection, which is a primary concern of 
the Falkland Islands. 64 According to Greenpeace, an organisation which campaigns 
for environmental protection, Argentina at the time of writing is about to sign a decree 
to allow Taiwanese and South Korean fishing boats to come back again, operating in 
the neighbouring seas. As these vessels have no inspectors on board, the Argentine 
decision will be a direct threat to the economic incomes of the Islanders, who have 
been extremely concerned about the poaching in and around the Falklands' waters. 65 
Hence, despite British unilateral efforts to "loosen the insecurity trap" in the islanders' 
sceptical mind by stressing the better relationship, 66 what is still lacking between the 
58 Daniel Dcudney and G John Ikenberry (1999) "The nature and sources of liberal international 
order" , Review ofInternational 
Studies, 25,2, p. 194; Mattei Dogan (1994) "The decline of 
nationalisms within Western Europe", Comparative Politics, 26,3, p. 28 1. 
" Peter Cocks (1980) "Towards a Marxist theory of European integration", International Organisation, 
34,1, p. 39. 
61 Robert J. Lieber (1972) Theory and worldpolitics (Massachusetts: Winthrop), pp. 58-9. 
61 Eileen Younghusband (1968) (ed. ) Community work and social change: The report ofa study group 
on training set up by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation (London: Longman), pp. 77-8. 
62 Daniel Warner (1996) "Levinas, Buber and the concept of otherness in international relations: A 
reply to David Campbell", Millennium, 25,1, p. 112. 
63 Paul Rabinow (1994) "Representations are social facts: Modernity and post-modernity in 
anthropology", in James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds. ), Writing culture. Thepoetics and 
politics ofethnography (Los Angels, Berkley & London: University of California Press), p. 2S7. 
64 Caroline Thomas (1992) The environment in international relations (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs), pp. 12-3. 
65 BBC World Service (1999) Calling the Falklands, 29 September, manuscript by D. Palmer 
66 Hansard (Commons) col. 1094,22 July 1998; David Boucher (1998) Political theories of 
international relations: From Thucydides to thepresent (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 405; 
Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth (1987) "Beyond the security dilemma: Technology, strategy and 
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Falkland Islands and the Argentine continent is a shared normative stance across the 
two sides. Argentina seems insensitive to the "thick morality" of a particularistic 
society that is highly vulnerable to the external world. 67 It seems not fully aware that, 
68 
although "environmental degradation has no particular national character", the 
Falkland Islands on fisheries is an exception. If the islanders' economic means is 
under threat, it can be detrimental to the notion of a community becoming reality. 
Historically, as Calhoun studied the dynamic of the British society and noted, 
there is a "danger in taking at face value the apocalyptic assertion of contemporaries 
about change in their 'communities'", 69 because, explained Deudney, "Britain's 
70 
political values have to be read into the historical experience". Seen in this light, 
historical sentiments are what communitarians pay homage to. 71 But they may be 
more of an obstacle to developing a broader regional involvement with Argentina than 
a solution. 72 The oft-repeated wishes of the islanders to retain their link to the British 
way of life will represent nothing but a view hardly compatible with the regional 
blueprint, seeking to combine the two sides. In this regard, the development of the 
Falkland Islands illustrates what Little concerns. Namely, the British governments 
seem to suffer from a policy dilemma between integration into an interdependent 
international community through regional development on the one hand, and keeping 
sovereignty on the other hand. 73 
Theoretically, the moral claims of community also espouse the norm of non- 
intervention embedded in relativism, 74 or in parallel with the principle of self- 
international security", in Carl CL Jacobsen (ed. ), Yhe uncertain course (W. Oxford University Press), 
321. 
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determination. 75 It is therefore an illusion for an observer to expect that the concept of 
community held by the Labour Government will deny the presence of "a particular 
quality and dimension of social experience" in the Falklands society. 76 Ultimately, the 
reinterpretation of socialism by advocating community is also relevant to the issue of 
77 identity, seen from the communitarian appeal. Thus prompted, there is a tension 
between the idea of shared sovereignty and New Labour's communitarian appeal. 
Because Communitarians emphasise "an identity that embodies historical continuity", 
this emphasis can be "more enthusiastic nationalists" in nature. 78 Hence, while 
invoking the notion of community, the entailed strategy of the British Government is 
still uncertain. Blair, with this strategy, rhetoric or not, may leave ample room for this 
thesis to doubt the practical meaning of community in this issue. It seems that this 
strategy open more space for this Government to manoeuvre, when Blair stated that 
the basic value of community should be applied differently to the modem world. 79 
Hence, the notion of shared sovereignty based on connotations of the term 
"community" is tantalising, but tenuous. The perspective from prospect theory will 
continue to be relevant in this regard. To be precise, if the political climate is 
unfavourable, and if the Falkland Islands resuscitates motivated framing in terms of 
losses, it is highly likely that the FCO will be forced to reconsider taking the wishes 
of the islanders as the negotiating principle again. It will be expedient to let moral 
concerns underpin the issue, and subdue the current framing either in terms of 
regional community or in terms of economic gains. 
No easy alternative 
Taken together, no easy alternative suggests itself. This thesis understands that 
the current diplomatic breakthroughs claimed by ex-President Menem and British 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook are still not at the final stage of the game. British 
initiatives towards Argentina can at best be described as "fence mending" for the past 
18 years since the war . 
80 But from the perspective of prospect theory that observes the 
R. John Vincent (1986) Human rights and international relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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competing sets of motivated framing against the rise of and fall of the domain of 
frame, there are reasons for pessimism. The Falklands lobbyists may be "marginal to 
the policy process", 81 but they know that their chances of seizing the spotlight remain. 
This is not only because backbenchers express their view more freely in moral 
issues, 82 or because the nature of this issue can be one "cross party", 83 but also 
because, when the domain of loss sets in, the reference point anchoring around British 
identity may constitute a powerful motivated framing that will nip the FCO's schemes 
to resolve the issue in the bud. 
The implications are complex for the longer term. Britain's attitude to its 
sovereignty over the Falkland Islands in the immediate future will be contingent upon, 
first, whether the dramatic effect of the war remained deeply rooted among the 
islanders. With reference to the domain of frame, historical memory of the war 
remains a critical reference point to arouse emotion. By this token, time will play an 
important role. The more time passes the weaker the anchoring effect of the war. On 
the other hand, the reference point around Britishness cannot be taken for granted. 
National identity comes and goes without a constant momentum. 84 A survey, 
conducted by the Economist and published in November 1999, shows that only two 
per cent of Britons think of their British identity first. 
85 It is therefore likely that 
"British nationalism may already have reached its apogee", 86 and that the British 
public have become less and less concerned about "the more general issue of UK 
nationaliSnf'. 87 In other words, when the reference point of Britishness recedes and 
war memories fade, the proposal of shared sovereignty and Beck's Hong Kong model 
may have a better chance of being brought forward by the FO for policy debates. 
Second, the future trend will also depend upon whether Argentina takes "a 
similar normative stance" in its dealings with economic and environmental affairs in 
45,11, P. 198. 
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the Falklands'waters. 88 In this respect, Argentina may have made good use of 
opportunities in the past two decades, but they are apparently less sensitive to the fact 
that annual incomes from licences are the mainstays of the Falkland Islands, and this 
is what the islanders are currently most concerned about. 
To sum up, the development of the issue of the Falkland Islands can be seen as 
an interaction where the FO's motivated framing in terms of gains, the Falkland 
Islands' motivated framing in terms of losses, and the general domain of frame 
shadowing the issue, and competing with one another. The interaction is also 
fundamentally influenced by the time/space biases of the British public towards the 
issue alongside the history. 89 Above all, the interaction serves as a barometer of the 
future development of this issue, to the extent that even the durability of current 
multilateral arrangements in the South Atlantic can be the function of this 
interaction. 90 
For the FCO as a result, the issue currently remains firmly lodged in a kind of 
political limbo. It has never been quite removed from the Cabinet's agenda, but never 
been able to gain sufficient political sympathy to make signi icant progress. at f" Wh 
have been left are, as discussed in Chapter 1, the Argentine unceasing nationalist 
appeal, Britain's intransigence on sovereignty, controversy over the principle of self- 
determination and an enduring security concern! 
2. A theory restatement bearing on foreign policy making 
As a territory dispute symbolises a new frontier for prospect theory, this thesis 
asserts that the explanatory power of prospect theory is reinforced by this case study. 
Also, through the test of the four hypotheses, despite some points remaining 
ambiguous, prospect theory in this case has proved capable of shedding its 
unfavourable criticism of being "micro-foundational" suited only to the laboratory. 91 
Levy's point that prospect theory is "unlikely to be replicated in the complex empirical 
88 Chris Brown (1995) "International theory and international society: The viability of the middle way,,, 
Review ofInternational Studies, 21,3, p. 196. 
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world of international relations" may no longer be valid. 92 On the other hand, when 
rational choice models fail to provide explanation consistently within their own 
premises in Chapter 2, prospect theory with its explanations in Chapter 4 meets the 
requirement that it must be "evaluated in the light of its competitors". 93 However, as 
Waltz admits in an interview, a theory "cannot be about everything". " This thesis 
realises that the broader the scope a theory covers, the less accurate will be its 
95 explanation. In an attempt to provide stimulus to further theory development, this 
thesis concludes in this section with a restatement of prospect theory. 
Broader than rational choice models 
Prospect theory can be seen as a broader but contingent framework than rational 
choice models. Based on the premise of representativeness within the domain of 
frame, prospect theory can explain preference formation, wherein rational choice 
models such as neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism are silent. 96 Secondly, with 
the assistance of decision weight-a subjective force, and dramatic events--an 
objective impact, prospect theory is also capable of explaining preference reversals 
that the latter finds hard to account for. 97 Thirdly and more importantly, as the case 
study indicated, framing in a territorial dispute was not "static" as Stein claimed. 98 
Framing can be formulated in terms of losses, as most IR researchers bank on their 
hypotheses. It can also be formulated in ternis of gains, when a decision-maker is 
highly motivated, locating the reference point above the status quo and seeking a 
better trade-off. 
In the light of the finding that framing can also be formulated in terms of gains, 
Levy is correct to argue that motivated framing can be thought of as a weak form of 
rational choice model. 
99 This is because prospect theory does not accept highly 
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idealised conceptions of rationality that take political decisions solely as a moment of 
one's seeking for gains, or purely independent of the structure. 100 Rather, it takes a 
weaker form of rationality that assumes a choice preference as the result of interaction 
of structures and decision-making agents. 101 
To start with, with the notion of the domain of frame and motivated framing, 
prospect theory holds a compromise assumption of rationality. It expects to see choice 
as a response to environmental stimuli due to the interaction of two forces between 
the domain of frame and different sets of motivated framing. 102 This is because 
prospect theory sees political decisions in foreign affairs as a lively ongoing process. 
Alongside this decision-making process, a policy preference can be influenced by 
different variables including personal motivation and negative impacts from the 
structural change. However, prospect theory admits that the cognitive capacity of 
human beings is limited. A decision-maker may "act for reasons", despite a lack of 
"practical reasoning". 103 To do this, the decision-maker seeking to acquire more about 
the background information has to draw inference. 104 He or she has to be assisted by a 
"situation-perception" map. 105 However, this map can never be complete so far as 
information gathering is concerned. The incomplete map will render decision-makers, 
rationality only a weak one. Viewed in this light, rationality in prospect theory seems 
more compatible with the idea of a "bounded", "procedural" or minimal" form of 
rationality. It has departed from the core assumption of rational choice models. 
Because of its weaker form of rationality, this thesis argues that prospect theory 
offers a more powerful model than rational choice models. To begin with, there are 
100 Christopher Cherniak (1986) Minimal rationality (London: MIT), pp. 9-11, p. 16; Rose McDcrinott 
(1998) Risk-taking in internationalpolitics: Prospect theory in Americanjoreign policy (Ann Arbour. 
University of Michigan Press), p. 3. Herbert A. Simon (1986) "Rationality in psychology and 
economics", Journal ofBusiness, 59,4, p. s210. 
'01 Dudley Shapere (1985) "Observation and the scientific enterprise", in PetcrAchinstein and Owen 
Hannaway (eds. ), Observation, experiment, and hypothesis in modern physical science (Cambridge: 
The MIT), p. 30. 
"Jak Jabes (1978) Individualprocess in organisational behaviour (Arlington Heights, Illinois: AHM), 
5, 
Robert Audi (1997) "Acting for reasons", in Alfred R. Mele (ed. ), Thephilosophy ofaction (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), p. 104. 
104 Robert Axelrod (I 976c) "The analysis of cognitive maps", in Robert Axelrod (ed. ), Structure of 
decision: The cognitive maps ofpolitical elites (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 57. 
'05 David Chalmers (1995) "High-level perception, presentation, and analogue: A critique of artificial- 
intelligence methodology", in Douglas Hofstadtcr and the Fluid Analogies Research Group (eds. ), Fluid 
concepts & creative analogies: Computer models ofthefundamental mechanisms ofthought (NY. 
BasicBooks, A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. ), p. 18 1. 
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descriptive failures from the perspective of rational-choice models. 106 Prospect 
theory, with its assumption of weak rationality, tacitly admits that a primary factor 
"affecting policy at time- I is policy at time-0". 1 07 In other words, it sees a preferred 
choice as a result of interaction between cognitive response to the structure and 
decision-makers' initiatives. ' 08 Arguing in this way, the structural impact cannot be 
dismissed in observation. Structural impact, instead, becomes the starting point of 
observation. 
On the other hand, however, decision-making in prospect theory is by no means 
dictated to by structural impact. Policy preferences in the form of choices are an 
interactive result of one's preferences and one's surroundings (the domain of frame) 
where an individual's motivated framing is nurtured. 109 More dynamically, this 
interaction is reinforced by dramatic events taking place occasionally that draw 
decision weight closer to an "appropriate" reference point as time passes by. Prospect 
theory therefore offers the readcr a more powerful decision-making model than a 
rational choice. It is capable of offering an explanation for preference formation and 
preference reversal from a perspective, which consists of structural impacts and 
subjective evaluation. ' 10 
Broader than cognitive psychology 
A weaker form of rationality also takes prospect theory one step further forward 
than cognitive psychology in the literature of decision-making. To begin with, the 
explanatory weakness in cognitive psychology lies in the tendency to explore little 
about the subjective value-system. It instead presents the behaviour of decision- 
David M. Grether and Charles R. Plott (1979) "Economic theory of choice and the preference 
reversal phenomenon" The American Economic Review, 69,4, p. 634; Michael Nicholson (1995) 
"Rational decision in iýternational crises: A rationalisation", in Keith Dowding and Desmond King 
(eds. ), Preferences, institutions, and rational choice (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 163. 
107 Peter A. Hall (1993) "Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: The case of economic 
policyrnaking in Britain", Comparative Politics, 25, p. 277. log Peter Bennett and Michael Nicholson (1994) "Formal methods of analysis in IR", in A. I R. Groom 
and Margot Light (eds. ), Contemporary international relations: A guide to theory (London: Pinter), p. 
208; Hilel J. Einhorn and Robin M. Hogarth (1986) "Decision making under ambiguity", Journal of 
Business, 59,4, p. s225; Mark Wickham-Jones (1995) "Rationality, revolution, and reassurance", in 
Keith Dowding and Desmond King (eds. ), Preferences, institutions, and rational Choice (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press), pp. 249-50; Herbert A. Simon (1976) "From substantive to procedural rationality", in 
Spiro J. Latsis (ed. ), Method and appraisal in economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
pp. 130- 1; Simon (1985) "Human nature in politics: The dialogue of psychology with political 
science', American Political Science Review, 79, pp. 293-305. 
101 F. H. Bradley (1922) Principle oflogic, vol, I (London: Oxford University Press), p. 98. 
110 Joseph Frankel (1970) National interest (London: Macmillan), p. 24. 
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making in too general a term of representativeness. "' However, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, that cognitive psychology explains decision-making solely by 
representativeness is still debatable. Take communication theory for instance, it 
emphasises metaphors and visual images, but makes no differentiation of the 
decision-makers concerned. ' 12 This is problematic. It can hardly escape the criticism 
of bifurcationism simplistically assuming that the human "experience reaches out no 
further than contact with perceptible types". ' 13 
Prospect theory in this regard clearly has a broader and more contingent 
perspective than the notion of representativeness. Although a domain of frame in 
prospect theory is taken as the primitive force, 114 it does not reduce a decision to the 
cffcct of representativeness or deny the subj ectivc value of strategic thinking. " 5 
Instead, the reference points, accentuated by decision weight and dramatic events, 
help an analyst to see how "different dccision-makcrs (or the same decision makers at 
different times) may be rational in different ways". ' 16 This is a plausible situation in 
foreign policy making as well as international politics. With different sets of 
motivated framing and different reference points whereupon decision weight lies, the 
argument based on cognitive psychology can be marginalised because of different sets 
of rationality. ' 17 
However, emphasising subjective values in prospect theory does not mean that 
subjective values will dominate policy outcomes. Although each subjective value- 
system influences the general framing of a problem, it has to be made clear that there 
may simultaneously exist several sets of motivated framing competing with one 
another in pursuit of a dominant status. Therefore the decision-makers' efforts to 
formulate their motivated framing do not guarantee that a new domain of frame of the 
same issue will emerge at one's will. It may also be possible that other sets of 
J. R. Anderson, J. R. (1983) The architecture ofcognition (Cambridge, Massachusetts &London: 
Harvard University Press), pp. 46-7, p. 126; John B. Best (1995) Cognitive psycholosy, 4 th edition 
(Minneapolis: West Publishing), pp. 11 -2. 
111 Robert M. Entman (199 1) "Framing U. S. coverage of international news: Contrasts in narratives of 
the KAL and Iran air incidents", Journal of Communication, 41,4, p. 7. 
Michael Luntley (1999) Contemporary philosophy ofthought: Truth, world, content (oxford: 
Blackwell), p. 300. 
"' Nicholas Rescher (1964) Hypothetical reasoning (Amsterdam: North-Holland), p. 7. 
Is George W. Downs (1989) "The rational deterrence debate", World Politics, 41,2, p. 237. 
Pascal Engel (1989) The norm oftruth: An introduction to thephilosophy oflogic (London: Harvest & 
Wheatsheaf), p. 294. 
116 Eric Herring (1995) Danger and opportunity., Explaining international crisis outcomes (Manchester 
& NY. Manchester University Press), p. 64. 
1" Stephen D. Krasner (1995/96) "Compromising Westphalia", International Security, 20,3, p. 148. 
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motivated framing, despite having been rejected by the central decision-makers, do 
not disappear but continuously challenge the dominant motivated frarning. ' 18 The 
preference of Governor Haskard and his effort to formulate the motivated framing in 
terms of loss by the end of 1968 can be understood in this light. Under these 
circumstances, cognitive psychology based on sole concept of representativeness will 
be weak in explaining preference reversals as it "does not embody a revision phase" in 
its theoretical domain. ' 19 Motivated framing as another explanatory variable in this 
thesis will be helpful in this regard. To be precise, subjective value in motivated 
framing can be seen as a filter, through which a decision maker will strategically 
determine what kind of information about the external world is selected for better 
120 argumentation, with reference to the positive or negative domain of frame. 
Additionally, with selection of better arguments, there is at least a case to be made that 
motivated framing can be part of strategic thinking. It is capable of regenerating a 
new domain of frame through the medium of reasons when arguments are exchanged. 
To summarise, prospect theory represents a meeting place of weaker rationality 
and representativeness. It can be seen as the perspective driving a wedge between 
rational-choice models and cognitive psychology. With the assumptions of bounded 
rationality and cognitive power, it avoids being criticised for explaining the behaviour 
as the partial understanding the whole. It also avoids the inconclusive debates 
between rationality and behaviouriSM. 121 Its methodological design exemplifies an 
explanatory framework that an observer needs so as not to see the influence of 
structure and agents as "mutually exclusive". 122 This design echoes Stein's call for 
integrating "cognitive and affective dimensions ofjudgement" in foreign policy 
analysis. 123 Meanwhile, the notions of dramatic events and decision weight also form 
a bridgehead to meet the question of interaction between the structural impacts and 
I" Julius Kuhl (1986) "Human motivation: From decision making to action control", in Berndt 
Brehmer, Helmut Jungermann, Peter Lourens and Guje Sevon (eds. ), New directions in research on 
decision making (Amsterdam, NY, Oxford & Tokyo: North-Holland), p. 11. 
I" G Matthew Bonham and Michael J. Shapiro (1986) "Mapping structures of thought", in Irmtraud N. 
Gallhofer, Willem E. Saris and Marianne Melman (eds. ), Different text analysis proceduresfor the 
study ofdecision making (Amsterdam: Sociometric Research Foundation), p. 46. 
120 Richard Little (1988) "Belief system in the social science", in Richard Little and Steve Smith (cds. ), 
Beliefsystems and international relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 47. 
121 Richard Zeckhauser (1986) "Comments: Behavioural versus rational economics: What you see is 
what you conquer", Journal ofBusiness, 59,4, ss435-6. 
122 Herbert A. Simon (1966) "Political research: The decision-making framework", in David Easton 
(ed. ), Varieties ofpolitical theory (NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. ), p. 15. 
123 Janice Gross Stein (1988) "Building politics into psychology: The Misperception of threat", 
political Psychology, 9,2, p. 265. 
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agents' deliberation. With this broader and contingent framework, this thesis 
concludes that prospect theory is better positioned to explain decision-making than 
cognitive psychology and rational choice theories. 
A critique of loss avoidance 
This thesis finds that treatment of loss avoidance as an independent variable 
bearing on the causal mechanism of prospect theory is a mistake. To begin with, 
losses in prospect theory refer to properties that are measured against the reference 
point. But this notion is too vague to grasp what a decision-maker exactly intends to 
communicate or argue for. To put it another way, losses are a difference between the 
status quo and an expected result. However, when a decision-maker talks about an 
expected result of loss, the term can be understood as properties locating above the 
status quo, or found staying below it. In other words, there are in fact two kinds of 
loss that a decision-maker may intend to avoid. If a decision-maker sets a reference 
point at the level of aspiration, and calls for action because of loss avoidance, the 
decision-makers, according to prospect theory, can be expected to have a risk-averse 
inclination. The first British policy preference in late 1966 was a case in point. 
There are occasions when decision-makers are engaged in the effort of 
maintaining the status quo. Under this condition, properties of loss concern refer to 
those below the level of status quo. A decision-maker under this circumstance, when 
calling for action in the name of loss avoidance is making an attempt to keep the 
status quo and protect the expected loss. For a decision-maker bargaining in this 
situation, according to prospect theory, we can expect a risk-acceptant preference to 
emerge in the ensuing policy behaviour. The second British policy preference that 
hurriedly came to the fore in December 1968 was a case in point. 
That said, loss avoidance is irrelevant to the risk propensity of a decision-making 
unit in terms of mechanism, because concern about loss may bring about either 
desperation to keep the status quo or a pre-emptive act to pursue an expected gain. 
This is because, following prospect theory, we can identify two kinds of loss 
avoidance as psychological forces at work. It may refer to loss of the Status quo or 
loss of an expected utility above the status quo. Without realising that there are two 
different natures of losses, i. e. two different perceptions of loss avoidance, analysts, 
when taking loss avoidance as an independent variable, may put the reader on slippery 
ground when they attempt to explore the causal relationship bearing on prospect 
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theory. Hence, there is no causal mechanism from the perspective of loss avoidance. 
Sparta's response to Athens' rising power, for instance, was a case owing to loss 
. avoidance, 
124 leading to Sparta's preference for war-a pre-emptive act. 125 But loss 
avoidance also can lead to cooperation with other states, such as Japan's decision to 
co-develop FSX fighters with US-a desperate choice that Japan only made 
unwillingly. 126 
indeed, the explanatory power of loss avoidance is weak. As Herring argues, 
"decision-makers may be motivated by potential loss or potential gain, and how they 
act may also be influenced by the extent of opportunity available to avert losses or 
make gains". 127 Because of the existing motivated bias, a "decision-maker", as 
128 Herring explained, might be "powerfully motivated by desire for gailf'. Dyer and 
Sarin concur, arguing that it would be more descriptive to call a decision-maker a 
"relatively risk neutral individual" with the indication that "preference for risky 
alternatives are neutral to the introduction of risk". 129 Seen in this light, even the status 
quo bias is questionable. The motivated framing in terms of gains does not necessarily 
give ground to that in terms of losses. 
The idea of loss avoidance can be problematic with the task of explaining policy 
preferences. Caution is needed when taking it as an explanatory variable in 
observation. It would, instead, be better to take loss avoidance as a dependent 
variable. Another point is that, in a wider context, loss avoidance is a constant 
variable in human behaviour, relative to expected utilities. As loss avoidance also has 
been so appealing in rational choice theorieS, 130 this thesis does not think that the 
notion of loss avoidance is a claim specific to prospect theory. 
Tension between a reference point and framing 
124 Laurie M. Johnson Bagby (1994) "The Use and abuse of Thucydides in international relations", 
International Organisation, 48,1, p. 136. 
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This thesis also finds the tension exists between the reference point and 
motivated framing in prospect theory. This tension will make the comment that 
"prospect theory is a reference-dependence theory" problematic. 
To begin with, it is debatable that British identity, as one reference point, was a 
decisive factor forcing the negotiating principle from the interests back to the wishes 
in late 1968. In this light, the whole argument will return to Femenia's notion of 
identity in the British-Argentinc dispute. 131 This is unacceptable. The decisive cause 
in December 1968 was the result of two major sets of motivated framing fiercely 
competing with each other. To put it more succinctly, it was not the concern for 
British identity, but the combination of the whole framing in terms of losses that 
forced the FO's motivated framing to fall apart. 
As Maoz argued, there are many manipulations anchoring on different reference 
points that compete with one another. However, manipulations do not necessarily 
bring about the expected motivated framing on the grounds that the effects of the 
rnanipulations are constrained by the domain of frame. 132 A better understanding as a 
result should be: with the dynamic of the dramatic events working against the domain 
of loss, the Falkland Islands'vcrsion of motivated framing gradually became 
powerful, to the extent that it was powerful enough to influence the policy shift in late 
1968. British identity in defeating the FO's motivated framing was the straw that 
broke the camel's back. 
a Hence, Britishncss was only one reference point among many in the overall 
framing of the issue. It cannot be seen as consistently decisive throughout the 
Falklands history. Before the war of 1982 indeed, Britishness had rarely entered into 
the FO's measurement, and apparently December 1968 was one exception when 
]3ritishness became a dominant reference point. However, even in the midst of the 
bitter rows in Parliament, the FO did not mention the importance of Britishness. Thus 
prompted, Britishness came as a dominant reference point and turned down the FO's 
rnotivated framing, indeed. But it only indicated that the FO backed down from its 
two-pronged motivated framing. It by no means proved that British identity became 
the FO's major reference point in the foreseeable future to come. Therefore, despite 
the causal mechanism of prospect theory being declared valid, i. e., the motivated 
131 Nova A. Femenia(1996) National identity in times of crises: The scripts of the FalklandslMalvinas, 
war (NY. Nova Science Publishers). 
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framing and the domain of loss both in terms of losses brought about risk-acccptant 
behaviour in December 1968, caution is needed. The empirical finding does not 
indicate that the FO had its reference point anchored in British identity. As Stewart 
later remarked, "The Cabinet took the plain British man in the street's view about the 
Falkland Islanders-more plainly and definitely than I did, because they, unlike me, 
had not been sort of 'soaked' in the Foreign Office atmosphere". 133 No word could be 
more straightforward than the "atmosphere" referred to by Stewart. The word 
indicated that the FO, unlike other departments in the Government, was well aware of 
the discontent on the Argentine side. It was therefore reluctant to replace the interests 
of the islanders by their wishes as the negotiating principle. The FO's reference points 
remained stubbornly the same, although the dominant motivated framing was about 
Britishness. Its unchanged reference points, i. e. better relations with Argentina, British 
prestige, and even potential markets reflected that the FCO in the following decade 
still thought that its motivated framing formulated in 1966-68 was of value. It also 
explained why there was at the FCO an unceasing effort in initiating proposals to 
solve the dispute. Meanwhile it implies that theoretically, discussants of prospect 
theory have to be cautious that motivated framing can be one thing, the reference 
point, another. It is highly likely that it is the content of argument, instead of the 
linguistic reference, that is the source of power for action. 134 Exponents of prospect 
theory have to dispel the myth that the theory is reference-dependent. There exists 
tension between the reference point assumed by a decision-making body and the 
motivated framing of an issue. 
The restatement of prospect theory 
The restatement of prospect theory developed above can be justified as follows. 
First, the traditional focus of loss avoidance in application of prospect theory 
does not advance the theory itself very far. Rather, an analysis based on the notion of 
loss avoidance or the status quo bias will run the risk of being trapped into rational 
choice models that are concerned more with relative loss trade-offs. This is, however, 
not what proponents of prospect theory, including Tversky and Kahneman, intend to 
argue. 
Secondly, the FO in mid-1967 formulated a dual motivated framing that broadly 
132 Zeev Maoz (199 1) "Framing the national interesf, World Politics, 43,1, p. 95. 
133 Charlton (1989) The little platoon, p. 27. 
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represented both the prospects of gains and losses. This formula has gone beyond 
what the classical prospect theory posits that an issue can be framed either in terms of 
gains or losses. It instead shows that the motivated framing of a choice can be 
formulated in both directions as this thesis observes. 
Thirdly, although many scholars have claimed that prospect theory is a reference- 
dependent model, 135 this case study demonstrates that one's reference point can be 
forced to be withdrawn, but remains different from the dominant reference point 
around which the current motivated framing develops. 
Fourthly, prospect theory, with the distinction between the domain of frame and 
motivated framing, proves capable of explaining the puzzles that the competing 
theories fail to offer in this thesis. It meets the rule to "solve more [i. e. two puzzles at 
least in this case] empirical problems than the reigning theories". 136 
In giving an explanation, prospect theory does not stay at the conceptual level, 
explaining things by vague metaphors or static imageS, 137 such as the 
imperialist/colonial interpretation, patriotism, or parliamentarianism. Rather, it builds 
a causal mechanism to cope with this complex issue based on the reasoning that facts 
are no substitute for a structure. In this regard, prospect theory clearly excels those 
arguments based on identity, culture and lobby politics that paid less attention to 
contextual factors. In other words, it is safer to argue that prospect theory is a 
systematic structure of thinking that reflects the causal relationship. It helps 
understand a case with less possibility of being prejudiced. 
Fifthly, prospect theory demonstrates a "multi-causal" capability to explain 
anomalies in the existing literature, 138 because the theory displays itself "a higher 
corroborated content" that consists of rational choice and cognitive response. 139 It can 
134 Luntley (1999) Contemporaryphilosophy ofthought, p. 230, p. 232. 
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be seen as a broader and contingent framework, straddling the cognitive process and 
deliberate strategy. 
On the one side, in observation of the domain of frame, an analyst assumes that 
decision-makers are "endowed with an ontological status", which is exactly "what 
f CUSoi. 
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constitutes a systemic 0 On the other side, the assumption of weaker 
rationality makes prospect theory compatible with motivational bias and allows 
preference reversals to take place. As this case demonstrates, the editing phase in 
prospect theory provides an angle more relevant than Gamba-Stonehouse's world- 
system perspective. The emphasis on the dramatic events that are interacting with 
decision weight also proves more task-specific than Becles historical approach. 
Weinberg argues that "The most important thing for the progress" of a discipline "is 
not the decision that a theory is true, but the decision that it is worth taking 
seriously". 141 Weinberg's remark is suggestive of two implications. First, so far as 
theory is concerned, prospect theory is a worthy tool of analysis, not because it 
explains the puzzles in this thesis, but because, when further information is available, 
it is an advisable method for analysing and inferring with a required degree of 
precision. 142 It encourages an analyst to move beyond the conceptual level. 143 
Next, so far as the discipline is concerned, this thesis concurs with Tversky and 
Kalmeman when they argued that decision-makers should be concerned more about 
"what will I feel then? " than "what do I want now? "144 Indeed, to most modem 
governments pressurised by the demand of rationality with a single and definitive 
parameter-efficiency- in their decision-making, 145 the remark made by Tversky 
and Kahneman exposes the problem of rationalism in decision-making. 146 This 
research drops the hint of an alternative model that reasonably takes ethical value into 
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account, despite not being compulsory. 147 It is with this broad concern in mind-a 
weaker form of rationality as well as pragmatism--4hat this thesis believes prospect 
theory is worth taking seriously in international politics. It is most relevant when the 
theory comes to description and analysis. 
3. An agenda for further research 
This thesis recommends further study to explore the effect of J. S. Bennett's 
reports of the cession of three British colonial territories on the FO before December 
1968. This may possibly be made with the release of archives (File no. FCO 7/141 to 
FC07/148) in 2008. Although Bennett's report stressed the degree of moral concerns 
in Britain's past diplomatic records, and some decision-makers did emphasise its 
significance several times, this thesis cannot be sure of the direct effect of moral 
assessment had on Stewart's directive to search for new reference points through the 
archival studies. 
Secondly, this thesis recommends the possibility of integrating the idea of policy 
mood into prospect theory. "Policy mood" is defined as "latent attitude structures 
underlying specific aggregate preferences, which propel these preferences in 
directions consistent with the outlook". 148 The above definition indicates that there is 
an overlapping interest between public mood and the idea of the domain of frame. 
Hopefully, the integration may help prospect theory enter into the quantitative 
analysis, as there has been significant progress in quantitative approaches adopted by 
the study of policy mood. 
Thirdly, Wilson was seen as the "artful dodger" in decision-making. 149 His 
personality will make the argument from prospect theory uncertain about whether the 
two British policy preferences were also Wilson's instinctual response to the framing 
due to his unique personality. This is of course not to advocate a "hero-in-history 
model of foreign policy". 150 When talking about personality as the invariant properties 
to function as a pro-active factor, this thesis understands that the issue is not whether 
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Wilson had a unique disposition, but whether personality has a determinative role. 151 
In this regard, exploration is worthwhile, because Wilson's personality was 
commented on in 1968 as "probably an important element in explaining the failure of 
the present Labour government". 152 This comment is relevant. It will bring about 
another question: are risk-averse and risk-acceptant responses personality-driven? 153 
Retrospectively, Thatcher had "an instinctive resistance to national decline" during the 
invasion in 1982.154 Personality was undoubtedly an important part in her decision- 
making. But this question is more difficult to answer when the sense of urgency in 
late 1968 was not as high as that in 1982. In other words, it is likely that Wilson's 
personality could be an intervening factor in the final decision either in late 1968 or 
1966. Hence, it is sensible to doubt that there might be two competing explanatory 
variables, the framing effect and personality could be co-relational in this case. The 
uncertainty needs more effort to clarify. 
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152 Rudolf Klein (1968b) "Without the prince", New Society, 11,298, p. 88 1. 
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Herbert McClosky (1960) "Perspectives on personality and foreign policy", World Politics, 13,1, p. 
132; Jane M. Klinger (1999) Hen in the realm oflosses: Prospect theory and decision making in war, 
paper presented at the International Studies Association, 16-20 February, p. 4. 
!4 Jeoffrey Srrýith (1986) "The British scene", Foreign, 4ffairs, 64,5, p. 924. 
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I am a military officer in the Taiwanese Army, serving in the Military History and 
Translation Bureau, and a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics of Bristol 
University. I am conducting research on the Falklands dispute under the supervision 
of Dr. Eric Herring. 
My pilot study has identified the period of 1966-68 a very important one for 
British policy on the Falkland Islands. In particular, as you will be aware, the British 
Government changed from emphasising the "wish" of the Falkland Islanders to 
emphasising their "interests". As far as I can tell, this period is somewhat under- 
researched and I would like to fill that gap. 
Obviously, as member of the Falkland Islands Association, you were well placed 
to observe and participate in the events of this period. I would be very grateful indeed 
if you would grant me an interview so that my research could benefit from your 
insights. 
I would like to interview you in person, if possible, rather than by telephone or 
by mail. I can be very flexible regarding date and location of our meeting. My 
questions will relate to relations between the governments of Britain and Argentina in 
the 1960s, the motivations behind British policy on the Falkland Islands, the impact of 
the Antarctic Treaty, the popularity of the Wilson Government, and British national 
sentiments on the talks over the sovereignty of the Falklands. I would like to tape- 
record the interview, but if you would rather I did not, that is perfectly 
understandable, and I would only take hand-written notes. I would like your 
comments to be attributable to you personally, but again, if you would rather remain 
anonymous, that is understandable. I would expect that the interview to take about 
half an hour. 
In addition, may I venture to ask whether I can have access to any documents 
relevant to this period by you? Finally, can you name any other persons who it might 
be useful to interview? 
I would be happy to answer any enquiries you might have. Please write or call. 
The telephone number is (0 117) 971-4347. Thanks for the assistance. I look forward 
to hearing from you. 
Cordially 




1. Do you think that British policy regarding the Falklands An opening 
should be founded on the "wishes" or the "interests" of the 
question 
islanders? 
2. Why did the British Government change in the period 1966-68 from information 
emphasising the "wishes" of the Falkland Islanders to emphasising 
seeking 
their "interests"? 
3. Why did the British Government hold discussions with Argentina in aing 
1966 regarding the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands? 
4. (1) How would you characterise relations between Governments of Framing 
Britain and Argentina between 1960 and 1966 before the talks 
began? 
Please choose one of the following, or offer an alternative if you wish: 
(a) very hostile / mildly hostile / normal / mildly friendly 
very friendly / other (please specify) / don't know 
(b) deteriorating / stable / improving / other (please specify) / don't 
know 
(2) Could you please explain your choice of characterisation? 
5. What impact, if any, did the Antarctic Treaty of the early 1960s the reference point 
have on the talks between Britain and Argentina over the Falklands? 
Did it: help? / made no difference? / hinder? / don't know 
others (please specify) 
6. Please explain. 
7. How popular with the British public was the Wilson Government in Domain of 
the late 1960s? framing 
very unpopular / mildly unpopular / neutral / mildly popular 
very popular / don't know 
8. Please explain. 
9. Did this unpopularity have any effect on the British Government's framing 
conduct of the talks with Argentina? 
major effect / minor effect / no effect / don't know 
10. Please explain. 
- 
11. Did the popularity have any efTect on the British Government's domain of framing 
decision to discuss the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands with 
Argentina? 
minor effect / no effect / don't know 
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12. Please explain. 
13. Why did the Wilson Government decide to abandon the talks in Framing 
December 1968? anchoring 
14. How important was British national sentiment regarding the anchoring 
Falklands in the Wilson Government's decision to abandon the framing 
latter on sovereignty? 
very- important / mildly important / important / don't know 
15. Please explain. 
16 Are there any additional points you would like to add, or are there Post-interview 
any other questions you think I ought to have asked? question 
17. Were there any questions in the interview that you were not sure Post-interview 
_how 
to answer? Please explain. question 
18. Can you name any other persons you think it would useful for me Snow-ball 
to interview? I samýling 
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Appendix C-INTERVIEWING 
Cameron, Sukey-- Representative of the Falkland Islands Government 
Haskard, Cosmo--Falkland Islands Governor in 1968. 
Hunt, Rex-Falkland Islands Governor in 1982 
Osgood, Robert-writer of the Franks Report in 1983, lobbyist 
Paul, Brian-- Representative of the Falkland Islands Agency 
Pepper, Peter-Editor of the Falkland Islands Association 
Pitaluga, Robin- Falkland Islander 
Pitaluga, Saul-Vice Chairman of the Falkland Islands Association 
Ranken, Michael--Chairman of the Parliamentary Maritime Group 
Taylor, David-Chief Executive of the Falkland Islands Government 
293 
UNIVERSITY 
OF BRISTOL 
LIBRARY 
I 
f] 
